Traffilog LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 21, 202014991969 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/991,969 01/10/2016 Robert Izraeli 8791-US 4734 69054 7590 05/21/2020 RECHES PATENTS HaArba''a Towers North Tower TEL AVIV, 6473925 ISRAEL EXAMINER HAN, CHARLES J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3662 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/21/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): MAIL@I-P.CO.IL OREN@I-P.CO.IL eofficeaction@appcoll.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT IZRAELI, ADI AMIHAI, ASSI BITTON, and ARIK GREENBERGER Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–38, and 40–43.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Traffilog Ltd. Appeal Br. 3. 2 Although claims 18 and 39 are pending, the Examiner withdraws these claims from consideration. Final Action 5; Answer 3, 8. Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 2 According to Appellant, the invention is directed “to detect[ing] car thefts as soon as possible[,] thereby increasing the probability of finding the stolen cars.” Spec. ¶ 2. Below, we reproduce independent claim 1 as illustrative of the appealed claims. 1. A method for monitoring a vehicle, the method comprising: generating, by an activity sensor located in the vehicle, an activity indication about an activity related to the vehicle; sending, by a vehicle monitor that is installed in the vehicle, the activity indication to a computer; receiving, by a computer, the activity indication; triggering, in response to the receiving of the activity indication, a determining of whether a pairing between a vehicle and a mobile device associated with the vehicle succeeded; determining, by the computer, whether the pairing between the vehicle and the mobile device associated with the vehicle succeeded; applying, by the computer, a first monitoring process when the pairing succeeded; and applying, by the computer, a second monitoring process that differs from the first monitoring process when the pairing failed. REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART3 The Examiner rejects the claims as follows: I. Claims 37 and 384 under U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite; 3 Although in the Final Office Action the Examiner rejects certain claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, in the Answer the Examiner withdraws this rejection. Final Action 5–12; Answer 3–4. 4 Inasmuch as the Examiner withdraws claim 39 from consideration, the Examiner’s reference to claim 39 in this rejection is harmless error. Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 3 II. Claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, and 40–43 under U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Suzuki5, Mock6, and Boudy7; and III. Claim 38 under U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Suzuki, Mock, Boudy, and Singhal.8 ANALYSIS Withdrawal from consideration of claims 18 and 39 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner withdraws from consideration claims 18 and 39, determining that the claims are directed to a non-elected invention. Final Action 5. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant traverse the Examiner’s withdrawal from consideration of these claims. Appeal Br 10–11. Consistent with the Examiner’s explanation (see Answer 8), this issue is reviewable, if at all, by filing a petition for the Director’s review; therefore we do not decide this issue. See In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403–04 (CCPA 1971) (stating that there are many kinds of decisions made by examiners that are not appealable to the Board when such decisions are not directly connected with the merits of issues involving rejections of claims, and holding that “the kind of adverse decisions of examiners which are reviewable by the [B]oard must be those which relate . . . to matters involving the rejection of claims”)); see MPEP §§ 706.01, 1002.02(c)(4), 1201 (the Board will not ordinarily hear a question that is reviewable by petition). Whether 5 Suzuki, US 2011/0086678 A1, published Apr. 14, 2011. 6 Mock, US 2007/0082614 A1, published Apr. 12, 2007. 7 Boudy, US 2013/0021145 A1, published Jan. 24, 2013. 8 Singhal, US 2015/0172450 A1, published June 18, 2015. Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 4 dependent claims 18 and 39 are or are not directed to an invention that is independent and distinct from the invention that was originally claimed is separate from whether the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claims 1 and 37, from which claims 18 and 39 respectively depend. Rejection I—Indefiniteness rejection of claims 37 and 38 Neither the Appeal Brief nor the Answer refers to the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claims 37 and 38 made in the Final Office Action. Based on our review of the record (Answer 3–4), however, it does not appear that the Examiner withdraws the rejection. Thus, we summarily sustain the rejection. Rejection II—Obviousness rejection of claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, and 40–43 We have carefully reviewed the record, including the Examiner’s Final Office Action and Answer, and Appellant’s Appeal Brief. Based on our review, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs in determining that claims 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, and 40–43 are obvious based on Suzuki and Mock. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection. Appellant argues that each of Suzuki, Mock, and Boudy “teaches away from the subject matter of claim 1 and should not be used as a prior art reference.” Appeal Br. 8–9. This is not persuasive of error, however. More specifically, these arguments do not explain persuasively why the Examiner errs by relying on each reference to disclose a portion of what is claimed, or why the Examiner errs by combining the references. Instead, Appellant’s arguments amount to an explanation of differences between what is claimed and each reference. For example, with respect to Suzuki, Appellant explains what Suzuki is alleged to disclose—i.e., “Suzuki teaches of a pairing method Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 5 for paring between a mobile device and an in-vehicle device. If the pairing attempt fails the driver is notified about the failure — the pairing attempts are terminated and the driver is informed about the incompatibility of pairing (step 520 of paragraph 39).” Id. at 8. Appellant then explains the difference between Suzuki and independent claim 1—i.e., “In this case there is no monitoring process at all when the pairing fails.” Id. But, such arguments do not persuade us that the combination of references lacks something claim 1 recites, and do not persuade us that the Examiner improperly combines the references. Appellant further argues that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine the references as the Examiner proposes. Id. at 9. This argument is not persuasive, as it does not show us how the Examiner’s specific, proffered motivation is in error. See Answer 6. Appellant argues separately against the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 8 and 26. Appeal Br. 9–10. Specifically, Appellant argues the following: The [Examiner] rejected claim[s] 8 [and 26] by stating: Regarding claims 8 and 26, [m]odified Mock discloses that the information about a location of the vehicle comprises an identity of cellular network cells sensed by the vehicle monitor (Mock: see, e.g., at least p[aragraph] 19). Mock in general and paragraph 19 of Mock (cited by the [Examiner]) fail to teach or suggest the information about a location of the vehicle comprises an identity of cellular network cells sensed by the vehicle monitor[.] The mere fact that Mock teaches of monitoring does not mean that Mock teaches of the subject matter of claim 8. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). This argument is not persuasive of error, however. More specifically, Appellant’s argument does not explain why the Appeal 2019-006284 Application 14/991,969 6 Examiner’s combination of references—Suzuki, Mock, and Boudy—do not disclose what claims 8 and 26 recite. Rejection III—Obviousness rejection of claim 38 Appellant does not argue separately against the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 38. Inasmuch as we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 37, from which claim 38 depends, we also sustain claim 38’s rejection. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections under §§ 112 and 103. In summary: No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 37, 38 112(b) Indefiniteness 37, 38 1–8, 17, 19–26, 35–37, 40–43 103 Suzuki, Mock, Boudy 1–8, 17, 19– 26, 35–37, 40–43 38 103 Suzuki, Mock, Boudy, Singhal 38 Overall Outcome 1–8, 17, 19– 26, 35–38, 40–43 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation