The United States Finishing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 28, 1945

63 N.L.R.B. 575 (N.L.R.B. 1945)

In the Matter of TILE UNITED STATES FINISHING COMPANY and UNITED
TEXTILE WORKERS OF AuIEIZICA, A. F. L.
Case No. 1-R-f370.-Decided August 28, 1945
Prosleauer, Rose, Goetz cC dlendelsohn, by Mr. Burton A. Zorn, of
New York City, for the Company.
dles.srs. William F. Bowen and Peter O'Malley, International Rep-
resentatives, and Mr. Charles Suisman, of New London, Conn., for
the A. F. L.
Mr. Benjamin Wyle, of New York City, for the C. I. O.
Mr. A ngelo J. Fiumara, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Upon a petition duly filed by United Textile Workers of America,
A. F. L., herein called the A. F. L., alleging that a question affecting
commerce had arisen concerning the representation of employees of
The United States Finishing Company, Norwich, Connecticut, herein
called the Company, the National Labor Relations Board provided
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice before Robert E. Greene,
Trial Examiner. Said hearing was held at Norwich, Connecticut, on
May 8, 1945. The Comnpany, the A. F. L., and Federation of Dyers,
Finishers, Printers & Bleachers of America, C. I. 0., herein called
the C. I. 0., appeared and participated. All parties were afforded
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence bearing on-the issues.
At the hearing, the C. I. O. moved to dismiss the petition, on the
ground that the contract between it and the Company is a bar to a
presenit determination of representatives. Ruling on the motion was
reserved for the Board. For reasons appearing in Section III, infra,
the motion is hereby granted. The Trial Examiner's rulings made at
the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
All parties were afforded an opportunity to file briefs with the Board.
03NLItB,No 90
575
576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The United States Finishing Company, a Connecticut corporation,
is engaged in bleaching, dyeing, and printing textile fabrics. In the
conduct of its business the Company operates several plants- in the
United States. The instant case involves its plant at Norwich, Con-
necticut. During the year 1944, the Company received at its Norwich
plant approximately 54,000,000 yards of textile fabrics, more than 90
percent of which came from sources outside the State of Connecticut.
During the same period, the Company shipped approximately 50,-
000,000 yards of processed textile fabrics from its Norwich plant,
more than 95 percent of which was shipped to points outside the
State. During the same year, the Company purchased supplies con-
sisting mainly of drugs, chemicals, fuel, paper boxes, and containers
for its Norwich plant, amounting in value to about $2,000,000; ap-
proximately 90 percent of such supplies was received by the Company
from places outside the State.
The Company admits, and we find, that it is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Textile `Yorkers of America, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to membership
employees of the Company.
Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers & Bleachers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Company.
III. THE ALLEGED QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
On March 19, 1941, the Company and the C. I. O. executed a con-
tract to be in effect until August Y, 1944, and from year to year there-
after unless terminated as therein provided. Three supplementary
agreements were subsequently entered into by the parties. The last
of these agreements, dated May 19, 1943, effects changes in the March
19, 1941, agreement and contains the following pertinent language
addressed to Article XVII, the duration clause of that contract :
Article 17 of ... said [agreement of -March 19, 1941] is hereby
modified and amended so as to provide for an expiration date 'of
August 1st, 1946 in place of the present expiration date of August
1st, 1944.
THE UNITED STATES FINISHING COMPANY 577
Except as hereinbefore expressly modified and amended, the
said [agreement of March 19, 1941] shall continue in full force
and effect to and including August 1st, 1946.
By letter of March 14, 1945, the A. F. L. requested recognition of
the Company as the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of certain of its employees. The Company refused such request.
At the,hearing, both the C. I. 0. and the Company contended that
their contract constitutes a bar to this proceeding.
The A. F. L. urges that, by virtue of the third supplementary
agreement to the March 19, 1941, contract, there is now in existence
between the parties a contract of a term in excess of 5 years, which is
of unreasonable duration and hence not a bar to a present determina-
tion of representatives. However, the C. I. 0. argues, in effect, that
the third supplementary agreement superseded the March 19, 1941,
contract and that its term of substantially 3 years is customary and
reasonable in the industry.
We do not agree with the position of the A. F. L. We are of the
opinion that the third supplementary agreement superseded the orig-
inal agreement of March 19, 1941, thus making the new agreement
operative from May 19, 1943, to August 1, 1946, a term of substan-
tially 3 years, which term is not, under the circumstances, unduly
prolonged.
We have frequently enunciated the rule, now well established in the
law of collective bargaining, that a contract of unreasonable duration
is not a bar to representation proceedings filed at the end of or subse-
quent to the first contract year. It does not follow, however, that we
regard all contracts exceeding 1 year as unreasonable in duration, and
we have recently held that 2-year contracts are presumptively reason-
able in term." Where, however, an agreement of substantially more
than 2 years' duration is urged as a bar, it is incumbent upon the party
asserting the bar to prove that the contract term is reasonable.2 Con-
sistently therewith, the C. I. 0., in the instant case, adduced uncon-
tradicted testimony that, in the New York, New Jersey, and Pennsyl-
vania area, where about 90 percent of the industry is located, it has
in excess of 250 plants under contract; that, among these, it has 3-year
contracts both with employer associations embracing about 167 plants,
and with individual companies covering about 89 plants; that it is
under contract with 14 plants for terms of 1 or 2 years, and that, of
all its contracts, 5 are for a term of 5 years. It showed further that, in
the New England area, where the Company is located, and where about
5 percent of the industry is concentrated, the C. I. 0. has about 15 con-
1 Thus, in Matter of Uxbridge Worsted Company , Inc., 60 N. L. R . B. 1395, the Board
found a contract of 221/2 months ' duration not unreasonable.
2 See Matter of The A. S. Abell Company, 62 N L. R B 1414.
578 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tracts for a term of 3 years and a fraction, 9 contracts for a term of
about 2 years, approximately 3 contracts for 1-year terms, and 2 con-
tracts for 5-year terms. The foregoing facts afford adequate proof
that it is not unreasonable in the industry to execute contracts for a
term of substantially 3 years.
It might be urged, however, that, even granting the reasonableness
of the contract term, this case involves a premature extension of an
existing contract, and that to hold the March 19, 1943, contract a bar
would sanction foreclosure of the employees' opportunity to select new
bargaining representatives at appropriate intervals. In those cases in
which we have held that a premature extension of a contract does not
bar a determination of representatives, we have required, in the
absence of special circumstances, that a rival claim of representation
be made prior to the expiration date of the original contract.' In
the instant case, however, the A. F. L. first made -known its rival claim
by letter of March 14, 1945, about 61/2 months after the expiration date
of the March 19, 1941, contract. Moreover, the record negates any
inference that the C. I. O. by its action intended to preclude the em-
ployees from seeking a change of representatives at or about the time
when the original contract was scheduled to expire 4 Accordingly, we
are persuaded that the 1943 contract does not operate as an unreason-
able restriction upon the employees' freedom of choice and that we
should, therefore, not proceed to an investigation of representatives
until such contract is about to expire. We shall, accordingly dismiss
the petition herein. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the A. F. L. to file a petition at a reasonable time prior to the
expiration of the existing contract.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record
in the case, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that
the petition for investigation and certification of representatives of
employees of The United States Finishing Company, Norwich, Con-
necticut, filed by United Textile Workers of America, affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, be, and it hereby is, dismissed
without prejudice.
8 See Matter of Wichita Union Stockyards Company , 40 N L. R B 369 , Matter of
Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co , 51 N L. R. B 1447.
' Cf Matter of Eric Concrete & Steel Supply Co , 55 N L R . B 1124 , which is dis-
tinguishable on its facts from the instant case In that case the employer and the inter-
vening union executed a premature 2-year extension of an existing 1-year contract on the
very day on which the petitioning union withdrew an earlier petition for investigation as
to representatives There the extension agreement was deliberately premature and,
although the petitioning union did not renew its representation claim until after the
expiration date of the extended contract, the Board found that no bar existed to a present
determination of representatives