Tischhauser, Paul David. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 21, 2020

13916949 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/916,949 06/13/2013 Paul David Tischhauser 338791.02 5052
69316 7590 02/21/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
LOFTIS, JOHNNA RONEE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte PAUL DAVID TISCHHAUSER, MARK DANIEL MacKENZIE,
JASON A. COOK, KARL-ERIK BYSTROM, and
JASDEEP SINGH CHUGH
____________________

Appeal 2018-0076920F1
Application 13/916,949
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed
April 27, 2017 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed December 20, 2017
(“Appeal Br.”); and (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 20, 2018
(“Ans.”). No Reply Brief was filed in response to the Examiner’s Answer.

Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

2
STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant1F2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–19 and 21. Claim 20 has been canceled (see Appeal Br. 2, 16
(Claims Appendix)). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s disclosed invention pertains to a “computing hardware
and software technology, and in particular to scheduling features in
information management applications” (Spec. ¶ 2). “Microsoft® Outlook®
is one example of an information management application” (Spec. ¶ 3).
Appellants have computerized meeting and event scheduling, “to select
people to invite to a meeting and possibly to select a room for the meeting”
(Spec. ¶ 5). Accordingly, Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention
provides an interface (see Figs. 1, 5–8) for scheduling/calendaring a room by
selecting participants and rooms/buildings based on participant and
room/building availability (see Spec. ¶¶ 5–9; Abstract; claims 1, 10, 19).
Exemplary Claims
Exemplary claims 1 and 10 under appeal, with bracketed lettering and
emphases added to key portions of the claim at issue, reads as follows:

2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC
(Appeal Br. 1).
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

3
1. One or more computer readable storage media having
program instructions stored thereon for facilitating event
scheduling that, when executed by a computing system, direct
the computing system to at least:
identify a plurality of event entities comprising an event
participant and an event environment, the event environment
comprising a plurality of sub-environments in which to
potentially host an event;
identify a participant availability for the event participant
based on a participant schedule associated with the event
participant;
identify an environment availability for the event
environment based on an environment schedule associated with
each of the plurality of sub-environments; and
present the participant availability for the event
participant in a calendar perspective in a user interface to an
information management application, wherein the calendar
perspective comprises a plurality of cells;
present the environment availability for the event
environment in the calendar perspective in the user interface to
the information management application;
[A] present a scheduling feature in the user interface that
when selected, results in a menu including at least a first option
to display an availability for any one of the plurality of sub-
environments in the event environment, a second option to
display an availability for all the plurality of sub-environments
in the environment, and a third option to select a new
environment; and
for each cell of the plurality of cells:
if a conflict exists between at least the event
participant and a day and time represented by the cell,
present a visual indication in the cell of the conflict; and
if a different conflict exists between at least the
event environment and the day and the time represented
by the cell, present a different visual indication in the cell
of a state of the different conflict.
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

4
Appeal Br. 11, Claims Appendix (emphases and bracketed lettering added).
10. A method for facilitating event scheduling
comprising:
identifying a plurality of event entities comprising an
event participant and an event environment, the event
environment comprising a plurality of sub-environments in
which to potentially host an event;
identifying a participant availability for the event
participant based on a participant schedule associated with the
event participant;
identifying an environment availability for the event
environment based on an environment schedule associated with
each of the plurality of sub-environments; and
presenting the participant availability for the event
participant in a calendar perspective in a user interface to an
information management application, wherein the calendar
perspective comprises a plurality of cells;
presenting the environment availability for the event
environment in the calendar perspective in the user interface to
the information management application;
[A] presenting a scheduling feature in the user interface
that when selected, results in a menu including at least a first
option to display an availability for any one of the plurality of
sub-environments in the event environment, a second option to
display an availability for all the plurality of sub-environments
in the environment, and a third option to select a new
environment; and
for each cell of the plurality of cells:
if a conflict exists between at least the event
participant and a day and time represented by the cell,
presenting a visual indication in the cell of the conflict;
and
if a different conflict exists between at least the
event environment and the day and the time represented
by the cell, presenting a different visual indication in the
cell of a state of the different conflict.

Appeal Br. 14, Claims Appendix (emphases and bracketed lettering added).
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

5
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–19 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea), without
significantly more. Final Act. 4–6; Ans. 2–4.
(2) Claims 1–3, 9–12, 18, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dorenbosch et al. (US 7,343,313 B2;
issued March 11, 2008) (hereinafter, “Dorenbosch”), Tromczynski et al. (US
2006/0010023 A1; published January 12, 2006) (hereinafter,
“Tromczynski”), Conmy et al. (US 2001/0014866 A1; published August 16,
2001) (hereinafter, “Conmy”), and Adams et al. (US 2009/0177518 A1;
published July 9, 2009) (hereinafter, “Adams”). Final Act. 6–10.
(3) Claims 4–8 and 13–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the base combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, and Adams, further taken with Doss et al. (US 7,395,221 B2; issued
July 1, 2008) (hereinafter, “Doss”). Final Act. 10–13.
(4) Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the base combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, and Adams, further taken with Iknoian (US 2007/0179830 A1;
published August 2, 2007). Final Act. 13.
Appellant’s Contentions
(1) With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant does not
argue any specific claim, and generally contends the claims are not directed
to an abstract idea, but to improvements in computer-related technology (see
Appeal Br. 6–7) that “are actually directed to a very specific computer-
implemented tool” for “analyzing the availability of a building” (Appeal Br.
7). Appellant contends the claimed invention is a computer-implemented
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

6
tool having features “that allow a user to more quickly search for an
available room in a building” (Appeal Br. 7).
Based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and because claims
1–19 and 21 contain commensurate limitations, we select claim 10 as
representative of claims 1–19 and 21 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
patent-ineligibility.
(2) With regard to the obviousness rejections of claims 1–3, 9–12, 18,
19, and 21, Appellant primarily argues the merits of independent claim 1
(see Appeal Br. 7–9), and makes similar arguments as to the patentability of
remaining independent claims 10 and 19, as well as dependent claims 2, 3, 9,
11, 12, 18, and 21 (see Appeal Br. 9). As to independent claim 1, Appellant
contends (Appeal Br. 7–9) that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103, because Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams,
whether taken individually or in combination, fail to teach or suggest
limitation A recited in claim 1.
Based on Appellant’s obviousness arguments, and because claims 1–
3, 9–12, 18, 19, and 21 contain commensurate limitations, we select claim 1
as representative of claims 1–3, 9–12, 18, and 19 rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) for obviousness over the base combination of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams. For similar reasons, we decide the
outcome of claim 21 (rejected over the base combination taken with Iknoian,
which ultimately depends from independent claim 19, on the same bases as
claim 19 (which in turn we decide on the basis of claim 1).
(3) With regard to the obviousness rejection of claims 4–8 and 13–17,
Appellant (a) relies on the arguments presented as to claims 1 and 10 from
which claims 4–8 and 13–17 ultimately depend; and (b) argues Doss teaches
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

7
away from claims 4–8 and 13–17 because Doss’ disclosure of
recommending meeting locations is based on proximity to a building, and
not on building availability as claimed (see Appeal Br. 9).
Based on Appellant’s arguments regarding claims 4–8 and 13–17, and
because claims 4–8 and 13–17 contain commensurate limitations, we select
claim 13 as representative of claims 4–8 and 13–17 rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) for obviousness over the combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, Adams, and Doss.
Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 6–
10), the following issues are presented on appeal:
(1) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 10, as well as claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21 grouped
therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter (i.e., a judicial exception such as an abstract idea), without
significantly more)?
(2) Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1–3, 9–12, 18, 19, and 21
as being unpatentable over the base combination of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams because the base combination fails to
teach or suggest limitation A recited in representative claim 1?
(3) Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 4–8 and 13–17 as being
unpatentable over the base combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, and Adams, further taken with Doss, because Doss teaches away
from the invention recited in representative claim 13?

Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

8
ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

9
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

10
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (Step 2B).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

11
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 10 recites “[a]
method for facilitating event scheduling” including a series of steps that
identify and present specific information (claim 10). Therefore, claims 10,
as a method claim, recites at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g.,
process) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claim 10, as well as claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21
grouped therewith, we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the
Guidance to determine whether representative the claims (1) recite a judicial
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

12
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) are patent-eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1
At a high level, representative claim 10 recites a method of facilitating
event scheduling based on certain identified data. More specifically, the
method is based on participant availability information and environment
(e.g., building) and sub-environment (e.g., room) information, which is used
to present options to a user (see claim 10). Appellant describes the claims as
pertaining to “event scheduling/management” (Appeal Br. 6). The Examiner
determines, and we agree, that claim 10 is “directed to an abstract idea” and
to a method “for viewing availability of an environment based on
availability of sub-environments” (Final Act. 4).
Appellant contends that claim 10 is not directed to an abstract idea,
but to an improvement in computer-related technology (see Appeal Br. 6–7),
and is a computer-implemented tool having features “that allow a user to
more quickly search for an available room in a building” (Appeal Br. 7).
Appellant’s arguments that claim 10 is not directed to an abstract idea are
unpersuasive.
We agree with the Examiner (see Final Act. 4; Ans. 3) that event
scheduling, including identifying availabilities and presenting options for
scheduling the event to avoid conflicts, is a mental process. See Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). And, we agree with the Examiner (see
Ans. 3) that event scheduling/management, including determining
scheduling conflicts, is a mental process that can be practically performed by
a human using pen and paper. Further, claim 10 recites not only a mental
process, but also the organization of human activity, such as business
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

13
relations between people (e.g., facilitating scheduling of events or business
meetings for participants). Therefore, we also agree with the Examiner that
the claimed improvement “would be considered a business improvement”
(Ans. 3), and not an improvement in computers or technology as argued by
Appellant.
We determine that the limitations of claim 10 are focused on, and
generally relate to a mental process for determining conflicts and scheduling
events which is also a business relation between people (see generally claim
10; Figs. 1, 5–8; Spec. ¶¶ 2–9; Abstract). As such, the claimed invention
recites certain methods of organizing human activity, which is an abstract
idea. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876
F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that concept of “local
processing of payments for remotely purchased goods’’ is a ‘‘fundamental
economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more, outside the
patent system.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“analyzing information by steps people [can] go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more [are]
mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”); Digitech Image
Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (holding that a process that starts with data, applies an algorithm, and
ends with a new form of data is directed to an abstract idea); Digitech
Information Systems, Inc. v. BMW Auto Leasing, LLC, 504 F. App’x 920
(mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rendering a decision based on data and
mathematical formulas and finding process of operating on information
using mathematical formulas/correlations patent ineligible); Clarilogic v.
Formfree Holdings, 681 Fed. App’x. 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

14
(gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract
idea that is patent ineligible).
Our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and
recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”). Moreover, our
reviewing court has concluded that acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and
editing data are abstract ideas. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, the collection of information and analysis of
information (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also
abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data”
is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely presenting the results
of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract
as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”) (quotations omitted).
Because we conclude claim 10 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to
Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 10 is “directed
to” the judicial exception, by determining whether additional elements of the
claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Such additional
elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

15
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
But for the recitation of a generic “user interface” to an information
management application (independent claim 10), we find the recited steps or
acts, could be performed as mental steps, or with the aid of pen and paper.
See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1146 (“While the Supreme Court has altered the
§ 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue
to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,
or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental
processes within the abstract-idea category.’”) (quoting Elec. Power, 830
F.3d at 1354); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
“[M]erely selecting information, by content or source, for collection
[and] analysis . . . does nothing significant to differentiate a process from
ordinary mental processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Receiving and
analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform an otherwise-
abstract process or system of information collection and analysis. See id.
Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find Appellant’s claim 10
does not invoke “any assertedly inventive programming” or an “arguably
inventive set of components or methods.” Id.
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

16
Appellant contends the claims allow a user to more quickly perform
the task of event scheduling (Appeal Br. 7), and are directed to an improved
computer (Appeal Br. 6). However, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments. Claim 10 merely recites steps for facilitating event scheduling
by identifying information and presenting menu options for scheduling and
giving visual indicators of conflicts. We consider this idea to be abstract.
We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 6) that the focus of claim
10 is on a technical improvement (or practical application of the abstract
idea). The mere recitation of identifying and presenting information in
claim 10 does not embody an improvement in computer capabilities as in
Enfish. See 822 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an
improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks
for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”). Rather, the focus of
claim 10 is on facilitating the scheduling of events, i.e., determining
availability of participants and locations for meetings while avoiding
conflicts. This is an improvement to help the user (scheduler), but not the
computer itself (or in the case of claim 10, the user interface and/or
information management application). Claim 10 does not recite a method of
facilitating the scheduling of events that improves the speed or efficiency of
the information management application or computer, reduces memory
requirements, or otherwise improves a user interface. To the extent that
Appellant would argue the claimed method to perform scheduling faster than
other computerized scheduling methods, that would not provide an
improvement to the computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Development Group
v. SAP America, 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in
order for a machine to add significantly more, it must "play a significant part
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

17
in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
more quickly"); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1095 (2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly purport to
accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes
from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented
method itself”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter”).
The claimed invention (see claim 10) identifies data (e.g., event
participants and environments and availability thereof), and then presents (i)
options on a menu of a user interface for selection; and (ii) presents visual
indications for conflicts – this is merely conventional data gathering and
analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. As
such, based on the record before us, we determine that the claimed invention
is not integrated into a practical application.
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

18
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer or calendaring applicaiton
to more quickly facilitate scheduling/managing events is nothing more than
the abstract idea itself (i.e., event scheduling/management to avoid conflicts
which is a fundamental economic practice and mental process).
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 10
(and claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21 grouped therewith) invokes generic
computer components (a “user interface” and an “information management
application”) merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the
judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a
practical application. Because Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner’s determination that claim 10 recites an abstract idea under Step
2A is in error, and claim 10 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea
of a method of organizing human activity and/or mental process) that is not
integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance, we
conclude claims 10 and claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21 grouped therewith, are
directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with
regard to claims 1–19 and 21 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 10 and claims 1–9, 11–19, and 21 grouped
therewith are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical
application, we now evaluate whether the additional elements, whether
examined alone or as an ordered combination, add a specific limitation that
is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

19
simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract
idea. See generally Guidance.
Here, claim 10 recites the additional elements of “a user interface”
and “an information management application” (claim 10). Considering
claim 10 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the
abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Appellant has not identified what it is about claim 10 (or any other
claims) that allegedly amounts to more than a conventional arrangement of
limitations for performing the abstract idea identified above. In other words,
Appellant does not persuasively argue any specific limitation or combination
thereof is not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field (see
generally Appeal Br. 6–7). Nor does Appellant persuasively argue the
Examiner erred in that aspect. In particular, Appellant’s attorney arguments
that the subject matter in the claims is an improvement to computer-related
technology (Appeal Br. 6), are unpersuasive, because they are not supported
by competent evidence. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1977). In addition,
Appellant’s argument (see Appeal Br. 6) is, in essence, a conclusory
assertion that the claims are non-conventional, and thus a technological
improvement.
The Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements
beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components used to perform
generic computer functions (Final Act. 5; Ans. 4) — a determination that is
supported by Appellant’s Figures 1 and 5 through 8 and the accompanying
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

20
descriptions found in the Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 34–55). Appellant’s
Specification only shows (see Figs. 1, 5–8) and describes (see Spec. ¶¶ 34–
37, 43–46) well-understood, routine, conventional computer components
used for facilitating event scheduling (e.g., a computer, processor, memory,
user interface, and information management application) that are in a general
purpose computing environment in a manner that indicates the components
and the functions they perform were well-known in the art. See Hybritech
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(explaining that “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well
known in the art”); see also USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19,
2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that
describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional
elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to
describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a)” can show that the elements are well understood, routine, and
conventional); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d
1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the
abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
As a result, we are not persuaded that the event scheduling and menu
operations recited in claim 10 are anything beyond generic computer
functions as opposed to an improvement to a fundamental economic practice
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

21
and/or method of organizing human activity. Considering the elements of
claim 10 individually and as an ordered combination, claim 10 does no more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a
generic computer, processor, and/or user interface. Dealertrack, Inc. v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a
‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without
more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”)
Additionally, as noted in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II), the courts have
previously recognized that using computer processors and memories to
collect data and keep records, perform repetitive calculations, and/or
receive/send data are well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(i)–(iv). See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366 (acts of
parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am.,
Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis”); Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1340 (“collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data” is an abstract idea); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of
data are directed to an abstract idea.”).
As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with
respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
Step 2B.
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

22
In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not sufficiently shown the
Examiner erred in determining claims 1–19 and 21 are directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea), without significantly more.

Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1–
19 and 21 (Final Act. 6–13) and response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief (Ans. 4–6), in light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal
Brief (Appeal Br. 7–9) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellant’s arguments.
Representative Claim 1 -- Limitation A
With regard to representative independent claim 1, we adopt as our
own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 6–8), and (2) the reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 4–6) in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and conclusions
reached by the Examiner. We provide the following for emphasis only.
We agree with the Examiner’s response (Ans. 4–6) to Appellant’s
arguments in the Appeal Brief (see Appeal Br. 7–9), that Appellant argues
the references individually, and not for the specific bases they were each
relied upon for in the Final Rejection. We note that each reference cited by
the Examiner must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in
combination with the prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding one cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where the rejections are based on
combinations of references). In this light, Appellant’s arguments presented
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

23
as to the shortcomings in the teachings of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, and Adams individually are not persuasive inasmuch as the
Examiner relies on a properly made combination of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams to support the conclusion of obviousness
of the subject matter of claim 1.
Appellant has not adequately shown that the combination of
Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams teaches or suggests the
computer driven event scheduling facilitation set forth in claim 1. In view of
the foregoing, Appellant’s contentions (Appeal Br. 7–9) that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious over the combination of
Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams are unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative claim 1, as well as claims 2, 3, 9–12, 18, and 19 grouped
therewith, as being unpatentable over the combination of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams.
Dependent Claim 21
Similarly, Appellant has not adequately shown that the combination of
Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, Adams, and Iknoian teaches or suggests
the computing apparatus having a user interface and calendar application set
forth in claim 21. Claim 21 depends from claim 19, which falls with
claim 1. Notably, Appellant “refrains from a separate discuss[ion] of
Iknoian in view of its failure to overcome the shortcomings of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams” (Appeal Br. 9). Accordingly, and for
similar reasons as discussed above for claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 21 as being unpatentable over the base
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

24
combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams, further
taken with Iknoian.
Representative Claim 13 – Teaching Away
With regard to representative claim 13, we adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken (Final Act. 10–11), and (2) the reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 6) in response to Appellant’s
Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and conclusions reached by the
Examiner. We provide the following for emphasis only.
Claim 13 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein the calendar perspective
further comprises availability information for each of the plurality of event
entities that indicates the overall availability of the building” (claim 13)
(emphasis added). The Examiner relies on Doss as teaching (i) “presenting
availability information using a calendar perspective (column 6, lines 26-
67)” (Final Act. 10); and (ii) “environment availability” in a “calendar
perspective associated with the environment (column 6, lines 26-67)” (Final
Act. 12). In other words, the Examiner relies on Doss for teaching a
calendar view or perspective for showing availability. The Examiner also
relies on Tromczynski for teaching displaying room/building availability
(see Final Act. 7, 11–12 citing Tromczynski ¶¶ 38–42). Although Doss
discloses an embodiment that factors in the “[r]elationships among physical
locations” and “distances between various locations and travel time” into the
scheduling process (Doss col. 6, ll. 66–col. 7, l. 2), Doss also teaches a
scheduling application that considers “not only calendar data but also
nuances related to the physical location of the invitees; . . . constraints of
particular locations and/or policies/laws/regulations that impact a person’s
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

25
availability” (Doss col. 6, ll. 58–62). One of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that “constraints of particular locations” (Doss col. 6, l. 60) could
include room/building availability. Because (i) Dorenbosch, Tromczynski,
Conmy, Adams, and Doss; and (ii) the subject matter recited in
representative claim 13, all pertain to scheduling meetings or meeting
planning, we do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that “it would not
make sense to combine Doss with Dorenbosch” because Doss “teaches
away” (Appeal Br. 9).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative claim 13, as well as claims 4–8 and 13–17 grouped therewith,
as being unpatentable over the base combination of Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams, further taken with Doss.
Summary
(1) As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 10, as well as claims 1–9, 11–19, and
21 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1–19 and
21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
(2) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–
3, 9–12, 18, and 19 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In view
of the foregoing, we sustain the obviousness rejection of representative
claim 1, as well as claims 2, 3, 9–12, 18, and 19 grouped therewith, as being
obvious over the base combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy,
and Adams. For similar reasons, and because (i) Appellant relies on the
Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

26
arguments presented as to claim 19 in arguing dependent claim 21; and (ii)
claim 21 ultimately depends from claim 19, we also sustain the remaining
obviousness rejection of claim 21 over the base combination taken with
Iknoian.
(3) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4–
8 and 13–17 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In view of the
foregoing, we sustain the obviousness rejection of representative claim 13,
as well as claims 5–8 and 13–17 grouped therewith, as being obvious over
the base combination of Dorenbosch, Tromczynski, Conmy, and Adams,
further taken with Doss.

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons above, we hold as follows:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–19, 21 101 Eligibility 1–19, 21
1–3, 9–
12, 18,
19
103(a) Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski,
Conmy, Adams
1, 2, 4–6, 8–16
4–8, 13–
17
103(a) Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski,
Conmy, Adams,
Doss
4–8, 13–17
21 103(a) Dorenbosch,
Tromczynski,
Conmy, Adams,
Iknoian
21
Overall
Outcome
1–19, 21

Appeal 2018-007692
Application 13/916,949

27

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED