Todd Binion et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 28, 2019

14057456 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/057,456 10/18/2013 Todd Binion 32060/47505E 9463
116886 7590 08/28/2019
Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP (State Farm)
233 South Wacker Drive
6300 Willis Tower
Chicago, IL 60606-6357
EXAMINER
KOLOSOWSKI-GAGER, KATHERINE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/28/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mgbdocket@marshallip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TODD BINION, JOE HARR, BRIAN FIELDS, STEVEN
CIELOCHA, and STEVE BALBACH1
Appeal 2018-005752
Application 14/057,456
Technology Center 3600
Before JENNIFER S. BISK, LARRY J. HUME, AND
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.
BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25, which are all claims pending in the
application. Appellants have canceled claims 4–8 and 10–21. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company. Appeal Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND2
Appellants’ disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
collecting and processing information generated onboard a vehicle in order
to provide targeted advertising. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method comprising:
[(1)] generating, by a camera device located on or inside
a vehicle, camera data representing information about an
environment external to the vehicle;
[(2)] generating, by a global positioning system (GPS)
subsystem onboard the vehicle, location data indicative
of locations of the vehicle;
[(3)] sending, via a wireless network, the camera data
and the location data to a remote electronic processing
system comprising a memory and one or more
processors;
[(4)] receiving, via the wireless network, the camera
data and the location data at the electronic processing
system;
[(5)] storing the received camera data and the received
location data in the memory;
[(6)] identifying, by the one or more processors and
using at least the stored camera data and the stored
location data, a locale type corresponding to a locale
visited by a driver of the vehicle;
[(7)] using, by the one or more processors, the identified
locale type to select an advertisement for another locale
having the identified locale type; and

2 Throughout this Decision we have considered the Specification filed
October 18, 2013 (“Spec.”), the Final Rejection mailed September 7, 2017
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed February 6, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer mailed March 22, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed May 16, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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[(8)] causing the selected advertisement to be provided
to the driver while the driver is in the vehicle.
Claims App’x 1 (limitation numbering added).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.
Claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the combination of US 2011/0093350 A1, published
April 21, 2011 (“Laumeyer”), US 2010/0004995 A1, published Jan. 7, 2010
(“Hickman”), and US 2008/0195457 A1, published Aug. 14, 2008
(“Sherman”). Final Act. 7–29.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate,
substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments
are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Rejection of Claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
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Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.’” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within one of these
excluded categories, the Court has set out a two-part framework. The
framework requires us first to consider whether the claim is “directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then
examine “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claims for an “inventive
concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration
in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office recently issued guidance regarding this framework.
See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised
Guidance, to decide whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
evaluate whether the claim (1) recites subject matter falling within an
abstract idea grouping listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea,
as noted above, we then determine whether the claim recites an inventive
concept. The Revised Guidance explains that when making this
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determination, we should consider whether the additional claim elements
add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[]
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
For purposes of the § 101 rejection, Appellants argue claims 1–20
together as a group. See App. Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 2–3. Therefore, consistent
with the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we limit our discussion to
independent claim 1. Independent claims 8 and 15 and dependent claims 2–
7, 9–14, and 16–20 stand or fall with independent claim 1.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101
rejection.
The Judicial Exception—Abstract Idea
The Examiner determined the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Final Act. 2–4. Specifically, the Examiner states that the method includes
presentation of an advertisement, which is a fundamental economic practice,
and “is not meaningfully different than those ‘idea,’ ‘practices,’ and
‘activities’ found by the courts to be abstract ideas.” Id. at 3–4. For the
reasons explained below, we agree that the claims recite an abstract idea.
Limitations (4)–(7) of claim 1, quoted above, under their broadest
reasonable interpretation,3 recite a method of receiving camera and location

3 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard,
we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
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data (limitation (4)), storing that information (limitation (5)), identifying
from that data a locale type of a visited locale (limitation (6)), and using that
identified locale to select an advertisement for another locale with the same
locale type (limitation (7)). Similar methods have been found to be
fundamental economic practices. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 714–15 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding claims recite an abstract idea, which
include steps “(1) receiving copyrighted media from a content provider” and
“(2) selecting an ad after consulting an activity log to determine whether the
ad has been played less than a certain number of times”). We are not
persuaded by Appellants conclusory assertion that claim 1 “is not the same
as (or even similar to) using advertising as an exchange or currency (as in
Ultramercial), or creating a contractual relationship (as in BuySAFE).”
Appeal Br. 15 (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d. 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
Moreover, each of limitations (4)–(7) recites a process that people can
perform in their heads or using pen and paper. The recited process is not
meaningfully different from other processes that courts have determined are
mental processes. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (determining
that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental
process). This is true even though these limitations recite a “wireless
network,” “memory,” and “one or more processors.” Claims App’x 1.
Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via

of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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pen and paper or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). A
person can, using only their mind and senses, receive information about an
environment and location of a vehicle, identify a locale type corresponding
to that information, and select an advertisement for another locale with the
same locale type.
Further, in Intellectual Ventures I, similar in key respects to the claims
before us on appeal, tailoring content based on information about the user
has also been determined as being directed to an abstract idea and, thus,
patent-ineligible.
At step one of the Alice framework, it is often useful to
determine the breadth of the claims in order to determine
whether the claims extend to cover a “fundamental . . . practice
long prevalent in our system . . . .” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356. As
noted, the claim relates to customizing information based on (1)
information known about the user and (2) navigation data . . . .
[T]ailoring is “a fundamental . . . practice long prevalent in our
system . . . .” Id. There is no dispute that newspaper inserts had
often been tailored based on information known about the
customer—for example, a newspaper might advertise based on
the customer’s location. Providing this minimal tailoring—e.g.,
providing different newspaper inserts based upon the location
of the individual—is an abstract idea.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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We, therefore, conclude that claim 1 recites a method of organizing
human activity and also a mental process, each of which are listed in the
abstract idea groupings in the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 1 thus recites an abstract idea.
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception, we determine whether the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating
those additional elements individually and in combination to determine
whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “generating, by a
camera device located on or inside a vehicle, camera data representing
information about an environment external to the vehicle” (limitation (1)),
“generating, by a global positioning system (GPS) subsystem onboard the
vehicle, location data indicative of locations of the vehicle” (limitation (2)),
“sending, via a wireless network, the camera data and the location data to a
remote electronic processing system comprising a memory and one or more
processors” (limitation (3)), and “causing the selected advertisement to be
provided to the driver while the driver is in the vehicle” (limitation (8)).
Claims App’x 1. Considering claim 1 as a whole, the additional elements do
not apply or use the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as
a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract
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ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant
postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)).
The Specification describes each of these elements as generic
computer components functioning in a generic manner. For example the
Specification makes it clear that the recited camera is a generic still or video
camera device. Spec. ¶¶ 15 (“devices that sense physical characteristics of
the environment external to the vehicle (e.g., still image cameras, video
cameras, lidar, radar, etc.)”), 16, 20–21, 49, 53, 58, 63, 66, 75, 81, 98, 106,
124. The Specification does not address how the camera generates data
indicating that the function is a generic function of the camera. Similarly,
the Specification makes it clear that the recited GPS is a generic device, with
no indication how it generates location data indicative of locations of the
vehicle. Spec. ¶¶ 15 (“navigational devices (e.g., dedicated global
positioning system (GPS) devices, smartphones with applications that locate
the smartphone using GPS or cell tower triangulation, etc.)”), 22 (“The
example system 10 also includes a GPS subsystem 48 that generates data
indicative of a current location of vehicle 12.”), 24, 54–55, 123–124.
Moreover, transmitting data, as recited by limitation (3), is a
conventional computer activity and thus this step does not integrate the
recited mental processes into an abstract idea. See, e.g., buySAFE, 765 F.3d
at 1355 (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a
network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
This is true even though these limitations recite transmitting “via a wireless
network” to “a remote electronic processing system comprising a memory
and one or more processors” because the Specification makes clear that
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these too are generic computer devices. For example, the Specification
states that “[i]n some embodiments, the data collection unit 50 receives data
from one or more of the external sensors 30, 32 and/or subsystems 40, 42,
44, 46 and 48 via a wireless link, such as a Bluetooth link.” Spec. ¶ 26; see
also Spec. ¶¶ 29, 33, 40, 43, 67, 71, 73, 95, 102, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123,
131. The Specification also states that the “data analysis unit 54 may
include one or more processors, and is configured to process the data
collected by data collection unit 50 and stored in memory 52 for various
purposes according to different embodiments” and “memory 56 for storing
outputs of the data analysis, which may be any suitable type of data storage,
such as a RAM, a flash memory, or a hard drive memory, for example.”
Spec. ¶ 30; see also Spec. ¶¶ 31–38.
Finally, causing the advertisement to be shown to the driver in the
vehicle is insignificant post-solution activity. The Specification, itself,
demonstrates the insignificant nature of this function because it does not
describe any particular method of showing the advertisement or explain how
such functionality is implemented. See Spec. ¶ 129 (stating that “method
480 may cause the advertisement to be provided to the driver while still
driving in the vehicle (e.g., via internet radio), or via email for later viewing,
etc.”).
Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us claim 1 is “directed to”
a patent-eligible concept. For example, Appellants argue the Examiner
failed to establish a prima facie case of patent ineligibility. Appeal Br. 14–
15. We disagree. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that “the prima
facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of
the burden of production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The
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Examiner satisfies the burden of establishing a prima facie case under 35
U.S.C. § 132 by setting forth a rejection in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
If the Examiner “adequately explain[s] the shortcomings . . . the burden
shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case with evidence and/or
argument.” Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370.
The Final Office Action adequately explains the § 101 rejection. See
Final Act. 2–6. The Examiner's statements satisfy § 132(a) because they
apply the Alice analytical framework and apprise Appellants of the reasons
for the § 101 rejection under that framework. Appellants have not
responded by alleging a failure to understand the rejection.
Appellants also argue that “[c]laim 1 focuses on providing targeted
advertisements to a driver of a vehicle in a vehicle telematics environment”
and “[t]he vehicle and vehicle telematics environment is not a mere ‘field of
use,’” but the claim “is necessarily rooted in vehicle telematics technology,
specifically by making use of data generated by a vehicle-based ‘camera
device’ and ‘GPS subsystem.’” Appeal Br. 13. Appellants, thus, assert the
claims are similar to those claimed in DDR Holdings. Id. (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); Reply
Br. 5–6.
We are not persuaded that claim 1 improves the functioning of the
computer itself or any other technology or technical field. MPEP
§ 2106.05(a). In reviewing the record, we find the claims on appeal are
silent regarding specific limitations directed to an improved computer
system, processor, or virtual environment software. According to the
Specification, the claims focus on “systems and methods for collecting and
processing information generated onboard a vehicle in order to provide
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targeted advertising.”4 Spec. ¶ 1. Providing targeted advertising based on
collected data is not a technical field, but a human endeavor that pre-dates
computers. There is no indication that any increase in efficiency or accuracy
comes from the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP. LLC v. Iatric
Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp
Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more
efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of
the claimed subject matter.”)) (alteration in original); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process
of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and
accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-
purpose computer ‘do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the
claimed subject matter.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Therefore, we find Appellants’ claimed invention does not provide a
solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” such as

4 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. “The Board’s slight
revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not
render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math)
to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see
also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination
of abstract ideas).
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considered by the court in DDR Holdings. See 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, even in combination with all the other recited elements,
the addition of limitations (1)–(3) and (8) does not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits
on practicing the abstract idea. For these reasons, we determine that claim 1
does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application.
Inventive Concept
Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is “directed to” an
abstract idea, we consider whether an additional element (or combination of
elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood, routine, conventional
(“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the additional elements simply
append WURC activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 23. The Examiner’s finding that an additional element (or
combination of elements) is WURC activity must be supported with a
factual determination. Id. (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d), as modified by the
Berkheimer Memorandum5).
Whether the additional elements (limitations (1)–(3) and (8)) are
WURC activity is a question of fact. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether something is well-understood,
routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan . . . is a factual
determination.”).

5 Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) (2018) (hereinafter “Berkheimer Memorandum”).
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On the record before us, Appellants have not shown that the claims on
appeal add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)).
In fact, Appellants’ Specification demonstrates the WURC nature of
the claimed additional elements because it indicates they may be
implemented with generic devices. Spec. ¶¶ 23–40. In addition, courts have
recognized that receiving data over a network, in a manner similar to that
recited in the claims, is WURC. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network);
buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (computer receives and sends information over a
network).
For these reasons, we conclude that claim 1, considered as a whole,
does not include an inventive concept.
Conclusion
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 2, 3, 9,
and 22–25, for which Appellants rely on the same arguments made with
respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–16; Reply Br. 2–6.
Rejection of Claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over a combination of Laumeyer, Hickman, and Sherman. Final
Act. 7–34.
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Appellants argue the cited references do not teach or suggest
limitation (8) of claim 1.6 Appeal Br. 17–20; Reply Br. 6–9. Appellants
argue “Laumeyer neither teaches nor suggests that the ‘drive-thru
presentation with at least one virtual advertisement’ is presented or delivered
to the ‘data acquisition vehicle,’ or to anyone associated with that vehicle
(e.g., the driver or a passenger).” Appeal Br. 17. According to Appellants,
“the combination of Laumeyer and Hickman would at best result in a system
in which a first vehicle (i.e., the ‘data acquisition vehicle’ of Laumeyer
collects images and location data, while selected advertisements are instead
provided to a driver of a second, different vehicle.” Id. at 19. Appellants
conclude the combination of the two references lacks showing the selected
advertisement to the driver in “the same vehicle on or inside which the
camera device that generated the camera data is mounted, as recited in claim
1.” Id.
The Examiner responds that “both Laumeyer and Hickman teach the
applicability of vehicle generated footage used to create in-vehicle
advertisement for the same user.” Ans. 7. The Examiner explains that “[a]t
no point in Laumeyer is a ‘second vehicle’ required.” Id.
Neither Laumeyer nor Hickman distinguish whether the device
showing the disclosed location-based advertising is in the same vehicle as
the device that captured and stored the location-information. And we agree
with the Examiner that Laumeyer gives examples of using real-time route
information to present an advertisement to a driver or occupants in a vehicle
as the information is being collected. Laumeyer ¶¶ 8, 9. We, therefore, find

6 Independent claim 22 recites a substantively similar limitation. Claims
App’x 3.
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that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have read the references
broadly to at least suggest that the showing device may be in the same
vehicle as the capturing device.
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s rejection. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 1 as
obvious over Laumeyer, Hickman, and Sherman. Remaining claims 2, 3, 9,
and 22–25, not argued separately (see Appeal Br. 20), stand or fall with
claim 1.7
DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 9, and 22–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED

7 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).