Thelma W. Morgan, Appellant,v.William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Information Systems) Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 10, 1999
01983272 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 10, 1999)

01983272

06-10-1999

Thelma W. Morgan, Appellant, v. William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Information Systems) Agency), Agency.


Thelma W. Morgan v. Department of Defense

01983272

June 10, 1999

Thelma W. Morgan, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01983272

) Agency No. UA-98-003

William S. Cohen, )

Secretary, )

Department of Defense, )

(Defense Information Systems)

Agency), )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On February 25, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a final agency decision (FAD) received by her attorney of record

on March 2, 1998, pertaining to her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. In her

complaint, appellant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination

on the bases of race (Black), sex (female), and age (DOB 6/26/46) when:

Appellant was denied promotions and awards; and

On December 3, 1997, during a mid-year performance review, appellant's

supervisor made a comment about her attitude.

The agency dismissed allegation (1), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b),

on the grounds that it raised a matter that was not brought to the

attention of an EEO Counselor and was not like or related to a matter

that was brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor, and allegation

(2) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a), for failure to

state a claim, or, alternatively, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e),

on the grounds that it was rendered moot.

With regard to allegation (1), the agency determined that although

appellant mentioned the denial of past promotions and awards during

counseling, appellant indicated that these matters were merely provided as

background for the instant complaint. In support of this determination,

the agency noted that only allegation (2) was identified in pre-complaint

counseling, and the record contains a notation by the EEO Counselor

indicating that appellant identified these issues as background

information.

The agency also determined that because the comments identified in

allegation (2) were unaccompanied by any agency action, they did not

render appellant aggrieved for the purposes of the EEOC regulations.

In the alternative, the agency concluded that because both appellant

and her supervisor transferred to another work location, allegation (2)

was rendered moot.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b) states, in pertinent part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint or portion thereof which raises a

matter that has not been brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor,

and is not like or related to a matter on which the complainant has

received counseling. A later allegation or complaint is "like or related"

to the original complaint if the later allegation or complaint adds

to or clarifies the original complaint and could have reasonably been

expected to grow out of the original complaint during the investigation.

See Calhoun v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05891068

(March 8, 1990); Webber v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Appeal No. 01900902 (February 28, 1990).

In the instant case, appellant provided no statement or evidence rebutting

the agency's contention that she raised the past denial of promotions

and awards only as background information. In discussing allegation (2),

the Counselor's Report states "[a]s background information, [appellant]

adds that since he became her supervisor, he has denied her promotions

and awards because of his untruthful disregard for her race, age, and

sex." The only allegation raised and counseled involved the comments

of December 3, 1997. Moreover, we find that the denial of promotions

and awards is factually distinct from the comments of her supervisor,

and could not have reasonably been expected to grow out of the original

complaint during the investigation. Consequently, we find that allegation

(1) was properly dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that

an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss

with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

The Commission has repeatedly found that remarks or comments unaccompanied

by a concrete agency action are not a direct and personal deprivation

sufficient to render an individual aggrieved for the purposes of

Title VII. See Backo v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960227

(June 10, 1996); Henry v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940695

(February 9, 1995). As the record in this case discloses no agency

action was taken as a result of the comments made to appellant about

her attitude, we find that allegation (2) was properly dismissed for

failure to state a claim.<1>

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons

set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 10, 1999

____________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1Since we are affirming the agency's dismissal of allegation (2) on the

grounds of failure to state a claim, we will not address the agency's

alternative grounds for dismissal, i.e., that it was rendered moot.