THE YOKOHAMA RUBBER CO., LTDDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 1, 20202019006200 (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/352,049 04/15/2014 Takumi Sekiguchi 3138-162.PCT.US 5390 162045 7590 05/01/2020 Thorpe North & Western/Yokohama P.O. Box 1219 SANDY, UT 84091-1219 EXAMINER HAKOMAKI, JAMES R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3753 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/01/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): braegger@tnw.com patentdocket@tnw.com warren.archibald@tnw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte TAKUMI SEKIGUCHI ____________ Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, ERIC C. JESCHKE, and AMANDA F. WIEKER, Administrative Patent Judges. JESCHKE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks review, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the Examiner’s decision, as set forth in the Non-Final Office Action dated September 24, 2018, rejecting claims 1–3 and 7–9. Claims 4–6 and 10–24 have been canceled. Appeal Br. 5. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies The Yokohama Rubber Co., LTD as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 2 BACKGROUND The disclosed subject matter “relates to a puncture repair liquid injection method and injection device that can easily inject a puncture repair liquid contained in [a] hand squeeze type container into a tire.” Spec. 1:8– 10.2 Claims 1 and 7 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below, with emphasis added to certain claim language: 1. A puncture repair liquid injection method comprising the steps of: using a puncture repair liquid injection device comprising a container having a liquid containing portion containing a puncture repair liquid, an outlet for discharging the puncture repair liquid, and an inlet for introducing compressed air; an injection hose connected between a tire valve of a wheel mounted on a tire and the outlet of the container; and a compressor having a pressure adjuster for selecting an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at a time of normal driving which is for filling the tire air pressure; the method further comprising the steps of connecting the injection hose between the tire valve and the outlet of the container, connecting the compressor to the inlet of the container, selecting a reduced air pressure as a pressurizing force by the compressor by an operation of the pressure adjuster, injecting the puncture repair liquid into the tire by pressurizing an interior of the container based on the reduced air pressure, selecting the liquid containing portion of the container to be configured from a plastic material, and selecting a thickness of the liquid containing portion to be 2.0 mm or less; 2 Citations to the Specification refer to the Substitute version filed on April 15, 2014. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 3 the pressure adjuster including a pressure adjusting valve, a pressure adjusting button driving the pressure adjusting valve, and a lock mechanism; the lock mechanism locking the pressure adjusting button in a push-in position; wherein the pressure adjusting button comprises a plate-shaped pinch portion on a top surface side to enable twisting of the pressure adjusting button. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references: Name Reference Date Knubley US 4,333,491 Issued June 8, 1982 Kojima ’875 US 6,668,875 B2 Issued Dec. 30, 2003 Kojima ’217 US 2011/0011217 A1 Published Jan. 20, 2011 Maki3 Japanese Publication No. 2009-269322 A (and machine translation of abstract) Published Nov. 19, 2009 REJECTIONS 1. Claims 1 and 7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kojima ’217, Knubley, and Kojima ’875. 2. Claims 2, 3, 8, and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kojima ’217, Knubley, Kojima ’875, and Maki. 3 Maki is a 17-page document that includes an English-language translation of the abstract, as well as the original document (in Japanese). It was entered into the file history on April 15, 2014. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 4 DISCUSSION Objections to the Drawings In the Office Action, the Examiner objected to the drawings filed on April 15, 2014, and March 3, 2016. Non-Final Act. 2–4. Appellant asserts that the Examiner’s objections are improper for various reasons. See Appeal Br. 10–13. In the Answer, the Examiner does not address Appellant’s arguments or the objections to the drawings. See generally Ans.; see also Reply Br. 4 (noting that, in the Answer, the Examiner “does not in any way respond to any of Appellant’s arguments against the drawing objections” and “does not even mention the objection to the drawings”). Here, Appellant has not argued that the drawing objections are related to any rejection now on appeal. In addition, the panel does not—based on our review of the record—identify any relationship. Thus, Appellant’s requested review of the drawing objections is to be made via petition to the Director under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181, not by appeal to the Board. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1077–78 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). We do not address further, and take no position as to the merits of, the stated objections. Rejection 1 – Claims 1 and 7 Appellant argues the patentability of independent claims 1 and 7 based on the same arguments. Appeal Br. 15–20; Reply Br. 4–8; see also Appeal Br. 18 (“Independent claim 7 includes similarly distinguishing limitations and Appellant similarly requests that the rejection be overturned.”). Because Appellant and the Examiner focus on the language of claim 1, however, we do also. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 5 For claim 1, the Examiner relied on Kojima ’217 for certain limitations but stated that “Kojima ’217 does not explicitly disclose a step of selecting an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at time of normal driving which is for filling a tire air pressure.” Non-Final Act. 5–6.4 The Examiner found, however, that “Knubley teaches a method of selecting an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at a time of normal driving which is for filling the tire air pressure.” Id. at 6 (citing Knubley 8:28–35). The Examiner states that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “to have modified the compressor disclosed by Kojima ’217 to include the selective pressure ability of Knubley” and also states that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to make this modification because this would allow a tire to be filled with greater precision and accuracy, as suggested by Knubley (column 1, lines 48–52).” Id. The Examiner relied on Kojima ’875 as to certain claimed aspects not at issue on appeal. See id. at 6–7. First, Appellant contends that although “Knubley allegedly discloses that the air pressure can be set to any desired pressure and may be selectively increased or decreased as desired, Knub[le]y is clea[]r that the selected pressure is intended to be the correct driving pressure for safety, fuel economy and optimizing the life of the tires.” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Knubley’s Background). Appellant continues that, “[b]ased on the disclosure of Knubley, one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand or be motivated to use an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at a time of normal driving.” Id.; see also id. at 15–16 (“The ability to select an 4 We will refer to this limitation—the first shown in emphasis in the recitation of claim 1 above—as the “selecting” limitation. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 6 air pressure for driving according to Knubley would not lead one of ordinary skill in the art to the claimed inventions.” (emphasis added)). According to Appellant, “[t]he combination of references would simply . . . result in using the air pressure of Kojima [’]217 as set precisely using the pressure transducer, comparator, etc. of Knubley.” Id. at 16. Second, Appellant argues that “[n]othing in the combination suggests pressurizing the puncture repair liquid container based on the reduced pressure as claimed” in the second limitation shown in emphasis above.5 Appeal Br. 17; see also id. at 16 (“One of ordinary skill in the art would not understand from the combination that a reduced pressure should be used for injection of puncture repai[r] liquid.”), 15 (“There is no suggestion in Knubley of selecting a reduced pressure for injecting puncture repair liquid into a tire.”). According to Appellant, “if the pressure adjusting system of Knubley was incorporated into the Kojima [’]217 apparatus, it is not clear that the pressure of the sealing agent container would be reduced.” Id. at 16. We agree with both of these arguments. As to the first, directed at the “selecting” limitation, we agree that Knubley discloses a system to more accurately inflate a tire to an air pressure used during driving, not “an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at a time of normal driving” as recited in the “selecting” limitation. For example, in the Background of the Invention (cited by Appellant), Knubley discusses how it is “well known that the inflation of tires to the correct pressure is a necessity for safety reasons and for fuel economy and for optimizing the life of the tires.” Knubley 1:24–27 (emphasis added). Soon thereafter (in a discussion cited 5 We will refer to this limitation as the “pressurizing” limitation. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 7 by the Examiner), Knubley states that “[a] principal object of the invention is the provision of an air dispensing apparatus which will enable the inflation of a vehicle tire to a desired pressure with a degree of accuracy and precision which previously has been unavailable using the commonly provided apparatus.” Id. at 1:48–52 (emphasis added), cited at Non-Final Act. 6. In the passage cited by the Examiner as to the “selecting” limitation, Knubley discloses how: in the first embodiment compensation for over-run resulting from the finite time taken for the valves to operate was effected by generating a target pressure lower than the pressure set by the user by a predetermined amount and aiming to inflate the tire to the lower target pressure, the over-run then bringing the target pressure attained up to close equality with the pressure set by the user . . . . Knubley 8:28–35, cited at Non-Final Act. 6. This passage makes clear, however, that the user sets the “predetermined” pressure value—i.e., for normal driving—and the system generates a lower pressure before then attaining the “predetermined” pressure (to compensate for lag in the valves). The result is that Knubley inflates to the normal driving pressure. As to this first argument by Appellant, addressing the “selecting” limitation, the Examiner responds that: the main reason that Knubley developed his electronically controlled air dispensing apparatus, was that maintenance of existing analog gauges was “a matter of great difficulty” and that “Frequent recalibration of the pressure gauge mechanism would be required if such mechanical arrangements were to be expected to function accurately for long periods.” Ans. 10 (quoting portions of Knubley 1:33–44). As noted by Appellant, however, this passage from Knubley, summarizing the reasons for the Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 8 invention there, does not support the Examiner’s position that Knubley discloses the “selecting” limitation here. See Reply 4–5 (stating that the Examiner “cites to a description of some of the problems the Knubley invention attempts to overcome . . . , but does not explain why or how this is relevant to Appellant’s arguments”). The Examiner also responds by taking the position that the three recitations of “reduced” air pressures in claim 1 “could be the same.” Ans. 11. From this, the Examiner determines that Kojima ’217 (rather than Knubley) discloses the “selecting” limitation. Id. As noted by Appellant, however, the Examiner already found—and then restated in the Answer— that “Kojima ’217 does not explicitly disclose a step of selecting an air pressure reduced relative to an air pressure at time of normal driving which is for filling a tire air pressure.” Ans. 5; Non-Final Act. 6; see also Reply Br. 5 (“If the Examiner has acknowledged that Kojima [’]217 does not disclose the reduced air pressure, it is not clear how the Examiner can reasonably assert without explanation in the Examiner’s Answer that Kojima ’217 meets the limitations of the reduced pressure.”). Turning now to Appellant’s second argument summarized above, we determine that the Examiner has not adequately explained how the proposed modified device would allegedly satisfy the “pressurizing” limitation. In response, the Examiner restates the position that the three recitations of “reduced” air pressures in claim 1 “could be the same.” Ans. 13. From this, the Examiner determines that Kojima ’217 discloses the “pressurizing” limitation. Id. The Examiner has not adequately explained this position. Although we agree with the Examiner that Kojima ’217 discloses “inject[ing] puncture repair liquid into the tire by pressurizing an interior of Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 9 the container” (Non-Final Act. 5), the Examiner has not adequately explained how such a pressure is a “reduced air pressure” as required by the “pressurizing” limitation. See, e.g., Kojima ’217 ¶ 74 (discussing “a nipple- like air intake port portion 7 that sends the compressed air from the compressor 3 into the container body 4, and a nipple-like sealing agent/compressed air ejector port portion 41 that sends out the puncture sealing agent and the compressed air successively from the container body 4 by the sent compressed air”). Third, Appellant argues that changeover switch 8 in Kojima ’217— identified by the Examiner as the “pressure adjuster” recited immediately prior to the “selecting” limitation (Non-Final Act. 4)—does not provide a “reduced pressure.” Appeal Br. 17–18; see also id. at 18 (arguing that “changeover switch 8 is not a pressure adjusting button and the assertion by the Examiner that it is a pressure adjusting button is in error”). According to Appellant, in Kojima ’217, changeover switch 8 is used “in changing over between a puncture repai[r] dedicated hose 77[,] which is attached to a sealing agent container 6[,] and a compressed air inflation dedicated hose 23.” Id. at 17; see also, e.g., Kojima ’217, Figs. 2 and 3 (showing the referenced structures). But, Appellant argues, “changeover switch 8 does not have a mechanism to enable reduction of the pressure.” Appeal Br. 17 (also stating that “Kojima [’]217 does not teach or suggest to differentiate the pressure of flow paths of two routes”). In response, the Examiner states that changeover switch 8 is a “pressure adjuster” as recited because, “when manipulated by a user between first and second positions, [it] adjusts the pressure being directed to hoses (23) and (75).” Ans. 10. According to the Examiner, “[a]s the changeover Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 10 switch (8) is manipulated, the pressures to each of the hoses (75 and 23) will either be on or off.” Id. at 15. We do not agree with the Examiner’s position that a pressure at ambient (i.e., when a hose’s pressure is “off”) is a “reduced” pressure as that term is used in claim 1. As argued by Appellant, the Examiner has not adequately explained how an ambient pressure could, when used in “pressurizing the interior of the container,” cause the “puncture repair liquid” to be “inject[ed]” “into the tire” as required by the “pressurizing” limitation and the recitation immediately prior. See Reply Br. 7 (arguing that “if the pressure is off, then Kojima [’]217 cannot discharge the puncture repair liquid and introduce compressed air to the tire as required by claim 1”). For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 7. Rejection 2 – Claims 2, 3, 8, and 9 Claims 2 and 3 depend from claim 1, and claims 8 and 9 depend from claim 7. Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s added reliance on Maki does not remedy the deficiencies in the rejection based on Kojima ’217, Knubley, and Kojima ’875, discussed above, regarding claims 1 and 7. Thus, for the same reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 2, 3, 8, and 9. CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3 and 7–9. More specifically, (1) we reverse the decision to reject claims 1 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Kojima ’217, Knubley, and Kojima ’875, and (2) we reverse the decision to reject claims 2, 3, 8, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Kojima ’217, Knubley, Kojima ’875, and Maki. Appeal 2019-006200 Application 14/352,049 11 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 7 103(a) Kojima ’217, Knubley, Kojima ’875 1, 7 2, 3, 8, 9 103(a) Kojima ’217, Knubley, Kojima ’875, Maki 2, 3, 8, 9 Overall Outcome 1–3, 7–9 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation