Theresa M. Hensel, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 18, 2009
0120080074 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 18, 2009)

0120080074

09-18-2009

Theresa M. Hensel, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Theresa M. Hensel,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080074

Hearing No. 530-2006-00179X

Agency No. 1C-081000405

DECISION

On September 28, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

August 28, 2007 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES the agency's final

order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Labor Relations Specialist (LRS), EAS-19, at the agency's Bellmawr,

New Jersey Post Office.

On August 15, 2005, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

she was subjected to unlawful harassment on the bases of her sex and in

reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. complainant told the Labor Relations Manager, EAS-24, who was her

supervisor (S1), on numerous occasions that her work load was more than

she could handle and working between three buildings on different tours

was exhausting, nevertheless, complainant was given more work;

2. complainant was denied a proper chair for approximately two months

and it took seven months to get a desk;

3. complainant was denied training on the Time & Attendance Control System

(TACS) system and the Human Resources Information System (HRIS);

4. complainant was not given clerical assistance or any assistance with

her work load;

5. complainant was given an office which served as a through-way for

the Electrical Room and therefore had no privacy and daily interruptions

became the norm;

6. on October 13 and 15, 2004, Lead Plant Manager for the South Jersey

Processing and Distribution Center (LPM) screamed at complainant and

management failed to investigate her claims of abuse by LPM;

7. S1 overturned three decisions complainant made on discipline and told

her she needed to be monitored during Step 2 hearings;

8. complainant was the only LRS assigned to give training and was required

to teach classes around her regular workload on all three tours; and

9. after attending mediation, the Human Resources Manager (HRM) refused

to speak to complainant and he would turn his back when complainant

walked past him.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. Over the complainant's objections, the AJ assigned

to the case granted the agency's February 9, 2007 motion for a decision

without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing in favor of

the agency on August 21, 2007.

The AJ found that incidents 1 through 5 and 8 were discrete actions and

dismissed them for untimely EEO counselor contact. The AJ determined

that complainant became aware of the harassment in September 30, 2003,

and therefore should have contacted an EEO Counselor by November 14, 2003.

Instead, complainant contacted the EEO Counselor on October 13, 2004.

With regard to the remaining incidents, the AJ found that complainant

failed to show that she was subjected to retaliatory harassment because

she failed to establish a nexus existed between prior EEO activity and

the incidents at issue in this case. Additionally, the AJ found that

complainant failed to show that incidents 6, 7 and 9 resulted from animus

towards her sex. Finally, the AJ determined that the taken together,

the remaining incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to

render her work environment hostile. The agency subsequently issued a

final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant argues that the AJ erred in issuing a decision

without a hearing. Complainant contends that she supplied sufficient

evidence to show that the agency was motivated by her sex in its actions.

Further, complainant argues that the AJ erred in finding that incidents

1 through 5 and 8 were untimely.

The agency argues that the AJ appropriately dismissed complainant's

incidents and appropriately determined that a hearing was not warranted

in the case.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see

also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision

without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and

legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that

the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC

"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its

interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

We find that the foregoing requirements were met in this case. However,

leaving aside for the moment the matter of whether there are genuine

issues of material fact in dispute, we further find that the AJ erred as a

matter of law with regard to his determination not to consider incidents 1

though 5 and 8 on the basis that they were discrete acts untimely raised.

The Supreme Court has held that a complainant alleging a hostile work

environment will not be time barred if all acts constituting the claim

are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within

the filing period. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101 (June 10, 2002). The Court further held, however, that

"discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id.

Nonetheless, the Court held that such untimely discrete acts may be used

as background evidence in support of a timely claim. Id.

Upon review, we find that, while the AJ may have correctly concluded that

incidents 1 through 5 and 8 were discrete acts which complainant did not

raise in a timely fashion, under the principles established in Morgan, he

nonetheless should have considered these incidents as background evidence

in support of complainant's claim of harassment. We will therefore vacate

the final agency order, and remand the case for further processing.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we VACATE the agency's

final order adopting the AJ's decision without a hearing and REMAND the

case for further processing. The agency is required to comply with the

Order of the Commission, below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the Cleveland Field

Office a request for assignment to an AJ to this case within thirty (30)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency is

directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at

the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted

to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue

a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and

the agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0408)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 18, 2009

Date

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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