Tim R. Bridges, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 2, 2000
01986388 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 2, 2000)

01986388

06-02-2000

Tim R. Bridges, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Tim R. Bridges v. United States Postal Service

01986388

June 2, 2000

Tim R. Bridges, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01986388

v. ) Agency No. 1-J-607-1218-95

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether complainant was discriminated against on the bases of race

(White) and retaliation (prior EEO activity) when on July 23, 1995, he

was issued a 7-Day Suspension; on August 23, 1995, the agency denied

his request to change his off days; on September 4, 1995, he was not

permitted to work the Labor Day holiday; on September 14, 1995, he was

issued a 14-Day Suspension; on October 23, 1995, the agency denied his

request to be reassigned to tour three; on November 28, 1995, he was

reassigned to the eighth floor; on December 1, 1995, his request for 24

hours of sick leave was denied; and on December 27, 1995, he was given

a 30-Day Notice of Removal.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as an Electronic Technician, PS-09, at the Chicago Processing

and Distribution Center, Chicago, IL. Complainant requested counseling

on eight separate occasions between July 24, 1995 and December 27,

1995, alleging discrimination on the bases of race and retaliation in

the matter mentioned above. These informal complaints were consolidated

for processing. Complainant filed a formal complaint of discrimination

on these matters on January 10, 1996. Following completion of the

investigation, on December 2, 1997, complainant was informed of his

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested a hearing before an AJ, but then, by letter dated June 9, 1998

withdrew his request for a hearing and asked that the agency issue an FAD.

In its FAD, issued August 13, 1998, the agency found no discrimination.

This appeal, by complainant, followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which

the first step normally consists of determining the existence of

a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to

the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

1) July 23, 1995 7-Day Suspension

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in

response to complainant's claim that he was discriminated against when

he was issued a 7-day suspension on July 23, 1995. At the outset, we

note that complainant was working another full time job, in addition to

his job at the agency. According to the agency, complainant received

the suspension for being absent from his assignment without permission.

Since the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,

the burden shifts to complainant to show that this reason was a pretext

for discrimination. We find that complainant has failed to do so.

According to complainant, he did not report for his assignment to the

eighth floor because he went home sick. He said that he tried to find

his supervisor when he needed to go home sick, could not locate his

supervisor, so left a sick leave form on the supervisor's desk, and

went home. According to complainant, he had followed this procedure in

the past of leaving the form on his supervisor's desk without incident.

His supervisor, however, denied this particular sick leave form and,

therefore, complainant was absent from his assignment without permission.

We find it more likely than not that complainant's sick leave form was

denied because, the record shows that, he had been verbally warned by

the his supervisor in January that he had too many absences. We find,

therefore, that complainant has not shown discrimination with respect

to this claim.

2) August 23, 1995 Denial of Request to Change Off Days

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in

response to complainant's claim that on August 23, 1995, he was denied

his request to change his off days. According to the agency, S-1

stated that he was not aware of a request for a change of non-schedule

days for complainant. The agency also stated that the record contains

no evidence that the complainant requested a change of his off days.

Complainant has not shown pretext because he has not proven beyond his

mere assertion, nor does the record contain evidence, that he requested

a change of his off days. Complainant verifies in his appeal that no

evidence of this request exists. Complainant has, therefore, not shown

discrimination with respect to this claim.

3) September 4, 1995 Denial of Permission to Work Labor Day Holiday

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in

response to complainant's claim that, on September 4, 1995, he was not

permitted to work the Labor Day holiday. According to S-1, employees

were scheduled according to seniority from the volunteer holiday work

list and they were rotated within that list. Complainant was not

allowed to work on Labor Day because he was not scheduled to work.

Complainant has not shown pretext. According to complainant, E-1, an

employee with less seniority was allowed to work on Labor Day. The record

shows, however, that E-1, in fact, had more seniority than complainant.

Complainant's position seniority date is October 30, 1993, while the

seniority date of E-1 is April 6, 1991. Complainant has, therefore,

not shown discrimination with respect to this claim.

4) September 14, 1995 14-Day Suspension

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in

response to complainant's claim that on September 14, 1995, he was issued

a 14-Day Suspension. According to the agency, complainant received the

suspension because of his attendance record. The record shows that the

suspension was based on the fact that complainant had 176 hours of AWOL

(Absent Without Leave) from July 28, 1995 through September 10, 1995.

Complainant has not shown that this reason was pretextual. He has

not denied that he was AWOL for those hours, nor has he shown that

anyone else with as many AWOL hours was not suspended. Additionally,

the record contains no other evidence of pretext. Complainant has,

therefore, not shown discrimination with respect to this claim.

5) Denial of Request for Tour Reassignment

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

denying complainant's October 23, 1995 request to be reassigned to tour

three. According to complainant, supervisors S-1, S-2, and S-3 all denied

his requests for reassignment while similarly situated employees, race

(Black), were granted reassignments. According to the agency, employees

must go through the bidding process to change tours. The record does

not show that complainant submitted a bid for the position. Complainant

has failed to show pretext. The record shows that the only comparison

employee that complainant cites is E-2, race (Black). This employee is

not, however, similarly situated to complainant because he was only given

a temporary change of tour, whereas the record shows that complainant

was requesting a permanent change of tour. Additionally, the record

contains no other evidence of pretext. Complainant has, therefore,

not shown discrimination with respect to this claim.

6) November 28, 1995 Reassignment to Eighth Floor

The agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

reassigning complainant to the eighth floor on November 28, 1995.

According to S-1, the ninth floor Multiple Position Letter Sorting

Machines were being phased out. Complainant only had ninth floor

experience and needed training on the eighth floor. Another supervisor,

S-4, stated that all technicians were being sent to the eighth floor for

on-the-job training on the Delivery Bar Code Sorters. Complainant has not

shown that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination. He asserts

that he had more seniority than fellow employees who were not reassigned

to the eighth floor and who needed training on that floor. However,

beyond this general assertion, he does not give information about who

these employees were, so it is not possible from the record to establish

that complainant did in fact have more seniority than these individuals

and that these individuals needed training on the eighth floor. A review

of the record does not reveal other evidence of pretext. Complainant has,

therefore, not shown discrimination with respect to this claim.

7) December 1, 1995 Denial of Sick Leave Request

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for denying complainant's December 1, 1995 request for 24 hours of

sick leave. According to S-1, because of complainant's past record,

complainant was told to substantiate his request for 24 hours of sick

leave. When complainant failed to provide appropriate documentation,

his leave was disapproved. Complainant has not shown pretext. He cited

two Black employees as comparators, stating that their requests for sick

leave were granted without documentation. The record reveals, however,

that complainant was not similarly situated to these employees because,

unlike complainant, they did not have attendance problems or prior

disciplinary actions for attendance. Further, the record contains

no other evidence of pretext. Complainant has, therefore, not shown

discrimination with respect to this claim.

8) December 27, 1995 30-Day Notice of Removal

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for giving complainant a 30-Day Notice of Removal. According to the

agency, complainant was removed from the agency because of his failure

to maintain regular attendance. Complainant has not shown pretext.

The record verifies that complainant had attendance problems. According

to complainant, he would not have had these attendance problems if

the agency had granted his requests for schedules changes. There is

no evidence in the record that the agency's failure to grant these

requests was discriminatory, nor is there evidence in the record of any

other employee with similar attendance problems who was not removed.

Complainant has, therefore, not shown discrimination with respect to

this claim.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

06-02-00

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.