01992984
07-06-2000
Tonya K. Priest, Complainant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.
Tonya K. Priest v. Department of Transportation
01992984
July 6, 2000
Tonya K. Priest, )
Complainant, )
)
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01992984
) Agency No. 3-98-3103
)
Rodney E. Slater, )
Secretary, )
Department of Transportation, )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
The Commission finds that the agency's decision dated October 8,
1998, dismissing complainant's complaint due to untimely EEO contact
is proper pursuant to the regulation set forth at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,
37,656 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �
1614.107(a)(2)).<1> In her complaint, complainant, an Office Automation,
FG-06, alleged that from June 1996 to September 14, 1997, while she was
employed at AFS, Gulfport, Mississippi, she was sexually harassed by her
former supervisor culminating in her being forced/tricked into a transfer
to ATC, Amarillo, Texas. Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor with
regard to the complaint on June 2, 1998, which was beyond the 45-day time
limit. With regard to her untimely EEO Counselor contact, complainant
indicated that while she was watching a video during an agency's sexual
harassment briefing on May 26, 1998, it �projected feelings in [her]
mind that [she] had felt before and clarified in [her] mind that [she]
was a victim of sexual harassment� on the part of her former supervisor.
The Commission has adopted a �reasonable suspicion� standard (as opposed
to a �supportive facts� standard) to determine when the limitation period
is triggered under the EEOC Regulations. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(2);
Ball v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6,
1988). Thus, the limitations period is not triggered until a complainant
should reasonably suspect discrimination, but before all the facts that
would support a charge of discrimination have become apparent. In the
instant case, the Commission finds that complainant knew or reasonably
suspected discrimination during June 1996 through September 1997, or at
the latest in March 1998, with regard to her complaint.
In her written statement, included in the complaint, complainant clearly
indicated that during her employment at the Gulfport facility, she was
not comfortable with the former supervisor's treatment when: he told her
that he was attracted to her; he asked her about her personal matters
and took her out to lunch on numerous occasions; she was forced to
go to a trip to Natchez with him; he made sexual advances/comments;
and he sent her e-mails of a personal/sexual nature to her home.
Complainant also stated that she discussed these incidents with her
coworkers and union representative during the relevant time period, and
that she also applied/bid for other jobs to be away from the supervisor.
Complainant indicated that in August 1997, the supervisor told her
that her job was being abolished due to an agency's realignment, and
to look for other employment. Complainant stated that relying on the
supervisor's false information, she accepted her current position, for
which she previously bid, effective September 14, 1997, causing her to
move to Amarillo, Texas, with a great financial hardship.
Complainant also indicated that after her transfer to the Amarillo
facility, she occasionally sent e-mails to the former supervisor, her
union representative, and her former coworker, asking them about her
former position to see if there was any possible way of getting back
to Gulfport. Complainant stated that six months after she left the
Gulfport facility, the union representative told her that the realignment
was a �dead issue� and her old position was not abolished as she was
previously told. Complainant also indicated that in March 1998, she
talked to her former coworker and was informed that her former position
was not abolished, rather it was simply taken off the flow chart.
After considering all of the above information, the Commission finds that
complainant knew or reasonably suspected that she was sexually harassed by
her former supervisor during the period of June 1996 and September 1997.
The Commission also finds that complainant knew or reasonably suspected
that she was allegedly forced to transfer to her current job in Amarillo,
Texas, at the latest in March 1998, when she was informed by her union
representative and her former coworker that her former position was not
abolished and no realignment was taking place at the Gulfport facility.
Thus, the Commission finds that complainant's June 2, 1998 EEO Counselor
contact with regard to the matters was untimely, and she failed to present
adequate justification to warrant an extension of the applicable time
limit therefor.
Accordingly, the agency's decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
July 6, 2000
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.