Thomas McKeon

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 30, 2018

No. 86705459 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2018)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: March 30, 2018

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Thomas McKeon
_____

Serial No. 86705459
_____

Mark C. Young of Erickson Kernell IP, LLC,
for Thomas McKeon.
Cassondra Anderson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Lykos, Goodman and Heasley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Thomas McKeon (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
word and design mark for “clothing, namely, T-shirts, shorts, pants,
hats, socks, and shoes” in International Class 25.1

1 Application Serial No. 86705459 was filed on July 27, 2015, based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act. The description of the mark states that “[t]he mark consists of the word
‘country’ with a crucifix that replaces the ‘t’ in the word.”
Serial No. 86705459
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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the
applied-for mark so resembles the registered mark #COUNTRY (in standard
characters) for “baseball caps and hats; graphic T-shirts; short-sleeved or long-
sleeved t-shirts” in International Class 25 as to be likely to cause confusion or
mistake, or to deceive.2
After the Trademark Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant
appealed to this Board. We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion

We base our determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”) cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Ind., Inc., 575 U.S.
__, 135 S.Ct. 1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Applying the DuPont factors, we bear in mind the fundamental principles
underlying the Lanham Act in general and Section 2(d) in particular, which are “to
secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability
of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 224 USPQ 327, 331 (1985), quoted in Matal v. Tam,

2 Registration No. 4941968 issued on the Principal Register on April 19, 2016.
Serial No. 86705459
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__ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 122 USPQ2d 1757, 1762 (2017); see also DuPont, 177 USPQ
at 566.
We have considered each relevant DuPont factor for which there is evidence or
argument, and have treated the other factors as neutral. See M2 Software, Inc. v. M2
Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark
Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015) (“While we
have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we focus our analysis on
those factors we find to be relevant.”). Varying weights may be assigned to each
DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City
Bank Group Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell
Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (factors “may play
more or less weighty roles in any particular determination”).
Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123
USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).
A. Similarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and Classes of Consumers.
We begin with the second and third DuPont factors, “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration…” and “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Serial No. 86705459
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Comparing Applicant’s clothing goods to the goods identified in the cited
registration, we see that Applicant’s “T-shirts” cover Registrant’s “Graphic T-shirts,
short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts.” These goods are legally identical. In addition,
both the application and cited registration include “hats.” See Bond v. Taylor, 119
USPQ2d 1049, 1053 (TTAB 2016) (goods identical in part, as application and
registration both identify t-shirts). This identity of goods in the same class,
International Class 25, favors a finding of likelihood of confusion as to all of
Applicant’s goods in that class. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v.
Rodriguez, 83 USPQ2d 1500, 1507 (TTAB 2007).
Nonetheless, with respect to Applicant’s remaining goods, “pants, socks, and
shoes,” the Examining Attorney has also submitted nine third-party, use-based
registrations indicating that such articles of clothing may emanate, along with hats
and T-shirts, from one registrant. For example:
• FOREVER ON VACATION, Reg. No. 5067991, for “clothing, namely, tops,
bottoms, swimwear, shorts, tshirts, sweatshirts, hooded sweatshirts, long
sleeve shirts, hats, baseball caps, sweat pants”;
• RAW VIBES, Reg. No. 5068618, for “hats, jackets, pants, shoes, sweatshirts,
T-shirts, underwear, vests, baseball caps and hats, graphic T-shirts, hooded
sweatshirts”;
Serial No. 86705459
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• LEGALIZE CONSCIOUSNESS, Reg. No. 5068764, for “hats, pants,
sweatshirts, T-shirts, baseball caps and hats, hooded sweatshirts, jogging
pants, sports caps and hats, sweat pants”;
• SUPERB, Reg. No. 5033570, for inter alia “hats, pants, shoes, shorts, socks,
sweat pants, sweatshirts, T-shirts, baseball shoes, baseball caps and hats,
cycling shoes, graphic T-shirts, short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts, sports
pants, sweat pants, sweat shorts”.3
This evidence shows that the clothing goods listed in the registrations are of a
kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re Aquamar,
Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co.
Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988), aff’d mem. 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir.
1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993) cited
in In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1412 (TTAB 2015), aff’d 866 F.3d 1315,
123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Additionally, the Examining Attorney has adduced third-party website pages
showing shorts, pants, long-sleeve T-shirts and socks advertised and offered together
by a single retailer, the GAP.4 See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198,
1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69,
1271-72 (TTAB 2009) (third-party use in commerce demonstrating that goods
emanate from single source under single mark). While this evidence from a single

3 Oct. 27, 2016 Office Action, TSDR pp. 10-34. All references to the TSDR are to the
downloadable pdf version.
4 GAP.com 10/27/2016, Oct. 27, 2016 Office Action, TSDR pp. 35-131.
Serial No. 86705459
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third-party retailer might seem sparse, we note that Applicant, in his response to the
Office Action, conceded “Applicant does not dispute that the goods covered by the
instant mark and the goods covered by the cited #country registration
are similar.”5 Applicant has echoed this concession that the goods are “related” and
“admittedly similar” in his appeal brief and in his reply brief.6
Consequently, we find that Applicant’s and Registrant’s identified clothing items
are identical in part and related in part. See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A. Inc.,
974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Since there are no restrictions
in either Applicant’s or Registrant’s identification of goods, we presume that the
parties’ goods would travel through the same channels of trade to the same classes of
customers, ordinary purchasers of clothing. See Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d at 1053;
B.V.D. v. Rodriguez, 83 USPQ2d at 1507; Genesco Inc. v. Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260,
1268-69 (TTAB 2003) (“Given the in-part identical and in-part related nature of the
parties’ goods, and the lack of any restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade
channels and purchasers, these clothing items could be offered and sold to the same
classes of purchasers through the same channels of trade”); In re Smith and
Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994).
Thus, the second and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.

5 April 26, 2017 Response to Office Action, TSDR p. 3.
6 Applicant’s brief p. 2, 4 TTABVUE 6; Reply brief p. 1, 7 TTABVUE 2.
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B. Similarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Where, as here, the goods are in part identical or legally identical, typically less
similarity between the marks is needed to find a likelihood of confusion. Coach Servs.,
Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations LLC v. Federal Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 102
USPQ2d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When marks would
appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to
support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.”). We consider the appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression of the marks in their entireties. Stone
Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1. Appearance
The Examining Attorney contends that the marks are similar in appearance
because their dominant portion, COUNTRY, is identical.7 Applicant disagrees,
arguing that the crucifix substituting for the letter “T” is the dominant feature in his
proposed mark:
Looking at Applicant’s mark , the eye is drawn immediately to the
prominent Latin cross/crucifix design portion that substitutes for the letter

7 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 6.
Serial No. 86705459
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“T” in the word “COUNTRY”. The crucifix design is bolder than the text
lettering, with the horizontal and vertical portions having a width at least
twice the width of the lines forming the textual portion of the mark.
Furthermore, the upper and lower ends of the vertical portion of the
crucifix design extend well above and below, respectively, the top and
bottom edges of the textual portion. While the crucifix has the general
shape of a “T”, it is clearly not a textual letter “T”, standing out prominently
from the remaining letters in the word.8

Applicant argues that this case is analogous to a nonprecedential Board decision,
In re Panasonic of North America, no. 78445277, 2006 WL 2414520 (TTAB Aug. 3,
2006), in which the Board found that the applicant’s mark,
, was not confusingly similar to the registered mark
HIFI.COM, in part because:
A potential consumer viewing applicant’s mark will be drawn first to the
‘phi’ symbol, displayed in large size and bold presentation, prior to noticing
the wording. Even consumers unfamiliar with the Greek alphabet and thus
unaware of the meaning of the ‘phi’ symbol would be drawn to what they
would perceive as a prominent design element in the center of the mark.
As such, the Greek “phi” symbol is the dominant portion of applicant’s
mark, and its presence therein renders applicant’s mark notably dissimilar
from that of registrant in appearance.

Id. at *4.9 Here, as there, Applicant contends that “Only after first viewing the
crucifix does a viewer then turn their attention and recognize that the crucifix design
also serves as the letter ‘T’ in the remaining textual portion of the word

8 Applicant’s brief p. 4, 4 TTABVUE 8.

9 The decision is reprinted in its entirety in Applicant’s Sept. 30, 2016 Response to Office
Action at TSDR p. 9 et seq.
Serial No. 86705459
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‘COUNTRY’.”10 Thus, Applicant concludes, the crucifix design is the dominant feature
of his applied-for mark, distinguishing it from the registered mark #COUNTRY.
We find, however, that the Panasonic decision is distinguishable from the present
case. In Panasonic, the Board found the term HIFI or HI-FI (short for “high fidelity”)
very weak for the involved audio components or related services, such that applicant’s
placement of a “phi” symbol in the center of its stylized mark,
served to distinguish it from HIFI.COM, which was registered on the Supplemental
Register. Id. at *5.
Here, in contrast, the literal term COUNTRY is arbitrary as applied to Applicant’s
and Registrant’s clothing goods (there being no restriction as to clothing style). And
the crucifix in Applicant’s proposed mark, , is part of the wording,
replacing the letter “T.” As such, this case is more analogous to In re Viterra, 671 F.3d
1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Viterra, the Board affirmed a refusal to
register XCEED in standard character form because it was confusingly similar to the
registered mark . The Board specifically found that the literal portion
of the X-Seed Mark, not the design portion, was the dominant part of the registrant’s
mark. In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Viterra
argued that the dominant portion of was the stylized letter “X”. The Federal Circuit,
however, agreed with the Board’s reasoning:

10 Applicant’s brief TSDR p. 5, 4 TTABVUE 9.
Serial No. 86705459
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Here, the design feature of the X-Seed Mark is not entirely distinct from the
literal portion of the mark; rather, the color and design features are
incorporated in the letter “X” and are covered in part by the “-Seed” portion
of the mark. This is not a case, therefore, where a larger design is separate
and independent from the literal features of the mark. The design itself is a
stylized letter that overlaps with, and is covered by, other literal portions of
the mark. Accordingly, the Board’s determination that the entire literal
portion “X-Seed” is the dominant portion of the mark, and not just the
stylized “X,” is supported by substantial evidence.

Id.

Here, as in Viterra, the crucifix is not separate and independent from the literal
feature COUNTRY. Rather, it serves as a stylized letter that replaces the letter “T,”
acting as a constituent part of the recognizable word COUNTRY. And since the mark
must be viewed in its entirety, the entire literal word COUNTRY is the dominant
portion of the mark, not just the stylized crucifix “T.” See id. at 1908, 1910-11 (citing
In re Cont’l Graphics Corp., 52 USPQ2d 1374, 1376 (TTAB 1999) (finding that the
standard character mark CONTINENTAL GRAPHICS was similar to the registered
mark CONTINENTAL containing a globe design within a large letter “C” at the
beginning of the mark); cf. TMEP § 1213.05(g)(i) (Oct. 2017) (mark with
distinctive design replacing a letter in descriptive or generic wording must still be
disclaimed, if word is still recognizable).
Our finding that COUNTRY is the dominant part of Applicant’s proposed mark is
in keeping with the line of decisions holding that “[i]n the case of a composite mark
containing both words and a design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark is the one most
likely to indicate the origin of the goods to which it is affixed.’” In re Viterra, 101
USPQ2d at 1908 (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200
(Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d at 1055. This is because it is
Serial No. 86705459
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the term consumers would use to refer to Applicant’s goods. In re Max Capital Grp.
Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1247 (TTAB 2010). The proper focus is on the recollection of
these average consumers, who would retain a general rather than a specific
impression of the involved marks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958,
1960 (TTAB 2016). For much the same reasons, consumers would focus on, recollect,
and refer to the word portion of Registrant’s mark, COUNTRY, as its dominant
element, rather than the hashtag symbol “#.” If the dominant portion of both marks
is the same, then the marks may be confusingly similar notwithstanding peripheral
differences. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260-61 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). “[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of
confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re National Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) cited in In re Davia, 110
USPQ2d 1810, 1813 (TTAB 2014).
Hence, the marks are far more similar than dissimilar in appearance.
2. Sound
Applicant acknowledges that “because the crucifix embedded within Applicant’s
mark substitutes for the letter ‘T’, Applicant’s mark would likely be pronounced as
the word ‘country’ by a consumer simply reading the mark and accepting the
prominent crucifix symbol as the letter ‘T’.”11 Even though Registrant’s mark contains

11 Applicant’s brief p. 6, 4 TTABVUE 10.
Serial No. 86705459
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the same word, COUNTRY, Applicant argues that because that word is preceded by
a hashtag symbol (#), it is likely to be pronounced “hashtag COUNTRY” by
consumers.12 Applicant supports this contention by citing the 2015 online article
“How Hashtags Changed the Way We Talk”,13 and the PTO’s notation that the cited
registration includes pseudo mark designations (i.e., phonetic equivalents) “hashtag
country” and “hash tag country.”14
The Examining Attorney responds that: the dominant features of both marks, the
word COUNTRY, are phonetic equivalents; there is no correct pronunciation of a
mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular
mark, Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB
2013) (quoting In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912; and even if consumers read
“#”as “hashtag,” slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a
likelihood of confusion. In re Energy Telecomm. Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351
(TTAB 1983).15 Applicant counters the Examining Attorney’s argument by citing to
our decision in Embarcadero Techs where the Board went on to find that the marks
in that case were “likely to be verbalized” similarly “by at least a significant number
of consumers.” Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, 222 USPQ2d at 1835. Applicant
further notes that the “slight differences” the Board found in Energy Telecomm were

12 Id.
13 www.tintup.com/blog/howhashtags-changedthe-way-we-talk/; Sept 30, 2016 Response to
Office Action, TSDR p. 6.
14 Id.
15 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 6-8.
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between the terms “ENTELEC” and “INTELLECT,” In re Energy Telecomm. Elec.
Ass’n, 222 USPQ at 351, a difference far slighter than that between “HASHTAG
COUNTRY” and COUNTRY.”16
We note that the significance of the hash symbol, “#”, depends upon its context.
Placed before a number or after a word, it may serve as a pound or number symbol
(e.g., THE #1 APP or ICHIBAN #). TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(TMEP) § 1202.18 (Oct. 2017).17 Placed before a word, it serves to identify or facilitate
a search on certain social media sites for a keyword or topic of interest. Id.
In this case, “#” immediately precedes the word COUNTRY in Registrant’s mark.
Even though it is used on clothing, given the current prevalence of the term’s use and
pronunciation on social media, it is fair to infer that some consumers, including
ordinary consumers of clothing items, will sound it out as “hashtag.”
Still, as we have found, “#” is not the dominant, source-identifying part of
Registrant’s mark. The dominant element, the word COUNTRY, is phonetically
identical in both marks. And where, as here, the dominant part of two marks is
pronounced identically, the addition of another word will not obviate the overall
similarity in sound. E.g., Anheuser-Busch, LLC V. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115
USPQ2d 1816, 1825 (TTAB 2015) (dominant element in WINEBUD identical in
sound to BUD); Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Respect Sportswear Inc., 83
USPQ2d 1555, 1561 (TTAB 2007) (“In this case, we find that applicant’s RATED R

16 Applicant’s brief p. 7, 4 TTABVUE 11.
17 Citing Dictionary.com, search of “hashtag,” dictionary.reference.com/browse/hashtag (June
19, 2013) (from the Random House Dictionary).
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SPORTSWEAR mark incorporates in its entirety opposer’s mark, RATED R.
The dominant and distinctive RATED R portion of applicant’s mark is identical to
opposer’s RATED R mark in appearance, spelling and sound.”); In re White Swan
Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988) (SHAKE SCATTER & GROW sounds
confusingly similar to SHAKE-N-GROW). Thus, although we do not discount the
impact of the hashtag character in Registrant’s mark, we find that it is insufficient
to overcome the strong phonetic similarity engendered by the identical and dominant
word COUNTRY.
For this reason, the marks are similar in sound and pronunciation.
3. Connotation and Commercial Impression
Applicant argues that his proposed mark, which includes a crucifix, evokes a
strong connotation or association with Christianity, whereas Registrant’s mark, with
its leading hashtag “#” symbol, connotes an association with social media. Applicant
contends that these are two entirely different commercial impressions, such that
there is no likelihood of confusion between the marks.18
We agree with the Examining Attorney, though, that the marks convey essentially
the same connotation and commercial impression, dominated by the common term
COUNTRY. Although the hashtag and crucifix present dissimilarities, they are not
sufficient to overcome the identity of that dominant element. The hashtag character
in Registrant’s mark is of little significance, as it does not present a source-indicating
function, serving only to “facilitate categorization and searching within online social

18 Applicant’s brief pp. 7-8, 4 TTABVUE 11-12.
Serial No. 86705459
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media….” TMEP § 1202.18. The crucifix design in Applicant’s applied-for mark may
convey a Christian connotation, but that is not inconsistent with the use of social
media, or the use of hashtags, for that matter; one may convey messages about
Christian subjects via social media using the “#” symbol; the two symbols are not
mutually exclusive. Consequently, there is nothing in either Applicant’s proposed
mark or Registrant’s mark that is so prominent as to diminish the significance of the
common word COUNTRY.
The proper test is “whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their
commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely
to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning, 101
USPQ2d at 1721 (internal punctuation omitted); In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117
USPQ2d at 1960. In this case, ordinary purchasers would encounter the marks on
identical or legally identical articles of clothing, presumably offered through the same
or similar channels of trade, such as general clothing stores. In these circumstances,
they could easily view Applicant’s proposed mark, which incorporates the dominant
COUNTRY element of Registrant’s mark, as another in Registrant’s line of clothing
goods. See In re Collegian Sportswear, Inc., 224 USPQ 174, 176 (TTAB 1984)
(“…customers familiar with registrant’s ‘COLLEGIENNE’ clothing might believe
that ‘COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA’ clothing was a new line of clothing from
registrant featuring a ‘California’ or west coast style.”). As such, the connotation and
overall commercial impression of the marks is similar.
Serial No. 86705459
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Thus, taking the marks in their entireties, we find that their similarities outweigh
their dissimilarities, and this DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion.
II. Conclusion
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant DuPont factors. Because we have
found that the marks at issue are similar, that Applicant’s identified goods are
identical or legally identical to Registrant’s goods, and that they would move in the
same or overlapping trade channels and be offered to the same class of consumers,
we conclude that Applicant’s proposed mark so resembles the cited registered mark
as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark
for “clothing, namely, T-shirts, shorts, pants, hats, socks, and
shoes” is affirmed.