Traffilog LTD.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 21, 2020

2019006284 (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/991,969 01/10/2016 Robert Izraeli 8791-US 4734
69054 7590 05/21/2020
RECHES PATENTS
HaArba''a Towers
North Tower
TEL AVIV, 6473925
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
HAN, CHARLES J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MAIL@I-P.CO.IL
OREN@I-P.CO.IL
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT IZRAELI, ADI AMIHAI,
ASSI BITTON, and ARIK GREENBERGER

Appeal 2019-006284
Application 14/991,969
Technology Center 3600

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–38, and 40–43.2
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Traffilog
Ltd. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Although claims 18 and 39 are pending, the Examiner withdraws these
claims from consideration. Final Action 5; Answer 3, 8.
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According to Appellant, the invention is directed “to detect[ing] car
thefts as soon as possible[,] thereby increasing the probability of finding the
stolen cars.” Spec. ¶ 2. Below, we reproduce independent claim 1 as
illustrative of the appealed claims.
1. A method for monitoring a vehicle, the method
comprising:
generating, by an activity sensor located in the vehicle, an
activity indication about an activity related to the vehicle;
sending, by a vehicle monitor that is installed in the
vehicle, the activity indication to a computer;
receiving, by a computer, the activity indication;
triggering, in response to the receiving of the activity
indication, a determining of whether a pairing between a vehicle
and a mobile device associated with the vehicle succeeded;
determining, by the computer, whether the pairing
between the vehicle and the mobile device associated with the
vehicle succeeded;
applying, by the computer, a first monitoring process
when the pairing succeeded; and
applying, by the computer, a second monitoring process
that differs from the first monitoring process when the pairing
failed.
REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART3
The Examiner rejects the claims as follows:
I. Claims 37 and 384 under U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite;

3 Although in the Final Office Action the Examiner rejects certain claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, in the Answer the Examiner withdraws this rejection.
Final Action 5–12; Answer 3–4.
4 Inasmuch as the Examiner withdraws claim 39 from consideration, the
Examiner’s reference to claim 39 in this rejection is harmless error.
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II. Claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, and 40–43 under U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Suzuki5, Mock6, and Boudy7; and
III. Claim 38 under U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Suzuki,
Mock, Boudy, and Singhal.8
ANALYSIS
Withdrawal from consideration of claims 18 and 39
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner withdraws from
consideration claims 18 and 39, determining that the claims are directed to a
non-elected invention. Final Action 5. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant
traverse the Examiner’s withdrawal from consideration of these claims.
Appeal Br 10–11.
Consistent with the Examiner’s explanation (see Answer 8), this issue
is reviewable, if at all, by filing a petition for the Director’s review; therefore
we do not decide this issue. See In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (citing In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403–04 (CCPA 1971)
(stating that there are many kinds of decisions made by examiners that are
not appealable to the Board when such decisions are not directly connected
with the merits of issues involving rejections of claims, and holding that “the
kind of adverse decisions of examiners which are reviewable by the [B]oard
must be those which relate . . . to matters involving the rejection of
claims”)); see MPEP §§ 706.01, 1002.02(c)(4), 1201 (the Board will not
ordinarily hear a question that is reviewable by petition). Whether

5 Suzuki, US 2011/0086678 A1, published Apr. 14, 2011.
6 Mock, US 2007/0082614 A1, published Apr. 12, 2007.
7 Boudy, US 2013/0021145 A1, published Jan. 24, 2013.
8 Singhal, US 2015/0172450 A1, published June 18, 2015.
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dependent claims 18 and 39 are or are not directed to an invention that is
independent and distinct from the invention that was originally claimed is
separate from whether the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claims 1
and 37, from which claims 18 and 39 respectively depend.
Rejection I—Indefiniteness rejection of claims 37 and 38
Neither the Appeal Brief nor the Answer refers to the Examiner’s
indefiniteness rejection of claims 37 and 38 made in the Final Office Action.
Based on our review of the record (Answer 3–4), however, it does not
appear that the Examiner withdraws the rejection. Thus, we summarily
sustain the rejection.
Rejection II—Obviousness rejection of claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37,
and 40–43
We have carefully reviewed the record, including the Examiner’s
Final Office Action and Answer, and Appellant’s Appeal Brief. Based on
our review, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs in
determining that claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, and 40–43 are obvious based
on Suzuki and Mock. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection.
Appellant argues that each of Suzuki, Mock, and Boudy “teaches
away from the subject matter of claim 1 and should not be used as a prior art
reference.” Appeal Br. 8–9. This is not persuasive of error, however. More
specifically, these arguments do not explain persuasively why the Examiner
errs by relying on each reference to disclose a portion of what is claimed, or
why the Examiner errs by combining the references. Instead, Appellant’s
arguments amount to an explanation of differences between what is claimed
and each reference. For example, with respect to Suzuki, Appellant explains
what Suzuki is alleged to disclose—i.e., “Suzuki teaches of a pairing method
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for paring between a mobile device and an in-vehicle device. If the pairing
attempt fails the driver is notified about the failure — the pairing attempts
are terminated and the driver is informed about the incompatibility of pairing
(step 520 of paragraph 39).” Id. at 8. Appellant then explains the difference
between Suzuki and independent claim 1—i.e., “In this case there is no
monitoring process at all when the pairing fails.” Id. But, such arguments
do not persuade us that the combination of references lacks something
claim 1 recites, and do not persuade us that the Examiner improperly
combines the references.
Appellant further argues that one of ordinary skill would not have
been motivated to combine the references as the Examiner proposes. Id.
at 9. This argument is not persuasive, as it does not show us how the
Examiner’s specific, proffered motivation is in error. See Answer 6.
Appellant argues separately against the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of dependent claims 8 and 26. Appeal Br. 9–10. Specifically,
Appellant argues the following:
The [Examiner] rejected claim[s] 8 [and 26] by stating:
Regarding claims 8 and 26, [m]odified Mock discloses that the
information about a location of the vehicle comprises an
identity of cellular network cells sensed by the vehicle monitor
(Mock: see, e.g., at least p[aragraph] 19).
Mock in general and paragraph 19 of Mock (cited by the
[Examiner]) fail to teach or suggest the information about a
location of the vehicle comprises an identity of cellular network
cells sensed by the vehicle monitor[.]
The mere fact that Mock teaches of monitoring does not
mean that Mock teaches of the subject matter of claim 8.
Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). This argument is not persuasive of error,
however. More specifically, Appellant’s argument does not explain why the
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Examiner’s combination of references—Suzuki, Mock, and Boudy—do not
disclose what claims 8 and 26 recite.
Rejection III—Obviousness rejection of claim 38
Appellant does not argue separately against the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of dependent claim 38. Inasmuch as we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 37, from which
claim 38 depends, we also sustain claim 38’s rejection.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections under §§ 112 and 103.
In summary:
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
37, 38 112(b) Indefiniteness 37, 38
1–8, 17, 19–26,
35–37, 40–43
103 Suzuki, Mock,
Boudy
1–8, 17, 19–
26, 35–37,
40–43

38 103 Suzuki, Mock,
Boudy, Singhal
38
Overall
Outcome
1–8, 17, 19–
26, 35–38,
40–43