Trans-Lux Midwest Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 230 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 230
Trans-Lux Midwest Corporation and International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 347. Case 18–CA–14523
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
Upon a charge filed on June 18, 1997, by the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 347 (the Union),1 the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on April
8, 1998, alleging that the Respondent, Trans-Lux Mid-
west Corporation, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by unlawfully failing to recognize the Union, on re-
quest, as the exclusive representative of its production
and maintenance employees. The Respondent filed a
timely answer admitting in part and denying in part the
allegations of the complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the above-named parties and the
General Counsel filed a motion to transfer proceeding to
the Board. They agreed that the stipulation of fact with
appended exhibits constituted the entire record in the
case, and that no oral testimony was necessary or desired
by any of the parties. The parties waived a hearing be-
fore an administrative law judge and the issuance of a
decision by an administrative law judge. The parties
stated their desire to submit this case directly to the
Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
issuance of a Decision and Order. On July 17, 1998, the
Board issued an order approving stipulation, granting
motion, and transferring proceeding to the Board.
The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union
each filed a brief. The Respondent filed a reply to the
Union’s brief. The Union filed a motion to strike the
Respondent’s reply brief or, in the alternative, for the
Board to accept the Union’s response brief, which it also
filed.2
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
On the entire record and briefs, the Board makes the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Trans-Lux Corporation, a Delaware corporation. The
Respondent has an office and places of business in Des
Moines, Iowa (the Respondent’s Trans-Lux Midwest
facility), where it is engaged in the manufacture and non-
retail sale and distribution of indoor and outdoor elec-
tronic display signs at various locations throughout the
United States. During the calendar year ending Decem-
ber 31, 1997, a representative period, the Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its operations, purchased and
received at its Trans-Lux Midwest facility goods valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from sources outside the
State of Iowa, and sold and shipped from this facility
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points lo-
cated outside the State of Iowa.

1 The Union filed an amended charge on September 25, 1997.
2 We deny the Union’s motion to strike the Respondent’s reply brief.
We grant the Union’s alternative motion to accept the Union’s response
brief.
We find that the Respondent is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
About May 1, 1997, the Respondent purchased certain
business assets of the Fairtron Corporation and since then
has continued to operate the business of Fairtron (manu-
facturing electronic scoreboards) in essentially the same
form, except that the Respondent reduced the production
of custom-made equipment at the facility at issue. At all
relevant times before May 1, 1997, the Union was the
exclusive representative of the bargaining unit employ-
ees.3
At the time of the asset sale, there were about 40 em-
ployees in the Fairtron bargaining unit. The Respondent
hired 30 of these 40 unit employees. Since the asset sale,
the Respondent has employed, as a majority of its unit
employees, individuals who were previously unit em-
ployees of Fairtron.
Of the 40 Fairtron unit employees at the time of the
sale, 15 were union members (13 paid dues by checkoff
and 2 paid the Union directly). The Respondent knew of
the 13 “checkoff” members.
Six of the thirty Fairtron unit employees hired by the
Respondent were union members. The Respondent later
hired a seventh union member. The other eight union
members were not hired.
3 The unit consisted of:
All regular full-time and regular part-time production and main-
tenance employees, including crating and shipping department em-
ployees and leadpersons employed at its facilities at 1700 Delaware
Avenue and 2301 Dean Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa; but excluding
service department employees, small parts shipping and mailing de-
partment employees, rehired retired employees, office clerical em-
ployees, temporary employees, temporary contract labor, casual em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended.
335 NLRB No. 22
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP 231
By letter dated May 19, the Union requested to meet
and bargain with the Respondent. On June 5, by letter,
the Respondent rejected the Union’s request for bargain-
ing, stating that it would recognize the Union if and
when the latter had established majority support. The
Respondent stated that authorization cards would suffice
for this purpose. The complaint does not allege that the
Respondent acted unlawfully in setting initial terms and
conditions of employment for the Fairtron Corporation
employees it hired, or that it unlawfully refused to hire
any Fairtron unit employees. The parties stipulated that
the General Counsel does not challenge the Respondent’s
right to set initial terms and conditions of employment
for its employees.
B. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent was a
Burns4 successor, and was therefore obligated to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union. The General Counsel
contends that the Respondent’s defenses to a presump-
tion of continuing union majority status are not defenses
recognized by the Board. In this regard, the General
Counsel maintains that the level of union membership is
not relevant and that communication to the Respondent
from the Union was not lacking and, even if it were, it is
not a relevant factor under the circumstances. The Gen-
eral Counsel submits that the Respondent has not suc-
cessfully rebutted the Union’s presumption of majority
status, and that the Respondent’s refusal to recognize and
bargain with the Union therefore violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. The General Counsel seeks a Board
ruling requiring the Respondent to recognize and bargain
with the Union.
The Respondent argues that it was not obligated to
bargain with the Union because it had a good-faith doubt
that the Union represented a majority of the employees.
The Respondent emphasizes that only 15 of the 40 em-
ployees in the former employer’s unit, and only 6 of the
30 employees initially hired by the Respondent, are Un-
ion members. The Respondent cites Allentown Mack
Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), in which
the Supreme Court held that the Board’s “good faith rea-
sonable doubt” standard meant that an employer could
withdraw recognition from an incumbent union on the
basis of a genuine, reasonable uncertainty as to the un-

4 NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972). Burns pre-
sented the issue of what, if any, bargaining obligation an employer has
when it takes over a predecessor employer’s business and operates it in
substantially the same form with a work force a majority of whom were
employed by the predecessor. The Supreme Court agreed with the
Board that, in those circumstances, the successor employer must recog-
nize and bargain with the union that represented the predecessor’s
employees. Id. at 280–281.
ion’s continued majority support. Id. at 367. The Re-
spondent contends that evidence of low union member-
ship could contribute to such an uncertainty. The Re-
spondent contends that a successor employer should be
allowed to condition recognition on a showing of au-
thorization cards where (as the Respondent maintains is
the case here) the following factors are present: a major-
ity of employees in the former or present unit were not
union members; former union leaders employed by the
successor did not refer to the union at any time during
the hiring process; the union offers no evidence of major-
ity support; and, the employer has been silent about the
union and has not communicated either the fact of the
union’s demand for recognition, or the employer’s re-
sponse, to the employees.
The Union argues that the Respondent was a Burns
successor and, as such, was obligated to recognize and
bargain with the Union on demand. In this regard, the
Union contends that the Respondent hired a majority of
Fairtron’s employees, and that a majority of the Respon-
dent’s employees were previously employed by Fairtron.
The Union also contends that the Respondent conducts
substantially the same business as Fairtron, and the Un-
ion demanded bargaining in an appropriate unit. The
Union maintains that the Respondent did not have a
good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of
unit employees at the Des Moines facility. The Union
submits that the record evidence refutes any assertions by
the Respondent that the Union was inactive or uncom-
municative so as to support a good-faith doubt on the
Respondent’s part. The Union argues that, because the
Respondent had no legal basis to demand a showing of
cards, it cannot rely on the Union’s noncompliance with
that demand. The Union contends that the fact that most
unit members were not union members was insufficient
to serve as a basis for good-faith reasonable doubt as to
the Union’s majority status. The Union maintains that
Allentown Mack Sales & Service, supra, is distinguish-
able because here there were no employee statements
indicating that the Union had lost support.
The Union seeks, in addition to the remedy requested
by the General Counsel, a requirement that the Respon-
dent bargain with the Union for a year from the date of
the Board’s order, as well as a requirement that the Re-
spondent rescind any unilateral changes in the employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment and make the
employees whole by remitting all wages and benefits that
would have been paid in the absence of the Respondent’s
unlawful conduct, until the Respondent negotiates in
good faith to agreement or impasse.
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP. 232
C. Discussion
As we discuss below, we find that the Respondent is a
Burns successor to Fairtron. We also find, for two rea-
sons, that the Respondent was not entitled to withhold
recognition from the Union pending a demonstration of
the Union’s majority support. First, we agree with the
General Counsel and the Union that the Respondent
failed to show that it had a good-faith reasonable uncer-
tainty as to the Union’s majority status when it withheld
recognition. Second, in two decisions issued since this
proceeding was transferred to the Board, the Board has
held that, once a successor employer’s duty to bargain
arises, the employer must bargain for a reasonable period
of time before the union’s majority status can be ques-
tioned.5 Thus, even if the Respondent had harbored a
good-faith uncertainty as to the Union’s majority sup-
port, it could not lawfully deny recognition when it did
because it had not bargained for a reasonable time.
1. Good-faith uncertainty
Although the Respondent, in its answer to the com-
plaint, denied that it was a successor to Fairtron, it does
not make that precise argument to the Board. Indeed, the
Respondent, in the “Questions Presented” portion of its
brief, uses the term “successor employer” in two of its
four questions, and the term “successor employers” in
another. Rather, the Respondent contends that the Burns
formula should not be applied “woodenly” without con-
sidering the particular facts and circumstances of the
instant case. The Respondent maintains that those facts
and circumstances support its claim of good-faith doubt.
In any event, we find that the Respondent is a Burns
successor. Most of the Respondent’s employees were
previously employed by Fairtron6 and the Respondent
has presented no evidence of a change in the work or
makeup of the bargaining unit. Also, the Respondent is
using substantially the same facilities to make the same
basic product for essentially the same customers in the
same geographic area.
Because the Respondent is a Burns successor, the Un-
ion enjoys a rebuttable presumption of continuing major-
ity status.7 To justify its refusal to extend recognition,
the Respondent must produce objective evidence of the
absence of majority support for the Union or objective
evidence supporting a good-faith uncertainty on the Re-
spondent’s part as to the Union’s continuing majority

5 St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 329 NLRB 341 (1999); Inn Credible
Caterers, 333 NLRB 898 (2001).
6 In fact, all of the employees hired by the Respondent for its May
startup date were former Fairtron employees.
7 Burns, supra at 278.
support.8 Otherwise, the Respondent’s non-recognition
violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Respondent does
not claim to have shown actual loss of majority support,
but rather asserts a “good-faith doubt.”9
We find that the Respondent has failed to establish that
it had a good-faith uncertainty that the Union represented
a majority of the employees. The issue of majority sup-
port turns on whether most unit employees wish to have
union representation, not on whether most unit employ-
ees are members of a particular union. See, e.g., Manna
Pro Partners, 304 NLRB 782, 783 (1991), enfd. 986
F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1993). Similarly, the number of
members or financial supporters of an incumbent union
is not necessarily the same as the number of employees
continuing to support union representation, R.J.B. Knits,
309 NLRB 201, 205 (1992). This is especially true in a
so-called right-to-work state such as Iowa. T.L.C. St.
Petersburg, Inc., 307 NLRB 605 (1992) (the number of
employees who have authorized the checkoff of union
dues does not indicate—particularly in a right-to-work
state—how many employees favor union representation,
whether or not they are members of the union). Accord-
ingly, we reject the Respondent’s contention that it had a
good-faith uncertainty as to the Union’s majority status
because only 15 of the 40 employees in Fairtron’s unit,
and only 6 of the 30 employees initially hired by the Re-
spondent, were members of the Union.
We also reject the Respondent’s contention that it had
a good-faith uncertainty based on alleged lack of com-
munication from the Union. About March 11, Union
Business Agent Gerald Granberg and Local Union Presi-
dent Scott Glass met with Alan Foster, Fairtron vice
8 See, e.g., Guerdon Industries, 218 NLRB 658, 659 (1975). As we
explain below, this evidence would be unavailing for the Respondent,
even if it had been produced. See St. Elizabeth Manor, supra; Inn
Credible Caterers, supra. In any event, as we also show below, the
Respondent failed to produce it.
9 In Levitz, 333 NLRB 717 (2001), which issued while this case
was pending before the Board, the Board overruled Celanese Corp.,
95 NLRB 664 (1951), and its progeny insofar as they permitted an
employer to withdraw recognition from an incumbent union on the
basis of a good-faith doubt of the union’s continued majority status.
The Levitz Board held that “an employer may unilaterally withdraw
recognition from an incumbent union only where the union has actu-
ally lost the support of the majority of the bargaining unit employ-
ees.” Id. However, the Board also held that its analysis and conclu-
sions in that case would only be applied prospectively; “all pending
cases involving withdrawals of recognition [will be decided] under
existing law: the ‘good-faith uncertainty’ standard as explicated by
the Supreme Court” in Allentown Mack. Here, we find that the Re-
spondent has not established—sufficient to support its refusal to
recognize the Union—that it had a good-faith uncertainty, based on
objective evidence, that the Union continued to have majority support
in the bargaining unit.
Chairman Hurtgen, concurring in Levitz, disagreed with the new
standard.
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP 233
president (later Trans-Lux vice president), to discuss the
pending sale and layoff issues. On April 24, 1997,
Granberg sent a letter to Foster at “Fairtron-Translux,”
identifying himself as representative of the bargaining
unit and asking for a list of employees, the names and
addresses of all unit members, and the identities of those
who would be laid off. He asked that the information be
provided by April 28. On May 19, Granberg again wrote
to Foster at Trans-Lux, asking to reopen negotiations in
order to continue their “fine history” of working to-
gether. He asked for a reply within 10 days. On June 5,
Richard K. Kramer, the Respondent’s human resources
director, sent a letter to Granberg stating that the Re-
spondent would recognize the Union if it demonstrated
majority support among the current work force in the
unit.
In light of these contacts, we find that there was no
significant gap in the Union’s communication with the
Respondent. See, e.g., King Soopers, Inc., 295 NLRB
35, 38 (1989) (no communication between the parties
from February 18 to June 25, 1987; 4-month hiatus was
not a sufficient objective consideration on which to base
a good-faith doubt of majority support).
The Respondent also asserts that Glass failed to affirm
that employees continued to support the Union. As dis-
cussed, the Union enjoyed a rebuttable presumption of
majority status. There is no requirement that the Union
must reaffirm its continuing majority status. The Union
requested recognition on May 19, just 18 days after the
sale, and the absence of immediate postsale communica-
tion from the Union’s president does not imply that the
Union had lost majority support. Albany Steel, Inc., 309
NLRB 442, 451 (1992), enfd. 17 F.3d 564 (2d Cir.
1994).
Contrary to the Respondent’s assertion, the dearth of
evidence of lost majority support for the Union distin-
guishes this case from Allentown Mack. In that case, a
significant number of employees, including a union
steward, made statements to the successor employer sug-
gesting that the incumbent union had lost support among
unit employees. Here, by contrast, no employee men-
tioned any dissatisfaction with the Union either before or
after the sale.10

10 The Respondent has presented no compelling reason why the
Board should adopt special rules for situations in which an employer
conditions recognition and bargaining on a showing of authorization
cards, and we decline to do so. What matters is not that the employer
leaves open the possibility that he will recognize the union if a condi-
tion is met later, but rather that the employer has failed to recognize the
union in the first place, despite being required to do so.
2. Successor bar rule
An additional basis for our finding that the Respondent
unlawfully refused to recognize the Union is the Board’s
decision in St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., supra , as extended
to the unfair labor practice context by Inn Credible Ca-
terers, supra.11 In these cases, the Board found that once
a successor’s duty to bargain attaches, and for a reason-
able time thereafter, there can be no challenges to the
union’s majority status. Thus, for a reasonable period of
time, there is an irrebuttable presumption of the union’s
continued majority status. Applying these principles to
the facts of this case, we find that the Respondent’s obli-
gation to recognize and bargain with the Union attached
on May 19, when the Respondent had hired a substantial
and representative complement of employees, a majority
of whom had been employed by Fairtron, and the Union
had demanded recognition.12 The Respondent’s June 5
refusal to recognize the Union therefore was not privi-
leged, in light of the “successor bar” rule enunciated in
St. Elizabeth Manor and Inn Credible Caterers.
D. The Remedy
The General Counsel seeks a Board order requiring the
Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union.
The Union contends that this remedy is insufficient, and
that the Respondent should also be required to bargain
with the Union for a year from the Board’s order, to re-
scind any unilateral changes in the employees’ terms and
conditions of employment, and to make the employees
whole by remitting all wages and benefits that would
have been paid in the absence of the Respondent’s
unlawful conduct, until the Respondent negotiates in
good faith to agreement or impasse. We decline to im-
pose this relief.
The complaint issued by the General Counsel does not
allege that the Respondent acted unlawfully in setting
initial terms and conditions of employment for the Fair-
11 Chairman Hurtgen does not subscribe to the Board’s decision in
St. Elizabeth Manor, from which he dissented. For the reasons stated in
Chairman Hurtgen’s concurring opinion in Inn Credible Caterers, he
also does not support the extension and application of St. Elizabeth
Manor to the unfair labor practice context. Accordingly, Chairman
Hurtgen does not join his colleagues’ finding that these decisions form
an additional basis for the instant violation or for the affirmative bar-
gaining order.
Chairman Hurtgen also notes that, although he agrees with his col-
leagues that the instant statistics on union membership do not establish
that the Union has lost majority support, he nevertheless finds those
statistics suggestive. Had there been here, as in Allentown Mack,
statements reflecting employee disaffection with the Union, Chairman
Hurtgen might well have found that the complaint should be dismissed.
On this stipulated record, he agrees with his colleagues that the Re-
spondent did not establish that it had a good-faith uncertainty as to the
Union’s majority status when the Respondent refused recognition.
12 See St. Elizabeth Manor, 329 NLRB, supra at 344 fn. 8.
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP. 234
tron employees it hired, or that it unlawfully refused to
hire any Fairtron unit employees. Indeed, the parties
stipulated that the General Counsel does not challenge
the Respondent’s right to set initial terms and conditions
of employment for its employees or allege that the Re-
spondent’s hiring practices discriminated against any
current or former employee in violation of the Act.13
Further, not only did the General Counsel not allege that
the Respondent made unlawful unilateral changes, but
there is also no evidence that the Respondent made any
unilateral changes after the Union sought recognition. In
these circumstances, we find that there is not an adequate
basis on which to order the rescission and make-whole
relief sought by the Union.
As to the Union’s request that the Respondent be re-
quired to bargain with the Union for a year from the
Board’s order, the Union asserts, inter alia, that such a
remedy is necessary to deter employers from using Allen-
town Mack as a means for advancing frivolous claims of
good-faith uncertainty, the implication being that the
Respondent has done so. Although we have found that
the Respondent has failed to establish its claim of good-
faith uncertainty, we do not find that claim to have been
frivolous. The complaint does not pray for the relief
sought by the Union, and the stipulation does not address
it. The Respondent entered into the stipulation with
these facts in mind. In these circumstances, we do not
think it appropriate to award the remedy the Union re-
quests.
However, we shall enter an affirmative bargaining or-
der which requires bargaining at least for a reasonable
period of time. We find, for the reasons fully set forth in
Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64 (1996), that an
affirmative bargaining order is warranted in this case as a
remedy for the Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of
recognition from the Union. We adhere to the view, re-
affirmed by the Board in that case, that an affirmative
bargaining order is “the traditional, appropriate remedy
for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collec-
tive-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of
employees.” Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has required
that the Board justify, on the facts of each case, the im-
position of such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Industrial
Plastics v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 734 (D.C. 2000); Lee
Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454,

13 It is well settled that the General Counsel controls the theory on
which the case is litigated, and the Charging Party may not seek reme-
dies that are contingent on a theory different from that of the General
Counsel. See, e.g., ATS Acquisition Corp., 321 NLRB 712 fn. 3
(1996).
1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB,
28 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Vincent, the
court stated that an affirmative bargaining order “must be
justified by a reasoned analysis that includes an explicit
balancing of three considerations: (1) the employees’
Section 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act
override the rights of employees to choose their bargain-
ing representatives; and (3) whether alternative remedies
are adequate to remedy the violations of the Act.” 209
F.3d at 738.
We respectfully disagree with the court’s requirement,
for the reasons set forth in Caterair.14 Nevertheless, we
have examined the particular facts in this case as the
court requires, and we find that a balancing of the three
factors warrants an affirmative bargaining order.
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the Re-
spondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition from the
Union. At the same time, an affirmative bargaining or-
der does not unduly prejudice the Section 7 rights of em-
ployees who may oppose continued union representation
because its attendant status is temporary.
Moreover, ordering the successor employer to bargain
for a reasonable period of time with the incumbent union,
as in this case, serves “to protect the newly established
bargaining relationship and the previously expressed
majority choice, taking into account that the stresses of
the organizational transition may have shaken some of
the support the union previously enjoyed.” St. Elizabeth
Manor, 329 NLRB, at 345. In successorship situations,
the employees’ anxiety about their status with the suc-
cessor employer could lead to their disaffection before
the union has the opportunity to demonstrate its contin-
ued effectiveness, and could tempt a reluctant successor
employer to postpone its statutory bargaining obligation
indefinitely. Id. at 342. To require bargaining to con-
tinue only for a reasonable period of time, not in perpetu-
ity, fosters industrial peace and stability and will ensure
that the bargaining relationship established between the
Respondent and the Union will have a fair chance to suc-
ceed. Id. at 346.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the im-
portant policies of the Act to foster meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. The temporary decerti-
fication bar inherent in this order removes the Respon-
dent’s incentive to further delay bargaining or to engage
in any other conduct that would further undercut employee sup-
port for the Union. It also ensures that the Union will not be pres-
sured, by the possibility of a decertification petition, to achieve
14 Chairman Hurtgen does not disagree with the court.
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP 235
immediate results at the bargaining table following the Board’s
resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and issuance of a
cease-and-desist order. Providing this temporary period of insu-
lated bargaining will also afford employees a fair opportunity to
assess the Union’s performance in an atmosphere free of the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, alone, would be inadequate to
remedy the Respondent’s refusal to bargain with the Union in
these circumstances because it would permit a decertification
petition to be filed before the Respondent had afforded the em-
ployees a reasonable time to regroup and bargain through their
chosen representative in an effort to reach a collective-bargaining
agreement. Indeed, permitting a decertification petition to be
filed immediately might very well allow the Respondent to profit
from its own unlawful conduct. We find that theses circum-
stances outweigh the temporary impact the affirmative bargain-
ing order will have on the rights of employees who oppose con-
tinued representation by the Union.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirmative bar-
gaining order with its temporary decertification bar is necessary
to fully remedy the Respondent’s unlawful refusal to bargain
with the Union in this case.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, we shall order it to cease and desist and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respon-
dent, Trans-Lux Midwest Corporation, Des Moines, Iowa, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to meet and bargain in good faith with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit:

All regular full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees, including crating and shipping de-
partment employees and leadpersons employed at its facili-
ties at 1700 Delaware Avenue and 2301 Dean Avenue, Des
Moines, Iowa; but excluding service department employees,
small parts shipping and mailing department employees, re-
hired retired employees, office clerical employees, tempo-
rary employees, temporary contract labor, casual employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.

(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of unit employees
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facil-
ity in Des Moines, Iowa, and at all other places where notices
customarily are posted copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”15 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees customarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense,
a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 5, 1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of
our employees in the following unit:

15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORP. 236
All regular full-time and regular part-time production
and maintenance employees, including crating and
shipping department employees and leadpersons em-
ployed at our facilities at 1700 Delaware Avenue and
2301 Dean Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa; but excluding
service department employees, small parts shipping
and mailing department employees, rehired retired em-
ployees, office clerical employees, temporary employ-
ees, temporary contract labor, casual employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the unit described above with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is reached, em-
body such understanding in a signed agreement.

TRANS-LUX MIDWEST CORPORATION