Thomas W. Heeter

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 13, 2019

14079402 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/079,402 11/13/2013 Thomas W. Heeter HEEPAT007US 1209
43737 7590 12/13/2019
John R. Casperson
P.O. Box 36369
Pensacola, FL 32516-6369
EXAMINER
WEISBERGER, RICHARD C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/13/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte THOMAS W. HEETER
____________

Appeal 2018-008267
Application 14/079,402
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and BRADLEY B.
BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Thomas W. Heeter (Appellant2) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134
of a final rejection of claims 1–6, the only claims pending in the application

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed April 26, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 7,
2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 7, 2018), and Final
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 29, 2016).
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on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Appellant invented a use of machine-readable codes for the
purposes of conducting monetary and credit transactions in a secure manner.
Specification 1:24–26.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1 which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
1. A method for conducting an electronic payment, said method
employing
a seller bar code encoding information solely to enable
electronic payment to a seller's account,
said seller's account belonging to an intended recipient of
the electronic payment,
a buyer's smart-phone with a camera function for
scanning or capturing an image of the seller bar code and
a keypad for entering a payment amount,
a remote electronic payment center for maintaining a
buyer's account and making electronic payments from the
buyer's account,
an electronic communication system for transmitting
data, including data representative of the seller bar code
image, and the payment amount, to the remote electronic
payment center,
and applications present on the smart-phone and at the
remote payment center to enable data transmission of the
data over the electronic communication system from the

2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as himself.
(Appeal Br. 2).

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buyer's smart-phone to the remote electronic payment
center using a send command and to authorize the remote
electronic payment center to electronically transfer funds
from a buyer's account associated with the buyer's smart-
phone to the seller's account,
said data transmission being effected wirelessly
from the buyer's smart-phone and bypassing seller
equipment,
said method comprising
[1] providing an image of the seller bar code at a point of sale
for goods or services,
[2] scanning or capturing an image of the seller bar code with
the camera function of the smart phone,
[3] processing the image with the smart-phone application to
form a wirelessly transmittable seller data file,
[4] wirelessly transmitting the seller data file from the smart-
phone and electronically receiving the seller data file at the
electronic payment center,
[5] wirelessly transmitting a payment data file representative of
a payment amount from the smart-phone and electronically
receiving the data file representative of the payment amount at
the electronic payment center,
[6] said steps of wirelessly transmitting being carried out from
the buyer's smart-phone and bypassing seller equipment
electronically debiting the buyer's account by the payment
amount,
[7] electronically crediting the seller's account by the payment
amount,
and
[8] electronically transmitting data representative of the
crediting of the seller's account to the seller.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Frantz.
Claims 1–6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,as
lacking a supporting written description within the original disclosure.
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired.
The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether the claims were
predictable in view of the prior art.
The issues of written description matter turn primarily on whether the
claims are supported by the originally filed disclosure.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1–6 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more
STEP 13
Claim 1, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
STEP 2

3 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
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The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, .
. . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations
omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the
claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite
one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining
whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally
determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the
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additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the
recited judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 1
At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method
claim 1 recites providing, scanning or capturing, processing, and
transmitting a bar code image, transmitting a payment data file, and crediting
and transmitting data about an account. Providing an image is data display.
Scanning, capturing, processing, and transmitting a bar code image is
conventional data processing. Crediting an account is data update. Thus,
claim 1 recites receiving, processing, updating, and transmitting data. None
of the limitations recite technological implementation details for any of these
steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means.
The claim preamble recites various conventional pieces of equipment that
describe the context in which the steps occur. None of the steps depend on
the nature of the equipment other than for the equipment’s ordinary,
conventional functions. In particular, the operation of a generic transmission
step and it implementing structural equipment is the same irrespective of the
transmission recipient.
From this we see that claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of
either natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts4, (2) certain methods of organizing

4 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
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human activity5, and (3) mental processes.6 Among those certain methods
of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial
or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 1 recites the concept of
making a commercial payment. Specifically, claim 1 recites operations that
would ordinarily take place in advising one to allow a buyer to transmit a
payment by acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode. The advice to
allow a buyer to transmit a payment by acquiring the needed seller data from
a barcode involves crediting the seller's account by the payment amount,
which is an economic act, and transmitting a payment data file
representative of a payment amount, which is an act ordinarily performed in
the stream of commerce. For example, claim 1 recites “crediting the seller's
account by the payment amount,” which is an activity that would take place
whenever one is paying a merchant. Similarly, claim 1 recites “transmitting
a payment data file representative of a payment amount,” which is also
characteristic of paying a merchant.
The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to the operations
performed in claim 1. See Final Act. 2.
The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for conducting an
electronic payment. The steps in claim 1 result in an electronic payment

Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
5 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
6 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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transaction absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional
computer for doing so.
As to the specific limitations, limitations 1 and 2 recite receiving data.
Limitations 3–8 recite generic and conventional processing, updating, and
transmitting of payment data, which advise one to apply generic functions to
get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for allowing a buyer
to transmit a payment by acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode.
To advocate allowing a buyer to transmit a payment by acquiring the needed
seller data from a barcode is conceptual advice for results desired and not
technological operations.
The Specification at 1:24–26 describes the invention as relating to the
use of machine-readable codes for the purposes of conducting monetary and
credit transactions in a secure manner. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence
shows that claim 1 recites making a commercial payment. This is consistent
with the Examiner’s determination.
This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a
certain method of organizing human activity because making a commercial
payment is the established way of consummating commercial sales in
market economies. The concept of making a commercial payment by
allowing a buyer to transmit a payment by acquiring the needed seller data
from a barcode is one idea for making such a payment. The steps recited in
claim 1 are part of how this might conceptually be premised.
Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas
when they recited similar subject matter. Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (local
processing of payments for remotely purchased goods).
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From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 1 recites
making a commercial payment by allowing a buyer to transmit a payment by
acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode, which is a commercial and
legal interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity
identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea.
STEP 2A Prong 2
The next issue is whether claim 1 not only recites, but is more
precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to
some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to,
this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.7
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At
some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of
such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said,
remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).
Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the
computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results,
devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 2 are pure data gathering
steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps
4–6 recite basic conventional data operations such as transmitting data.

7 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981).
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Steps 3, 7, and 8 recite generic computer processing expressed in terms of
results desired by any and all possible means and so present no more than
conceptual advice. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is
interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically
enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically
achieves those results.
Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites the concept of
making a commercial payment by allowing a buyer to transmit a payment by
acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode as performed by a generic
computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this
concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those
parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation.
Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. The 9+ pages of specification prose8 do not
bulge with disclosure, but only spell out different generic equipment9 and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of making a
commercial payment by allowing a buyer to transmit a payment by acquiring
the needed seller data from a barcode under different scenarios. They do not
describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions.
Instead, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an
instruction to apply making a commercial payment by allowing a buyer to

8 There are an additional 7+ pages that only list drawing references
9 The Specification describes using a smartphone, which is a conventional
piece of equipment, throughout the Specification.
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transmit a payment by acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode using
some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies
or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for
a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses
a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture
that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception.
We conclude that claim 1 is directed to achieving the result of making
a commercial payment by advising one to allow a buyer to transmit a
payment by acquiring the needed seller data from a barcode, as distinguished
from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result.
This amounts to commercial or legal interactions, which fall within certain
methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The
claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
STEP 2B
The next issue is whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception.
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The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter
the analysis at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract
idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, processing, updating, and transmitting data amounts
to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional
computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See
Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Also see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303,
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1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of
these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor do any produce
some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these
activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even
if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular
content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection
and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-processing-
update-transmission is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of
receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and
receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of
data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission),
Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling,
and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and
conventional.
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We conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Claim 1 is representative. The remaining method claims merely
describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical
application of that concept. There are no structural claims. As a corollary,
the claims are not directed to any particular machine.
LEGAL CONCLUSION
From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not
recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any
other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular
transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the
claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the commercial and
legal interaction of making a commercial payment by advising one to allow
a buyer to transmit a payment by acquiring the needed seller data from a
barcode, without significantly more.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the rejection “fails
a prima facie showing that the claim is ‘wholly directed to subject matter
encompassing a judicially recognized exception’.” App. Br. 9. Such a
showing is provided supra.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that as to the rejection
“even if the claim is directed toward an abstract idea, it incorporates enough
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meaningful limitations to ensure that it requires something meaningful in
addition to carrying out the abstract idea.” App. Br. 10. Such a showing
that it does not is provided supra. In particular, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument that “getting paid for something is not an abstract
idea, nor is being informed that you have been paid, nor is paying for
something.” App. Br. 9. The concept of payment is among the most
abstract of human concepts. It is no more than the exchange of paper or
computer bits. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (sequence of receiving,
selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving
payment recited an abstraction).
Claims 1–6 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frantz
The Examiner set forth this rejection in the Non-Final Action mailed
December 3, 2015. The Examiner refers back to this rather than replicating
it in the Final Action. The Examiner determines that all of the limitations
are described except for bypassing the seller equipment and the debit and
credit limitation. Examiner determines that such debiting and crediting are
conventional accounting entries for the claimed payment. This is not
disputed. Appellant only contends that the art does not explicitly recite this.
The Examiner also determines the bypassing is predictable. This is the core
dispute. App. Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 7–9.
Appellant cites:
the client application establishes communication either directly
with the vendor (when all of the required information is
contained in the barcode and/or in the client application) or with
a centralized platform that will relay the information to the
vendor to process the payment. Use of a centralized platform
will allow easy and secure storage of information related to the
[a] the user (such as delivery address, bank or credit card
information, preferred payment modalities, and/or to the vendor
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(such as vendor name, address, or banking information) and/or
[b] the invoice (such as amount, tax amount, vendor
identification key, etc.)
Frantz para. 14. This describes two alternatives. One does go through the
vendor, but the other first goes to a centralized platform that will relay the
information to the vendor. As all of the information needed to process the
payment goes to the centralized platform in the second alternative, there is
no technological need to continue sending the data on to the vendor. Thus,
any continuation on to the vendor is by way of convention rather than
technological need. It is obvious to delete a function for the purpose of
excluding its effects. See In re Larson, 340 F.2d 965 (CCPA 1965)
(Omission of additional framework and axle which served to increase the
cargo carrying capacity of prior art mobile fluid carrying unit would have
been obvious if this feature was not desired.); and In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553
(CCPA 1975) (deleting a prior art switch member and thereby eliminating its
function was an obvious expedient). Here, the only discernable purpose of
the existing convention is to convey information that is unused. No practical
or technological downside results from removing this part of the convention.
Claims 1–6 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking a
supporting written description within the original disclosure
We are persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims are
supported by the originally filed disclosure. App. Br. 13–15. The Examiner
responds that he “finds ‘bypassing’ to be broader in scope from "without
being routed from through the payee" and maintains the rejection.” Ans. 15.
The Examiner provides no analysis or explanation for this determination,
and no explanation of why this determination supports the rejection.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more is proper.
The rejection of claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Frantz is proper.
The rejection of claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
lacking a supporting written description within the original disclosure is
improper.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1–6 is affirmed.

In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6 101 Eligibility 1–6
1–6 103 Frantz 1–6
1–6 112(1) Written
Description
1–6
Overall
Outcome
1–6

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED