TIME WARNER CABLE ENTERPRISES LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 2, 2020

2019004203 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/282,619 05/20/2014 Dharmen K. Udeshi TWC14-05(14-21) 8568
156874 7590 12/02/2020
Armis Intellectual Property Law, LLC
P.O. Box 1564
Westborough, MA 01581
EXAMINER
EL-BATHY, MOHAMED N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chris.lutz@armisiplaw.com
docket@armisiplaw.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DHARMEN K. UDESHI, ASHISH A. PATEL, and
VIJAY VENKATESWARAN

Appeal 2019-004203
Application 14/282,619
Technology Center 3600

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–14, 16–21, and 32–45, which are all
the claims pending. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part and enter a new ground of rejection. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b) (2018).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Time
Warner Cable Enterprises LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed and claimed subject matter relates to methods and
systems that provide “novel ways of analyzing and determining whether it is
desirable to install a respective wireless access point in each of many
possible geographical regions.” Spec. 3:12–14. In particular, the claimed
subject matter relates to methods and systems that receive mobile device
usage density and physical network resource information for multiple
regions, generate a metric for each region based on the received information
that indicates a desirability of installing a new wireless access point, and
display, on a map, a visual indication of the metric in each region. Spec.
3:15–4:25. Claims 1, 14, 19, and 32 are independent claims, and claim 1 is
reproduced below:
1. A method comprising:
via computer processor hardware:
receiving density information indicating an amount
of mobile device usage in each of multiple geographical
regions;
receiving resource information indicating locations
of physical network resources available to support
installation of wireless access points in the multiple
geographical regions;
utilizing the density information and the resource
information to produce a respective metric for each of the
multiple geographical regions, the respective metric
indicating a desirability of installing a respective wireless
access point in a corresponding geographical region;
displaying a map, the map indicating the multiple
geographical regions; and
displaying, on the map, a corresponding visual
indication of the respective metric for each of the multiple
geographical regions.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 7, 9, 19, 32, 33, 36–40,2 44, and 45 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lee (US 9,288,689 B2; Mar. 15, 2016),
Geller (US 2015/0215791 A1; July 30, 2015), Jadunandan (US 9,210,600
B1; Dec. 8, 2015), and Goldberg (US 2014/0051451 A1; Feb. 20, 2014).
Final Act. 8–21.3
Claims 2–5, 11, 12, 20, 21, 41, and 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Lee, Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Resende (US
7,978,629 B2; July 12, 2011). Final Act. 22–32.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lee,
Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, Resende, and Jang (US 2010/0317285 A1;
Dec. 16, 2010). Final Act. 32–33.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lee,
Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, Loeffler (US 7,376,098 B2; May 20, 2008).
Final Act. 33–34.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lee,
Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Alizadeh-Shabdiz (US 7,999,742 B2;
Aug. 16, 2011). Final Act. 34–35.

2 The Examiner’s statement of rejection omits claim 38, Final Act. 8, but the
Examiner substantively rejects claim 38 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, and Goldberg, Final Act. 17–18. We treat claim 38’s omission
in the statement of rejection as a harmless typographical error.
3 We note that, with respect to rejecting independent claims 19 and 32, the
Examiner relies on Jadunandan only for teaching the displaying a map
limitation, but claims 19 and 32 do not recite this limitation.
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Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Lee,
Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Anderson (US 2003/0158668 A1;
Aug. 21, 2003). Final Act. 35–36.
Claims 14 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Geller and Egner (US 2008/0046306 A1; Feb. 21, 2008). Final
Act. 36–39.
Claims 16 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Geller, Egner, and Resende. Final Act. 39–42.
Claims 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Geller, Egner, Resende, and Jang. Final Act. 42–43.
Claims 34 and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over Lee, Geller, Jadunandan, Goldberg, Resende, and Pembroke (US
2007/0019961 A1; Jan. 25, 2007). Final Act. 43–45.
OPINION
REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 19, AND 32 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, and Goldberg. Final Act. 8–12. Claim 1 recites a method that
receives density information and resource information, uses the received
information to produce a metric, which indicates a desirability of installing a
wireless access point, for each of multiple geographical regions, and
displays a map with visual indications of the metrics in the respective
regions. Appeal Br. 74 (claim 1).
Appellant primarily attacks each of the cited references individually
without considering the rejection as explained by the Examiner and, in
particular, Appellant fails to consider the system resulting from the
Examiner’s proposed combination. E.g., compare Appeal Br. 20–21
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(arguing Lee relates to configuring a network using density information but
does not generate a metric and Geller teaches using a number of user
requests to decide where to install new access points but fails to utilize the
recited density and resource information), with Final Act. 19 (finding Geller
teaches using collected information to generate a metric related to
desirability of installing a wireless access point), and Ans. 4 (finding
Geller’s metric teaches determining where to install an access point and
“[t]he combination of Lee’s density information with Goldberg’s resource
information and Geller’s metric teaches” the limitation related to using the
data to generate the recited metric). Similarly, Appellant acknowledges
Jadunandan teaches displaying performance metrics in respective markets on
a map and indicates desirability of installing new access points but fails to
teach the metric is produced using density and resource information. Appeal
Br. 23. Again, this argument fails to consider the Examiner’s proposed
combination.
Appellant repeatedly asserts “the office action uses the claimed
invention as a basis to reject itself as opposed to finding the limitations in
the prior art that teach or suggest the claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 19, 22,
23. To the extent Appellant argues the individual limitations are not taught
in the art, we disagree. We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings
regarding the cited teachings in Lee, Geller, Jadunandan, and Goldberg. To
the extent Appellant argues the Examiner’s proposed combination is based
only on improper hindsight, we also disagree. The Examiner provides a
rationale, supported by evidence of record, to combine the individual
teachings and we agree with and adopt those rationales. See Final Act. 11–
12. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. For
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clarity, we briefly summarize the references’ cited teachings and the
Examiner’s combination.
The Examiner finds Lee teaches a computer system and program that
receives density information indicating mobile device usage in multiple
geographical regions, and using that information. Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 4.
Lee discloses estimating a density metric in a wireless network’s coverage
areas and, configuring “one or more network-access components . . . in
response to the estimated density metric.” Lee 1:44–50. More specifically,
Lee allocates more “compute resources to virtual base-station pools” to
regions with a high density metric and fewer resources to regions with a low
density metric. By doing so, Lee may activate more remote radio heads
(RRHs) in high density regions and reduce active RRHs in low density
regions. Lee 4:10–21. In other words, Lee teaches or suggests receiving the
recited density information and using that information to configure a
network to allocate more resources to regions having higher densities.
The Examiner finds Geller teaches using density information and
resource information to produce a metric for each region that indicates the
desirability of installing a new wireless access point in that region and
displaying a map indicating those regions. Final Act. 9–11; Ans. 4. Geller
notes that the number of mobile device users in an area by itself does not
necessarily correlate to high usage rates by users if a new wireless access
point is installed in that area. Geller ¶ 7. Thus, Geller discloses that making
installation decisions at least in part based on user requests to install new
wireless access points at particular geographical locations would be
beneficial. Geller ¶¶ 8–10, 39–42, 49, 80, Fig. 3. Geller optionally provides
a map of a region and allows a user to see existing access point locations and
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user requests to install new access points already received. Geller ¶¶ 74, 75,
117, Figs. 4–6. Geller analyzes the user requests and produces installation
request information (i.e., metrics) for different regions based on the number
and weight of the individual user requests for those regions. Geller ¶¶ 11,
12, 50, 99, 106–109, 111–114. The installation request information is
analyzed to help decide where to install new wireless access points. Geller
¶ 51, 99, 100, 105–109, 114, 115. In other words, Geller uses one type of
density information (the number of user requests) along with other
information (e.g., existing access points and types of subscribers submitting
the requests) to generate a metric (i.e., installation request information) that
can be used to decide whether to install a new wireless access point.
The Examiner finds Goldberg teaches receiving resource information
indicating locations of physical resources available to support installing a
new wireless access point in geographical regions and using the resource
information to determine whether a proposed location is suitable for
installing a new access point. Final Act. 12; Ans. 3. Goldberg discloses a
user interface to facilitate installing new network resources that displays a
map with geographical regions overlaid with existing network infrastructure
(i.e., physical network resources available to support installing access
points) and a site plan. Goldberg ¶¶ 11, 112, Figs. 2, 3, 5–13. In other
words, Goldberg teaches receiving information regarding existing resources
and that information is used to determine where to install new network
resources.
The Examiner finds Jadunandan teaches displaying a visual indication
of a metric for each region on a map. Final Act. 11. Jadunandan discloses
determining performance metrics for each of various markets (i.e.,
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geographical regions) and using those metrics to identify markets in which
to install new cell sites. Jadunandan 4:40–43. Jadunandan displays the
performance metrics for each market on a map, which may be presented at
different levels of granularity—i.e., at a national level or more local level.
Jadunandan 8:50–9:6. Thus, Jadunandan teaches displaying a visual
indication of a metric that indicates the desirability of installing new network
resources in various geographical regions on a map.
The Examiner explains that “[t]he combination of Lee’s density
information with Goldberg’s resource information and Geller’s metric
teaches” the limitation reciting utilizing the density and resource information
to produce a metric for each region indicating the desirability of installing a
new wireless access point in that respective region. Ans. 4 (citing Final
Act. 9–10). As stated above, we agree with and adopt these findings and
conclusions because they are supported by the cited disclosures. Moreover,
using Lee’s density information and Goldberg’s resource information merely
requires adding additional information or substituting that information for
Geller’s user request information when producing Geller’s installation
information (i.e., metric) that indicates where new access point. As noted,
Geller indicates that the installation decision is based at least in part on the
user request information, which at least suggests that other information may
be relevant to deciding where to install a new wireless access point.
Claim 19 recites a system that performs the method recited in claim 1,
except claim 19’s system does not perform claim 1’s steps that display a
map with visual indications of the produced metric. Compare Appeal Br. 74
(claim 1), with Appeal Br. 78–79 (claim 19). Claim 32 recites a computer-
readable hardware storage with instructions that, when executed, perform the
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same method claim 19’s system performs. Compare Appeal Br. 78–79
(claim 19), with Appeal Br. 80 (claim 32). Appellant argues claim 19
separately from claim 1, but Appellant’s arguments are substantively the
same as Appellant’s contentions regarding claim 1’s steps that also are
recited in claims 19 and 32. Compare Appeal Br. 18–22, with Appeal
Br. 28–31. Appellant argues claim 32 is allowable for the same reasons
asserted with respect to claim 19. Appeal Br. 32. Accordingly, for the
reasons discussed above, we also agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions regarding independent claims 19 and 32. For these
reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 19, and 32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
REJECTION OF CLAIM 2 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 2 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Resende. Final Act. 22–23. Claim 2, which
depends directly from claim 1, further recites that producing the metric takes
into account subscription revenue and installation costs. Appeal Br. 74. The
Examiner finds Resende teaches or suggests these additional limitations.
Final Act. 22. In particular, the Examiner finds Resende discloses
optimizing where to put fiber optical cable in a fiber optic network using a
map or graph representing a city street in which vertices are one of a root
vertex, street corner, and customer premise and edges are potential fiber
optic cable placement locations. Final Act. 22 (citing Resende 1:38–42).
The Examiner finds Resende further discloses that 1) each customer premise
vertex has an associated potential revenue if that vertex is connected by fiber
optical cable to the root vertex and 2) each edge (i.e., location where fiber
optical cable needs to be placed to connect the vertices) has an associated
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cost to place fiber optical cable at that edge. Final Act. 22 (citing Resende
1:42–46). The Examiner finds Resende’s fiber optical network revenue and
cable installation cost are similar to and “representative of the costs of
installing the wireless access point.” Ans. 6; see Final Act. 22. The
Examiner finds Lee, Geller, Jadunandan, and Goldberg relate to wireless
networks. Ans. 7. The Examiner finds Resende is not limited to wired
networks and Resende’s purpose is to optimally design networks generally
to maximize profits (i.e., generating more revenue than the installation costs)
such that combining Resende’s cited teachings with Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, and Goldberg to take into account revenue and installation costs
when determining whether to install a wireless access point would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art because. Ans. 6–7; Final Act.
23.
Appellant argues the proposed combination does not teach or suggest
the subject matter recited in claim 2 because Resende “has nothing to do
with installation of a new wireless access point based on an amount of
mobile device usage in a particular area.” Appeal Br. 43.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings regarding
Resende’s teachings discussed above. Additionally, Resende discloses that
the “network optimization problem is to place fiber optical cables such that
the difference between the total revenue and the total cost of the giver
optical cables is maximized.” Resende 1:46–49. Accordingly, Resende
teaches determining an amount of financial gain or return on investment for
installing a particular fiber optical cable taking into account the installation
cost and potential revenue. The Examiner relies on Resende for the limited
purpose of teaching optimizing network design by taking into account
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installation costs and potential revenue from installing additional network
resources. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive and fail to consider the
combination as articulated by the Examiner. For these reasons, we sustain
the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REJECTION OF CLAIMS 6 AND 18 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 6 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Jang. Final Act. 32–33. Claim 6 depends
directly from claim 2 and further recites, in relevant part, that the installation
costs take “into account a distance between i) a location of a network
resource as specified by the resource information and ii) a location of the
respective wireless access point to be installed in the corresponding
geographical region.” Appeal Br. 75. The Examiner finds Jang teaches
these additional limitations. Final Act. 32–33 (citing Jang ¶ 57, Fig. 9(b)).
The Examiner rejects claim 18 as obvious over Geller, Egner,
Resende, and Jang. Claim 18, which depends directly from claim 16, further
recites a similar limitation to the additional limitation recited in claim 6
relating to the costs of installing wireless access points taking into account a
distance between a network resource location and the location where a
respective access point is to be installed. Appeal Br. 78. The Examiner
relies on the same teachings in Jang to reject this limitation recited in claim
18. Final Act. 42–43 (citing Jang ¶ 57, Fig. 9(b)).
Appellant reproduces the claim language and Jang’s paragraph that
the Examiner cited, then asserts “[t]he cited paragraph in Jang indicates it is
desirable to increase an output capacity of a distributed repeater and that it is
more cost efficient to install fewer repeaters.” Appeal Br. 54–55. Appellant
then asserts that Jang’s teaching of installing fewer repeaters “is an entirely
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different matter than taking into account a distance between” the network
resource location and the location where the access point is to be installed.
Appeal Br. 55.
Although Appellant’s argument is arguably conclusory, in this case,
we agree with Appellant that the cited paragraph in Jang, on its face, does
not teach or suggest an installation cost that takes into account the distance
between the resource being installed and a physical resource available to
support installing the new resource. The rejection does not provide an
explanation sufficient to support the Examiner’s findings. Jang’s cited
disclosure clearly teaches the obvious notion that using fewer repeaters is
more cost efficient than using more repeaters. Jang ¶ 57. Jang also teaches
that output capacity of the system does not vary significantly between a
system using three repeaters and one using five repeaters. Jang ¶ 57. We
see nothing in this paragraph, however, that teaches or suggests determining
a cost of installing a resource (e.g., a repeater) that takes into account a
distance between the resource being installed and a physical resource
available to support installing the new resource (e.g., the base station).
Although taking such distance into account when determining
installation costs may be a very basic concept, the evidence (i.e., the cited
Jang disclosure) the Examiner points to does not support the finding that the
proposed combination teaches this basic concept. Moreover, because the
Examiner incorrectly finds Jang teaches this limitation, the Examiner does
not articulate a reason with a rational underpinning for modifying the
proposed combination to take into this distance when determining
installation costs. We will not speculate in that regard here in the first
instance on appeal.
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For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REJECTION OF CLAIMS 7–10 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 7 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, and Goldberg. Final Act. 8–12. Claim 7 depends directly from
claim 1 and further recites, in relevant part, “receiving parameters specifying
a region of interest” and “subdividing the region of interest into a candidate
pool of regions.” Appeal Br. 75. The Examiner finds Geller teaches these
additional limitations. Final Act. 12–13 (citing Geller ¶¶ 99, 100, 105).
Appellant argues that, because Geller relates to tracking locations where
users request installing new access points, Geller fails to teach or suggest
subdividing a region of interest into a candidate pool of regions and
selecting regions from the pool. Appeal Br. 24–25. Appellant further argues
nothing indicates that Geller’s installation request locations “have anything
to do with subdividing regions of interest and then selecting ‘the multiple
geographical regions’ from the candidate pool of regions.” Reply Br. 9.
Much of Appellant’s argument focuses on the fact that Geller tracks
different information. See Appeal Br. 24–25; Reply Br. 9. As discussed
above, this argument fails to consider the Examiner’s proposed combination.
Nevertheless, we find the Examiner’s proposed combination problematic
with respect to claim 7. In particular, we do not see anything in Geller’s
cited disclosures or the Examiner’s explanation that teaches or suggests
receiving parameters specifying a region of interest, subdividing that region
of interest into a candidate pool of regions, selecting multiple regions from
that candidate pool, wherein those multiple regions are the regions for which
the metrics are generated. Geller merely teaches that the user requests may
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indicate the locations in a geographical region of those requests to install a
new access point. See Geller ¶¶ 99, 100, 105. To the extent Geller may
suggest that some parameter is received that specifies a region of interest
and then subdividing that region of interest into a candidate pool of regions,
the Examiner’s findings and explanation do not clearly indicate what
specific aspects of Geller teach or suggest 1) the region of interest (or the
parameter specifying that region), 2) the candidate pool of regions, and
3) the multiple geographical regions selected from the candidate pool. We
will not speculate in that regard here in the first instance on appeal.
Claims 8–10 depend directly from claim 7 and incorporate the same
limitation. Although the Examiner rejects claim 8 in further view of
Loeffler and claim 10 in further view of Alizadeh-Shabdiz, the Examiner
does not find either of these references teach or suggest the limitations
recited in claim 7 and, therefore, neither Loeffler nor Alizadeh-Shabdiz
cures this deficiency in claim 7. For these reasons, we do not sustain the
rejection of claims 7–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because we do not sustain
the rejection, we need not address Appellant’s arguments specifically
directed to claims 9–10, see Appeal Br. 26–27, 56–60.
REJECTION OF CLAIM 13 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 13 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, and Goldberg. Final Act. 8–12. Claim 13 depends directly
from claim 1 and further recites, in relevant part, that “the respective metric
for the corresponding geographical region takes into account presence of
consumer-visited businesses located in the corresponding geographical
region.” Appeal Br. 77. The Examiner finds Anderson teaches this
additional limitation. Final Act. 36 (citing Anderson ¶ 37, 160, 163).
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Appellant reproduces the claim language and Anderson’s paragraphs
that the Examiner cited, then asserts Anderson relates to “displaying
attributes associated with polygon regions” but “has nothing to [do] with
installing a respective new access point or producing a metric in a manner as
recited by the claimed invention,” which produces a metric that takes into
account consumer-visited businesses. Appeal Br. 61–62.
Appellant’s argument is arguably conclusory (as with Appellant’s
argument regarding claim 6), but we see nothing in Anderson’s cited
paragraphs that teaches or suggests a metric that takes into account the
presence of consumer-visited businesses located in a corresponding
geographical area. Once again, the rejection does explain sufficiently how
Anderson’s disclosures support the Examiner’s findings. Anderson’s cited
disclosures teach mapping geographical regions and displaying attributes on
the map (e.g., latitude and longitude) associated with points on the map.
Anderson ¶¶ 37, 160. Anderson creates polygons on the map representing
structures using a geometric algorithm considering various attributes (e.g.,
coordinates and parcel numbers) defining entities and overlaying
georeferenced photographs for the region. Anderson ¶¶ 151–160. Other
attributes may then be attached to the points/structures and displayed on the
map. Anderson ¶¶ 160–165, Table 1.
Notably, however, we see nothing in these paragraphs to teach or
suggest a metric that takes into account the presence of consumer-visited
businesses located in a region, let alone a metric related to the desirability of
installing a new resource such as a wireless access point. For these reasons,
we do not sustain the rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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REJECTION OF CLAIM 14 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 14 as obvious over Geller and Egner.
Final Act. 36–39. Claim 14 recites a method similar to claim 1 but of
slightly different scope. Specifically, claim 14’s method recites producing
first and second installation metrics, each indicating a value of installing a
wireless access point in respective first and second geographical regions and
representing a return-on-investment value then producing a map including a
representation of the two regions and providing visual indications that the
metrics have been assigned to the respective regions. Appeal Br. 77.
The Examiner finds Geller teaches the limitations related to producing
a map because Geller discloses producing a map with geographical regions
and indicating zones in which user requests for installing new access points
where submitted as circles on the map. Final Act. 37 (citing Geller ¶ 100).
The Examiner finds Egner teaches producing the two installation metrics
because Egner discloses analyzing strategic network investments in wireless
networking and calculates investment return for each sector. Final Act. 37–
38 (citing Egner ¶¶ 26, 62, Fig. 2).
Appellant argues Geller relates to metrics and symbols that indicate
where user requests occurred, not an installation metric that represents a
return on investment. Appeal Br. 64. Appellant also argues Egner performs
its wireless network analysis to identify holes in the network whereas claim
14 recites producing a map providing a visual indication that each metric has
been assigned to a respective geographical region. Appeal Br. 64–65.
The Examiner rejects claim 14 based on a combination of Geller and
Egner. The Examiner finds Egner teaches the particular metrics recited in
claim 14, and the Examiner finds Geller teaches the producing a map step.
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Final Act. 37–38. Thus, Appellant’s arguments fail to consider the rejection
as articulated by the Examiner based on the proposed combination and do
not address the Examiner’s findings regarding Egner and Geller. For these
reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REJECTION OF CLAIM 34 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 34 as obvious over Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan, Goldberg, and Pembroke. Final Act. 43–45. Claim 34 depends
directly from claim 5 and further recites, in relevant part, that the installation
costs take “into account a distance between i) a location of a network
resource as specified by the resource information and ii) a location of the
respective wireless access point to be installed in the corresponding
geographical region.” Appeal Br. 81. Although the Examiner finds Jang
teaches a commensurate limitation recited in claims 6 and 18, the Examiner
finds Pembroke teaches this additional limitation. Final Act. 43–45 (citing
Pembroke ¶ 35).
Appellant argues that, although Pembroke teaches “rough costs of
installing a respective fiber cable[,] . . . there is no indication that such
information is used to produce a respective metric.” Appeal Br. 71.
Appellant’s argument is conclusory and does not consider the
combination of references. The Examiner relies on Pembroke for the limited
teaching that the installation cost of a network resource takes into account
the distance between a distance between the resource being installed and a
physical resource available to support installing the new resource.
Pembroke discloses that the cost to install fiber optic access in a home
includes the cost of laying fiber between the existing resource (where the
fiber optic cable can be branched off) and the access point in the home (the
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new access point). Pembroke ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 31 (explaining the cost of
installing fiber to a home includes “the cost of the fiber drop to the home”),
32 (explaining the “drop might average about 150 feet of fiber per house,
resulting in a drop cost of about $300” at a cost of “about $2 per running
foot when the utility trench (for connecting sewer, water, and electrical in-
ground service) is open”). Pembroke then explains the cost of adding fiber
is much greater once the trench is closed, at which point “the cost for laying
the giber is between about $10/foot and $20/foot.” Pembroke ¶ 35.
Given the limited purpose for which the Examiner relies on
Pembroke, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings. For these
reasons we sustain the rejection of claim 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
REJECTIONS OF CLAIMS 3–5, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 33, 35–45 UNDER
35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues claims 3–5, which depend from claim 2, separately
from claim 2 but merely reiterates arguments made with respect to claims 1
and 2—namely that Resende relates to installing fiber optical cable rather
than installing wireless access points and Geller relates to a metric based on
user requests rather than density and resource information. Appeal Br. 44–
48. Appellant argues claim 12, which depends directly from claim 1, is
allowable for the same reasons asserted with respect to claim 4. Appeal Br.
49. Appellant argues claim 16, which depends directly from claim 14,
separately from claims 2 and 14, but merely reiterates arguments made with
respect to claim 2 (as applied to two different metrics)—namely that
Resende relates to installing fiber optical cable rather than installing wireless
access points. Appeal Br. 67–68. Appellant argues claim 20, which
depends directly from claim 19, is allowable for the same reasons asserted
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with respect to claim 2. Appeal Br. 50. Appellant argues claim 21, which
depends directly from claim 20, is allowable for the same reasons asserted
with respect to claim 3. Appeal Br. 51.
Appellant argues claim 33, which depends directly from claim 1,
separately from claim 1 but merely reiterates the assertion that Geller
determines where to install a new access point based on user requests rather
than a magnitude of a metric based on availability of resources in a
particular geographical region. Appeal Br. 33–34. Appellant argues claim
35, which depends directly from claim 34, separately from claims 1 and 34
but merely reiterates the assertion that Geller relates to a magnitude of
installation requests rather than a metric based on mobile device usage,
resource availability, revenue, and installation costs. Appeal Br. 72.
Similarly, Appellant argues claim 36, which depends directly from claim 1,
and claim 40, which depends directly from claim 19, separately from claim
1, but Appellant merely reiterates the assertion that Geller relates to
generating a metric indicating the desirability of installing a new access
point based on user requests, not mobile device usage or resource
availability. Appeal Br. 35, 37 (referring to arguments asserted with respect
to claim 33 when arguing the patentability of claim 40). Appellant argues
claim 42, which depends directly from claim 41, separately from claim 1 but
merely reiterates the assertion that Geller relates to densities of installation
requests rather than mobile device usage density. Appeal Br. 52–53.
Appellant argues claim 43, which depends directly from claim 14, separately
from claims 14 and 334 but merely reiterates the assertion that Geller relates

4 Appellant states: “As previously discussed with respect to claim 33, Geller
indicates to install a respective wireless access point based on a number of
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to densities of installation requests rather than a return on investment metric.
Appeal Br. 66. Appellant argues claim 44, which depends directly from
independent claim 1, separately from claim 1 but merely reiterates similar
arguments regarding Geller and that Goldberg provides a map only when a
decision to install new access points has been made already. Appeal Br. 38–
39. Appellant argues claim 45, which depends directly from claim 44,
separately from claims 1 and 44 but merely reiterates similar arguments
regarding Geller and similar arguments raised with respect to claim 1 that
Lee relates to configuring existing infrastructure, not installing new access
points. Appeal Br. 40–41.
As discussed above, we find these arguments unpersuasive because
the rejection is based on a combination of references. In particular, the
Examiner finds Goldberg teaches receiving resource information, Lee
teaches receiving mobile usage density information, Resende teaches taking
into account costs and revenue when installing resources, and, when these
teachings are combined with Geller’s teaching of generating a metric based
on received information, the combination teaches or suggests the recited
subject matter.
Appellant does not argue claims 11, 37 and 41, which depend directly
from independent claim 1; claim 38, which depends directly from claim 37;
or claim 17, which depends directly from claim 16, separately with
particularity. See generally Appeal Br. Appellant argues claim 39, which

subscribers requesting same.” Appeal Br. 66. We presume Appellant
intended to refer to claim 14 but, regardless of whether Appellant attempts to
distinguish based on Geller relating to user requests rather than a return on
investment or installation metric, we have already addressed those
arguments above.
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depends directly from claim 38, is allowable for the same reasons asserted
with respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 36.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
We enter a new ground of rejection pursuant to our authority under
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). In particular, we newly reject claims 1–14, 16–21, and
32–45 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 being directed to an ineligible judicial
exception without significantly more.
If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility, the Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101—i.e., evaluating whether the claim
is directed to a judicially recognized exception. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). We also follow the United States Patent and
Trademark Office’s revised guidance for applying the Alice framework
when evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2103–2106.07(c) (9th ed., Rev.
10.2019, June 2020) (collectively referred to herein as “Guidance”).
As part of our inquiry, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance
over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is
directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217 (“First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts.”). The Guidance breaks this “directed
to” inquiry (“Step 2A”) into two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite
a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea) (“Prong 1”), and (ii) if so, is the
judicial exception integrated into a practical application (“Prong 2”). MPEP
§ 2106.04(II)(A).
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If we determine the claim is directed to the judicial exception, we then
examine “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claims for an “inventive
concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration
in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see MPEP § 2106.05(II)
(directing us to “[e]valuate whether any additional element or combination
of elements are other than what is well-understood, routine, conventional
activity in the field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality” (“Step 2B”)).
Guidance Step 2A (The Alice “Directed To” Inquiry)
Appellant’s claims are directed to evaluating where to install a new
wireless access point based on network usage and resource information.
This claimed concept is a mental process and similar to concepts the Federal
Circuit previously identified as abstract. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III);
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (concluding claims
directed to selecting a fishing hook characteristic based on received
information—i.e., observed water conditions—were ineligible abstract
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mental processes); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
This characterization of the claims is consistent with how Appellant
describes the claimed embodiments of the invention in the Specification. At
a high level, Appellant’s invention is titled “WIRELESS NETWORK
INSTALLATION ANALYZER AND REPORTING.” Spec. (Title). The
Specification explains that conventional techniques involve installing a new
access point upon determining “that a large number of mobile device users
typically frequent a particular geographical region based on collected mobile
device usage information.” Spec. 3:2–7. The Specification’s only described
deficiency of conventional techniques is that “installation of new wireless
access points in high traffic areas does not always ensure that a respective
service provider funding the installations will financially benefit from
installations.” Spec. 3:7–9; see also id. at 6:18–20 (“Embodiments herein
are useful over conventional techniques because they provide unique ways
of quickly assessing the financial value of installing a respective new
wireless access point in a geographical region.”).
According to the Specification, described embodiments “include
novel ways of analyzing and determining whether it is desirable to install a
respective wireless access point in each of many possible geographical
regions.” Spec. 3:12–14. The Specification describes various embodiments,
explaining that, in addition to density information (i.e., “information
indicating an amount of mobile device usage in each of multiple
geographical regions”), Appellant’s techniques may receive and consider
resource information (i.e., “information indicating locations of physical
network resources available to support installation of wireless access points
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in the geographical regions and the location of any existing wireless access
points already installed”) in order to generate a metric that indicates the
desirability of installing a new wireless access point in a particular
geographic region. Spec. 3:15–25. The Specification provides additional
details regarding information taken into account when generating the metric,
and how the metric is presented to a user. See, e.g., Spec. 4:4–5 (“Each
installation metric for a respective geographical region can be a numerical
value.”), 4:4–14 (metric considers costs and revenue related to installing a
new access point in a particular region), 4:15–5:3 (each region’s metric may
be presented as a visual indication on a map), 5:4–26 (each metric may
indicate a degree of financial gain or advantage, such as a return-on-
investment value).
Independent claims 19 and 32 recite subject matter commensurate in
scope to claim 1’s receiving steps and utilizing the information step (claims
19 and 32 do not recite displaying a map or visual indicators on the map).
Independent claim 14 recites producing an installation metric for each of two
geographical regions that represent return-on-investment values of installing
a new wireless access point in the respective region and producing a map
with visual indications representative of the metric. Dependent claims 2–13,
16–18, 20, 21, and 33–45 (1) further define the data collected and analyzed,
how the particular geographical regions are selected, what the metric
represents, and/or how the metric is visually represented on the displayed
map or (2) add the generic step of installing access points depending on the
value of the metric(s). Accordingly, the dependent limitations merely
further refine the abstract idea. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“we
have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular
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content (which does not change its character as information), as within the
realm of abstract ideas”); SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that
dependent claims reciting features that further narrow the abstract idea “add
nothing outside the abstract realm”).
Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 (Recite an Abstract Idea)
All of the functional limitations recited in the claim 1—i.e.,
(1) receiving density and resource information; (2) utilizing the received
information to produce a metric for each region; and (3) displaying a map
and visual indications—merely describe the concept of evaluating where to
install a new wireless access point based on network usage and resource
information. This is also true for the additional steps recited in independent
claims 14, 19, and 32, as well as the additional functional limitations recited
in the dependent claims and the dependent claim limitations that merely
refine what information is received or utilized to generate the metric(s). As
such, and consistent with the Guidance, the claims recite an abstract idea
because evaluating where to install a new wireless access point based on
network usage and resource information is a mental process that could be
performed mentally or using pen and paper. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Appellant’s invention generally claims analyzing whether/where to
install wireless access points, which allegedly improves upon conventional
analysis by (1) using more information to calculate a metric indicating
regions where installing access points produces the greatest financial benefit
and (2) providing the metric on a map of the regions. Thus, the claims recite
an abstract idea because it is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
determination that claims focusing on mental processes and similar
commercial activities are abstract. The claimed subject matter focuses on a
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process that could be performed mentally, similar to the claims held
ineligible in Electric Power. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III) (explaining that
claims that recite concepts performed in the human mind recite abstract
ideas); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d 1350.
In particular, claim 1’s receiving steps merely “collect[] information”
about usage and resource availability in a network, and claim 1’s step
utilizing the received information to generate a metric merely “analyz[es]
the collected information.” See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d. at 1353–54. Claim
1’s displaying a map and visual indicators steps are akin to “displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis.” See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at
1354. Thus, claim 1’s steps recite an abstract idea in the mental process
category because, but for the recitation of generic technological components,
claim 1’s steps describe a concept that can be performed practically in the
human mind or with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That
purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a
computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson”); see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(C) (“Claims can recite a mental
process even if they are claimed as being performed on a computer.”).
As discussed above, independent claims 14, 19, and 32 recite similar
data collection and analysis steps as claim 1 and, therefore, claims 14, 19,
and 32 also recite mental processes. Each of claims 2–13, 16–18, 20, 21,
and 33–45, which depend from and incorporate the limitations of one of
claims 1, 14, 19, and 32 from which they depend, therefore recite these same
abstract mental processes.
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Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 (Integrate Into a Practical Application)
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we next determine whether
the claims integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. MPEP
§ 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application, we identify “whether there are any additional
elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate
those elements in combination with the limitations that recited an abstract
idea to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a
recognized practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II) (emphasis added);
see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
We determine the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) use a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see
MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). Accord Ans. 3.
As noted above, all the functional limitations are part of the abstract
idea. The additional limitations in the independent claims beyond the
abstract idea—i.e., the computer processor hardware and hardware storage
resource (or “[c]omputer-readable hardware storage having instructions
stored thereon”)—are claimed and disclosed at a high level of generality as
merely generic computer hardware to performing the recited functional
limitations, which we identified above as being directed to an abstract idea.
The recited devices are generic computer components performing generic
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computer functions—receiving, processing, and displaying data. See
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user
interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter”); MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (explaining that “[m]
merely reciting the words ‘apply it’ (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on
a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract
idea” by itself is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application); Spec. 6:26–7:17 (explaining that the invention can be carried
out using any generic hardware and software).
The majority of the dependent claims merely add additional details
regarding (1) the particular information collected, analyzed, generated or
displayed, (2) how the information is displayed, or (3) how the particular
geographical regions are selected. Limiting the particular information
collected, analyzed, generated or displayed is insufficient to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because, even to the extent that it
narrows the abstract idea, it does not add any additional limitations beyond
the abstract idea itself. See SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that
dependent claims reciting features that further narrow the abstract idea “add
nothing outside the abstract realm”); see also FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at
1097 (“The mere combination of data sources, however, does not make the
claims patent eligible.”).
The only claims that recite additional limitations beyond the abstract
idea are claims 36, 39, and 43, which recite steps related to installing an
access an access point in each of two geographical regions depending on the
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magnitude of the metric for the corresponding region. Appeal Br. 81–83.
These steps are merely insignificant extra-solution activity that are
insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because
the steps simply apply the results of the mental processes that constitute the
abstract idea. MPEP § 2106.05(g); see Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842
F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming determination that merely
printing or downloading generated menus are insufficient limitations to
render eligible the otherwise ineligible process directed to generating
menus); In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (non-
precedential) (determining that using scissors to cut hair after performing the
abstract mental process—i.e., evaluating a head and determining an
appropriate hairstyle to be applied—“does not transform this abstract idea
into patent-eligible subject matter.”).
Appellant’s claims are directed to the mental process of generating a
metric based on received information to determine whether/where to install a
new wireless access point. This is a business problem and an alleged
business improvement. Appellant’s claims, read in light of the
Specification, do not embody an improvement to a computer or other
technology. Nor do Appellant’s claims embody a particular machine used to
perform the method or transform an article to a different state or thing.
Instead, the claimed subject matter identifies and analyzes information that
allegedly improves the decision-making process regarding whether to install
an access point and displays a map indicating the same. As noted above,
collecting information, analyzing it, and outputting results of the analysis is
an ineligible abstract concept. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d 1350. As such,
Appellant’s claims, at most, improve the abstract idea itself. For at least the
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foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Accordingly, the claims are directed to an abstract
idea.
Guidance Step 2B (Inventive Concept/Significantly More)
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
evaluate whether the claims include an inventive concept. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(II). As stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to
determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two
of the Alice framework already are considered as part of determining
whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical
application. MPEP § 2106.05(II). Thus, at this point of the analysis, we
determine whether the claims (1) add a specific limitation, or combination of
limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
at a high level of generality. MPEP § 2106.05(I)(A).
As explained above, the additional elements recited in the claims are
the generic computer devices (processor hardware and hardware storage)
and the steps related to installing access points. As supported by Appellant’s
Specification, the generic computer devices were well-understood, routine,
and conventional in the field. Spec. 6:26–7:17 (explaining that the invention
can be carried out using any generic hardware and software); see also MPEP
§ 2106.07(a)(III)(a)(“A specification demonstrates the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of additional elements when it describes the
additional elements as well-understood or routine or conventional (or an
equivalent term), as a commercially available product, or in a manner that
indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
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specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. 112(a).”). Moreover, the steps related to
installing the access points are recited generically and at a high level of
generality in a way that does not suggest any installation step that was
beyond what was well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appellant’s
claims and Specification focus on the analysis of locations to install access
points that will provide the greatest financial benefit. Once the analysis is
complete (i.e., the relevant data is collected and analyzed to determine where
to install the access point(s)), it is evident from the context of the
Specification that the generically recited step of installing the access point(s)
was a well-understood, routine, and conventional activity. In fact, the
Specification is so focused on the metric-generation analysis, that we do not
see an actual step of installing an access point described in Appellant’s
Specification.
For these reasons, we enter a new ground of rejection of claims 1–14,
16–21, and 32–45 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
New
Ground
1, 7, 9,
19, 32,
33, 36–
40, 44,
45
103
Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg
1, 19, 32,
33, 36–40,
44, 45
7, 9

2–5, 11,
12, 20,
21, 41,
42
103 Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg, Resende
2–5, 11, 12,
20, 21, 41,
42

6 103 Lee, Geller, Jadunandan, 6

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Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
New
Ground
Goldberg,
Resende, Jang
8
103 Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg, Loeffler
8

10
103 Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg,
Alizadeh-Shabdiz
10

13
103 Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg,
Anderson
13

34, 35 103
Lee, Geller,
Jadunandan,
Goldberg,
Pembroke
34, 35

14, 43 103 Geller, Egner 14, 43
16, 17 103 Geller, Egner, Resende 16, 17

18 103 Geller, Egner, Resende, Jang 18

1–14,
16–21,
32–45
101 Ineligible
1–14, 16–
21, 32–45
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 11, 12,
14, 16,
17,19–21,
32–45
6–10, 13,
18
1–14, 16–
21, 32–45
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides:
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When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the
claims, Appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this
subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)