Thomas P. Kyu, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 29, 2011
0120090671 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 29, 2011)

0120090671

08-29-2011

Thomas P. Kyu, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.




Thomas P. Kyu,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(New York Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120090671

Hearing No. 520-2008-00445X

Agency No. 1A-113-0019-08

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s

appeal from the Agency’s October 29, 2008 final order concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Processing and Distribution Center

in Brooklyn, New York. On April 12, 2008, Complainant filed a formal

complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the

basis of disability when his request for light duty was denied and he

was denied eight hours of work per day.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of his

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant’s objections,

the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion and issued a

decision without a hearing on October 20, 2008.

The AJ found that on, or about March 12, 2008, Complainant underwent

a cardiac catheterization procedure. Following the procedure,

Complainant’s doctor provided him with a note, asking the Agency to

put him on light duty for one month and limited the amount of weight he

could lift to 10 pounds. Complainant submitted a light duty application

to management on March 12, 2008. Complainant’s manager (M1) approved

Complainant’s request and allowed him to work six-hour days until

April 19, 2008. Complainant signed the application, acknowledging the

temporary accommodation the Agency granted him.

On April 7, 2008, Complainant submitted documentation from his doctor

confirming that he could return to full duty. Between March 11 and

April 5, 2008, Complainant worked 19 six-hour shifts and designated

the remaining two hours of each day as sick leave. The Agency was

forced to limit Complainant’s hours because of the significant

decrease in the mail volume at the facility. In addition, the last two

hours of Complainant’s tour included “heavy work” which exceeded

Complainant’s 10-pound lifting restriction. As a result, the Agency

was unable to provide work beyond six hours each day.

The AJ determined that Complainant’s impairment was of short duration

with no long term effects or severe impact. Therefore, the AJ found that

Complainant’s impairment was a temporary condition that did not rise to

a level of a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. As Complainant does

not have a substantial limitation in a major life activity, he is not an

individual with a disability. As a result, the AJ found that Complainant

had not established a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination

and therefore had not shown that he was discriminated against as alleged.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s decision.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant maintains that he is an individual with a

disability as defined under the Rehabilitation Act. Further, Complainant

alleges that the light duty position he performed was the same as his full

duty assignment. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission

reverse the final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Decision without a Hearing

The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such

that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material”

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Upon review of the record, the Commission determines that there are no

genuine issues of material fact or any credibility issues which required

a hearing and therefore the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing

was appropriate. The Commission concludes that, even assuming all facts

in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact finder could not find in his

favor, as explained below. Therefore, no genuine issues of material

fact exist. Under these circumstances, the Commission finds that the

AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

Denial of Reasonable Accommodation

The Commission notes that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits

discrimination against qualified disabled individuals. See 29 C.F.R. §

1630. In order to establish that Complainant was denied a reasonable

accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) he is an individual with

a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified

individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3)

the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See Enforcement

Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, EEOC No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (“Enforcement

Guidance”).

Under the Commission’s regulations, an Agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations

of a qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show

that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. §§�

�1630.2 (o) and (p). The Commission shall assume without deciding (for

the purposes of this decision) that Complainant is an individual with

a disability and a qualified individual with a disability.

The Commission finds that Complainant has not established that the Agency

denied him reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation

Act. The record indicates that Complainant was provided a light duty

assignment in accordance with his restrictions in the 030/040 Operation.

ROI, at 232. Complainant’s lifting restriction prevented him from

performing the final two hours of the shift which included heavy lifting

to clean out the cases, close out, and dispatch. Id. at 233. Further,

the Agency had experienced a decrease in mail volume. Id. at 242. As a

result, the Agency had no work available for Complainant and granted

him sick leave each day for the remaining two hours of his shift until

his restrictions were lifted. ROI, at 259. The Commission notes that

Complainant is entitled to an effective accommodation, but not necessarily

the accommodation of his choice. Complainant has not offered any evidence

that the accommodation granted to him was ineffective nor has he alleged

that he was forced to work outside of his restrictions. Accordingly,

the Commission finds that Complainant has not demonstrated that he was

denied reasonable accommodation.

Further, to the extent that Complainant is alleging disparate treatment

(apart from accommodation), the Commission finds that as discussed above,

the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions. Because the Agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for the alleged discriminatory event, Complainant now bears

the burden of establishing that the Agency's stated reasons are merely

a pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc.Sec. Admin., EEOC Request

No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). Complainant can do this directly by showing

that the Agency’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Construing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, the record is devoid

of any evidence that discrimination was a factor in the Agency's actions.

At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Complainant

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's

reasons were not the real reasons, and that the Agency acted on the basis

of discriminatory animus. Complainant has failed to carry this burden.

Accordingly, the Commission finds that Complainant has failed to show

that he was discriminated against as alleged.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order,

because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of a decision without a

hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does

not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 29, 2011

Date

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0120090671

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120090671