Thrush Press, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 21, 1968

171 N.L.R.B. 575 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

THRUSH PRESS , INC. 575
Thrush Press , Inc. and District 65, Retail , Wholesale
and Department Store Union , AFL-CIO. Case
2-CA-11281
May 21, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
On January 16, 1968, Trial Examiner Alvin
Lieberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed excep-
tions to the Decision , and a supporting brief, and
the Respondent filed exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief,
and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner except as modified
herein.
We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
bargain with the majority representative of its em-
ployees in an appropriate unit . However, we do so
on the ground that after the Union's demand for
recognition Respondent engaged in a course of
conduct evidencing not only a complete rejection
of the principles of collective bargaining but a
desire to gain time in which to dissipate the Union's
majority status. Thus, all in violation of Section
8(a)(1), Respondent systematically interrogated its
employees as to their union sympathies and those
of other employees , threatened reprisal for union
adherence, and made promises of benefits to in-
duce employees to disavow the Union. Such action
clearly belies any asserted good-faith doubt of the
Union 's majority status.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that Thrush Press, Inc., New York, New
York, its officers, agents , successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer 's Recommended Order.
' The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Examiner 's findings requiring
the inclusion of employees O'Connor and Hinson in the unit involved
herein . We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue since the unit placement
of these two employees could not affect the Union 's majority status
2 See Joy Silk Mills , Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd as modified 185 F 2d 732
(C A.D C.).
Member Jenkins also agrees with the Trial Examiner that the violation of
Section 8 ( a)(5) is established by the fact that Respondent had based its
defenses for its refusal to bargain upon an erroneous view of the law.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Trial Examiner: The trial in
this proceeding, with all parties represented, was
held before me in New York, New York, on July
26, 27, and 28, 1967,1 upon a complaint of the
General Counsel' and Respondent's answer.3 In
general, the issues litigated were whether Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended ( herein
called the Act). Particularly the questions for deci-
sion are as follows:
1. Did Respondent independently violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating em-
ployees and promising them benefits?
2. Did the Union, when it requested recognition
from Respondent, represent a majority of Respon-
dent's employees in the unit set forth in the com-
plaint, the appropriateness of which for collective
bargaining Respondent is not contesting?
3. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the
Union?
Upon the entire record,' upon my observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying,
and upon careful consideration of the arguments
made and the able brief submitted by the General
Counsel,' I make the following:
' Unless otherwise noted , all dates referred to in this Decision are in
1967.
' The complaint was issued on a charge filed by District 65 , Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union , AFL-CIO (herein called the
Union).
During the trial Respondent amended paragraph 2 of its answer by
deleting all references to paragraph 3 of the complaint Paragraph 3 of the
answer denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of the complaint which
describes a unit claimed by the General Counsel to be "appropriate for the
purpose of collective bargaining " Notwithstanding this denial, Respon-
dent, at the conclusion of its opening address, stated that it was not contest-
ing the appropriateness for collective bargaining of the unit set forth in the
complaint.
Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting the stenographic
transcript of this proceeding in several respects.
Neither Respondent nor the Union submitted a brief
171 NLRB No. 86
576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation, maintains
an office and place of business in New York, New
York, where it is engaged in providing printing and
related services. During 1966, a representative
period, Respondent, at its New York premises, per-
formed printing services valued at more than
$50,000 for customers located outside the State of
New York. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction over this
matter by the National Labor Relations Board
(herein called the Board) is warranted. Siemons
Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
Briefly, this case concerns itself with the events
which followed the Union's authorization by em-
ployees of Respondent to act as their collective-
bargaining representative. Among these, the com-
plaint alleges, were the Union's demand for, and
Respondent's refusal of, recognition and bargain-
ing; Respondent's interrogation of employees; and
its promises of benefits to induce them to renounce
the Union.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent's
refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union is
violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. He further
argues that Respondent's subsequent interrogation
of, and promises of benefits to, employees con-
travened Section 8( a)(1).0
Taking issue with the General Counsel,' Respon-
dent asserts that its refusal to bargain with the
Union is based upon its good-faith doubt as to the
Union's majority status. Admitting that it inter-
rogated employees, Respondent argues that its in-
terrogation was not coercive and, therefore, not
'The sections of the Act just mentioned provide
Sec 8 .( a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-( I )
to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7,
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees , subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
Insofar as pertinent , Sections 7 and 9 ( a) are as follows.
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization , to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection
Sec 9 (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Finally,
Respondent denies that it promised benefits to em-
ployees to dissuade them from supporting the
Union.
Rebutting Respondent's "good faith doubt" con-
tention, the General Counsel asserts, on brief, that
it "was based upon an erroneous view of the law."
Accordingly, continues the General Counsel, "such
doubt is not available to Respondent as a defense to
the instant charge."
B. Facts Concerning Respondent's Alleged
Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
1. The alleged interrogation
As will be more fully discussed below, on the
morning of April 5 Peter Van Delft, an organizer
for the Union, appeared at Respondent's office,
showed Robert Conover, Respondent's production
manager,8 authorization cards which had been
signed by a group of Respondent's employees, and
requested that Respondent recognize and bargain
with the Union. Later that morning five employees9
were individually summoned into the office of
Donald B. Thrush, Respondent's president. There,
in the presence of Conover and Anthony DiSalvo,
Respondent's general foreman,1° Thrush questioned
each about the Union.
Some were asked whether they were members of
the Union. Others were asked why they joined the
Union. One, Degrammont, was asked for the identi-
ty of the Union's "leader." After Degrammont
replied that "all [are] leaders," Thrush remarked,
"Alphonse, I'm sorry for you." 1
Admitting the interrogation, Thrush, Respon-
dent's president, stated that it was undertaken in
order to ascertain "how on earth [the employees]
ended up with this department store workers union
when they are in the graphic arts business." How-
ever, the employees questioned were not informed
of this and only Goldsmith, as Thrush testified, was
assured "that anything [he] said would not affect
[his] job." In this connection, Thrush, as he further
testified, reminded Goldsmith that he had "taken
[him from another company] and given him an op-
portunity to learn," and told Goldsmith that he was
"disappointed" and "sorry for" him.
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment
' Not having filed a brief, Respondent's position on the issues in this case
is gleaned from its opening and closing statements , its answer , and support-
ing testimony
"Although he is not an officer of Respondent, Conover was given the
title of vice president to enhance his prestige in dealing with Respondent's
customers
' Raul Silva , Daniel Sarnicola , Alphonse Degrammont , James Gold-
smith, and Hayward Prentice.
10 Respondent does not contest Conover 's supervisory status and it was
stipulated that DiSalvo is a supervisor.
11 The quotations are taken from Degrammont 's testimony
THRUSH PRESS , INC. 577
DiSalvo, Respondent 's general foreman , who was
present while Respondent 's employees were being
interrogated by Thrush , did not remain silent dur-
ing the several interviews . Although DiSalvo did
not ask any questions , his remarks bear noting. In
this regard , upon Silva 's admission to Thrush that
he had joined the Union , DiSalvo interjected,
"After [Thrush ] signed a personal loan [for you],
you did this to him ."" And , in the case of Gold-
smith , after he said that he had " followed the boys"
to the Union , DiSalvo stated , with obvious sarcasm,
"What a fine bunch of boys you are." 13
Like Thrush, DiSalvo also interrogated em-
ployees concerning their relationship to the Union.
Thus, on April 5 , before being called into Thrush's
office , Silva and Degrammont were approached at
their work stations by DiSalvo who, without more,
asked them whether , and why , they had joined the
Union.
Sarnicola , too, was questioned by DiSalvo. After
Sarnicola left Thrush 's office , where he had ad-
mitted membership in the Union , DiSalvo asked
him why he had joined and called him "a
doublecrosser" for doing so. At a later occasion
DiSalvo again spoke to Sarnicola about the Union
telling him , as Sarnicola put it , that he "will be sor-
ry, [he ] will be bouncing around from shop to
shop. "
2. The alleged promises of benefit
During their interrogation on April 5 by Thrush,
Respondent 's president , Silva and Sarnicola, em-
ployees of Respondent , were asked why they joined
the Union . Each answered, in essence , that he
became a union member because of the benefits
which it was thought would ensue from representa-
tion by the Union . Thrush's rejoinder to Silva was
"If we give you the same benefits as the union ...
will you still join the union ?" and to Sarnicola, "if
you had [those ] benefits would you still join the
union?".
C. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning
Respondent 's Alleged Independent Violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
It is well settled that an employer 's interrogation
of an employee concerning his relationship to a
labor organization violates Section 8(a)(I) of the
Act if it is coercive. In the light of this principle,
Respondent , relying on Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
109 NLRB 591, argues that the interrogation dis-
closed by the record in this case did not contravene
Section 8 ( a)(1). I find , however, that it did.
The coercive nature of the questioning of
Respondent 's employees by Thrush , its president, is
quickly demonstrable. First , it was carried on in
Thrush's office . N.L.R.B . v. M & B Headwear Co.,
Inc., 349 F.2d 170 , 172 (C.A. 4). Second , assuming
that the doctrine enunciated in Blue Flash, upon
which Respondent relies , is still the law, 14 the
safeguards there found to be present for which
reason the Board exonerated the employer involved
were , for the most part , absent in the case at bar.15
Finally , like that in M & B , the interrogation here
under consideration was "accompanied by manifest
employer hostility to the union ," as appears from
Thrush 's remarks to Degrammont and Goldsmith,
and those of DiSalvo , Respondent 's general
foreman , to Silva and Goldsmith.
DiSalvo 's separate questioning of Silva , Degram-
mont , and Sarnicola was also coercive because no
assurances against reprisals were given . Further,
and the absence of assurances aside , DiSalvo's
comment to Silva in Thrush 's office concerning his
joining the Union notwithstanding Thrush 's having
"signed a personal loan " for Silva , his calling Sar-
nicola a "doublecrosser" for having become a
union member , and telling him that he would "be
sorry [for doing so and ] will be bouncing around
from shop to shop " imbued DiSalvo 's interrogation
of those employees with an aura of coercion.
Respondent has denied the complaint 's allegation
that it promised benefits to employees to induce
them to disavow the Union. This denial , however,
has been overcome by the proof.
I have found that during his interrogation of
Respondent 's employees , Silva and Sarnicola,
Thrush , its president, asked them, in essence,
whether they would still adhere to the Union if
Respondent gave them the same benefits which
they thought would be forthcoming by reason of
their representation by the Union. I construe these
questions as an implied offer by Respondent to
furnish its employees with advantages similar to
those which they expected the Union to obtain for
them . Offers of this nature , the Board has held, are
"promises of benefit calculated and likely to
procure abandonment of the Union " and, hence,
proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Water-
town Undergarment Corporation , 137 NLRB 287,
300. To the same effect , see also Playbill, Incor-
porated, 131 NLRB 592, 593, 597.
Accordingly , I conclude that , as alleged in the
complaint, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by coercively interrogating its employees
concerning their relationship to the Union and by
promising them benefits to induce them to forsake
the Union.
'' It appears that at an earlier time Thrush had , in fact, arranged for Silva
to borrow a substantial sum of money.
"The quotations are taken from the testimony of the employees con-
cerned.
" See, however , StruAsner C'onstrut tion Co , Inc., 165 NLRB 1062
" Although Thrush assured Goldsmith that his answers would not affect
his job , this assurance, it seems to me, was effectively negatived by
Thrush 's accompanying statement to Goldsmith that he was "disappoin-
ted" and "sorry for" him
578 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. Facts Concerning Respondent 's Alleged Violation
of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
and York "worked for [ Respondent ] up to and in-
cluding April 7."
1. The Union 's initial request for recognition and
bargaining
Early on the morning of Wednesday , April 5,
Peter Van Delft , an organizer for the Union, came
to Respondent 's premises . In the absence of Donald
Thrush , Respondent 's president , he conferred
briefly with Robert Conover , Respondent 's produc-
tion manager . During this conference Van Delft in-
formed Conover that all of Respondent 's produc-
tion employees , excluding those who were members
of Amalgamated Lithographers of America ( herein
called Lithographers Union), had joined the Union
and requested that Respondent recognize, and bar-
gain with , the Union.
In answer to a question put by Conover as to the
identity of the men represented by the Union, Van
Delft handed Conover seven cards, each of which
had been signed by an employee of Respondent,
authorizing the Union to act as the signer s collec-
tive -bargaining agent ." After looking at each
card 17 Conover told Van Delft that he had no
authority to act upon the Union 's recognition
request ; that Donald Thrush , Respondent's pre-
sident , would "have to make the decision"; that
Thrush would be informed of Van Delft 's visit; and
that Thrush would then communicate with Van
Delft . With the matter in this posture Van Delft de-
parted.
2. The discharge of Roscoe Croom and Dennis
York
Roscoe Croom and Dennis York were hired by
Respondent , respectively , in April 1966 and March
1967. Croom was employed as a messenger and
York as a messenger and shipping clerk.
As Van Delft, the Union 's organizer, was leaving
Respondent 's premises on April 5 after his con-
ference with Conover , Respondent 's production
manager, he met Croom and York on their way to
work . Noting their obvious tardiness , Van Delft re-
minded Croom that he had specifically advised
Croom "not to be late today " and instructed him
" to get right in to work." Both did so.
As stipulated by the parties, Croom and York
were told on April 5, sometime after they signed in,
that they were discharged as of Friday , April 7.l" It
was further stipulated by the parties that Croom
"No issue is raised with respect to the nature of the cards or their execu-
tion In pertinent part each card contains the following recital
I of my own free will hereby authorize I the Union I to act for me as
a collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay,
wages , hours , or other conditions of employment
" The cards which were handed to Conover , each of which he examined,
were signed by the following employees Raul Silva, Daniel Sarnicola,
Dennis York, Alphonse Degrammont, James Goldsmith . Hayward
Prentice , and Roscoe Croom
3. The Union 's subsequent requests for, and
Respondent 's refusal of, recognition and bargaining
Upon arriving at his office on the morning of
April 5 , Thrush , Respondent 's president , was in-
formed by Conover , Respondent 's production
manager , of his earlier conference with Van Delft,
the Union 's organizer , and of what transpired dur-
ing its course . Thrush 's first reaction was to inter-
rogate Respondent 's employees , as found above.
He then discussed Respondent 's request for recog-
nition with Florian Borkowski , an official of the
Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York
(herein called the Association), of which Respon-
dent is a member , who advises its constituents on
labor relations matters . It was decided during this
consultation that Thrush tell Van Delft that he
would discuss the Union 's recognition request with
Van Delft within the next few days.
Thrush and Van Delft spoke to each other on the
following day , April 6 . After remonstrating with
Thrush about the discharge of Croom and York,
Van Delft asked when he would hear from Respon-
dent with respect to the Union 's request for bar-
gaining . On this point Thrush counseled patience.
Also on April 6, Borkowski, the Association's
labor relations adviser, came to Respondent's
premises and consulted further with Thrush con-
cerning the Union 's recognition request . In addi-
tion , Borkowski made an investigation as to the
composition of the unit involved in the Union's
recognition demand and the number of employees
in that unit whose authorization cards had been
presented to, and examined by, Conover , Respon-
dent 's production manager . Borkowski concluded
from his inquiry in this area that the Union did not
represent a majority.
In conversations with Borkowski between April 6
and April 10 Van Delft, the Union 's organizer,
reiterated the Union 's request for recognition. In
reply Borkowski stated that Respondent doubted
that the Union represented a majority of the em-
ployees in the unit involved , suggested that the
Union seek a Board-conducted election and stated
that if the Union did not do so Respondent would.
Neither party, however, ever filed a representation
petition. party,
During their last conversation, which took place
on April 10, Van Delft discussed with Borkowski
'" These discharges are not alleged in the complaint as constituting unfair
labor practices
"There was much talk between Borkowski and Van Delft, Borkowski,
and Thrush , and Borkowski and Board personnel about the filing of a peti-
tion by Respondent should the Union fail to do so . Further, although Bor-
kowski went so far as to begin to prepare a petition he suspended his efforts
in this regard on April 12 , because, the Union having taken no action to en-
force its demand for recognition , he decided , as he stated " to let sleeping
dogs lie "
THRUSH
Respondent 's discharge of Croom and York. In this
connection , Van Delft told Borkowski , as Van Delft
testified , "that as a condition of bargaining, the
company would have to reinstate the two
discharged workers."
Upon the filing of the charge in the instant
proceeding on April 17, Borkowski was supplanted
as Respondent 's representative by Hugh P.
Husband , Jr., an attorney at law . Starting early in
May and continuing through June , Van Delft, the
Union's organizer , requested of Husband , as he had
of his predecessor, Borkowski, that Respondent
recognize and bargain with the Union. Husband,
however, like Borkowski, did not accede.
Summing up the foregoing , I find that although
the Union, commencing on April 5, repeatedly
requested that Respondent recognize and bargain
with it , Respondent refused to do so, taking the
position that it doubted that the Union represented
a majority of the employees concerned.
4. The composition of the unit and the basis for
Respondent's doubt as to the Union's majority
Although the parties are not in agreement as to
all the persons who should be considered as being
in the unit20 for which the Union requested recogni-
tion as collective -bargaining agent , they have
agreed, at least, as to the inclusion of eight. Five of
these employees had signed authorization cards,
which, together with those executed by Croom and
York, were exhibited to, and examined by,
Conover.
The parties are in dispute as to five persons.
These are Croom, York, Martin Sacks, Joseph 0'-
Connor, and Herbert Hinson . The General Counsel
contends that only Croom and York should be in-
cluded in the unit. Concerning the others, he argues
that Sacks should not be counted because he was in
military service on April 5, the day the recognition
request was first made; that O'Connor is a super-
visor and should, therefore, be excluded; and that
Hinson had either been discharged before April 5,
or, as set forth in his brief, "had no reasonable ex-
pectancy of future employment with Respondent
after March 10 ." Respondent 's counterposition,
and the basis for its doubt as to the Union's majori-
ty when it requested recognition , is that Croom and
York, because of their discharge on April 5, were
not in the unit; that Sacks, despite his being in the
military service on the day the Union first
requested recognition, should be counted; that 0'-
" It will be remembered that when Van Delft , the Union 's organizer, first
approached the Respondent , he told Conover , Respondent 's production
manager , in essence , that the Union represented Respondent 's production
employees who were not members of Lithographers Union. In the com-
plaint the unit involved is described as being "All full-time and regular
part-time production employees employed by Respondent at its plant, in-
cluding all letterpress employees , but excluding offsetpress employees, of-
fice clerical employees , sales employees , guards, watchmen and all super-
visors, as defined in . the Act ." Inasmuch as Respondent is not contest.
ing the appropriateness of the unit described in the complaint and has
raised no issue concerning any variances between the unit so described and
PRESS, INC. 579
Connor is not a supervisor; and that Hinson was not
discharged until after April 5.
If Respondent's position is correct, on April 5,
the date of the Union's initial recognition request,
there were 11 people in the unit of whom the
Union, on the basis of authorization cards'21
represented only 5, less than a majority. On the
other hand, if the General Counsel's position is cor-
rect, the unit complement on April 5 was 10, of
whom the Union represented 7, more than a
majority.
In view of the divergent contentions of the
General Counsel and Respondent as to the disputed
persons, it becomes necessary, insofar as it has not
already been done, as respecting Croom and York,
to make findings concerning their status as mem-
bers of the unit. Accordingly, as to Sacks, O'Con-
nor, and Hinson , I find as follows:
Martin Sacks: Until October 1, 1965, Sacks
worked for Respondent as a folder and shipping
clerk. As stipulated, "since that date, he has been
in the armed forces and has not worked for
[Respondent] up until the present." Although not
stipulated, it was established that he was promised
reemployment with Respondent upon being
mustered out of the military service.
Joseph O'Connor: O'Connor has been employed
by Respondent for 14 years. With the possible ex-
ception of Conover, Respondent's production
manager, O'Connor is the most experienced and
technically knowledgeable person in Respondent's
employ, having, during his career with" Respon-
dent, worked at every job in the unit. Presently 0'-
Connor operates the largest letterpress on Respon-
dent's premises and spends his entire time on
production work.
In the performance of its printing work Respon-
dent employs a Stoneman, who prepares the form
which is placed in the presses, and two pressmen in
addition to O'Connor. 2 Because of the size of 0'-
Connor's press, his weekly wage, which appears to
be in line with industry practice insofar as it relates
to operators of similar presses, is $165 a week. This
is $30 more than that received by the next highest
paid pressman employed by Respondent, who
operates a smaller press.23
Each printing job to be run on Respondent's
presses is noted on a job ticket, 90 to 99 percent of
which contain instructions with respect to the press
to be used. On the rare occasions when this infor-
mation does not appear on the job tickets the
stoneman or the other two pressmen consult with
the unit mentioned by Van Delft to Conover , all subsequent mention of the
unit involved will have reference to the unit as set forth in the complaint
Si There is no evidence to establish that on the critical date the Union
represented employees who had not signed cards.
22 The stoneman , Joseph Ehrlich, and the two additional pressmen,
Anthony Denicola and Arnold Demcola, are among the employees who,
the parties agreed , should be considered as being in the unit.
Z' The wages paid to the operators of the smaller presses, $135 a week to
Anthony Denicola and $ 125 a week to Arnold Denicola , also appear to be
in line with the practice in the industry.
353-1770-72-38
580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
O'Connor concerning the press to be used. From
time to time Anthony and Arnold Denicola, who, as
noted, operate the smaller presses in Respondent's
establishment , seek , and receive, advice from 0'-
Connor as to the work available for their presses or
the priority to be given to such work. They do this,
O'Connor testified, because "they don't want to be
bothered with worrying about what job is next or
what goes on next or what do you have."
In 1963, upon the death of the Stoneman then
employed by Respondent, O'Connor took over the
stonework and performed it in addition to his nor-
mal duties . When "the work got to be too much to
handle," as O'Connor related, he "said to Mr.
Conover, [ Respondent 's production manager, that
he thought ] we should hire somebody to take [the
former stoneman 's] place."
Conover acquiesced in O'Connor's proposal that
a Stoneman be employed. In due course, Joseph
Ehrlich, Respondent's present Stoneman, was
hired. Upon his application for employment Ehr-
lich was interviewed by Conover who then sent him
to O'Connor for further interview. After speaking
to Ehrlich, O'Connor told Conover, in response to
a question as to whether Ehrlich "will help us,"
"that as f a r [he] could see from talking to him ... .
[Ehrlich] would fit our needs." Ehrlich was then
given the job. Substantially the same procedure was
followed in connection with the hiring of Ehrlich's
vacation replacement.
Except as set forth above, O'Connor did not par-
ticipate in any personnel actions taken by Respon-
dent .24 Finally, in this connection , O'Connor was
never informed by any officer of Respondent, by
Conover, Respondent 's production manager, or by
DiSalvo, its general foreman , that he was a
foreman ; or that he had the power to hire, transfer,
suspend , lay off, promote, discharge, assign work
to, discipline , or direct, employees; s nor , with the
exception of Ehrlich and his vacation replacement,
was he ever asked for his opinion in this area.
Herbert Hinson: As stipulated, Hinson was hired
by Respondent during the week of January 27 as a
messenger and general helper. During the morning
of Thursday, March 9, Hinson announced that he
was leaving to look for his wife. This, Thrush,
Respondent's president, testified was not con-
sidered "too unusual " and, as Hinson was expected
to return, his paycheck, which was given him when
he left, included his wages for the following day.26
Hinson , however, has never, thereafter, worked for
Respondent.
About a week after Hinson's departure, Respon-
dent received a letter from him in which he in-
formed Respondent that he was in jail and asked
that Respondent send him money so that he could
effect his release . Although Respondent did not
send Hinson the money he requested, it still ex-
pected him to return and at the time considered
him still to be an employee notwithstanding his im-
prisonment.
On the Friday immediately after the visit to
Respondent's premises of Van Delft, the Union's
organizer, for the purpose of requesting Respon-
dent to recognize the Union27 or on Friday of the
next week Hinson, for the first time since his depar-
ture on March 9, returned and demanded a day's
pay which he claimed Respondent owed him. It
was explained to Hinson that Respondent owed him
nothing, whereupon he left Respondent's premises.
Anticipating that Hinson would be back on the
following Monday, Thrush, Respondent's president,
made an investigation "to decide," as Thrush put it,
"whether or not to re-employ him." Thrush
learned, during this investigation, that while work-
ing for Respondent before his departure on March
9, Hinson "was trying to encourage some of
[Respondent's other employees] to play dice at
noontime and was causing a little problem with
some of the fellows out there." Accordingly, Hin-
son was not permitted to resume his employment
with Respondent.'"
E. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning
Respondent's Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act
The General Counsel contends that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the Union, which, he al-
leges , represented a majority of Respondent's em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for collective bargain-
For such worth as it may have , I note that O'Connor testified that since
1963 no "letterpress people " have been laid off, suspended , or discharged.
" O'Connor testified that upon being hired Ehrlich told him that he (Eh-
rlich) had been told by someone that he ( O'Connor "was his IEhrlich'sI
boss " The hearsay nature of this testimony, however , deprives it of proba-
tive value N L R B v Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc., 202 F . 2d 671, 673
(C.A 9)
'" Respondent 's employees receive their wages each Thursday for a
period which starts the preceding Monday and ends the following Friday
•r It will be recalled that this occurred on Wednesday , April 5.
1X My findings concerning Hinson 's employment with Respondent and its
termination are based on Thrush 's testimony Dennis York , who, it will be
remembered , was notified of his discharge by Respondent on April 5
testified , as a witness for the General Counsel, that on a date which he
couldn 't remember , but which was about 2 or 3 weeks before his own em-
ployment was terminated , he saw Hinson in Respondent's office ; that at the
time a lady in the office was "handing [Hinson] a check "; and that he
"heard some people say [Hinson ] was fired ." In response to a leading
question put by the General Counsel, York further testified that Hinson
was not working for Respondent at the time. For several reasons, however,
I ascribe no weight to this testimony. Considering , first, the time of the
event described , York, although unable with certainty to remember its
date , placed it about 2 or 3 weeks before April 5 If, rather than 2 or 3
weeks before April 5, it had actually occurred a week earlier , i e , about 4
weeks before April 5, it would have taken place about March 9, the date
Hinson left Respondent 's premises to look for his wife and was given his
paycheck (G C. Exh 3(b) in evidence ) which, as stipulated , was the last
check received by Hinson from Respondent Second , York's testimony as
to Hinson's discharge was obviously a repetition of "general gossip," as
readily recognized on brief by the General Counsel and, hence , hearsay en-
titled to no probative value See fn . 25, supra Finally, York's assertion that
at the time in question Hinson was not working for Respondent was elicited
on direct examination by a leading question in a critical area and, there-
fore, of little worth as proof Liberty Coach Company, Inc , 128 NLRB 160,
162.
THRUSH PRESS, INC.
ing at the time of its first request for bargaining.
Concerning Respondent 's doubt as to the Union's
majority , the General Counsel argues that such a
claim does not justify Respondent 's refusal to bar-
gain with the Union because it is founded on er-
roneous legal conclusions as to the status of the
people whose inclusion in the unit is disputed.
Respondent 's defense to the complaint 's allega-
tion that it unlawfully refused to bargain with the
Union is that it doubted, in good faith, that the
Union represented a majority of the employees in
the unit . 2 This doubt was engendered by its conclu-
sions, after investigation , as to the position of five
people as members of the unit.
Whether a person is within or without a collec-
tive-bargaining unit is a question of law. Swift and
Company, etc., 128 NLRB 347, 350, enfd. 292 F.2d
561 (C.A. 1). This being so, if Respondent based its
conclusions as to the unit placement of the disputed
persons upon "an erroneous view of the law" in
that regard " its good faith [ in doing so] is not
available as a defense to a charge of refusal to bar-
gain." N.L.R.B. v. Keystone Floors, Inc., etc., 306
F.2d 560, 564 (C.A. 3). In essence, as did the em-
ployer in Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 123 NLRB 833,
835, who refused to bargain with a union claiming
that the unit was inappropriate because it included
"a class of employees" found to be properly within
the unit , Respondent " acted at its peril." Also com-
pare The Pembek Oil Corporation, 165 NLRB 367.
Accordingly, the decision in this case turns not
upon whether Respondent 's refusal to bargain with
the Union was based upon its good faith in doubt-
ing that the Union represented a majority of the
employees in the unit, but upon whether the Union
actually represented a majority of those employees.
As pointed out earlier the controlling factor in this
respect is the unit placement of five people , Roscoe
Croom, Dennis York, Martin Sacks, Jospeh O'Con-
nor, and Herbert Hinson, whose status is in
dispute . 30 Since this will settle the majority issue,
the determination as to whether the persons con-
cerned are in or out of the unit must be made with
reference to time of the Union's initial request for
bargaining ,:" which , I have found , was early on the
morning of April 5.
The General Counsel contends that Croom and
York should be included in the unit and Respon-
dent that they should be excluded because they
were discharged on April 5. Although Respondent,
in fact, notified Croom and York on April 5 that
their employment would be terminated on April 7,
t" There being no contest by Respondent as to the appropriateness of the
unit , I conclude that , as alleged in the complaint , the unit " is appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act "
M' In this connection , it will be remembered , there are eight employees
whose position in the unit is undisputed
ii Joy Sill Milk, Inc.. 85 NLRB 1263, 1264-65, enfd in this regard 185
F 2d 732 (C A.D.C ), cert . denied 341 U.S 914, International Union ,
United Automobile etc. (Preston Products( v. N L R.B., 373 F 2d 671, 66
LRRM 2548, 2552-53 (C A.D C , November 14, 1967) In the latter case
it was stated that " the crucial question in a refusal to bargain case is
581
they were not so informed until after the Union's
April 5 request for recognition had been made.
Furthermore, Croom and York actually continued
to work for Respondent through April 7. Ac-
cordingly, as the Board did under very similar cir-
cumstances in The Hamilton Plastic Molding Com-
pany, 135 NLRB 371, 374,32 I find that Croom and
York were in the unit when the Union first asked to
be recognized.
Sacks was employed by Respondent until Oc-
tober 1, 1965. It was stipulated that "since that
date, he has been in the armed forces and has not
worked for [Respondent]." For this reason, the
General Counsel argues , on brief, "Sacks should
not be counted in determining the Union's majority
status ." Respondent's position seems to be that
because Sacks was promised reemployment upon
completion of his military service he should be
counted. Respondent's undertaking to Sacks, how-
ever, avails it nothing, for even without it Sacks
would have retained his status as an employee of
Respondent while a soldier. Supersweet Feed
Company, Incorporated, 62 NLRB 53, 54. Not-
withstanding this, it is the Board's "established
practice not to count employees on military leave
as part of the unit when computing the Union's
majority." Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283,
1291, enfd. 363 F.2d. 702 (C.A.D.C.). This being
so, Sacks must be considered as not being in the
unit.
Insofar as O'Connor's unit placement is con-
cerned, the General Counsel vigorously maintains
that he is a supervisor" and should, therefore, be
excluded from the unit. With equal stoutness
Respondent urges a contrary view. The bases for
the General Counsel's contention are essentially
that O'Connor's wages are substantially higher than
other persons employed by Respondent; that he as-
signs work to, and directs the work of, employees;
and that he had interviewed, and effectively recom-
mended the hiring of, applicants for employment.
As will be seen, however, I consider the General
Counsel's position as being not well taken.
As I have found, O'Connor has a wealth of
technical experience and has long been in Respon-
dent's employ. He spends all of his time on produc-
tion work, during the course of which he operates
Respondent's largest letterpress.
The wages paid by Respondent to its pressmen,
including O'Connor, are, as is the practice in
Respondent's industry, based on the size of the
press operated. In line with this, O'Connor does, in-
whether the union had the support of a majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate bargaining unit at the time the request to bargain was made
Modified in other respects 312 F.2d 723 (C.A 6)
As defined in Section 2(1 1) of the Act, a supervisor is
any individual having authority , in the interest of the employer.
to hire, transfer, suspend , lay off, recall, promote, discharge , assign,
remand, or discipline other employees , or responsibly to direct them,
or to them or to adjust their grievances , or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment
582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
deed, receive substantially higher wages than the
other pressmen working for Respondent. This, how-
ever, is because they operate presses smaller than
O'Connor's. Accordingly, I do not consider O'Con-
nor's higher wage rate in the circumstances as
being indicative of supervisory status. Cf. Corey
Brothers, Inc., 162 NLRB 1253.
Respecting O'Connor's function in the area of as-
signing work to, and directing the work of, em-
ployees, I have found that on those rare occasions
when the job ticket describing the matter to be
printed does not contain instructions as to the press
to be used,3a the stoneman or the other pressmen
will seek instructions in this regard from O'Connor.
I have also found that the two other pressmen in
Respondent's employ from time to time seek advice
from O'Connor as to the work available for their
presses and the order in which such work should be
done. They did this not because they were required
to, or because they could not make such a deter-
mination themselves, but because, in effect, they
preferred to have O'Connor do their thinking for
them.
Although O'Connor's rarely exercised function of
determining the press to be used when such infor-
mation is not specified on a job ticket may be of a
supervisory character, its performance does not, in
my opinion, establish that O'Connor is a supervisor.
The rule expressed in N.L.R.B. v. Beaver Meadow
Creamery, Inc., 215 F.2d 247, 251 (C.A. 3), relied
on by the General Counsel in this regard, "that Sec-
tion 2(1 1) must be read disjunctively, that the pos-
session of any one of the Section 2(11 ) powers will
make one a supervisor" must be reasonably ap-
plied. The "performance of isolated, infrequent du-
ties of a supervisory nature does not transform a
rank and file employee into a supervisor." Plastic
Workers Union, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 369 F.2d 226, 230
(C.A. 7). Considering the rule in this light , I cannot
find that O'Connor is a supervisor because on in-
frequent occasions he determines on what press a
particular job should be printed.
Nor does the advice O'Connor gives to the other
pressmen concerning the work available and the
order in which it should be done place him in a dif-
ferent position . Assuming that the pressmen con-
cerned were obliged to seek such directions from
O'Connor, which has not been established , his giv-
ing them does not endow O'Connor with superviso-
ry status. This , because in the context in which the
instructions in question are given by O'Connor they
involve in the words of Section 2(11 ) of the Act
"the exercise of ... authority ... of a merely rou-
tine ... nature ...." See, in this connection , Preci-
'A In this connection, I have found that 90 to 99 percent of the job tickets
do contain this information
is I have found , regarding this, that after speaking to the first Stoneman,
O'Connor told Conover " that as far as the could] see from talking to (the
stoneman he) would fit our needs " A similar "recommendation" was
made by O'Connor with respect to the second Stoneman hired by Respon.
dent
sion Fabricators v. N.L.R.B., 204 F.2d 567,
568-569 (C.A. 2).
Coming now to the final factor claimed by the
General Counsel to establish that O'Connor is a su-
pervisor; namely, his interviews, and recommenda-
tions concerning the hiring, of two stonemen. It will
be remembered, in this connection, that when the
stonemen applied for employment they were first
interviewed by Conover, Respondent's production
manager. Conover then sent them for further inter-
view to O'Connor following which he asked O'Con-
nor for his opinion as to their suitability.35
Conover's solicitation of O'Connor's views as to the
qualifications of the two stonemen seems to me to
have been nothing more than the type of request
any production manager might make of any em-
ployee or other person possessing O'Connor's ex-
perience and technical knowledge. In my opinion it
does not, either alone or in conjunction with any
other factor insofar as this phase of the case is con-
cerned, place O'Connor within the statutory defini-
tion of supervisor, even if, as here, his opinion that
the stonemen in question would "fit [Respondent's]
needs" resulted in their being hired. Cf. Edinburg
Manufacturing Company, 164 NLRB 121.
Furthermore, as is disclosed by the record, only
twice in 14 years has O'Connor recommended that
employees be hired. Even if these recommenda-
tions were of the type encompassed by Section
2(11 ) of the Act, they would not in view of their
isolation, as Plastic Workers Union 36 teaches,
"transform [O'Connor] into a supervisor."
Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record as
it relates to O'Connor, I find that he is a rank-and-
file employee and not a supervisor.
The last person whose unit placement is disputed
is Herbert Hinson. The General Counsel urges that
he be excluded. In support of his position the
General Counsel argues, on brief, that Hinson, who
actually performed no services for Respondent
since March 9, "had no reasonable expectancy of
future employment with Respondent after March
10."a7
Briefly reviewing the facts with respect to Hin-
son, I have found that on Thursday, March 9, Hin-
son, while employed by Respondent as a mes-
senger , informed Respondent that he was leaving to
look for his wife. As Respondent expected Hinson
to return, and March 9 being payday, the paycheck
given to him on his departure included his wages
for the following day.
Respondent next heard from Hinson about a
week later when it received a letter from him in-
forming Respondent that he was in jail. Several
' Plastic Workers Union etc v N L R B , 369 F 2d 226, 230 (C A 7)
31 The General Counsel's first position concerning Hinson , i e , that he
was discharged prior to April 5, the date on which the Union first requested
recognition , is pretermitted , as I have found that his discharge did not
occur until after that date
THRUSH PRESS, INC. 583
days after April 5, the date of the Union's initial
request for recognition, Hinson returned to
Respondent's premises and demanded a day's pay
which he claimed Respondent owed him. Upon
Respondent 's explanation to Hinson that it owed
him no money , Hinson departed.
Anticipating that Hinson would be back, Respon-
dent instituted an investigation to determine
whether it should allow Hinson to work. Discover-
ing, during its course, that before his departure on
March 9 Hinson had encouraged other employees
to gamble , Hinson was not permitted to resume his
employment with Respondent.
The General Counsel recognizes the rule that
employees in a nonwork status on the date of a
union 's recognition request will be considered as
being members of the unit involved if they "had a
reasonable expectancy of further employment with
the employer in the foreseeable future." Scobell
Chemical Company, Inc., 121 NLRB 1130, 1131,
enfd. 267 F.2d 922 (C.A. 2). As noted, however,
he argues that Hinson should not be included in the
unit because on April 5 , the date on which the
Union initially asked to be recognized , there was no
such "expectancy" insofar as Hinson was con-
cerned.
The facts do not support this argument. It is clear
that at the time of Hinson 's departure on March 9
he was expected to return to work. Nothing appears
in the record to show that Respondent had changed
its position in this regard at any time prior to the
Union's initial recognition request on April 5.
Respondent 's decision not to permit Hinson to
resume his work was made after that and following
an investigation prompted, seemingly , by Hinson's
demand, also made after April 5, for a day's pay
which Respondent felt was not due him.
As Hinson "had a reasonable expectancy of
further employment" with Respondent on the date
of the Union's first request for recognition, he will
be considered as having been in the unit at that
time.
In sum , with respect to the persons whose unit
placement is in issue , I have found that on the criti-
cal date Sacks was not in the unit and that Croom,
York, O'Connor, and Hinson were. Adding the
latter 4 employees to the 8 as to whom there is no
dispute, the total unit complement was 12.
At the time it requested recognition on April 5,
the Union had the support of seven employees in
the unit.31 It was, accordingly, the majority
representative and, in the light of the principles set
forth at the outset of this discussion, should have
been recognized.
I conclude, therefore, that by refusing to recog-
nize the Union as the collective-bargaining agent of
its employees in the unit Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In arriving at this
conclusion I have taken into account the statement
made on April 10 by Van Delft, the Union's or-
ganizer, to Borkowski, who was then Respondent's
representative, "that as a condition of bargaining,
the company would have to reinstate [Croom and
York]," who were earlier discharged under circum-
stances not alleged to be unfair labor practices. As-
suming the condition thus laid down by Van Delft
to have been illegal under the Act it would not have
justified Respondent's refusal to recognize the
Union. Illegal bargaining demands are matters "to
be resolved in the bargaining process, not an excuse
for refusing to bargain at all." N.L.R.B. v. Sunrise
Lumber & Trim Corp., 241 F.2d 620, 624-625
(C.A. 2), cert. denied 355 U.S. 818.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Respondent's activities set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations
set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the Act, my
Recommended Order will direct Respondent to
cease and desist therefrom and to take the affirma-
tive action normally required in such cases to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act. Because of the nature
of the unfair labor practices engaged in by Respon-
dent, broad cease-and-desist provisions will be in-
cluded in my Recommended Order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the entire record in this case , I make the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees con-
cerning their relationship to the Union and by
promising employees benefits to induce them to
forsake the Union, Respondent has engaged, and is
engaging , in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. All full-time and regular part-time production
employees of Respondent, including all letterpress
employees, but excluding offsetpress employees, of-
fice clerical employees, sales employees, guards,
3' For the names of the employees who prior to the Union 's demand had
signed authorization cards , see fn. 17.
584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
5. At all times material herein the Union has
represented a majority of the employees in the unit
set forth in Conclusion of Law 4, above.
6. By failing and refusing to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the unit set forth
in Conclusion of Law 4, above, Respondent has en-
gaged , and is engaging , in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and upon the entire record in this case, I
hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Thrush Press , Inc., its officers , agents , sucessors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concern-
ing their or other employees ' relationship toward,
attitudes concerning, membership in, or activities
on behalf of, District 65, Retail, Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union , AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization.
(b) Promising benefits to employees to dissuade
them from supporting, engaging in activities on be-
half of, or to induce them to forsake or renounce,
District 65, Retail , Wholesale and Department
Store Union , AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization.
(c) Failing or refusing to recognize, or bargain
collectively respecting rates of pay, wages , hours,
or other terms or conditions of employment with
District 65, Retail , Wholesale and Department
Store Union , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the following ap-
propriate unit:
All full-time and regular part -time production
employees, including all letterpress employees, but
excluding offsetpress employees , sales employees,
guards, watchmen , and supervisors as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(d) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization , to form , join, or
assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended , or to refrain
from any or all such activities , except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
condition of employment in conformity with Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of said Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it
is found, will effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended:
(a) Upon request , recognize and bargain with
District 65, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive represen-
tative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment , and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understand-
ing in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its premises copies of the attached
notice marked " Appendix ."39 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional or for Region 2
of the National Labor Relations Board , after being
duly signed by an authorized representative of
Respondent , shall be posted by Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof , and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places , including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced , or covered by
any other material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director in writing,
within 20 days from receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.40
`10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order"
10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 2 , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO THE
RECOMMENDED ORDER OF A TRIAL EXAMINER OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
After a trial in which both sides had the opportu-
nity to present their evidence it has been found that
we violated the law by committing unfair labor
practices and we have been ordered to post this
notice and to keep the promises that we make in
this notice.
WE WILL NOT question you in any way about
District 65, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT promise, or give, pay increases
or any other benefits to influence you against,
or to keep you from, joining, signing a card for,
supporting , or helping in any way, District 65,
Retail , Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
THRUSH PRESS, INC. 585
WE WILL NOT promise , or give , pay increases
or any other benefits to induce , persuade, or
convince you to reject , renounce , or resign
from , District 65, Retail , Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union , AFL-CIO, or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT in any other way interfere
with , restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of
any rights guaranteed to you by the National
Labor Relations Act. In this connection, WE
WILL respect your rights to self-organization, to
form , or join , or assist any union , to bargain
collectively through any union or representa-
tive of your choice as to wages, hours of work,
or any other term or condition of employment.
You also have the right , which WE WILL also
respect , to refrain from doing so.
WE WILL , upon request , recognize and bar-
gain collectively with District 65, Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
our employees , in a group which has been
found to be proper , as to rates of pay , wages,
working hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment . If we come to an agreement
with the Union about these things we will put
that agreement in writing and sign it . The par-
ticular group found to be proper for this pur-
pose is:
All persons working for us who do produc-
tion work , including letterpress em-
ployees, but not offsetpress employees,
sales employees , guards , watchmen, or su-
pervisors.
All our employees are free to become or remain,
or to refrain from becoming or remaining , members
of District 65, Retail , Wholesale and Department
Store Union , AFL-CIO, or any other union.
THRUSH PRESS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 5th Floor, Squibb Building, 745 Fifth
Avenue, New York, New York 10022, Telephone
751-5500.