Tiffany Handbags

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 1984

271 N.L.R.B. 621 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

TIFFANY HANDBAGS
Tiffany Handbags, Inc. and Leather Goods, Plastics,
Handbags and Novelty Workers Union, Local 1
affiliated with International Leather Goods,
Plastics and Novelty Workers Union, AFL-
CIO. Case 2-CA-18754
31 July 1984
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER, AND
DENNIS
On 3 October 1983 the National Labor Relations
Board issued an Order directing the Respondent,
inter alia, to make whole certain of its employees
for any losses resulting from the Respondent's
unfair labor practices.' A controversy having
arisen over the amount of backpay owed discrimin-
atees William Villamar, Enrique Battista, Maria
Martinez, Juan Cariel, and Alicia Serrano, the Re-
gional Director for Region 2, on 26 January 1984,
issued and caused to be served on the parties a
backpay specification and notice of hearing alleg-
ing the amount of backpay due under the terms of
the Board's Order. On 9 March 1984 the Respond-
ent filed an answer generally denying each allega-
tion of the specification.
On 16 April 1984 the General Counsel filed with
the Board a Motion to Strike Answer in Part and
Motion for Summary Judgment in Part to Backpay
Specification. On 23 April 1984 the Board issued
an order transferring the proceeding to the Board
and a Notice to Show Cause why the General
Counsel's motion should not be granted. The Re-
spondent has not filed a response to the Notice to
Show Cause.
The Board has delegated its authority in this pro-
ceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
in Part
Section 102.54(b) and (c) of the Board's Rules
and Regulations provides as follows:
(b) Contents of the answer to specification.-
The answer to the specification shall be in
writing, the original being signed and sworn to
by the respondent or by a duly authorized
agent with appropriate power of attorney af-
fixed, and shall contain the post office address
of the respondent. The respondent shall specif-
ically admit, deny, or explain each and every
i This Order adopted, in the absence of exceptions, the decision and
the Order of an administrative law judge issued in this case 16 August
1983. On I November 1983 the Respondent stipulated that it had no ob-
jection to anyportion of the Board's Order and agreed to comply with
its provisions.
271 NLRB No. 97
allegation of the specification, unless the re-
spondent is without knowledge, in which case
the respondent shall so state, such statement
operating as a denial. Denials shall fairly meet
the substance of the allegations of the specifi-
cation denied. When a respondent intends to
deny only a part of an allegation, the respond-
ent shall specify so much of it as is true and
shall deny only the remainder. As to all mat-
ters within the knowledge of the respondent,
including but not limited to the various factors
entering into the computation of gross back-
pay, a general denial shall not suffice. As to
such matters, if the respondent disputes either
the accuracy of the figures in the specification
or the premises on which they are based, he
shall specifically state the basis for his dis-
agreement, setting forth in detail his position
as to the applicable premises and furnishing
the appropriate supporting figures.
(c) Effect of failure to answer or to plead spe-
cifically and in detail to the specification.-If the
respondent fails to file any answer to the speci-
fication within the time prescribed by this sec-
tion, the Board may, either with or without
taking evidence in support of the allegations of
the specification and without notice to the re-
spondent, find the specification to be true and
enter such order as may be appropriate. If the
respondent files an answer to the specification
but fails to deny any allegation of the specifi-
cation in the manner required by subsection
(b) of this section, and the failure so to deny is
not adequately explained, such allegation shall
be deemed to be admitted to be true, and may
be so found by the Board without the taking
of evidence supporting such allegation, and the
respondent shall be precluded from introduc-
ing any evidence controverting said allegation.
In its answer to the backpay specification, the
Respondent offered a general denial to each of the
allegations of the specification. Thus, the Respond-
ent has generally denied the accuracy of the Gen-
eral Counsel's allegations concerning the backpay
periods for each discriminatee, the formula used to
compute gross backpay, the method of computing
net backpay, the computation of gross backpay for
each discriminatee, and the failure to make valid
reinstatement offers to Villamar and Battista. The
General Counsel asserts that information regarding
each of these matters is within the Respondent's
knowledge, and that the Respondent has failed to
state the basis for its disagreement with any of the
allegations in the specification. Accordingly, the
General Counsel contends that the Respondent's
621
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
general denials do not comply with the require-
ments of Section 102.54(b), and therefore the alle-
gations of the backpay specification-except as to
interim earnings-should be deemed admitted as
true and that summary judgment should be granted
as to the computation of gross backpay. 2
We agree. Inasmuch as the data at issue is within
the Respondent's knowledge and control, its failure
to set forth fully its position as to the applicable
premises or to furnish appropriate supporting fig-
ures is contrary to the specificity requirements of
Section 102.54(b). Accordingly, we strike the Re-
spondent's answer with respect to paragraphs I, II,
IV, V(a), and VI(b) of the backpay specification,
and deem such allegations to be admitted as true.
Thus, we shall grant the General Counsel's Motion
for Summary Judgment in Part as to the amount of
gross backpay due discriminatees Villamar, Bat-
tista, Martinez, Cariel, and Serrano. We find, how-
ever, that the Respondent's general denial is suffi-
2 On 21 March 1984 counsel for the General Counsel informed the Re-
spondent by letter that its answer contained only general denials and that
he intended to move for partial summary judgment unless the Respond-
ent submitted an amended answer in proper form (including reasons why
it should be considered) by 2 April 1984. No amended answer had been
received by the Region as of the date the General Counsel filed his
motion, 16 April 1984.
cient to place interim earnings into issue for all the
discriminatees because that information is generally
not within the knowledge of the Respondent.3 Ac-
cordingly, we shall order a hearing limited to the
determination of the discriminatees' interim earn-
ings, including the availability to discriminatees of
interim employment and the discriminatees' failure
to seek and/or retain such interim employment.
ORDER
It is ordered that the General Counsel's motion
to strike the Respondent's answer in part is grant-
ed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the General Coun-
sel's Motion for Summary Judgment in Part as to
gross backpay computations for all the discrimina-
tees is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding is
remanded to the Regional Director for Region 2
for the purpose of arranging and giving notice of a
hearing before an administrative law judge, at
which hearing the issues shall be limited to deter-
mining the interim earnings of William Villamar,
Enrique Battista, Maria Martinez, Juan Cariel, and
Alicia Serrano.
3 Dews Construction Corp,, 246 NLRB 945 (1979).
622