Timothy Fitzgerald, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes/Midwest Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 11, 2000
01990758 (E.E.O.C. May. 11, 2000)

01990758

05-11-2000

Timothy Fitzgerald, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes/Midwest Region), Agency.


Timothy Fitzgerald v. United States Postal Service

01990758

May 11, 2000

Timothy Fitzgerald, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01990758

v. ) Agency No. 4-J-604-1213-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(Great Lakes/Midwest Region), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male) and reprisal (prior EEO activity),

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> Complainant alleges he was discriminated

against on the above-stated bases and sexually harassed by his Acting

Supervisor (AS; female) when: (1) on July 13, 1996, AS invited him

to a house party; and (2) on July 15, 1996, AS invited him out for a

beer. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659

(1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a PS-5 Part-Time Flexible Letter Carrier at the agency's

Berwyn, Illinois Post Office ("facility"). Believing he was a victim of

discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed

a complaint on November 26, 1996. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge.

However, complainant subsequently withdrew his request for a hearing

and requested a FAD, and in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110, the

agency issued a FAD.

The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of race, sex or reprisal discrimination. In so finding, the FAD

noted the testimony of the facility Postmaster and Postmasters of two

other agency Post Offices stating that they had no knowledge of the

actions of AS as claimed by complainant. In addition, the FAD noted

that two other witnesses stated that they had no knowledge of sexual

harassment or sexual advances by AS toward complainant. The FAD found

that complainant did not present evidence to indicate that any agency

official harbored a discriminatory animus towards him based on race,

sex and/or retaliation.<2> On appeal, complainant makes no contentions,

while the agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

Complainant appears to assert that his claims, when taken together,

indicate a pattern of sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion

is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998)

(citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as

discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford

Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment is

sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined

by looking at all of the circumstances, including the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8,

1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6.

In order to establish a prima facie case of such harassment, the

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence

of five elements: (1) that he is a member of a statutorily protected

group; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests

for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;

(3) that the harassment of which he complained is based on sex; and (4)

that the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or

had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work

environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work

environment; and (5) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the

employer. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 987, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).

The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint

of a reasonable person in the victim's situation.

After consideration of the record, we find that concerning the incidents

of alleged inappropriate invitations by AS, complainant has failed to

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these conversations

occurred as alleged and thus he cannot establish a prima facie case

of sexual harassment. We further find that even assuming, arguendo,

that complainant's allegations were credible, nevertheless the acts

of AS were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to demonstrate sexual

harassment due to an objectively hostile work environment. See Harris,

supra; see also Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

(1998); Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Even as

individual allegations, we find that complainant has failed to present

any credible or corroborated evidence which would lead to an inference

of discrimination based on race, sex or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd,

545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation

cases). Therefore, after a careful review of the record and arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, and for the

reasons discussed herein, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 11, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The FAD noted that the facility's Supervisor, Customer Services,

stated that she did not discriminate against or harass complainant by

asking him to document medical appointments on July 24, 1996, and that

she was not abusive in tone or manner to complainant. However, we need

not address these claims as they were not accepted for investigation by

the agency and complainant failed to contest the agency's determination.