01980692
01-13-2000
Tonya G. Hill, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region), Agency.
Tonya G. Hill v. United States Postal Service
01980692
January 13, 2000
.
Tonya G. Hill,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Pacific/Western Region),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01980692
Agency No. 4F7920006397
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final
agency decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination on the bases of race (Caucasian), national origin
(American), color (White), religion (Christian), sex (female), and
reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal
is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following
reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD as CLARIFIED.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Letter Carrier at the agency's Hesperia, California postal
facility. Complainant claims that she was discriminated against and
harassed as evidenced by the following incidents: (1) she was singled
out and subjected to an unwarranted discussion by the Postmaster (PM)
regarding comments she made during a stand up on October 26, 1996, which
in turn resulted in a seven day suspension issued on November 25, 1996;
and (2) on December 3, 1996, PM spoke to her in a threatening, angry, and
hostile manner, jerked her chair and pulled her hair, called the police,
and issued her an unwarranted fourteen day suspension on January 3, 1997.
Believing she was a victim of discrimination regarding each incident,
complainant sought EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed formal
complaints. At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency issued
its FAD finding no discrimination. Complainant makes no new contentions
on appeal, and the agency requests that we affirm its FAD.
The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of race, color, religion, or national origin discrimination because
she failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees (i.e. those
who were disciplined for unacceptable conduct and failure to follow
instructions) not in her protected classes were treated more favorably
under similar circumstances. The FAD also determined that complainant
failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal because she produced
no evidence to demonstrate a causal nexus between the incidents at issue
and her prior protected activity. Notwithstanding these determinations,
the FAD additionally found that the agency articulated legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in both incidents, namely
that complainant was disrespectful, very loud and disruptive and that
she refused to follow PM's instructions to return to work. The FAD then
found that complainant failed to produce any evidence to show that these
reasons were pretext for discrimination.
After a careful review of the record, based on McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation
for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd,
545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglasto retaliation
cases), the Commission agrees with the agency that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination or reprisal because she
submits only assertions and conjecture to support her claims, presenting
no credible evidence from which to infer that any of PM's actions were the
result of discriminatory or retaliatory animus towards her. In reaching
this conclusion, we note that complainant's accounts of PM engaging in
verbal or physical hostile conduct toward her are completely unsupported
by witness affidavits, but that her own inappropriate conduct and failure
to follow directions is fully supported by the record. We note also that
the record shows that management was willing to enter into discussions
with the union to reduce both suspensions at issue, but that complainant,
a union steward, refused.
Complainant also claims that both incidents constitute harassment. The
agency failed to provide an analysis of this harassment claim, so we
will address it here, and CLARIFY the FAD accordingly.
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently
severe or pervasive as to result in an alteration of the conditions of
the complainant's employment. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994),
Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3. See also
Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13,
1997); Jackson v. U.S. Postal Service, Appeal No. 01972555 (April 15,
1999). In applying these legal standards to the facts of this case,
the Commission finds that complainant has failed to establish that she
was subjected to harassment based on her protected classes which was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to constitute a hostile work
environment. As noted, the record shows that PM did not engage in
hostile or threatening conduct. Moreover, [PAGE 3] we find that PM's
discussions with complainant, his instructions to her to return to work,
and the subsequent issuance of both suspensions, were all warranted by her
conduct, and not designed to harass complainant. Furthermore, we find that
all of these actions fell within PM's supervisory duties and were carried
out in a manner authorized by postal service regulations and guidelines.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions, as well as arguments and evidence not specifically addressed
in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD as CLARIFIED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The
request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other
party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c). [PAGE 4]
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and
not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court
appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to
file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791,
794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion
of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
January 13, 2000
__________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.