Tim Reiz et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 29, 201914831036 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/831,036 08/20/2015 Tim Reiz Farelogix_Guaranteed 8004 60033 7590 11/29/2019 MARK TERRY, ESQ. 801 BRICKELL AVE., SUITE 900 Miami, FL 33131 EXAMINER ERB, NATHAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3628 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/29/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): eofficeaction@appcoll.com mark@terryfirm.com yurie@terryfirm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte TIM REIZ and VITALI RUPPEL ____________ Appeal 2018-0024091 Application 14/831,036 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 5, 10, 14, and 15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Farelogix, Inc., as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 2 THE INVENTION Appellant states “[t]he disclosed embodiments relate to the field of electronic commerce and, more specifically, the disclosed embodiments relate to the field of providing travel offers over communications networks.” Spec. ¶ 4. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A server for providing a travel reservation process to a consumer over a communications network, comprising: a database for storing a consumer record, including a consumer profile, a unique identifier for a consumer, and login data, in an attached database; and for storing a plurality of fare records, wherein a fare record includes at least a unique identifier, an origin, a destination and one or more rules, wherein each rule defines a fare price or identifies other rules to execute, if predefined conditions are met; a memory; a network interface device communicatively coupled with the communications network; and a processor coupled with the database, the memory and the network interface device, the processor configured for: receiving from a consumer, over the communications network, login data and first fare search parameters; authenticating said consumer by comparing the login data received from the consumer against the login data stored in a corresponding consumer record in the database; performing a search for fare records in the attached database that match the first fare search parameters, thereby producing one or more first matching fare records; executing one or more rules from the first matching fare records, wherein said rules are evaluated against attributes from the consumer profile of the Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 3 consumer record corresponding to the consumer, thereby producing a separate fare price corresponding to each of the first matching fare records; displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to each of the first matching fare records; storing, in the attached database, the following data for each of the first matching fare records: a unique identifier for the consumer, the unique identifier for the fare record, the fare price, and a time period definition; receiving from the consumer at a later time, over the communications network, login data and second fare search parameters substantially identical to the first fare search parameters; authenticating said consumer by comparing the login data received from the consumer against the login data stored in the corresponding consumer record in the database; performing a search for fare records in the attached database that match the second fare search parameters, thereby producing one or more second matching fare records; executing one or more rules from the second matching fare records, thereby producing a separate fare price corresponding to each of the second matching fare records; determining that, for each of the second matching fare records, the unique identifier for each fare record has previously been stored with the unique identifier for the consumer, in the attached database; and for each second matching fare record with a unique identifier for the fare record equal to a unique identifier of a first matching fare record, if a seat corresponding to said second matching fare record is currently available, if the fare price corresponding to said second matching fare record is greater than the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record, and if a time-period defined by Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 4 the time period definition associated with said first matching record has not passed, then displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record. THE REJECTION The following rejection is before us for review. Claims 1, 52, 10, 14, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–9 in the Final Office Action3 and on pages 3–17 in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5, 10, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Appellant argues claims 1, 5, 10, 14, and 15 as a group. (Appeal Br. 6). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group based 2 Claim 5 is to “the method of claim 1,” although claim 1 is to a “server.” Claim 1 changed from a method claim to a structural server claim in an amendment filed February 8, 2016. Claim 5 should be corrected should prosecution continue. 3 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on September 22, 2016. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 5 upon Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9, 17, 18, 20), and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 6 rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 7 The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 8 In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). The Specification states: One arena where these opportunities have been embraced is the commercial travel industry. Financial troubles and a desire to provide the most economical prices for their customers have led the commercial travel industry (namely, the commercial airline industry) to seek additional ways of attracting customers, increasing consumer satisfaction and generating revenue. One area where the commercial travel industry has yet to make significant improvements in customer satisfaction, however, is in the area of online travel reservations. . . . One of the well-known problems with conventional online travel reservation systems is the dynamic nature of availability and fares. At any given moment, there may be hundreds or thousands of customers logged into an online travel reservation system, and many of those consumers succeed in making reservations or purchasing fares via the system. But because fare offers and seats may be purchased or reserved so quickly by online customers, this leads to a common complaint whereby a customer searching for seats or fares is presented with a fare offer or seat, only to find that at a later time (sometimes within a few minutes) the fare offer or seat is no longer available. This can be annoying and confusing to customers. With the commercial travel industry (especially the commercial airline industry) currently seeking to establish closer relationships with their customers and drive greater loyalty between consumers and brands, greater and more extensive customer satisfaction is sought during the point of sale process, especially during a customer’s online travel Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 9 reservation experience. Spec. ¶¶ 5–6. The preamble states the claim is “for providing a travel reservation process.” Claim 1. Understood in light of the Specification, claim 1, recites, in pertinent part, receiving from a consumer, . . . login data and first fare search parameters; authenticating said consumer by comparing the login data received from the consumer against the login data stored in a corresponding consumer record . . . ; performing a search for fare records in the attached database that match the first fare search parameters, thereby producing one or more first matching fare records; executing one or more rules from the first matching fare records, wherein said rules are evaluated against attributes from the consumer profile of the consumer record corresponding to the consumer, thereby producing a separate fare price corresponding to each of the first matching fare records; displaying for the consumer, . . . the fare price corresponding to each of the first matching fare records; storing, in the attached database, the following data for each of the first matching fare records: a unique identifier for the consumer, the unique identifier for the fare record, the fare price, and a time period definition; receiving from the consumer at a later time, . . . login data and second fare search parameters substantially identical to the first fare search parameters; authenticating said consumer by comparing the login data received from the consumer against the login data stored in the corresponding consumer record in the database; performing a search for fare records in the attached database that match the second fare search parameters, thereby producing one or more second matching fare records; executing one or more rules from the second matching fare records, thereby producing a separate fare price corresponding to each of the second matching fare records; Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 10 determining that, for each of the second matching fare records, the unique identifier for each fare record has previously been stored with the unique identifier for the consumer, in the attached database; and for each second matching fare record with a unique identifier for the fare record equal to a unique identifier of a first matching fare record, if a seat corresponding to said second matching fare record is currently available, if the fare price corresponding to said second matching fare record is greater than the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record, and if a time-period defined by the time period definition associated with said first matching record has not passed, then displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record. Accordingly, the Examiner found that the claims are directed to “providing particular pricing for a reservation.” (Final Act. 7). The Specification excerpts set forth above and parts of claim 1 require: for each second matching fare record with a unique identifier for the fare record equal to a unique identifier of a first matching fare record, if a seat corresponding to said second matching fare record is currently available, if the fare price corresponding to said second matching fare record is greater than the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record, and if a time-period defined by the time period definition associated with said first matching record has not passed, then displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record. These claim steps recite, inter alia, basic steps of a purchase, e.g., reiteratively, “performing a search for fare records,” and thereafter “producing one or more second matching fare records,” “if the fare price corresponding to said second matching fare record is greater than the fare Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 11 price corresponding to said first matching fare record.” Such steps constitute a certain method of organizing human activity for smart purchasing practices, which is a basic fundamental economic practice. The patent-ineligible end of the spectrum includes fundamental economic principles. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 220. In addition, we find that, because claim 1 also recites, “executing one or more rules from the first matching fare records, wherein said rules are evaluated against attributes from the consumer profile of the consumer record corresponding to the consumer, thereby producing a separate fare price corresponding to each of the first matching fare records,” and “displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record,” claim 1 is also directed to data collection, analysis, and display. Claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” are “a familiar class of claims ‘directed to’ a patent ineligible concept”). See also Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 nn.12, 14. Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “a database,” “a memory,” “a network interface device,” and “a processor.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 18, 19, Fig. 1. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance 84 Fed. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 12 Reg. at 53. We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a fundamental economic practice and/or information as such, that is not integrated into a practical application. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to travel reservations, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step the Examiner found, “[t]aking the elements both individually and as a combination, the computer components at each step of the claims perform purely generic computer functions. The claims as a whole do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” (Final Act. 9). We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 13 abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, authenticate, search, and apply decision criteria to data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the claims do not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 18, 19, Fig. 1). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 14 Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (retrieve, authenticate, search, and apply decision criteria to data) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 12–29). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Citing to numerous limitations of claim 1, Appellant argues: the subject matter claimed by Appellant in claim 1 is not an ‘abstract idea’ within the meaning of Alice because it is not a long-prevalent and fundamental practice, no matter how widespread, especially in comparison to the abstract ideas of risk-hedging and intermediated settlement relied upon by the Alice court, which have been in widespread use for many centuries throughout the world. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 15 (Appeal Br. 9; see also id. at 11). We disagree with Appellant because under part one of the Alice framework, we “determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353). Thus, although we consider the claim as a whole, the “directed to” inquiry focuses on the claim’s “character as a whole.” In this case, we find above that the character of the claims as a whole is directed to providing particular pricing for a reservation using time based fare matching associated with a given reservation at different times. We disagree with Appellant that such a practice of asking for a quote on an item at different times to see if the quoted price has risen or has declined has not been in widespread use for many centuries throughout the world. Open markets for example, have worked this way for thousands of years. Likewise, we fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Appeal Br. 10–12) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appeal Br. 16–17. Specifically Appellant argues, “[i]n the DDR Holdings decision, the [c]ourt found that there was no such longstanding business practice that correlated to the solution provided by the patent-in-suit online, and therefore, it was not an abstract idea.” Id. at 10. But, in DDR Holdings, the court evaluated the eligibility of claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported away from a Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 16 host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. There, the court found that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The problem addressed by the claims before us here, is “seeking to establish closer relationships with their customers and drive greater loyalty between consumers and brands, greater and more extensive customer satisfaction is sought during the point of sale process.” Spec. ¶ 6. These are interpersonal problems, and not technical problems, such as found in DDR Holdings with the conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol. Even assuming the abstract idea found here is not a long-prevalent and fundamental practice, Ultramercial, Inc. speaks to this. The Ultramercial, Inc. claims were “directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). Nevertheless, those claims were patent ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea of ‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet.’” Id. We further disagree with Appellant that “[t]he fact pattern discussed in McRO4 is almost identical to the facts of the instant case. Appellant’s 4 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 17 claimed invention (1) includes specific limitations that help avoid preemption; (2) clearly describes processes that are more than merely automation of existing human activity, and (3) are clearly inventive when each claim is considered as a whole.” (Appeal Br. 13). First, we disagree with Appellant that the fact pattern in McRO is almost identical to the facts of the instant case. In McRO, there was a technological improvement over existing, manual 3–D animation techniques, whereas the improvement here is to more extensive customer satisfaction. Compare McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314 with Spec. ¶ 6. Second, although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a whole, we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is directed to providing particular pricing for a reservation using time based fare matching associated with a given reservation at different times for the reasons specified above with respect to our “directed to” findings. As found supra, claim 1 only includes the following generically recited device limitations: a database,” “a memory,” “a network interface device,” and “a processor.” What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations, are abstractions, i.e., fare matching mental processes: for each second matching fare record with a unique identifier for the fare record equal to a unique identifier of a first matching fare record, if a seat corresponding to said second matching fare record is currently available, if the fare price corresponding to said second matching fare record is greater than the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record, and if a time-period defined by the time period definition associated with said first matching record has not passed, then displaying for the consumer, over the communications network, the fare price corresponding to said first matching fare record. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 18 Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90). Under McRO the question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 as a whole is focused on “improvements in customer satisfaction” (Spec. ¶ 5), by providing particular pricing for a reservation using time based fare matching associated with a given reservation at different times.5 Improvements on customer relationships and satisfaction do not constitute technical improvements. Cf. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (The claims’ focus “was not on an improved telephone unit or an improved server.”) Appellant argues, “[i]n the instant case, Appellant’s independent claim 1 satisfies the ‘significantly more’ requirement because it recites more than input of data and performance of calculations of that data by a computer, thereby transforming an allegedly patent ineligible abstract idea into a patent eligible application of that idea.” (Appeal Br. 22). To the extent Appellant is arguing that these are additional elements constituting an inventive concept, such features cannot constitute the 5 Appellant on pages 17, 18 19, 20, and 21 of the Appeal Brief states that the Examiner characterizes the abstraction as “disseminating ads over a network.” However, according to the record, the Examiner characterized the abstraction as being directed to “the abstract idea of providing particular pricing for a reservation.” (Final Act. 7). The Examiner as well notes this discrepancy in the Answer at page 14. No Reply Brief has been filed. Accordingly, we cannot respond to those arguments which the Appellant makes based on this discrepancy. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 19 “inventive concept.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“It is clear from Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself, and Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”); see also BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). In Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit also made it clear that “not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In fact, the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer did not require evidentiary support for independent claim 1 because “[t]he limitations [of claim 1] amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components.” Id. at 1370. Appellant next argues its “invention greatly improves upon the technology of the travel, travel marketing, and targeted advertising, all fields of which involve interfacing with advertising to travel customers. (Appeal Br. 24) (emphasis omitted). Although such improvement may be true, the improvement is not an improvement to another technology, such as computer chip design which drives the way computers operate. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In other words, Appellant wrongly seeks to have the travel and the advertising industries seen as technology. Personal services, absent technological implementation details, are not technology. Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 20 Appellant next argues, None of the above calculations are found in the prior art references, as was made apparent by the complete lack of any prior art rejections in this case. This fact supports the assertion that Appellant’s invention includes specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field. (Appeal Br. 27). We disagree with Appellant because a novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). Appellant argues, “Appellant’s invention includes specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, but rather it adds unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful application.” (Appeal Br. 26). Although Appellant lists numerous limitations from claim 1, we do not find, and Appellant does not identify, any analogous modification to the routine and conventional functioning of computer network technology. Appellant appears to be relying on attorney argument alone. At best, the invention appears to use generic computer components to perform an abstract business practice. We find that in this particular case, the broadly claimed sequence of information analysis and output, which focuses on the result rather than the technical details of its implementation, is generic and conventional and is similar to language otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 715 (sequence of receiving, selecting, Appeal 2018-002409 Application 14/831,036 21 offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction)). Appellant also argues, “Appellant’s invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing.” (Appeal Br. 27). We disagree with Appellant. In Diehr, the Court established eligibility under § 101 for claims containing mathematical formulas when the claim “implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole,” causes or performs “(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing) . . . .” 450 U.S. at 192– 193. In contrast, we fail to see how buying a ticket on an airline constitutes transforming or reducing an article into a different state or thing. Finally, Appellant’s other arguments (Appeal Br. 15, 22–25, 28, 29) directed to now-superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive of error. (See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility- related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))). CONCLUSION Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 5, 10, 14, 15 101 Subject Matter Eligibility 1, 5, 10, 14, 15 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation