TRAVEL TRIPPER LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 7, 2021

2021002094 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/718,369 05/21/2015 Gautam LULLA 120035.00001 8402
27305 7590 10/07/2021
HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC
450 WEST FOURTH STREET
ROYAL OAK, MI 48067
EXAMINER
HARRINGTON, MICHAEL P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/07/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDocket@HowardandHoward.com
dtrost@HowardandHoward.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GAUTAM LULLA and JOSEPH PARRILLA

Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369
Technology Center 3600

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
SHEILA F. McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judges.
LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–17.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Gautam Lulla and Joseph Parrilla, the
inventors, as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter relates “to procuring travel
accommodations, namely seamlessly searching direct sellers and third party
sites for travel accommodation rates and comparisons” (Spec. 2:15–17).
Claim 1, reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A computer implemented method for executing travel
accommodation transactions comprising the steps of:
a client sending a first query over a network to a booking
engine, wherein the first query contains at least a pricing
information request;
the booking engine performing a search of a database
associated with the booking engine, wherein the search is done
within constraints of the first query;
the booking engine performing a search of at least one
third party database, wherein the search is done within
constraints of the first query;
the booking engine comparing at least pricing results of
the booking engine search and pricing results of the third party
search;
determining if the pricing results are equal or more or less
expensive through the booking engine or the third party database;
wherein if the pricing results through the booking engine
are more expensive than that of the third party database and
within a tolerance constraint, then the price through the booking
engine is changed in response to the lower third party price,
wherein if the pricing results through the booking are
more expensive than that of the third party database and at least
one price result of the third party database is outside of the
tolerance constraint, then an alert is generated and sent to an
owner of the at least one price result, and
wherein if the pricing results through the booking engine
are less expensive than the third party database, then the pricing
through the booking engine is not changed in response to the
higher third party price.
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

3
REJECTION
Claims 1–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
OPINION
Appellant argues claims 1–17 as a group. See Appeal Br. 17–31. We
select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining
claims 2–17 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Introduction
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”
In that regard, claim 1 covers a “process” and is thus statutory subject
matter for which a patent may be obtained.2 This is not in dispute.
However, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 provision “contains an important
implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).

2 This corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance (“2019 Revised 101 Guidance”), which requires
determining whether “the claim is to a statutory category.” 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
53 (Jan. 7, 2019). See also id. at 53–54 (“[C]onsider[] whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject
matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101.”).
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

4
In that regard, notwithstanding claim 1 covers statutory subject
matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Alice step one — the “directed to” inquiry:
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 218 (emphasis added).
The Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed to, inter alia,
“sending a pricing information query to a booking entity, conducting a
searches of different databases, comparing the pricing results to determine
differences, and either changing the price, not changing the price, and
alerting another user” (Final Act. 6), which falls into the 2019 Revised 101
Guidance’s mental processes and organizing human activity groupings of
abstract ideas. Id. at 6–7.
Appellant appears to be arguing, in part, that the claimed subject
matter is not directed to an abstract idea because it is directed to a
technological improvement; that is, “providing a system that can not only
find the best rates for a particular travel accommodation, but will
automatically price match a found rate when appropriate . . . dynamically
and in real-time” (Appeal Br. 27).
Accordingly, a dispute over whether claim 1 is directed to an abstract
idea is present. Specifically, is claim 1 directed to “sending a pricing
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

5
information . . . to a booking entity” (Final Act. 6) or a technological
improvement (Appeal Br. 26–30)?

Claim Analysis3
We consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest reasonable
construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in
light of the Specification at the time of filing.4,5,6
Claim 1 is a method reciting 5 steps using a “client,” a “network,” a
“booking engine,” a “database [of] the booking engine,” and a “third party
database,” all claimed generically.
The first step is to send a first query about price information to the
booking engine.

3 “[T]he important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.”
Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “In Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court observed that
‘claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity
determination under § 101.’ However, the threshold of § 101 must be
crossed; an event often dependent on the scope and meaning of the claims.”
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1347–48
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
4 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
5 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the
claims. . . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations,
it is important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016), among others).
6 See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim,
under its broadest reasonable interpretation . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

6
The next two steps are to perform searches “within constraints of the
first query” of a “database [of] the booking engine” (BED) and a “third party
database” (TPD).
Then the two pricing results are compared (BEDp v. TPDp).
Finally,
• if BEDp > TPDp “within a tolerance constraint,” then the BEDp is
changed;
• if BEDp > TPDp and TPDp is “outside of the tolerance constraint,”
“then an alert is generated and sent to an owner of the at least one
price result; and”,
• if BEDp < TPDp, then the BEDp is not changed.
As for the “client,” “network,” “booking engine,” “database [of] the
booking engine,” and “third party database,” the Specification describes
them generically. See, e.g., Spec. 29:7–8 (“the database may be a
conventional, fault tolerant, relational, scalable, secure database”).
Putting it together, the claimed subject matter is for a method for
providing a price.
According to the Specification, “favorable pricing listings of the
OTAs [online travel agencies], which has subsequently resulted in a
decrease in revenue for the travel accommodation provider.” Spec. 2:25–27.
This has reduced the customer base for travel accommodation providers.
“Travel accommodation providers . . . need to be afforded an opportunity to
effectively and automatically match prices within a particular range in order
to offer the same, if not better, rates on accommodations.” Id. at 3:14–16.
“The present invention and its embodiments provide a simple and effective
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

7
way of offering discounts and automatically price matching to a consumer
directly from a travel accommodation provider.” Id. at 5:6–8.
Given the method as claimed and in light of the Specification’s
description of the objective of the invention in the “price matching” realm,
we reasonably broadly construe claim 1 as being directed to a price
matching scheme.
The Abstract Idea7
Above, where we reproduce claim 1, we identify in italics the
limitations that recite an abstract idea.8 Based on our claim construction
analysis (above), we determine that the identified limitations describe a price
matching scheme. Price matching is a commercial interaction. It falls within
the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping
of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance.9 2019 Revised
101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

7 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A
determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an
abstract idea. Step 2A is a two-prong inquiry.
8 This corresponds to Prong One (a) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101
Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong
One, examiners are now to: (a) Identify the specific limitation(s) in the
claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the examiner
believes recites an abstract idea.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
9 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a
Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners
are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within
the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the
[2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This case implicates
subject matter grouping “(b)”: “(b) Certain methods of organizing human
activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

8
Technical Improvement10 (Appellant’s Argument)
Our characterization of what the claim is directed to is similar to that
provided by the Examiner’s, albeit the Examiner’s characterization is
described at a somewhat lower level of abstraction. Nevertheless, “[a]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“The Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the
patentability analysis.”).
We have reviewed the record and are unpersuaded as to error in our or
the Examiner’s characterization of what claim 1 is directed to.
According to Appellant,
the process steps of independent claim 1 are executed
dynamically and in real-time and cannot be practiced by a
human without a computer, as humans cannot continuously and
in real-time perform the process steps of: (1) searching a
database associated with a booking engine; (2) searching a third

agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” Id. at 52.
10 This corresponds to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial
Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a
Practical Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an
additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the
exception into a practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects
an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55.
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

9
party database; (3) comparing the pricing results of the booking
engine and the pricing results of the third party search; (4)
determining if differing pricing results exist between the booking
engine result and the third party database; and (5) performing one
or more process steps based on the result of the comparison.
Appeal Br. 22. Because the process steps are “being performed dynamically
and in real-time [the claimed method] is not an abstract idea.” Id. at24.
The words “dynamically” and “in real-time” do not appear in the
claim. Thus, the argument is not commensurate in scope with what is
claimed.
To the extent Appellant is arguing that the use of the recited generic
computing devices permits the process to be conducted “dynamically” and
“in real-time,” the addition of a common computer to process information
“dynamically” and “in real-time,” as computers normally do, does not affect
claimed subject matter otherwise directed to an abstract idea. Cf. OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015):
Beyond the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization, the
claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional
activit[ies],” either by requiring conventional computer activities
or routine data-gathering steps. Alice, [573 U.S. at 225] (quoting
Mayo [Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 73 (2012)) . . . . For example, claim 1 recites “sending a first
set of electronic messages over a network to devices,” the
devices being “programmed to communicate,” storing test
results in a “machine-readable medium,” and “using a
computerized system . . . to automatically determine” an
estimated outcome and setting a price. Just as in Alice, “all of
these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”
Alice, [573 U.S. at 225] (quoting Mayo, [566 U.S. at 73])
(alterations in original); see also buySAFE[, Inc. v. Google, Inc.],
765 F.3d [1350,] 1355 [(Fed. Cir. 2014)] (“That a computer
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

10
receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Appellant also argues that the claimed method “improve[s] the
technological field;” that is, “the instant invention provides travel
accommodation providers, such as hotels, an opportunity to recapture
business and revenue siphoned off by online travel agencies (OTAs).”
Appeal Br. 26. “The instant invention . . . provid[es] a system that can not
only find the best rates for a particular travel accommodation, but will
automatically price match a found rate when appropriate.” Id. at 27.
We are unpersuaded that the claimed subject matter provides a
technological improvement.
The method as claimed describes, in very general terms, processing
(via “sending,” “performing a search,” “performing a search[es],” and
“determining” steps) price-related information. The method as claimed is not
focused on improving technology. The method may provide better rates as
Appellant argues, but that is insufficient to show the claimed method yields
a technical improvement. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d
1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims are focused on providing
information to traders in a way that helps them process information more
quickly, ’556 patent at 2:26–39, not on improving computers or
technology.”).
We have carefully reviewed the claim. Per our previous claim
construction analysis, claim 1 is reasonably broadly construed as covering a
price matching scheme. We see no specific asserted improvement in
technology recited in the claim or attributable to practicing the method as
claimed. Rather than being directed to any specific asserted improvement in
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

11
technology, the claim supports the opposite view — that the claimed subject
matter is for obtaining better rates. See, e.g., Spec. 3:16.
The claim provides no additional structural details that would
distinguish any device required to be employed to practice the claimed
subject matter as claimed, such as the recited “client,” “network,” “booking
engine,” and “third party database,” from its generic counterpart.11
With respect to the “sending,” “performing a search, “performing a
search[es],” and “determining” steps, the Specification attributes no special
meaning to any of these operations, individually or in the combination, as
claimed. In our view, these are common computer processing functions that
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have known
generic computers were capable of performing and would have associated
with generic computers.
We find Appellant’s contention that the claim presents a technological
improvement in the field unpersuasive as to error in the Examiner’s or our
characterization of what the claim is directed to because the system as
claimed fails to adequately support it. We are unable to point to any claim
language suggestive of an improvement in technology. Argument, without
evidence, that such an improvement exists is insufficient. See generally In re
Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965); In re Glass, 474 F.2d 1015, 1019
(CCPA 1973); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974); and In re
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

11 Cf. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid
of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us
to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the
abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

12
Accordingly, within the meaning of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance,
we find there is no integration of the abstract idea into a practical
application.
Appellant also directs our attention to the claimed “tolerance
constraints.” Appeal Br. 28–30. But Appellant does not explain further how
these limitations draw the claimed subject matter away from the abstract
idea as the Examiner (and we) have characterized it. The difficulty is that it
points to conditions in the determining step that we, and the Examiner, have
characterized as being part of the abstract idea. Rather than showing that
said “tolerance constraints” describe a technical improvement, the Appellant
points to benefits (e.g., adds flexibility to the price determination (id. at 30))
that are unconnected to any particular means (other than a generic
computing device) for achieving any purported technological improvement.
By so broadly defining constraints, that is, by setting out what they are
aspiring to accomplish without any technical details, let alone any purported
technological improvement, these constraints, and the claim as a whole, are
in effect presenting the invention in purely result-based functional language,
strengthening our determination under Alice step one that the claim is
directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Claim 1 recites a
method for routing information using result-based functional language. The
claim requires the functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’
‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating records,’ but does not sufficiently describe
how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.”). See also Uniloc USA,
Inc. v. LG Elecs. USA Inc., 957 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

13
The claims we held ineligible in Two-Way Media similarly failed
to concretely capture any improvement in computer
functionality. In Two-Way Media, the claims recited a method of
transmitting packets of information over a communications
network comprising: converting information into streams of
digital packets; routing the streams to users; controlling the
routing; and monitoring the reception of packets by the users.
874 F.3d at 1334. Two-Way Media argued that the claims solved
data transmission problems, including load management and
bottlenecking, but the claimed method was not directed to those
improvements. Id. at 1336–37. We therefore held the claims
ineligible because they merely recited a series of abstract steps
(“converting,” “routing,” “controlling,” “monitoring,” and
“accumulating records”) using “result-based functional
language” without the means for achieving any purported
technological improvement. Id. at 1337.
We have considered Appellant’s other arguments challenging the
Examiner’s determination under step one of the Alice framework and find
them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice step two — Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?12
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).

12 This corresponds to Step 2B, of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56, “if a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial
exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the
additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to
determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).”
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

14
In that regard, the Examiner determined, inter alia, that
The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the
abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element
of using a network to send and receive information, and a
booking engine to conduct search amounts to no more than mere
instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer
component. Mere instructions to apply an exception using a
generic computer component cannot provide an inventive
concept. Additionally, receiving and transmitting information
over a network (e.g. sending queries and sending alerts) are a
routine, well-known, and conventional (MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)).
Additionally, storing and retrieving information in memory (e.g.
searching a database with a pricing engine) has been found to be
routine, well-known, and conventional. (MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)).
Final Act. 7–8. We agree.
We addressed the matter of whether the claim presented any purported
specific asserted technical improvements in our analysis above under
step one of the Alice framework. This is consistent with the case law. See
Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“We have several times held claims to pass muster under Alice step one
when sufficiently focused on such improvements.”). Such an argument, as
Appellant has presented here, can also challenge a determination under step
two of the Alice framework. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354–55. “[R]ecent
Federal Circuit jurisprudence has indicated that eligible subject matter can
often be identified either at the first or the second step of the Alice/Mayo
[framework].” See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53 n.17.
We are unpersuaded that claim 1 presents an element or combination
of elements indicative of a specific asserted technical improvement, thereby
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

15
rendering the claimed subject matter sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon a price matching
scheme.
We have reviewed the claim in light of the Specification and, as
explained above, we find the claimed subject matter insufficiently expresses
a technological improvement as a result of performing the steps as broadly
as they are recited.
We cited the Specification in our earlier discussion. This intrinsic
evidence supports that the claimed “client,” “network,” “booking engine,”
and “third party database” as claimed are conventional. By considering this
evidence, we have followed “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining
to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)],” USPTO
Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner For Patent
Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)).
Here, the Specification indisputably shows the recited “client,”
“network,” “booking engine,” and “third party database” individually and in
the context of the price matching scheme as claimed were conventional at
the time of filing. Accordingly, there is sufficient factual support for the
well-understood, routine, or conventional nature of the claimed “client,”
“network,” “booking engine,” and “third party database” individually or in
the combination as claimed.
No other persuasive arguments having been presented, we conclude
that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two
that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

16
circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to
transform the concept into a patent-eligible application.
We have considered all of the Appellant’s arguments and find them
unpersuasive.
Accordingly, because we are not persuaded as to error in the
determinations that representative claim 1, and claims 2–17 which stand or
fall with claim 1, are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an
“inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that they are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially-excepted
from 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x
991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have considered all of LendingTree’s
remaining arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly,
because the asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to an abstract
idea and do not present an ‘inventive concept,’ we hold that they are directed
to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”); see, e.g., OIP Techs.,
788 F.3d at 1364; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–17 is affirmed.
More specifically:
The rejection of claims 1–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to judicially-excepted subject matter is affirmed.
Appeal 2021-002094
Application 14/718,369

17
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–17 101 Eligibility 1–17

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED