01982057
01-10-2000
Tia L. Morgan v. United States Postal Service
01982057
January 10, 2000
Tia L. Morgan, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01982057
) Agency No. 4F-900-0183-97
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
_______________________________)
DECISION
Complainant filed the instant appeal from the agency's December 11,
1997 decision finding that the agency did not breach the settlement
agreement because there was no valid settlement agreement.<1>
A document signed by complainant on June 6, 1997, and by the Postal
Manager and a Union Representative on June 12, 1997, stated the following:
I, Tia L. Morgan, will resign from the Postal Service due to my need for
time off for surgery and recovery. The Postal Services agrees to rehire
me, after I am cleared to return to full duties, to a career position
(PTF Carrier at Dockweiler Station).
There are no other statements in the document signed by complainant on
June 6, 1997, apart from the titles of the signatories and the dates
of signature.
By letter dated June 30, 1997, complainant requested that 4F-900-0183-97
be reopened. In its decision, the agency does not clearly state why it
concluded the agreement was invalid. The agency stated in the decision
that neither the management official nor the union representative who both
signed the purported agreement submitted written statements relative to
their understanding of the purported agreement. On appeal, complainant
claims that the agency breached the purported settlement agreement.
On appeal, the agency states that "due to conflicting statements on
the part of the complainant and the agency, the complainant's case was
reinstated from where processing ceased by decision letter dated December
11, 1997."
The regulation set forth at 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,660 (1999) (to be
codified as and hereinafter cited as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a)) provides
that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the
parties shall be binding on both parties. If the complainant believes
that the agency has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement
agreement, then the complainant shall notify the EEO Director of the
alleged noncompliance "within 30 days of when the complainant knew or
should have known of the alleged noncompliance." 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a).
The complainant may request that the terms of the settlement agreement
be specifically implemented or request that the complaint be reinstated
for further processing from the point processing ceased. Id.
Settlement agreements are contracts between the appellant and the agency
and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and not
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(Aug. 23, 1990); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 94 F.2d 296 (7th
Cir. 1938). In reviewing settlement agreements to determine if there is
a breach, the Commission is often required to ascertain the intent of the
parties and will generally rely on the plain meaning rule. Wong v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05931097 (Apr. 29, 1994) (citing
Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2,
1991)). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, then its meaning must be determined from the
four corners of the instrument without any resort to extrinsic evidence
of any nature. Id. (citing Montgomery Elevator v. Building Engineering
Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984)).
The Commission finds that the document signed by complainant on June 6,
1997 is not a settlement agreement of an EEO claim. Specifically, the
document contains no reference to an EEO complaint or to an EEO matter.
Therefore, complainant never withdrew any pending EEO matter in the
purported agreement. While there are no necessary provisions for an
agreement to be valid per se, the Commission notes that the purported
agreement is void of any standard or customary language or terms usually
found in settlement agreements.<2> The instant purported agreement is
not a valid agreement because of the failure to include any reference
to the EEO claim now purported by complainant to be settled. In other
circumstances this failure might be considered a mere formality.
In the instant matter, however, the failure is meaningful because of
the lack of other provisions in the agreement which might indicate that
the agreement was meant to settle an EEO claim. There is no indication
that the agency ever treated the EEO matter as settled by providing any
consideration to complainant; furthermore, within the same calendar month
after the purported agreement was signed complainant contended that the
agency breached the purported agreement.
The Commission finds that the agency properly decided that there was no
valid settlement agreement in the instant matter. The Commission finds
that there is no persuasive evidence of bad faith by the agency and that
there is no evidence showing that the agency has taken actions such that
it would be inequitable to hold the purported agreement unenforceable.
The Commission finds that the agency properly determined that the
underlying complaint should be reinstated from the point processing
ceased. The Commission notes that the record shows that the agency has
been processing the underlying complaint since the instant appeal was
filed and that complainant has requested a hearing on the underlying
complaint.
The agency's determination finding that the agency did not breach the
purported settlement agreement is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Jan 10, 2000
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_____________________ _________________________
Date
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2Such terms could include a clause forbidding retaliation, confidentiality
provisions, an explanation of rights to allege breach, and/or a clause
explaining complainant's obligation to withdraw the EEO matter and not
further pursue such a matter.