Tinley Park Hotel and Convention Center, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 16, 2015

13-CA-141609 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 16, 2015)

JD–36–15
Chicago, IL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
TINLEY PARK HOTEL AND
CONVENTION CENTER, LLC
and Case 13–CA–141609
AUDELIA SANTIAGO,
an Individual
R. Jason Patterson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Laura A. Balson, Esq. and Brianna L. Golan, Esq.
(Golan & Christie), of Chicago, Illinois,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHARLES J. MUHL, Administrative Law Judge. The General Counsel’s complaint in this
case alleges that Tinley Park Hotel and Convention Center, LLC (the Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), by discharging banquet server
Audelia Santiago for a violation of an overly broad handbook rule prohibiting disloyalty. In
addition, the General Counsel alleges that three other rules in the Respondent’s employee
handbook are facially unlawful and constitute independent violations of Section 8(a)(1). The
Respondent denies that it violated the Act and asserts that it discharged Santiago due to her
violation of its lawful cell phone use policy.
I conducted a trial on the complaint on April 27, 2015, in Chicago, Illinois. Counsel for
the parties filed post-hearing briefs on June 1, 2015, which I have considered. Based upon the
Board’s Double Eagle rule, I conclude that the Respondent’s discharge of Santiago violated the
Act, because it was imposed, at least in part, on an unlawfully overbroad disloyalty rule and
because Santiago violated the rule by engaging in conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns
underlying Section 7 of the Act. Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 39 (2011); Double
Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112 (2004). The Respondent did not establish that Santiago’s
conduct actually interfered with her own work or that of other employees or otherwise actually
interfered with the Respondent’s operations, nor did it establish that such interference, rather
JD–36–15
2
than Santiago’s violation of the disloyalty rule, was the reason for her discharge. On the entire
record, including my observation of the demeanor of witnesses, I make the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT5
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent provides hotel, meeting, and convention center services at its facility in
Tinley Park, Illinois. In conducting its business operations in the last past calendar year, the 10
Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received goods,
products, and materials in excess of $5000 directly from points located outside the State of
Illinois. Accordingly, and at all material times, I find that the Respondent has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and is subject to
the Board’s jurisdiction, as the Respondent admits in its answer to the complaint. 15
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND ANALYSIS
The Respondent operates a Holiday Inn hotel attached to the Tinley Park Convention
Center. Pursuant to an agreement with Tinley Park, the Respondent runs and manages the20
convention center. Audelia Santiago began working for the Respondent as a banquet server on a
part-time basis in September 2007. The Respondent promoted her to full time, or core, status on
January 8, 2014.1 As a banquet server, Santiago’s responsibilities included setting up and
serving meals and snacks in banquet rooms, as well as occasionally to operate concession stands.
Santiago’s superiors were Senior Operations Manager Tim Gourley and Junior Operations 25
Manager Emily Balis.2
A. The Discharge of Audelia Santiago
1. The Respondent’s “Personal Conduct & Work Rules”30
In August 2011, the Respondent issued and, at all times material to this case, maintained
an employee handbook containing its personal conduct and work rules, a non-exhaustive list of
examples of employee misconduct. Violations of the rules subjected employees to discipline,
including discharge, even for a first offense. The examples of misconduct at issue in Santiago’s 35
discharge are:
9. Disloyalty, including disparaging or denigrating the food,
beverages, or services of the company, its guests, associates, or
supervisors by making or publishing false or malicious 40
statements.

1 All dates hereinafter are in 2014, unless otherwise specified.
2 At the hearing, the Respondent stipulated only to the 2(13) status of Gourley and Balis, as well
as of Nancy Reed, the Respondent’s director of human resources.
JD–36–15
3
26. Unauthorized use of telephone or frequent and unnecessary use
of the telephone for personal business.
30. Cellular phone usage during work hours is prohibited. Cell
phones must be turned off and used only during breaks.5
(GC Exh. 2, pp. 23-24 of handbook.) Effective March 30, 2012, the Respondent also issued a
“Standard Operating Procedure” (SOP) as to cell phone usage, which stated:
• The use of cell phones during your shift is prohibited10
• The use of [p]ods and other personal music devices during your
shift is prohibited
• Usage of the above devices is only allowed during your
scheduled 30 min lunch break
• Usage is not allowed during any paid break times15
• A manager may issue exceptions on the use of cell phones for
certain positions if their use is necessary for effective
communication
(R. Exh. 1.) Santiago signed a copy of this SOP stating she had read, been trained, and 20
understood the policy.
2. The events of June 27
The Respondent’s level of business varies significantly during the year, with its busiest 25
period from May until the beginning of November. During this period, core employees such as
Santiago may be expected to work for an extended number of hours, covering breakfast, lunch,
dinner, and perhaps a wedding thereafter on a single workday. During each workday, banquet
servers are provided one, unpaid, half-hour lunch break and two, paid, 15-minute breaks. Lunch
breaks are recorded in the Respondent’s timekeeping system, but paid breaks are not. Breaks 30
during the workday are unscheduled. Employees take them when they have time to do so, such
as after a meal service is finished.
On June 27, Santiago arrived for work at 5:30 a.m. That day, she had seven banquet
rooms to cover from breakfast through lunch service, or 4 p.m., as well as a dinner in the 35
evening. Santiago worked continuously without taking a break until she finished setting up for
dinner at 7:30 p.m. At that point, Santiago and other banquet servers, both core and temporary
employees, gathered in a non-public hallway between the kitchen and banquet rooms and took a
break until 8 p.m. Although this hallway was not designated by the Respondent as a break area,
the employees frequently took breaks there. During this break, some of the employees were 40
sitting down, some were talking, and some were using their cell phones.
Santiago was with employees Xaverie Benedict, Cody Bridges, and Sandra Sana.3
Santiago had her cell phone in her hand and told Bridges, why don’t you take a selfie like you

3 Bridges, like Balis, was identified as a junior banquet manager, but was not alleged as a
supervisor or agent in the General Counsel’s complaint.
JD–36–15
4
always do?4 Bridges grabbed Santiago’s phone and took a picture of himself, Benedict, and
Sana, then immediately posted it to Santiago’s Facebook page with the comment, “No phones at
work – with Xaverie Benedict and 2 others.”5 (GC Exh. 3, p. 2.) After Bridges gave Santiago
her cell phone back, she posted the comment, “Reinita you are scary,” under this picture.
Santiago also took two additional pictures. However, she did not post them to her Facebook 5
page or make any further comments about the photos until after she finished working that day.
Multiple people commented on the photo posted by Bridges on Santiago’s Facebook
page. Nick Leyva, a former employee, posted “tell Cody to do some work for once,” to which
Bridges responded with “its not required to work for anyone at tpcc.” Santiago responded to that 10
post with: “Yea Cody you are right cause while I was the only one working like an (sic) slave
you guys were taking selfies with my own phone and posting them on my wall lol.” Bridges
responded, “Oh Silvia You were standing next to us telling us to take a selfie Lol.”
One of the pictures Santiago posted on Facebook after work was of the banquet servers 15
congregated in the hallway. (GC Exh. 3, p. 1.) Santiago included the comment, “That’s how we
work at TPCC,” when posting the photo. Santiago testified that this comment was a joke
because, although the picture made it appear as if the banquet servers were not working, they
actually all had worked too hard that day.
20
After she posted it, multiple people commented on that photo. The first comment, from
Santiago’s cousin, Mercedes Rodriguez, was in Spanish and translated to “Oh, how hard you
work, you look tired, you guys look tired.” A former employee, Joyce Kobiernicki Bussema,
commented, “unbelievable! Let Reva [one of the Respondent’s owners] keep paying all these
people for doing nothing.” Bridges responded: “Well technically they get paid by the client’s 25
gratuity that is broken up among the servers. Plus standing to pose for a team building photo for
one minute is never a bad thing especially since they have done all that could be done for the
next two days!” Santiago later added, “Hi Joyce I still remember the game we use to play in the
lunch room for hours it was fun I miss you guys. Now we don’t have time for that.”
30
Santiago’s Facebook page only can be seen by her Facebook friends, 10 of whom are
coworkers of hers.
3. The discharge of Santiago on July 3
35
On July 3, Gourley and Balis met with Santiago shortly after her shift began. Gourley
said he was sorry, but he had to terminate her. Gourley provided Santiago with a discharge
letter, stating:
On 6-27-14, Sylvia was using her cell phone while on duty. She 40
posted pictures on Facebook that depict the company in an

4 A “selfie” is defined as a photograph that one takes of oneself with a digital camera or front-
facing smartphone, tablet, or webcam, especially for posting on a social-networking or photo-sharing
website. See, e.g., www.dictionary.com and www.merriam-webster.com, visited June 9, 2015.
5 Santiago’s Facebook username is “Delia S Santiago.” Santiago also is referred to as “Sylvia” in
some of the Facebook comments.
JD–36–15
5
unfavorable light. In addition derogatory comments were made in
regards to the pictures that further compromise the public
perception of the Convention Center and MidCon Hospitality.6
This violated several “Personal Conduct & Work Rules” (page 24)
as listed in the company's Employee Handbook. Sylvia violated 5
rules 9, 26, 30[.] Due to the severity and multitude of rule
violations, Sylvia will be terminated effective Thursday, July 3rd,
2014.
Fearful that she would lose her job, Santiago told Gourley that she did not take those pictures and 10
was not using her phone while she was working, even though both statements were inaccurate.
Gourley again said he was sorry and she would have to go to human resources if she had
something else to say. Neither Gourley nor Balis provided any additional details in this meeting
concerning the basis for Santiago’s discharge.
15
Santiago then went to see Nancy Reed, the Respondent’s director of human resources. At
that point, Reed had not seen the discharge letter and did not have a lot of details about what
happened. Reed told Santiago that she understood both good and bad comments had been made
on Facebook. When Santiago denied making any bad or derogatory comments, Reed responded
that maybe she did not, but Bridges did and it gave a bad image to the Company because clients 20
could see the comments. Santiago also told Reed that they were trying to depict all of the people
standing in the banquet hallway, many of whom were temporary employees. Santiago told her
they wanted to show how the Respondent used way too many temps and they were all standing
there doing nothing.
25
As to cell phones, Santiago told Reed, again inaccurately, that she did not take the posted
pictures and was not using her phone while she was working. She stated it was her cell phone,
she had given it to Bridges, and Bridges posted the information on Facebook. Reed told her she
should not give her cell phone to anybody. Santiago also asked Reed about the rules on cell
phone usage, saying employees always used them to communicate with managers because the 30
banquet rooms were far away. Reed responded they could only be used for work.7
4. Legal framework
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a work rule that reasonably tends 35
to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia,
343 NLRB 646, 646-647 (2004); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). Where the
rule is likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the maintenance of the rule is an unfair
labor practice, even absent evidence of enforcement. In determining whether a challenged rule is

6 MidCon Hospitality is the management company for the Tinley Park Hotel and Convention
Center. (Tr. 137-138.)
7 The findings of fact concerning the conversation between Santiago and Reed are based on the
credited testimony of both individuals. By and large, their accounts are consistent as to the content of the
conversation, even when their specific recollections of the statements made were not exact matches. Each
person also remembered, and testified credibly to, different statements made during the conversation that
are not conflicting. By either account, the two discussed both the comments made in the Facebook
postings, as well as Santiago’s use of her cell phone.
JD–36–15
6
unlawful, the rule must be given a reasonable reading, particular phrases must not be read in
isolation, and improper interference with employee rights must not be presumed.
In evaluating a rule’s lawfulness, the first area of inquiry is whether the rule explicitly
restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, the rule is unlawful. If it does not, the rule 5
is unlawful only upon the showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to
union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Discipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule violates the Act in those 10
situations in which an employee violated the rule by (1) engaging in protected conduct or (2)
engaging in conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns underlying Section 7 of the Act.
Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 39, slip op. at 3-6 (2011); Double Eagle Hotel &
Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 fn. 3 (2004). An employer can avoid liability for discipline
imposed pursuant to an overbroad rule if it can establish that the employee’s conduct actually 15
interfered with the employee’s own work or that of other employees or otherwise actually
interfered with the employer’s operations, and that the interference, rather than the violation of
the rule, was the reason for the discipline. The employer bears the burden of asserting this
affirmative defense and establishing that the employee’s interference with production was the
actual reason for the discipline. That burden only can be met when an employer demonstrates 20
that it contemporaneously cited the employee’s interference with production as a reason for the
discipline, not simply the violation of the overbroad rule.
5. Analysis of the Respondent’s rule 9 prohibiting disloyalty
25
The General Counsel alleges that rule 9 violates Section 8(a)(1), because it reasonably
could be construed to prohibit Section 7 activity. As previously noted, that rule gives as an
example of misconduct: “disloyalty, including disparaging or denigrating the food, beverages, or
services of the company, its guests, associates, or supervisors by making or publishing false or
malicious statements.” The Board repeatedly has found similar language to be unlawful. In Lily 30
Transportation Corp., 362 NLRB No. 54 (2015), the Board ruled unlawful a ban on electronic
posting of “disparaging, negative, false, or misleading information or comments” about the
employer or employees. In Lafayette Park Hotel, supra, 326 NLRB at 828, the Board concluded
that a prohibition on “false, vicious, profane, or malicious statements towards or concerning [the
employer] or any of its employees” likewise was unlawful. Rule 9 reasonably could be 35
construed to prohibit protected activity, such as coworkers discussing with one another the
complaints they have about their supervisors.
While the Respondent contends that it only sought to ban false and malicious statements,
its use of the disjunctive in the rule language negates that argument. The Board has drawn a 40
distinction between statements that are both false and malicious, which are not protected, and
statements that are merely false, which retain protection. Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.,
351 NLRB 1250, 1252 (2007) (mere fact that statements are false, misleading, or inaccurate is
insufficient to demonstrate that they are maliciously untrue and unprotected). By prohibiting
“false or malicious” statements, the Respondent has banned merely false statements, an overly 45
broad prohibition. First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 18 fn. 2 (2014) (disloyalty
JD–36–15
7
rule which prohibited “false, vicious, or malicious statements concerning the Company or its
services, a client, or another employee” overly broad and unlawful).
Thus, rule 9 violates Section 8(a)(1).
5
6. Analysis of the Respondent’s discharge of Santiago
In the complaint and brief, the General Counsel alleges and argues that Santiago’s
discharge violates Section 8(a)(1), because the termination was imposed pursuant to overly broad
and unlawful rule 9 and the conduct for which Santiago was discharged implicates the concerns 10
underlying Section 7 of the Act.
Applying the Double Eagle rule to this case, I conclude that the General Counsel has
demonstrated that Santiago’s Facebook comments on June 27 were protected, even if not
concerted, and thus otherwise implicate the concerns underlying Section 7. Part of the back and 15
forth between Santiago and her Facebook friends centered on their terms and conditions of
employment that day, in particular how hard Santiago and other employees had been working.
Santiago stated she had been working like a “slave” and noted that she had no time to play games
like she used to do. These comments came after Santiago began work at 5:30 a.m., but did not
take her first break until 14 hours later at 7:30 p.m. that day. Employees’ complaints about their 20
hours of work, including heavy workloads, long have constituted protected activity. See, e.g.,
MCPC, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 39, slip op. at 1 (2014); Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 306 NLRB 1037,
1039 (1992).
Santiago’s discharge was imposed, at least in part, due to her violation of the 25
Respondent’s unlawful disloyalty rule. Santiago’s termination form explicitly cites to a violation
of rule 9. The text therein notes that the pictures Santiago posted depicted the Company in an
unfavorable light and the derogatory comments made as to the pictures compromised the public
perception of the Company. Although her discharge also was justified by violations of the
Respondent’s cell phone rules, an employer does not escape liability for an unlawful discharge 30
because it asserts other, lawful reasons for the same disciplinary action. A.T. & S.F. Memorial
Hospitals, 234 NLRB 436, 436 (1978). The fact that one reason for a disciplinary action is
lawful in no way diminishes the fact that the other reason was unlawful.8
While the Respondent contends that Santiago was discharged solely due to her violation 35
of the rules regarding cell phone use, the Respondent’s own termination form directly contradicts
that claim. Beyond the form, Reed testified that a portion of the conversation she had with
Santiago on July 3 dealt with the derogatory comments made on Facebook, which likewise is
inconsistent with the Respondent’s contention. Finally, neither Gourley nor Balis, the two
supervisors who actually made the decision to discharge Santiago, testified at the hearing. Thus, 40

8 At the hearing, both sides presented evidence on the question of whether the Respondent’s past
discipline of Santiago played a role in her discharge, as well as whether the Respondent previously had
disciplined employees for violations of its cell phone use policy. (Tr. 58-62, 82-83, 108-109; GC Exhs. 6,
10-13.) Because at least one of the Respondent’s reasons for discharging Santiago was unlawful, I do not
find this evidence relevant to the analysis of the Double Eagle burdens.
JD–36–15
8
no record testimony supports the Respondent’s argument. Santiago’s violation of the
Respondent’s cell phone rules was a factor in her discharge, but it was not the sole basis for it.
In its brief, the Respondent also argues that Santiago was not engaged in protected,
concerted activity through her Facebook postings. That simply is not the legal question 5
presented in this case. The Board has made clear that the Double Eagle rule applies to situations
where an employee is discharged due to conduct that is protected, but not concerted. Continental
Group, supra, 357 NLRB No. 39, slip op. at 5. The potential chilling effect on employees’
exercise of their Section 7 rights is even greater in these situations.
10
Given the General Counsel’s evidentiary showing, the Respondent bears the burden of
establishing that Santiago’s interference with production or operations was the actual reason for
her discharge. In its answer, the Respondent did not assert this as an affirmative defense. At the
hearing, the Respondent also did not present evidence that Santiago’s interference with
production was contemporaneously cited as the reason for her discharge. In any event, the 15
record establishes that Santiago took pictures during her break and posted the pictures and
comments on Facebook either while still on break or after she was done working on June 27.
Thus, her actions could not have interfered with her or other employees’ work responsibilities, or
the Respondent’s operations. Accordingly, the Respondent has not met its Double Eagle burden.
20
For all these reasons, I conclude that the Respondent’s discharge of Santiago violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The Remaining Allegations of Unlawful Handbook Rules
25
In addition to rule 9, the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that three other rules in the
Respondent’s employee handbook independently violate Section 8(a)(1).9
1. The Respondent’s rule 8
30
The General Counsel alleges that rule 8 violates Section 8(a)(1), because it explicitly
restricts employees’ Section 7 activity. Rule 8 defines as another example of employee
misconduct:
Unauthorized disclosure of confidential information relating to 35
guests, visitors, clients or other associates (including wage and
salary information to another associate) to anyone (including
outside sources and all news media) except company personnel
who have an authorized need to know or discussing confidential
company information in public areas where guests can overhear 40
conversation

9 The General Counsel made an oral motion at the hearing, which I granted, to withdraw
complaint paragraph IV(a)(4). That paragraph had alleged that personal conduct rule 18 also was
unlawful.
JD–36–15
9
This rule forbids employees from disclosing confidential information, including wages, to other
employees without the Respondent’s authorization. This rule is a textbook example of one
which explicitly prohibits employees from engaging in the protected activity of discussing their
wages and other working conditions with one another or members of the public. Parexel
International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 4 (2011); Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, supra, 341 5
NLRB at 113-115. The Respondent essentially conceded that the rule was unlawful during the
General Counsel’s investigation of the underlying charge in this case. (GC Exh. 8, p. 2.) The
maintenance of this rule plainly violates Section 8(a)(1).10
2. The Respondent’s rule 210
The General Counsel alleges that rule 2 violates Section 8(a)(1), because it reasonably
could be construed to prohibit Section 7 activity. Rule 2 states that “discourteous or
disrespectful treatment of guests, visitors, supervisors, or fellow associates” is another form of
misconduct subjecting employees to discipline. The meaning of “discourteous or disrespectful 15
treatment,” without further clarification or examples, is ambiguous. The language could be
construed to include protected conduct, such as group protests to management concerning their
working conditions. The Board repeatedly has found similar language to be overly broad and
encompassing employees’ protected activity. First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72, supra, slip
op. at 3 (rule prohibiting “[d]iscourteous or inappropriate attitude or behavior to passengers, 20
other employees, or members of the public” unlawfully overbroad); University Medical Center,
335 NLRB 1318, 1320-1321 (2001) (rule against “disrespectful conduct” unlawful).
Accordingly, this rule likewise violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The Respondent’s rule 2925
The General Counsel alleges that rule 29 violates Section 8(a)(1), because it reasonably
could be construed to prohibit Section 7 activity. Rule 29 subjects an employee to discipline for
engaging in “[a]ny other conduct that the company believes has created, or may lead to the
creation of a situation that may disrupt or interfere with the amicable, profitable and safe 30
operation of the company.” This rule is the Respondent’s catch-all provision, where it attempts
to cast as wide a net as possible to cover any conceivable act of employee misconduct. The
language is so broad and all encompassing, without any specific examples of misconduct which
might limit its scope, that it could engulf a multitude of protected activities. Some examples
include concerted protests of working conditions; lawful solicitations of other employees to 35
union activity; or publicizing any labor disputes to the public or the media. As with rule 8, the
Respondent essentially admitted that this rule violated the Act during the Board’s investigation

10 Other bases exist for finding rule 8 unlawful, given that multiple provisions reasonably could
be construed to restrict Section 7 activities. The ban on discussing “confidential information” could
reasonably be construed to include employee conversations about labor disputes or other terms and
conditions of employment. Like discussions concerning wages, those conversations are protected. The
rule also impermissibly restricts employees from discussing the same topics with “outside sources and all
news media.” Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc., supra, 351 NLRB at 1252; Kinder-Care Learning
Centers, 299 NLRB 1171, 1171-1172 (1990). Finally, prohibiting discussion of confidential information
and wages where customers might overhear the conversation is overly broad, because employees have a
protected right to speak to customers concerning their working conditions when not on work time.
Guardsmark, Inc., 344 NLRB 809, 809 (2005).
JD–36–15
10
of the charge in this case. For all these reasons, this rule also violates Section 8(a)(1). Purple
Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 43, slip op. at 1, 6 (2014) (“no disruptions” rule
prohibiting employees from causing, creating, or participating in a disruption of any kind during
working hours on company property unlawful).
5
To summarize then, I conclude, as alleged, that the Respondent’s personal conduct and
work rules 2, 8, 9, and 29 all violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.11
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
10
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by:
15
(a) Since August 1, 2011, promulgating and maintaining an overly broad rule
prohibiting employees from discussing wages or other terms and conditions of
employment with employees or non-employees.
(b) Since August 1, 2011, promulgating and maintaining an overly broad rule 20
prohibiting employees from “[d]iscourteous or disrespectful treatment of
guests, visitors, supervisors, or fellow associates.”
(c) Since August 1, 2011, promulgating and maintaining an overly broad rule
prohibiting employees from “[d]isloyalty, including disparaging or 25
denigrating the food, beverages, or services of the company, its guests,
associates, or supervisors by making or publishing false or malicious
statements.”

11 At the hearing, the Respondent presented testimony from MidCon Human Resource and Risk
Manager Beverly Carli indicating that the Respondent had revised its employee handbook in August and
September 2014, as a result of a prior Board charge not a part of this case. (Tr. 140.) However, Carli did
not identify the specific changes that were made, other than to say three items were amended and one new
item was added. (Tr. 141-142.) In addition, Carli testified that the Respondent distributed the changes to
employees in written form, with a letter of explanation, and had employees sign an acknowledgement that
they had read the changes. However, these documents were not offered or received into the record. (Tr.
141-142.) This evidence is not nearly sufficient to meet the requirements of a proper rule rescission, as
established in Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138, 138-139 (1978). See also Boch
Honda, 362 NLRB No. 83 (2015). For a repudiation to be effective, the Board requires that it be timely,
unambiguous, specific in nature to the coercive conduct, and free from other proscribed illegal conduct.
The repudiation also must be adequately published to the employees involved, while giving them
assurances that, in the future, the employer will not interfere with the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
JD–36–15
11
(d) Since August 1, 2011, promulgating and maintaining an overly broad rule
prohibiting employees from engaging in any other conduct that the
Respondent believes has created, or may lead to the creation of, a situation
that may disrupt or interfere with the amicable, profitable and safe operation
of the Company.5
(e) Discharging Audelia Santiago on July 3, 2014, for violating its overly broad
and unlawful rule 9 prohibiting disloyalty.
3. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), 10
(6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it 15
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act. In particular, I shall order the Respondent to offer Audelia Santiago full
reinstatement to her former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed, and to make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of 20
the discrimination against her. Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987),
compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). In
addition, the Respondent must compensate Santiago for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award and to file a report with the Social Security Administration 25
allocating the backpay award to appropriate calendar quarters. Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas
Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10 (2014). I also shall order the Respondent to remove from its
files any references to the unlawful discharge of Santiago and to notify her in writing that this
has been done and that the unlawful discharge will not be used against her in any way.12
30
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended13
ORDER
35
The Respondent, Tinley Park Hotel and Convention Center, LLC, Tinley Park, Illinois,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

12 The General Counsel’s complaint sought a requirement, as part of the remedy, that Santiago be
reimbursed for search-for-work and work-related expenses, without regard to whether interim earnings
are in excess of these expenses. Under extant Board law, those expenses are considered an offset to
interim earnings. In this case and others, the General Counsel is seeking a change in Board law. Such a
change must come from the Board, not an administrative law judge. Accordingly, I decline to include the
requested remedy in my recommended order.
13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–36–15
12
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining any rule that prohibits employees from discussing their wages
and other terms and conditions of employment with employees and non-
employees. 5
(b) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits discourteous or disrespectful
treatment of guests, visitors, supervisors, or fellow associates.
(c) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits disloyalty, including 10
disparaging or denigrating the food, beverages, or services of the Respondent,
its guests, associates, or supervisors by making or publishing false or
malicious statements.
(d) Maintaining an overly broad rule that prohibits any other conduct that the 15
Respondent believes has created, or may lead to the creation of a situation that
may disrupt or interfere with the amicable, profitable and safe operation of the
Respondent.
(e) Discharge or discipline employees due to a violation of overly broad and 20
unlawful rule 9 prohibiting disloyalty.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.25
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind rules 2, 8, 9, and 29 from the Respondent’s Personal Conduct and
Work Rules policy.30
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Audelia Santiago full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any
other rights or privileges she previously enjoyed.35
(c) Make Audelia Santiago whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of this decision.
40
(d) Compensate Audelia Santiago for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file a report with the Social
Security Administration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar quarters.
45
JD–36–15
13
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any
references to the unlawful discharge of Audelia Santiago, and, within 3 days
thereafter, notify her in writing that this had been done and that her unlawful
discharge will not be used against her in any way.
5
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Tinley Park,
Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being
signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 days in conspicuous places including all 10
places were notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that 15
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent 20
in the position employed by the Respondent at any time since August 1, 2011.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Regional Director attesting to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.25
Dated, Washington, D.C., June 16, 2015.
________________________
Charles J. Muhl
Administrative Law Judge

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain any rule that prohibits employees from discussing their wages and
other terms and conditions of employment with employees and non-employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain an overly broad rule that prohibits discourteous or disrespectful
treatment of guests, visitors, supervisors, or fellow associates.
WE WILL NOT maintain an overly broad rule that prohibits disloyalty, including disparaging or
denigrating the food, beverages, or services of the Company, its guests, associates, or supervisors
by making or publishing false or malicious statements.
WE WILL NOT maintain an overly broad rule that prohibits any other conduct that we believe
has created, or may lead to the creation of a situation that may disrupt or interfere with the
amicable, profitable, and safe operation of the Company.
WE WILL NOT discharge or discipline employees due to a violation of the overly broad
disloyalty rule described above.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind rules 2, 8, 9, and 29 from our
Personal Conduct and Work Rules policy in the employee handbook.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Audelia Santiago full reinstatement
to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges she previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Audelia Santiago whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against her.
JD–36–15
WE WILL compensate Audelia Santiago for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award, and file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any references to
the unlawful discharge of Audelia Santiago, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her
in writing that this had been done and that her discharge will not be used against her in any way.
TINLEY PARK HOTEL
AND CONVENTION CENTER, LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
The Rookery Building, 209 South LaSalle Street, Suite 900, Chicago, IL 60604-1443
(312) 353-7570, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (312) 353-7170.
.