TRANS UNION LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 27, 2020

13841022 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/841,022 03/15/2013 Craig F. LaChapelle 24079-1016 (21US2) 7501
25541 7590 03/27/2020
NEAL, GERBER, & EISENBERG
SUITE 1700
2 NORTH LASALLE STREET
CHICAGO, IL 60602
EXAMINER
MPAMUGO, CHINYERE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipusmail@ngelaw.com
twilliams@ngelaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CRAIG F. LACHAPELLE, CLIFTON H. BURNS, STEVEN M.
CHAOUKI, TAMMY P. MITCHELL, and PATRICK WHITE
Appeal 2019-004942
Application 13/841,022
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22, which are all the claims pending
in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Trans Union LLC.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention “relates to . . . systems and methods for
matching online data with offline data using credit-related data in order to
support targeted internet marketing.” Spec. ¶ 1. Independent claim 1,
reproduced below with added emphasis, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for matching of offline data and online data, using
a processor, the method comprising:
receiving the offline data at the processor, the offline
data comprising at least one offline data record;
receiving the online data at the processor, the online data
comprising at least one online data record;
retrieving credit-related data from a database using the
processor, the credit-related data obtained from a credit file and
comprising identifying information for a plurality of targeted
individuals;
comparing the at least one offline data record to the
credit-related data, using the processor, to determine whether
the at least one offline data record corresponds to a matching
targeted individual of the plurality of targeted individuals;
comparing the at least one online data record to the
credit-related data, using the processor, to determine whether
the at least one online data record corresponds to the matching
targeted individual;
when the at least one offline data record corresponds to
the matching targeted individual and the at least one online data
record corresponds to the matching targeted individual:
generating a key linking the at least one offline
data record and the at least one online data record, using
the processor; and
storing the key in a key database, using the
processor.
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REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–22 under U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Balducci et al. (US 9,152,727 B1, issued Oct. 5, 2015)
(“Balducci”) and Umbreit et al. (US 2003/0131102 A1, published July 10,
2013) (“Umbreit”).
OPINION
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
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See Guidance.
Appellant argues claims 1–22 together as a group. See generally
Appeal Br. 13–16. As Appellant did, we select claim 1 as representative.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, claims 2–22 stand or fall with
claim 1.
The Examiner determines independent “claims 1 and 12 are directed
to an abstract idea of providing targeted advertising.” Final Act. 5; see also
Answer 4 (“claim limitations fall within the Certain Methods of Organizing
Human Activities groupings of abstract ideas”).
Appellant disagrees, and argues that the focus of claim 1 is on an
improvement to computer functionality and not on an economic task for
which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. Appeal Br. 13.
We have reviewed the eligibility of claim 1 through the lens of the
2019 Revised Guidance, but we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
concluding that the claim is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Step 2A, Prong One
Appellant’s invention is titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR
TARGETED INTERNET MARKETING BASED ON OFFLINE, ONLINE,
AND CREDIT-RELATED DATA,” and the Specification describes
“matching online data with offline data using credit-related data in order to
support targeted internet marketing.” Spec. ¶ 2. According to the
Specification, “there exists an opportunity for improved systems and
methods that can match and link offline data and online data more
completely and accurately, in order to, among other things, provide better
leads and more effective management of advertising and marketing
spending.” Id. ¶ 6.
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To that end, claim 1 recites, inter alia, (1) receiving offline data; (2)
receiving online data; (3) retrieving credit-related data, the credit-related
data obtained from a credit file and comprising identifying information for
a plurality of targeted individuals; (4) comparing the at least one offline
data record to the credit-related data to determine whether the at least one
offline data record corresponds to a matching targeted individual of the
plurality of targeted individuals; (5) comparing the at least one online data
record to the credit-related data to determine whether the at least one online
data record corresponds to the matching targeted individual; and (6) when
the at least one offline data record corresponds to the matching targeted
individual and the at least one online data record corresponds to the
matching targeted individual, generating and storing a key linking the at
least one offline data record and the at least one online data record. Appeal
Br. 13. These steps are recited as being performed “using a processor.” Id.
The initial steps of collecting information by receiving offline and
online data recite data gathering actions, which under the broadest
reasonable interpretation represent extra-solution activity. See MPEP
§ 2106.05 (g).
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the steps of “retrieving
credit related data, obtained from a credit file and comprising identifying
information for a plurality of targeted individuals,” “comparing the at least
one offline data record to the credit-related data,” and “comparing the at
least one online data record to the credit-related data,” “to determine
whether the at least one online [and offline] data record corresponds to the
matching targeted individual” describe processes that can be performed in
the human mind, including observation (i.e., obtaining identifying
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information for two targeted individuals), evaluation (i.e., comparing data),
and judgment (i.e., determining a match). For example, the comparison
steps can be performed mentally by a person evaluating each data record and
mentally determining or judging whether there is a match with the “credit-
related data” that identifies the “targeted individual.” See Spec. ¶ 73
(“offline data and the online data may be compared to the credit-related data
in order to determine whether a particular offline data record and/or
particular online data records corresponds to a particular matching targeted
individual.”).
Further, the conditional limitation “when the at least one offline data
record corresponds to the matching targeted individual and the at least one
online data record corresponds to the matching targeted individual” recited
in claim 1 calls for generating and storing a key linking the at least one
offline data record and the at least one online data record. The Specification
discloses the “key may be alphabetic, numeric, alphanumeric, and/or in
another format.” Spec. ¶ 75. The Specification describes several different
embodiments, such as that “the key includes one or more identifiers or
references to the offline data record and/or the online data records,”
“includes the offline data record and the online data record,” “includes the
offline data record . . . and a link or reference to the online data record,” or
“includes the online data record . . . and a link or reference to the offline
data record.” Id. The step of generating and storing a key can be performed
by a human using pen and paper, such as by writing down identifiers
corresponding to the data records, which is an association that can be
performed in the human mind and recorded on paper with a pen. Thus,
under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the identified steps discussed
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above recite abstract mental processes (e.g., observation, evaluation,
judgment) that can be performed in the human mind. See Revised Guidance
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (“Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.”)).
In addition, the claim recites a certain method of organizing human
activity, as determined by the Examiner, because the claim recites steps
performed by a marketer that “provide better leads and more effective
management of advertising and marketing spending” (Spec. ¶ 6), which is
akin to “advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors” as outlined
in the Guidance. Id.; see also MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B). For instance,
the Specification discloses that “user 756 may utilize the [generated] keys to
target advertisements, push notifications, and the like to the particular
matching targeted individuals.” Spec. ¶ 75.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the steps of claim 1
could not “be practically performed in the human mind,” because of “the
amount of data.” Appeal Br. 22. The claim language requires only one item
of online and one item of offline data, and is silent on the volume of “credit-
related data” retrieved. As such, the claim merely requires evaluation of
three items of data, which is not an amount that would render the mental
comparison of the data impractical.
We also are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the
Examiner’s Answer has incorrectly recited the language of the identified
limitations of claim 1 by omitting that the retrieving and comparing steps
involve a processor and/or a database.” Reply Br. 3, 6. The Examiner’s
omission of the additional elements is to highlight the language in the claim
that encompasses the judicial exception. Under the Guidance, “if a claim
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recites a judicial exception (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea as grouped in Section I, above), it must then be analyzed to
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception.” Guidance at 53. Here, the Examiner
determined that the “processor” and “database” recited in claim 1 (the
omitted elements) are the additional elements beyond the recited abstract
idea, which is addressed in Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance. Id. at 54,
56.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim
recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two).
The “additional elements” of claim 1 (italicized supra) that do not
recite abstract ideas are the data receiving steps, and the recitation of using
a/the processor and database. As discussed above, the data receiving steps
(receiving offline and online data) represent mere data gathering activities,
in the form of insignificant extra-solution activity. See Guidance at 55,
fn. 31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g).
What remains, therefore, is “using a processor” and “database” to
perform the abstract steps discussed above. The Specification indicates that
“processor 602 can be any custom made or commercially available
processor, such as, for example, a Core series or vPro processor made by
Intel Corporation, or a Phenom, Athlon or Sempron processor made by
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.” Spec. ¶ 59. We find no indication in the
Specification, and Appellant does not direct us to any indication, that the
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operations recited in claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming,
require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer
components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is
implemented using anything other than generic computer components to
perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there
can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not
make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
The Specification does not describe, and we do not discern from the
claims, any improvement in processor technology, especially because any
computer can be used to perform the recited method. Claim 1 does not
improve the functioning of a computer or any other technology. Guidance
at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because any computer can be used (see
Spec. ¶¶ 59–67), a “particular machine” is not required. Guidance at 54; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(b). The claim does not transform matter. Guidance
at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(c). The claim fails to recite that it “applies
or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment,” because the claim merely implements the
abstract mental steps on a general-purpose computer. Guidance at 54; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(e)–(f).
Appellant argues that “the ‘plain focus’ of the claims in the present
application is on a ‘specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities’
and ‘an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or
other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.’” Appeal
Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 2 (“representative claim 1 does not include any
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limitations that recite an abstract idea”). According to Appellant, “a claim
reciting a software-related invention focused on improving computer
technology may not be directed to an abstract idea. Here, the claims
similarly are directed to a software-related invention with non-abstract
improvements to computer technology.” Appeal Br. 15–16.
We are not persuaded because Appellant has not adequately explained
what aspect of the invention as recited in the claim reflects an improvement
in computer capabilities. Rather than being directed to improvements in
computer technology, the invention is directed to activities performed by a
generic processor in its ordinary capacity to facilitate targeted advertising
and marketing by collecting and comparing data. Spec. ¶ 2 (“systems and
methods for matching online data with offline data using credit-related data
in order to support targeted internet marketing”); see also id. ¶ 33
(“techniques for leveraging data to assemble targeted advertisements”).
Furthermore, implementing the mental processes described above using a
generic computer do not reflect non-abstract improvements to computer
technology, but instead, reflect a process of improving a marketing and
advertising technique, for which a computer is used as a tool in its ordinary
capacity.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “the claimed
invention functions differently than conventional matching systems and
targeted Internet marketing systems.” Appeal Br. 14. Even unconventional
abstract ideas are still unpatentable. See SAP America, Inc. v. Investpic,
LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “What is needed is an inventive
concept in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Citing BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Appellant argues “the claims ‘improve an
existing technology process.” Appeal Br. 16–17; see also Reply Br. 7. We
disagree that the claims are patent-eligible in view of BASCOM. There, the
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he inventive concept described and claimed in
the ‘606 patent is the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location,
remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to
each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1350. The court explained that the remote
location of a filtering tool having customizable user-specific filtering
features provides the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local
computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server, which is a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at 1350–51. Here,
Appellant has not demonstrated any particular arrangement in the claim as
providing an inventive concept parallel to BASCOM in claiming a
technology-based solution. Claim 1, which is focused on comparison of data
rather than computer capabilities, links items of data that may better identify
targeted customers for advertising. Spec. ¶¶ 4–5.
We are also not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument that the
“claims do not preempt all ways of performing the alleged abstract idea.”
Appeal Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 5–6. Preemption is not a separate test for
eligibility or separate step under the Alice framework. “While preemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Where a patent’s
claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter” under
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the Alice framework, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.” Id.
Citing DDR Holdings, Appellant argues that “claim 1 provides a
technical solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order
to overcome a technical problem specifically arising in the realm of
matching systems and targeted Internet marketing systems.” Appeal
Br. 18–19. Appellant’s reliance on DDR Holdings is unavailing because the
claims at issue do not address a problem unique to the Internet. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The patent at issue in DDR provided an Internet-
based solution to solve a problem unique to the Internet that (1) did not
foreclose other ways of solving the problem, and (2) recited a specific series
of steps that resulted in a departure from the routine and conventional
sequence of events after the click of a hyperlink advertisement. The patent
claims here do not address problems unique to the Internet, so DDR has no
applicability.”).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant advances the new argument that the
claimed invention “transforms the data.” Reply Br. 7. A process that starts
with data, applies an algorithm, and ends with a new form of data is directed
to an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc.,
758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This alleged “transformation” is, at
best, merely a manipulation of data, which is not sufficient to meet the
transformation prong under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S.
at 71–72 (holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms
data from one form to another is not patent-eligible).
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Therefore, we determine the subject matter of independent claim 1
does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B
We next determine if “the additional elements individually and in
combination . . . provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).” Guidance
at 56. We determine “whether an additional element or combination of
elements . . . [a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that
are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.” Id.
The “receiving” steps of claim 1 are described as receiving data from
data sources. Spec. ¶ 69 (“matching engine 702 may be in communication
with the offline data source 750, the online data source 752, and/or the
user 756 through a data network”); see also id. ¶ 72 (“matching engine 702
may access the credit data database 704 and retrieve credit-related data”).
This describes a standard means for a computer to receive, retrieve, and
compare data using a processor; operations of receiving, retrieving,
comparing, determining, and storing data are basic computer operations
found in any computing system. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’
discussed below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming.”).
Appellant argues that the retrieving of credit-related data, the
comparing steps, and the “when” limitation are not well-understood, routine,
or conventional. Appeal Br. 25–26 (incorporating arguments from
id. 19–20). These steps, apart from the data gathering steps, are part of the
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abstract idea, and thus not relevant under Step 2B. “It has been clear since
Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is
directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under § 101, and of
claims 2–22, which fall with claim 1.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
As to claim 1’s language “storing the key in a key database, using the
processor,” the Examiner finds this limitation disclosed in Balducci at Figure
5, and column 8, lines 7–11, which the Examiner characterizes as
“disclosing cookies associated with shared audience ID stored in audience
database.” Final Act. 9.
Appellant argues “Balducci clearly does not teach or suggest that the
cookie is stored in an audience database. Instead, the cookie of Balducci is
stored in consumer browsers, and provides access to shared consumer data
in the audience database 502.” Appeal Br. 32–33 (citing Balducci, 5:35–38,
8:22–24).
The Examiner responds that column 8, lines 7–11 of Balducci “shows
the cookie and the corresponding data being stored in an audience database.”
Answer 9.
In response, Appellant argues “the plain language of this portion of
Balducci describes that data in an audience database 502 may be accessible
via a shared audience ID 504, and that the shared audience ID 504 may be
embedded in a browser cookie. The cookie itself is not stored in the
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audience database 502.” Reply Br. 13. We agree with Appellant because
Balducci discloses the cookie is stored in the cookie database on a user’s
browser, wherein the cookie contains ID information which can be used to
access the appropriate records in the audience database. See Balducci 8:7–
11 (“data is accessible via a shared audience ID 504. The ID may be
embedded in a browser cookie”). Because the Examiner’s finding in
Balducci as to this disputed limitation is unsupported, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–11 that depend from claim 1.
Appellant asserts the arguments directed to claim 1 “are also
applicable to independent claim 12.” Appeal Br. 33. We agree. The
Examiner similarly finds “storing the key in a key database” is disclosed in
Balducci at Figure 5 and column 8, lines 7–11. Final Act. 19 (“disclosing
cookies associated with shared audience ID stored in audience database”).
For the same reasons as above, we do not sustain the obviousness rejection
of claim 12, and claims 13–22 that depend from claim 12.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
REVERSED.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22 101 Ineligibility 1–22
1–22 103(a) Balducci, Umbreit 1–22
Overall
Outcome
1–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED