Tomer, Clint et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 20, 2020

2020001809 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/067,687 10/30/2013 Rex Franklin Tomer 29873-3 3606
76656 7590 10/20/2020
Patent Docket Department
Armstrong Teasdale LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
LINDSEY III, JOHNATHAN J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte AMBER TOMER and CLINT TOMER
________

Appeal 2020-001809
Application114/067,687
Technology Center 3600
__________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and
RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges.

TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims to a
method of generating a plurality of educational materials, a device for
generating such materials, and a non-transitory computer-readable storage
media for generating such materials, which have been rejected as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the applicant.
(Appeal Br. 1.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Specification states that there are “known systems for
providing educational content” where what is provided is “previously
obtained educational instructional materials with defined formats.” (Spec.
¶ 2.) Appellant’s Specification states, however, that particular forms and
content of educational materials may be more suitable for some learners than
others. (Id.) Appellant’s invention is a computer-based method for
generating educational materials. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 29.)

Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23 are on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative and reads as follows:
1. A computer-based method for generating a plurality
of educational materials performed by a computing device in
communication with an input device and a client device, the
computing device including a memory device and a processor
coupled to the memory device, the memory device partitioned
in a plurality of sections, the plurality of sections including an
educational materials section and a game format section, each
section communicatively coupled to each other, the method
comprising:
[a] receiving, at the memory device from at least one of
the input device and the client device, a first set of educational
content including a plurality of educational questions and a
plurality of educational answers, wherein each educational
answer is associated with at least one of the plurality of
educational questions;
[b] generating, at the computing device, educational
content metadata for the first set of educational content, the
educational content metadata including a difficulty rating
associated with each of the plurality of educational questions
and answers of the first set of educational content, a subject
matter category associated with each of the plurality of
educational questions and answers of the first set of educational
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content, an age level associated with each of the plurality of
educational questions and answers of the first set of educational
content, and a usage history associated with each of the
plurality of educational questions and answers of the first set of
educational content;
[c] storing the educational content metadata along with
the first set of educational content in the educational materials
section of the memory device;
[d] receiving, at the computing device from at least one
of the input device and the client device, a set of parameters
including i) a format parameter for generating an output format
of the plurality of educational materials and ii) at least one of a
difficulty level, a grade level, a categorization level, a subject
level, an age level, a usage history, a school week number, and
a total number of users;
[e] storing the set of parameters in the game format
section of the memory device;
[f] generating a filter based on the set of parameters;
[g] parsing, using the generated filter, the first set of
educational content based on the educational content metadata
to generate a second set of educational content, wherein
educational content metadata of the second set of educational
content matches the set of parameters used to generate the filter;
and
[h] generating the plurality of educational materials using
the second set of educational content including generating at
least one game board based on the format parameter.
(Appeal Br. 14–15 (bracketed lettering added for ease of reference).)
The following ground of rejection by the Examiner is before us on
review:
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
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DISCUSSION
Appellant provides no arguments differentiating independent claims 1,
8, or 15, nor does Appellant provide separate argument as to the dependent
claims. Thus, we address the Examiner’s rejection with respect to
exemplary claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
The Dispute
The Examiner finds that the steps [b], [f], [g], and [h] of claim 1
above are steps that
describe a mental process (i.e., a concept performed in the
human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7, 2019) [hereinafter 2019
Revised Guidance] (footnote 14) (“If a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but
for the recitation of generic computer components then it is still
in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot
practically be performed in the mind.”).
(Non-Final Action 3; Ans. 4.)
The Examiner further finds that the mental process, which is a judicial
exception, is not integrated into a practical application. (Non-Final Action
4). The Examiner finds that steps [a], [c], [d], and [e], which are not part of
the abstract idea, are limitations that “describe data gathering and data
output,” which steps are considered insignificant extra-solution activity and
conventional computer functions appended to the abstract idea not an
integration of the abstract idea. (Id. at 4, 7.) And the Examiner finds the
computer elements recited in the claim, such as a “computing device” that
includes “a memory device” and a processor coupled to the memory device,
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“input device” and “client device” are generic computer or computer
components that perform generic computer functions and the Specification
supports such a conclusion. (Id. at 4–7.) The Examiner concludes,
therefore, that these elements are not a particular machine and these general
elements are only invoked “as tools to execute the identified abstract idea”
without imposing meaningful limits on the claim and that the “generating”
and “parsing” steps in which they are used are “no more than mere
instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.”
(Id. at 7.)
Appellant contends that the “claims do not recite an abstract idea”
because “the present limitations involve specific steps that enable a
computer device to apply a set of parameters to automatically generate
educational materials including at least one game board in a specific
format,” “rather than general instructions performed ‘by a processor’ with no
further limitations.” (Appeal Br. 7–8.) Appellant concludes, therefore, that
the claim recites not just the “concept” of generating, parsing,
receiving, and storing, as alleged in the Office Action, but
rather a specific electronic-based means that leverages the use
of electronic educational content to generate educational
materials and at least one game board formatted based on
specific parameters.
(Id. at 8; Id. at 9 (“the claim limitations narrowly focus on a particular
sequence of steps involving electronic data manipulation”).)
Appellant also contends that given a prior Board decision “found that
‘collecting usage information,’ . . . is ‘not a mathematical concept, an
identified method of organizing human activity, or a mental process’[,]” we
should conclude that the “collecting sets of educational content and sets of
parameters” here, which is what the “claims are directed to,” “is ‘not a
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mathematical concept, an identified method of organizing human activity, or
a mental process’.” (Id.)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellant also contends that the
claims integrate any abstract idea into a practical application in light of the
“functions performed by [the] allegedly ‘generic’ computer components.”
(Id. at 8–9.) Appellant argues that “the detailed limitations recite a specific
manner of generating educational materials, grouping educational questions,
and generating an output format of the educational materials that provides a
specific improvement over prior educational computer systems, resulting in
an improved educational computer system.” (Id. at 10.) In particular,
argues Appellant, “the claims recite a specific combination of steps that uses
a non-generic computer including at least one database with specific
partitions to generate a plurality of educational materials.” (Id.) Appellant
also contends that the integration provides a “clear benefit to the user (e.g.,
educational materials are automatically generated in a specific output format
based on specific parameters tailored for each user)” and the user “no longer
has to manually research for educational materials that meet their learning
parameters.” (Id. at 11.)
Finally, Appellant argues that the claims also recite significantly more
than the abstract idea, similarly to BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 2015-1763 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2016). (Id.)
Appellant notes that “the claimed system combines the advantages of
receiving a set of parameters to generate a filter that is used to parse a first
set of educational content to generate a second set of educational, which is
used to generate a plurality of educational materials including at least one
game board.” (Id.) Appellant concludes that this is “like the filtering system
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of BASCOM, the specific arrangement and distribution of functionality
provided in the pending claims facilitates the practical application described
above.” Id.

The Analysis
The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for
“distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217
(2014). “First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” a
patent-ineligible concept. Id. If so, “we consider the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2012)).
Applying the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance
(“Guidance”), 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019),2 and in accordance with
judicial precedent, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims
are addressed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 1 (the “October 2019 Update”) (available
at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_
update.pdf).
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STEP 2A, Prong One:
Under the Guidance, in determining what concept a claim is “directed
to” in step one of the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, such as (a) mathematical
concepts, (b) methods of organizing human activity including fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating
risk), and/or (c) mental processes including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, or opinion. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54 (Step 2A, Prong
One).
We agree with the Examiner that the steps [b], [f], [g], and [h] of
claim 1 are mental processes, but for the recitation in the claim of the use of
“a computing device” at which the step [b] generating takes place.
A claim recites a mental process when the claim encompasses acts
people can perform using their minds or pen and paper. See, e.g.,
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an
unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites that a
generic computer component performs the acts. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp.
v. SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a
claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in
the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
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still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be
performed in the mind.”).
In step [b], metadata such as a “difficulty rating” and/or a “subject
matter category” is generated for an educational question and answer. This
is something that can be done via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.
Thus, Appellant’s argument in its Reply Brief that this limitation cannot be
practically performed in the human mind because it “requires a processor
accessing computer memory” (Reply Br. 2) is not persuasive of Examiner
error.
In step [f], a filter is generated that is based on a set of parameters
such as “grade level” and/or “difficulty” as well as output format, which set
of parameters were received at the computing device. As described in
Appellant’s Specification, the filter is simply a mechanism by which
information is examined for certain qualifying information. (Spec. ¶ 59.)
Such a mechanism can be accomplished in a person’s mind. That is, one can
decide, using one’s mind based on a selection input from another person, to
filter information based on that selection input. The “filter” is generated
mentally by the input received.
Step [g] involves filtering the first set of education content using the
generated filter to generate a second set of educational content. In short, the
collected first set of educational content is analyzed via the filter and sorted
into a second set of educational content. (See Spec. ¶ 61.) This can be done
in the mind as just explained. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds . . . without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”);
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FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (collecting and analyzing information are mental processes within the
abstract-idea category).
Finally, in step [h] a plurality of educational materials are generated
from the second set educational content, including a gameboard based on the
output format parameter. This is a step than can be performed by pen and
paper.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s argument that the
limitations discussed above “involve specific steps that enable a computer
device to apply a set of parameters to automatically generate educational
materials” (Appeal Br. 7) is not persuasive to establish that the limitations
are not mental processes.
Appellant’s additional argument regarding collecting educational
content and parameters not being a mathematical concept, an identified
method of organizing human activity, or a mental process (Id. at 8) is also
not persuasive as the Examiner’s rejection did not describe Appellant’s
collecting of data (e.g., step [a] receiving a first set of educational content,
and step [d] receiving a set of parameters) as a mental process. The
Examiner identified these data collection steps as insignificant extra-solution
activity, which we address in Step 2A, prong two of the judicial exception
analysis below.
In light of the above, we conclude that claim 1 recites mental
processes which are abstract ideas, and thus, we proceed to the next step of
the eligibility analysis under the Guidance.
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STEP 2A, Prong Two:
Following the Guidance, we next consider whether “the claim as a
whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of
the exception,” i.e., whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This analysis includes
“[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application.” Id. at 54–55.
Here, we agree with the Examiner’s position that the elements that are
not part of the judicial exception are the recited computer elements, and
steps of receiving data and storing that received data in memory, i.e., steps
[a], [c], [d], and [e]. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner’s analysis of
these elements and that they do not provide for a practical application of the
claimed mental processes when considered individually or in combination.
As the Examiner explained, the computer elements are recited at a
high level of abstraction. The claim requires a “computer device” that
includes “a memory device” and “a processor.” The memory device
receives data from an input device and/or a client device and stores it. This
is a typical and generic function of computer memory. Nothing specific is
recited in the claim regarding the function of the computer device or the
processor other than “at the computing device” educational content metadata
is generated. Appellant’s Specification indicates that this metadata “may be
provided manually or programmatically.” (Spec. ¶ 57.) No specific
algorithms are claimed or disclosed.
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Moreover, we find no indication in the Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any indication therein, that the operations recited in
independent claim 1 require any specialized computer hardware or software
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. To the
contrary, the Specification describes the computer system generically
throughout, indicating that the “processor may include any programmable
system” (Spec. ¶ 33) the database used to store educational material can be
any structured collection of records that is stored in a computer system (Id.
¶ 34), and the memory is not limited in any way except for being “usable for
storage of a computer program” (Id. ¶ 50). Thus, there can be no dispute
that the computer elements recited are not of a particular machine, but rather
generic computer elements performing generic computer functions.
Consequently, we disagree with Appellant’s assertion that the combination
of steps “uses a non-generic computer” (Appeal Br. 10).
The fact that the database includes specific partitions in which to store
information does not rise to the level of a non-generic computer element. As
the Specification explains, any structured collection of records or data that is
stored in a computer system may be used. (Spec. ¶ 34.) This description
does not designate any characteristics that distinguish the storage structure
from a generic database. Thus, the use of the claimed memory/storage
structure here is unlike the non-generic database involved in Enfish LLC v.
Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In Enfish, the
claimed self-referential table was a specific type of data structure designed
to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed
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invention uses a specific type of data structure to improve a computer’s
functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that device
functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such
a contention.
Thus, that the generating steps [b], [f], and [h], and the parsing step
[g] may be performed using elements of the computer device is not
sufficient to establish a practical application. Mental processes remain
unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what
once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at
1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[M]erely adding computer
functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not
confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”); see also Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This
invention makes the trader faster and more efficient, not the computer. This
is not a technical solution to a technical problem.”). Indeed, “after Alice,
there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does
not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Regarding the steps of receiving the first set of educational content
and storing it in the memory device at a particular “section,” and receiving a
set of parameters and storing those in the memory device at a particular
“section,” we also agree with the Examiner’s position that such steps do not
provide for a practical application of any of the mental steps. Rather, the
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receiving steps are simply data gathering steps which “cannot make an
otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370;
2019 Revised Guidance, 55 n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g).
The “storing” limitations operate to make data available for
processing, they do not “apply, rely on, or use” the mental concepts in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception.” We
conclude that, like data gathering in the first instance, the storage of data in
the claimed process is insignificant extra-solution activity to the mental
processes recited. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata, 793 F.3d
1334).
Moreover, “[i]nformation as such is an intangible” and collecting,
analyzing (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset), and displaying
that information, without more, is an abstract idea. See Interval Licensing
LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
and citing similar decisions holding that displaying different types or sets of
information from various sources on a generic display is abstract absent a
specific improvement to the way computers or other technologies operate);
see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting
and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such
collection and analysis.”).
In light of the above, we do not find Appellant’s argument that the
claim is directed to an improvement in “the technical field of electronically
generating education materials tailored to particular students” (Reply Br. 4)
persuasive. “An additional element . . . [that] merely includes instructions to
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implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea,” is not an improvement to a technical field.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
The additional elements considered individually and together do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More
particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality
of a computer or other technology or technical field; (ii) a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception; (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state; or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation. Id.
Appellant’s argument that BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc., v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d. 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) supports the
patentability of the claims (Appeal Br. 11) is not persuasive. In Bascom, the
court explained that the remote location of a filtering tool having
customizable user-specific filtering features, where the placement at the
remote location was unconventional, provides the filtering tool with both the
benefits of a filter on a local computer, and the benefits of a filter on the ISP
server, which is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering
content. Id. at 1350–51. Furthermore, the customizable filtering solution
also improved the computer system’s performance. See id. Here,
Appellant’s claim does not recite a non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of components, whether software or hardware. As Appellant
asserts, the claim limitations “focus on a particular sequence of steps
involving electronic data manipulation.” (Appeal Br. 9.)
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that because a
“clear benefit to the user (e.g., educational materials are automatically
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generated in a specific output format based on specific parameters tailored
for each user)” and the user “no longer has to manually research for
educational materials that meet their learning parameters” is provided, there
is necessarily an integration of the abstract idea (Id. at 11). That the claimed
invention provides for automation and avoids the need for manual research
is a result of the capabilities of the generic computer components—not the
recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839
F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life
Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the
required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer
does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject
matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F.
App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Though the claims purport to
accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have
held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general-purpose computer do not materially alter the patent
eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). Like the claims in FairWarning,
the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer processors as
tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing
components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095; see also Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354 (“we have recognized that merely presenting
the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information,
without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is
abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”).
In sum, we find that the claimed invention does not integrate the
abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the
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Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Thus, we conclude that the
claim is directed to an abstract idea. We next turn to the second step of the
Alice analysis, i.e., whether the claim includes an “inventive concept.”

STEP 2B
Step 2B requires that we look to whether the claim, that we have
determined above to set forth the judicial exception of an abstract idea,
“[a]dds a specific limitation [beyond the judicial exception that is] not well-
understood, routine, conventional in the field.” Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at
56; MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
As noted in the step 2A, prong two analysis, the claim elements that
are not part of the abstract ideas are the generically recited computer
elements, and steps of receiving data and storing that received data in
memory, i.e., steps [a], [c], [d], and [e]. Using generic computer
components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the necessary
inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.”). Moreover, the concept of collecting data,
storing that data in a memory and recognizing certain data within the
collection, is undisputedly well-known and involves basic computer
functions. See MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata., 793 F.3d at 1334
(when generically claimed, storing and retrieving and operating on
information in memory and displaying information are computer functions
that have been recognized as either insignificant extra-solution activity or
well-understood, routine, conventional functions)); see also Bascom, 827
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F.3d at 1348 (“[F]iltering content is an abstract idea because it is a
longstanding, well-known method of organizing human behavior.”).
We conclude claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept because the
claim, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements with no
more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using
generically recited computer-based elements to generate the educational
materials including a game board. See Bancorp Servs. 687 F.3d 1277–78
(performance by computer of operations that previously were performed
manually or mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known
abstract idea into eligible subject matter); BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons,
Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice
that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
As noted above, Appellant does not argue independent claims 8 and
15 distinctly from claim 1, or provide separate argument regarding
dependent claims 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–23. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
those claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Appeal 2020-001809
Application 14/067,687

19
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–7, 9,
11–14, 16,
18–23
101 Patent-Ineligibility 1, 2, 4–7, 9,
11–14, 16,
18–23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED