The Torrington Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 3, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 1233 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

TORRINGTON CO. 1233
The Torrington Company , Standard Plant and Local
1645, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America. Case 1-CA-10137
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent and
have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of witnesses, I hereby make the following:
May 3, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On October 17, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel and
Charging Party filed briefs in support of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, The Torrington Compa-
ny, Standard Plant, Torrington, Connecticut, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE , Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , was heard pursuant to due notice
on June 24 and 25, 1975, at Hartford, Connecticut.
The charge was filed on October 3, 1974; the complaint
in this matter was issued on April 30, 1975. The issues
concern whether the Respondent has refused to bargain
with the Union by refusing to furnish necessary and rele-
vant information, when requested, for the Union' s use in
policing and administering the existing collective-bargain-
ing agreement between the Union and the Respondent,
and thereby has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER I
The Torrington Company, Standard Plant, the Respon-
dent, is, and has been at all times material herein, a corpo-
ration duly organized under and existing by virtue of the
laws of the State of Connecticut. At all times herein men-
tioned, Respondent has maintained its principal office and
place of business at 59 Field Street, in the city of Torring-
ton, and State of Connecticut (herein sometimes called the
plant), and is now and continuously has been engaged at
said plant in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of an-
tifriction bearings and specialty products.
Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business,
causes , and continuously has caused at all times herein
mentioned, large quantities of metal used by it in the man-
ufacture of antifriction bearings and specialty products to
be purchased and transported in interstate commerce from
and through various States other than the State of Con-
necticut, and causes, and continuously has caused at all
times herein mentioned, substantial quantities of antifric-
tion bearings and specialty products to be sold and trans-
ported from said plant in interstate commerce to States of
the United States other than the State of Connecticut. Re-
spondent annually receives directly from points outside the
State of Connecticut goods and materials valued in excess
of $50,000. Respondent also annually ships directly to
points outside the State of Connecticut goods and materi-
als valued in excess of $50,000.
As conceded by Respondent and based upon the fore-
going, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is,
and has been at all times material herein, an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED 2
Local 1645, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Issues: Supervisory Status s
At all times material herein, the following named person
occupied the position set opposite his name, and has been
and is now an agent of the Respondent, acting on its be-
half, and is a supervisor within the meaning of Section
1 The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
2 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
3 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
223 NLRB No. 182
1234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2(11) of the Act: William Milligan-manager of industrial
relations.
B. The Bargaining Unit; Exclusive Representative Status 4
1. All production and maintenance employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Standard Plant , exclusive of of-
fice , clerical and salaried employees , timekeepers , firemen,
engineers, gatemen , watchmen , guards , executives, fore-
men, assistant foremen and subforemen , and all supervi-
sors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. At all times material herein , the Union has been the
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of a
majority of the employees in the said unit and, by virtue of
Section 9(a) of the Act, has been and is now the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the said unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages , hours of employment , or other conditions of em-
ployment.
C. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
The current collective -bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Respondent has been in effect since May
11, 1973, and is to be in effect until May 14, 1976.
Excerpted from such agreement are those articles and
provisions having a bearing on the issues in this case. Such
excerpts are as follows:
ARTICLE I
Recognition
The Company agrees to recognize the above desig-
nated Union as the sole and exclusive representative
of all production and maintenance employees in the
Standard Plant of the Company , for the purpose of
collective-bargaining in respect to rates of pay, hours
of work, and other conditions of employment , provid-
ed that such representation shall not include office,
clerical and salaried employees , time keepers, firemen,
engineers , gatemen , watchmen, guards , executives,
foremen, assistant foremen and sub-foremen : provid-
ed, that any individual employee shall have the right
to present his own grievance under the procedure set
forth in the National Labor Relations Act.
ARTICLE III
Checkoff
Section 3.1
The Company agrees to deduct monthly dues from
wages and remit the same to the Executive Secretary
of the Union.
ARTICLE XIV
Management Rights
Section 14.1
The management of the Company shall have the
The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein , or upon
undenied pleadings which may be deemed to be true and are so deemed.
exclusive rights to determine from time to time the
places and products (in Torrington or elsewhere) of
manufacture, to subcontract and to establish the
methods and processes of manufacture. The
Company's right to establish methods and processes
of manufacture shall not derogate or diminish any
rights of employees otherwise specifically provided by
this Agreement.
Section 14.3
In the event that the Company subcontracts work
normally done by bargaining unit employees who are
on a work schedule or less than forty-five (45) hours
per week, the question of whether or not the
Company's decision to so subcontract was based on
good and sufficient economic reasons will be subject
to the grievance and arbitration procedure.
If the Union alleges in arbitration that a subcon-
tract was improperly undertaken where the employees
who are directly affected were on a schedule of less
than forty-five (45) hours, and the arbitrator finds that
the Company lacked good and sufficient economic
reasons for the subcontract, the arbitrator may make
an award that appropriately adjusts any such directly
affected employee for any hours worked under forty-
five (45) hours a week.
No subcontract shall be entered into which in and
of itself causes a reduction of hours below forty-five
(45) hours a week or loss of jobs.
Notwithstanding the arbitrator's decision under
paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 above, the arbitrator may also
rule whether the effects of the subcontracting deprives
an employee of his rights under provisions of this
Agreement, and provide an appropriate remedy.
Section 14.4
An up-to-date list of all bargaining unit work sub-
contracted will be given to the Shop Chairman on or
about the first of each month. This list will be com-
piled by plants.
ARTICLE XV
Relocation and Subcontracting
Section 15.1
In the event that any subcontract let to any inde-
pendent contractor directly results in the elimination
of any bargaining unit job, any employee affected
thereby, either directly or by displacement by a senior
employee, shall have the option of:
(a) Accepting a transfer to another job or bumping
into another job in accordance with the seniority pro-
visions hereof; or
(b) If he has at least seven and one-half (7-1/2)
years of continuous company service, receiving forty
(40) hours pay at his average hourly earnings for each
year of continuous company service, in lieu of contin-
uing his recall rights under the contract.
Section 15.2
If the Company transfers any operations from one
of its existing plants in Torrington to another of its
present plants in Torrington, or to a plant hereafter
constructed or acquired by the Company within a ra-
TORRINGTON CO. 1235
dius of seventy-five (75) land miles from the center of
the City of Torrington, the employees involved shall
follow their jobs without loss of seniority or continu-
ous Company service. In any such plant hereafter con-
structed or acquired within the above radius of seven-
ty-five (75) land miles , the Company agrees to
recognize Local 1645 as the bargaining representative
for such employees , if it is not illegal to do so.
Section 15.4
The Company will give the Union and the Shop
Chairman advance written notice of any transfer of
operations or operating equipment under Section 15.2
and 15.3 of this Article.
Section 15.5
The same payment as that described in Section
15.1(b) above will be made to any employee who is
terminated by the Company because of a shutdown or
permanent abandonment of any operations in the
Torrington area , if he does not exercise his transfer or
bumping rights under Section 15.1(a) above. It is un-
derstood, however, that this section shall not apply to
ordinary layoffs due to lack of orders.
Section 15.6
This Article shall apply only to subcontracts let or
to transfer of equipment or to jobs involved in Section
15.5 made after September 27, 1963.
Section 15.7
Any dispute as to the application of this Article
shall be subject to the grievance procedure and to ar-
bitration, but not the Company's decision to subcon-
tract work or to transfer operations or equipment.
D. Background Events
1. Article XV (Sec. 15.2)
Since early 1964, the parties have had in their collective-
bargaining agreements a clause as set forth in article XV
(sec. 15.2) above. This clause in effect affords certain rights
to employees relating to transfer of operations within a
radius of 75 miles from the Standard Plant to one of the
Respondent's existing plants or to a plant constructed or
acquired by the Company after early 1964. This clause also
affords certain recognitional rights , if lawful, at such con-
structed or acquired plants.
2. Acquisition of certain plants: Thomaston, Bantam,
Morris, and Waterbury
After early 1964 and apparently around 1967 and 1968,
the Respondent acquired the Thomaston Special Tool and
Manufacturing Company. The acquisition included facili-
ties located at three separate locations-Thomaston, Mor-
ris, and Bantam , Connecticut-which are located 25-35
miles from Torrington, Connecticut. In May 1968 the Re-
spondent acquired the Vaill Company located in Water-
bury, Connecticut, about 30 miles from Torrington, Con-
necticut. As has been indicated, the Torrington Company's
Standard Plant is located in Torrington, Connecticut. The
employees at the Standard Plant constitute the basic con-
tractual bargaining unit involved herein;5 the Thomaston
plants, referred to above, are respectively known as
Respondent's Thomaston, Morris, and Bantam plants. The
Vaill facility, referred to above, is now known as
Respondent's Waterbury plant. The Thomaston, Morris,
Bantam, and Waterbury plants all constitute plants ac-
quired after early 1964, the time that article XV (sec. 15.2)
came into being, and are within a 75-mile radius of Tor-
rington, Connecticut. The issues in this case concern the
application of article XV (sec. 15.2) with respect to the
Standard Plant and the operations at Respondent's Thom-
aston, Morris, Bantam, and Waterbury plants.
3. Transfer of operations; Waterbury and Bonnie Mills
The facts are undisputed that the Respondent has trans-
ferred operations on two occasions, since early 1964, to
existing or acquired facilities within a radius of 75 miles of
the Standard Plant.
Thus, in 1968, the Respondent removed its entire swag-
ing.operation from its Standard Plant at Torrington, Con-
necticut, to one of the plants acquired from the Vaill Com-
pany, called the Waterbury plant, at Waterbury,
Connecticut, located 26 miles from the Standard Plant.
The facts are not disputed and reveal that at such time
the Standard Plant had around 1,200 employees, that 22
employees were engaged in the swaging operations and
were afforded the opportunity to transfer from the Stan-
dard Plant bargaining unit to the Vaill (Waterbury) opera-
tion, that 5 of such bargaining unit employees elected to so
transfer.6
In early 1974, the Respondent transferred an operation
involving the assembly and manufacture of rear wheel ball
bearings from its Standard Plant to a Bonnie Mills facility,
located in Torrington, Connecticut, and within the con-
tractual 75 miles radius. It is clear that the Respondent
notified the Union of such transfer, afforded employees
rights under art. XV, sec. 15.2, and considered the employ-
ees at Bonnie Mills to be part of the Standard Plant bar-
gaining unit and covered by the collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union. The facts reveal that the nature
of the transfer revealed no question concerning representa-
tion.
5 The facts indicate that employees at Respondent 's Excelsior plant,
Broad Street plant , and Wire plant, all located in Torrington, Connecticut,
are deemed covered by the existing collective -bargaining contract with the
Union referred to in sec. C. As noted later, the Bonnie Mills facility is also
deemed within such contractual unit and covered by such contract.
6 The Union filed a petition for clarification of the bargaining unit at the
Standard Plant and sought to have the unit of production employees at the
Vaill (Waterbury) plant included in such bargaining unit. The Union essen-
tially sought inclusion of such employees at the Vaill plant in the Standard
Plant bargaining unit on the basis of art. XV, sec. 15.2. The Regional Direc-
tor, noting that such article included the terminology , "if it is not illegal to
do so," reviewed the facts , found in effect the extent of the removal of an
operation of 22 employees out of 1,200 employees , and the resultant transfer
of 5 employees into a unit of 31 employees to be insubstantial . The Regional
Director found in effect that there was not an accretion to the Standard
Plant bargaining unit and that the petition for clarification of the bargaining
unit raised a question concerning representation which may not be resolved
through a clarification of an existing unit. The Regional Director, on Au-
gust 1, 1969, dismissed the Union's petition for clarification of the Standard
bargaining unit.
1236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. Representation question ; Thomaston , Bantam , Morris,
and Waterbury plants
As indicated, the Regional Director dismissed the
Union's unit clarification petition in Case 1 -UC-55, relat-
ing to certain of the Waterbury plant employees, on Au-
gust 1 , 1969. Thereafter, in 1970 a question concerning rep-
resentation as to certain of the Waterbury plant employees
arose.
On August 12, 1970, a representation election was held
among certain employees of the Respondent's Waterbury
operation. Teamsters Local Union No. 677, a/w Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, was the only union involved
in the proceeding. The exact bargaining unit involved is
not revealed by the evidence. However, the evidence that
such plant had 31 production unit employees at the time of
the determination of the Local 1645 UAW's petition for
clarification indicates the probability that the unit involved
was a production unit and not a limited drivers' unit.' Lo-
cal 1645, UAW, revealed no interest in such employees at
that time , was aware of such election while pending, and
did not intervene therein. The Teamsters lost the August
12, 1970, representation election.
The parties are in agreement that, excepting for the rep-
resentation petition involved in the August 12 , 1970, Wa-
terbury election , no representation petition has been filed
respecting the Thomaston , Bantam, Morris , and Water-
bury plants of the Respondent. It is also clear that there
has been no definitive certification concerning representa-
tion rights , nor does the Respondent recognize any union
concerning the employees in such plants.
5. Demand for recognition
re: Thomaston, Bantam , Morris, and Waterbury;
Events of April 3, 1974
On April 3, 1974, Angelo Franculli, president of Local
1645, transmitted a letter to Joseph J. Palker, director of
labor relations of the Torrington Company, to the follow-
ing effect:
Mr. Joseph J. Palker
Director of Labor Relations
The Torrington Company
59 Field Street
Torrington, Connecticut 06790
April 3, 1974
Re: Standard Plant
Torrington, Connecticut
Dear Mr. Palker:
In accordance with the Company's request, this letter
is written to you in order to set forth the position of
Local 1645 with respect to the Torrington Company's
operations at Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam and
Morris, Connecticut.
All of these operations are within a radius of seventy-
' If the unit involved were a limited drivers' unit , such would not affect
the results of the decision herein.
five (75) land miles from the center of the City of
Torrington and were acquired at various time by the
Torrington Company . The operation of Waterbury
was acquired from Vaill and the other operations were
acquired from Thomaston Special Products, Inc.
At the present time all of these operations are func-
tionally inter-related with the Standard Plant in Tor-
rington both with respect to manpower and products.
It is the position of Local 1645 that the aforesaid oper-
ations come within the scope of the current Standard
Plant Contract pursuant to Article I and Article 15,
Section 15 .2 and 15.3.
Would you please let us know, within two weeks,
whether or not the Company agrees with the contents
of this letter or if you wish to arrange a conference to
discuss same.
Very truly yours,
Angelo Franculli,
President.
6. Events of April 19, 1974
On April 19 , 1974, William G. Milligan , manager of la-
bor relations for the Respondent , responded by letter to
President Franculli of the Union.
The following reveals Milligan's reply.
April 19, 1974
Mr. Angelo Franculli, President
Local 1645, UAW
100 Prospect Street
Torrington, Connecticut
Dear Mr. Franculli:
In response to your letter to Mr. Palker of April 3,
1974, please be advised that the Company does not
believe Local 1645 has any legal or contractual basis
for the position outlined therein at any of the plants
listed.
You will recall, no doubt, that your general position
was rejected by the National Labor Relations Board
in 1969 at the Waterbu6 plant.
Nothing has happened basically to change that situa-
tion for our plant at Waterbury as well as Thomaston,
Morris and Bantam . Contrary to the assertion in your
letter, their operations are not functionally interrelated
to operations at Torrington but are separate physi-
cally, functionally and administratvely.
Accordingly, we see no purpose in a conference with
you on this matter.
Yours very truly,
William G. Milligan
Manager , Labor Relations
7. Refusal-to-bargain charge:
events of May 9, 1974, et seq.
The Union thereafter on May 9, 1974, filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the Respondent in Case 1-
CA-9811. The Union in effect alleged that the Respondent
TORRINGTON CO. 1237
was violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Specifical-
ly, the Union alleged that:
The Company is refusing to bargain with the Union
with reference to its Standard Plant Operations locat-
ed in Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam and Morris,
Connecticut.
The above plants are covered by the current collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
Later the Union, on the understanding that the Regional
Office did not consider that there was sufficient evidence
to issue a complaint, notified the Regional Office that it
wished to withdraw the charge without prejudice.8
The Regional Director for Region 1 approved said with-
drawal request on June 17, 1974, and on June 18, 1974,
notified the parties of the approval of the withdrawal of the
charge without prejudice.
8. Other background facts; pre-June 27, 1974
As set forth later herein, the Union, by letter dated June
27, 1974, requested that the Respondent supply it certain
information so that it could carry out its dues with respect
to policing the contract as to articles I, III , and XV (sec.
15.2). In addition to the background evidence previously
set forth, testimony was presented with respect to whether
events had occurred warranting the need for such informa-
tion and to the relevance of the information requested as to
such referred-to contract sections.
Such additional background evidence is herein summa-
rized.
1. Franculli credibly testified to the effect that, in his
role as union president, he received information regarding
transfers of work and/or people in the plant .9
S It should further be noted that Franculli , president of the Union, first
testified to the effect that he had furnished all of the information that he
had to the Regional Office in connection with its investigation of the unfair
labor practice charges in Case I-CA-9811 . However, Franculli qualified
such testimony by stating that he didn ' t know whether he had given the
Regional Office all of the information that the Union had at such time, that
it was possible that some information had been held back, that there had
been other potential witnesses , and that the Union had presented the avail-
able witnesses for interview by Regional Office personnel . Franculli, howev-
er, testified to the effect that such witnesses not presented essentially had
the same information as the witnesses presented, that the information con-
cerned "work going to Waterbury and their other - plants." Although
Franculli's testimony refers to having had other potential witnesses, I am
persuaded that, if the Union had thought that such potential evidence was
significant enough to persuade the Region of merit to the charges, the
Union would have proceeded to present such evidence.
9 As to a question relating to specific information received as to such
transfers of work and/or people in the plant, an objection was made to
testimony of a hearsay nature . The dialogue of the General Counsel and the
context of the record indicated the General Counsel 's purpose to establish
the Union 's belief that the Respondent 's November 25, 1974, reply was not
properly responsive . Under such circumstances , it was indicated to the Gen-
eral Counsel to proceed without hearsay testimony . However, as the ques-
tioning and testimony proceeded , testimony of hearsay nature, without ob-
jection , was introduced into the record . The General Counsel, however, did
not protect his record otherwise by an offer of proof . It is noted that the
witness was witness for the General Counsel . The Charging Party's counsel,
in argument , presented a basis for receipt of the evidence into the record
which was different from the purpose tendered by the General Counsel.
However, the Charging Party did not question the witness along the lines of
the basis of his contended relevance . Again, a similar problem arose with
the consideration of an improper document concerning a Chrysler Sprague
rod operation . Objection to hearsay testimony concerning an operation
For the past few years at Respondent's Standard Plant,
an employee (the steel cutoff man in the machine room)
has, on a fairly continuous basis,. cut off steel designated
for use at the Waterbury plant.1° There is a sign located
nearby where the steel , as cut off, is stacked. This sign
indicates that the steel is for the Waterbury plant. Further,
after such steel has been cut off and designated for Water-
bury, blueprints are forwarded with such steel to the Wa-
terbury plant. Almost every week, an employee from Wa-
terbury picks up the cutoff steel and blueprints for
apparent transportation to the Waterbury plant. 1
Franculli, president of the Union, on a number of occa-
sions during the past few years, spoke to Plant Superinten-
dent Caputi and Industrial Relations Manager Milligan
about the steel being cut off and shipped to the Waterbury
plant. It appears that Franculli's complaint was that this
work was being subcontracted.12 Both Caputi and Milligan
indicated to Franculli that they did not consider such work
to be subcontracted work.
Milligan credibly testified to the effect that the work in-
volved was "Waterbury" work, that he did not consider the
"cutting off" of steel on such work to constitute an inte-
grated production process, but that it was a service per-
formed by Standard for Waterbury. The fact that Milligan
considered such work to be a service is not determinative
as to whether such work should be considered service or an
integrated process.
2. David Hughes is an employee who works in the re-
search department of the Standard Plant. During the peri-
od of time of 1973-74, Hughes, on approximately 16 occa-
sions for about a day at a time, or perhaps several days at
the same time, went to the Waterbury plant to work. On
some of the occasions Hughes was accompanied by John
Dubiel, an engineer in the Standard Plant research depart-
ment. It is not clear from the record whether Dubiel went
to the Waterbury plant on other occasions.
9. Miscellaneous after June 27, 1974
In addition to the background facts previously alluded
to, there was testimony or evidence relating to other work
performed at the Standard Plant or the Thomaston, Ban-
tam, Morris, or Waterbury plants. Such facts may be sum-
marized as follows:
1. In October or November 1974, Anthony Stolfi, a set-
up man from the Standard Plant swaging department, went
to the Waterbury plant to set up certain work. On such
occasion, Stolfi was accompanied by a foreman, Walter
Schroeder.
2. In December 1974 or January 1975, Standard Plant
employee Perdetto took tools from the Standard Plant
swaging department to Waterbury. Franculli, president of
the Union, spoke to Industrial Relations Manager Milligan
sheet was sustained. It was indicated , however, that the witness , who alleg-
edly had copied a company document, could testify to the terms of the
document and refresh his recollection thereto from his notes . The witness,
however, was not questioned along this line.
10 Steel is also cut off for use at other plants.
11 The facts are based upon Franculli's credited testimony.
12 It is noted that the collective-bargaining agreement contains clauses
relating to subcontracting and the rights of employees concerning certain
specified hours of work and arbitration and grievance procedures thereto.
1238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about this incident. Milligan told Franculli that he would
check into the matter . Later, Milligan told Franculli that
Perdetto had taken the tools to Waterbury to do some ex-
perimental work on the swaging of some parts , that the
tools were needed for such reason.
3. Joseph Alibozak is a Standard Plant employee who
works on the "Blanchard" grinder in the machine room.
Around the last of May or first of June 1975, Alibozak told
Union President Franculli that there had been some work
already at his machine for him to work on, that such work
was being taken to the Waterbury plant. Franculli and Ali-
bozak spoke to Plant Superintendent Caputi about this
matter . Caputi told Franculli that he didn't know much
about it, that he would get back to him later. Several days
later Franculli approached Caputi again on the same mat-
ter. At this time Caputi told Franculli that the Respondent
had, at such time , sent work to Waterbury, that the Re-
spondent had wanted to get the work done in a hurry.
Franculli asked Caputi if he could tell him how much
work was done and the type of work done. Caputi told
Franculli that he would check and try to get the informa-
tion. Later on June 20, 1975, Franculli asked Caputi about
the information requested . Apparently Caputi told Fran-
culli at such time that he still did not have such informa-
tion.
4. At some point of time, not revealed by the record,
Union President Franculli investigated a question as to
whether work on a "Chrysler Sprague rod job" was being
performed at a plant other than the Standard Plant. It ap-
pears that the Chrysler Sprague rod job was developed at
the Standard Plant and that there had been continued
work on such job at the Standard Plant. The details as to
whether other plants performed work on the Chrysler Spra-
gue rod job are not revealed in the record.
5. Cisowski credibly testified to the effect that she was a
press operator in the Standard Plant, that in October or
December 1974 she worked on a sample of 100 pieces of a
particular type precision bearing , that this was not a bear-
ing that was in production at that time , that at such time
her supervisor told her in effect that the employees would
have to commence assembling this type bearing in April
1975. Cisowski further credibly testified to the effect that
such production did not thereafter commence at Standard
Plant on such bearings, that, however, on April 2, 1975, she
noticed a component part of such bearing while at work,
that she picked up an operation sheet related to such bear-
ing and noticed that the bearing was destined for a vendor,
the Thomaston Speciality Products Company. Cisowski
also credibly testified to the effect that she later asked her
forelady about such precision bearing and was told, "It
doesn't look good."
10. Miscellaneous otherwise 13
1. At times some orders from customers are produced
partly at the Standard Plant and partly at either the Water-
bury, Bantam, Moms, or Thomaston plants.
2. One cannot determine from Respondent 's records
13 The facts are based upon a composite of Milligan 's and Harwood's
credited testimony.
whether a Standard Plant employee has worked at times at
the Waterbury, Bantam, Morris, or Thomaston plants un-
less such employee has been transferred on the payroll rec-
ords.
E. Events of June 27, 1974
On June 27, 1974, President Franculli, for the Union,
transmitted a letter to the Respondent as is revealed by the
following:
June 27, 1974
Mr. Joseph J. Palker
Director of Labor Relations
The Torrington Company
59 Field Street
Torrington, Connecticut 06790
Dear Mr. Palker:
With reference to our letter to you of April 3, 1974
concerning the Torrington Company's operations at
Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam and Morris, Con-
necticut, please be advised that the Union hereby re-
quests the information set forth hereinbelow in order
to police and administer intelligently Article I, Article
II and Article XV, Section 15.2 of our Standard Plant
contract since all of the aforesaid operations are with-
in a radius of seventy-five (75) land miles from the
center of the City of Torrington:
1. The date that each of the above operations was
acquired;
2. The method of acquisition and the party from
whom each operation was acquired;
3. The reason that each operation was acquired;
4. The date or dates that operations from the Stan-
dard Plant, if any, were transferred to each of the
above operations with a full description of each opera-
tion including, but not limited to, the volume of work
involved;
5. The same information as requested in paragraph
4 hereinabove with respect to any transfer of bargain-
ing unit employees in connection with transfer of op-
erations including, but not limited to, names of such
employees;
6. The number of employees working at the Water-
bury, Thomaston, Bantam and Morris operations at
the time of acquisition and at the present time;
7. The volume of production of each product being
manufactured at the Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam
and Morris operations at the time of acquisition and
at the present time;
8. The products being manufactured at the Water-
bury, Thomaston, Bantam and Morris operations at
the time of acquisition and at the present time;
9. The names of any bargaining unit employees
who perform work both at the Standard Plant in Tor-
rington and at any of the aforesaid four operations;
10. The name, description and volume of each
product, if any, which is partially processed at the
Standard Plant in Torrington and also is partially pro-
cessed at one or more of the four aforesaid operations
TORRINGTON CO. 1239
including, but not limited to, a description of each
such partial process;
11. A complete description of the wage scale paid
to all hourly rated employees at Waterbury, Thomas-
ton, Bantam and Morris;
12. A complete description of any and all fringe
economic benefits, if any, available to hourly rated
employees at Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam and
Morris;
13. A complete description of any and all non-eco-
nomic benefits available to hourly rated employees at
Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam and Morris includ-
ing, but not limited to, seniority benefits; and
14. Photocopies of any and all company records
wherein the information requested in paragraph I
through 13 hereinabove is contained.
Very truly yours,
Angelo Franculli,
President.
F. Events of July 9, 1974, through September 23, 1974, and
October 3, 1974
On July 9, 1974, William G. Milligan, manager of labor
relations for the Respondent, replied by letter to President
Franculli as is revealed by the following,
July 9, 1974
Mr. Angelo Franculli, President
Local 1645, UAW
100 Prospect Street
Torrington, Connecticut
Dear Mr. Franculli:
Your recent letter of June 27 addressed to Mr. Palker
has been referred to me for reply.
We seriously challenge the legal basis behind your re-
quest for information regarding the Company's plants
in Thomaston, Bantam , Morris and Waterbury not-
withstanding Section 15.2 of the Standard Plant con-
tract.
It continues to be the Company's position that it is
under no legal obligation to deal with your Union for
these plants. Under the interpretation accorded Sec-
tion 15.2 by the NLRB Regional Director in Boston in
Case Number 1-UC-55, we are not required to deal
with your Union for any such plants of the Company
within the 75 mile radius of Torrington. This is partic-
ularly so in view of your recent withdrawal of unfair
k.:,or practice charges alleging a refusal to bargain by
the Company with Local 1645 in connection with
those plants.
Before we can give serious consideration to your re-
quest or any portion thereof, we will require your out-
lining in detail and with case authorities, the basis un-
der which you claim a legal right to obtain the data
you seek at the plant locations mentioned in you let-
ter.
Yours very truly,
William G. Milligan
Manager , Labor Relations
Thereafter, on August 5, 1974, the Union, by its attor-
ney, William S. Zeman, replied to the Respondent's letter
of July 9, 1974. Zeman's letter in effect related that the
information requested was necessary to police and intelli-
gently administer article XV, section 15.2 of the Standard
Plant contract. Zeman's letter also referred to various
Board and court cases in support of his contentions.
On September 23, 1974, the Respondent, by William G.
Milligan, replied to Zeman's letter of August 5, 1974, as
follows:
September 23, 1974
William S. Zeman, Esq.
Zeman, Daley and Silvester
18 North Main Street
West Hartford, Connecticut
Dear Mr. Zeman:
We have been advised by our labor counsel that there
continues to be no legal basis for the information
which Local 1645 is seeking to obtain regarding Com-
pany facilities at which it is not the certified collective
bargaining representative. You are, we hope, aware of
the fact that the National Labor Relations Board re-
cently dismissed charges against the Company involv-
ing the lack of standing of your client, Local 1645, at
other Torrington Company plants.
We are also informed that a review of the cases cited
in your letter of August 5th do not reveal any holding
by either the Labor Board or the Courts that an em-
ployer is obligated to furnish information under the
circumstances existing here. Accordingly, your request
is denied.
Yours very truly,
William G. Milligan
Manager, Labor Relations -
G. Events of November 25, 1974
On November 25, 1974, William G . Milligan , for the
Respondent , transmitted another letter to Franculli for the
Union. It is clear that this letter is in further reply to the
Union 's letter of June 27, 1974. It is noted that the unfair
labor practice charge in this case had been filed on October
3, 1974. Milligan testified in effect that he transmitted such
letter on the belief that it would result in the elimination of
the unfair labor practice charges in this case.
The November 25, 1974, letter is as herein set out.
November 25, 1974
Mr. Angelo Franculli , President
Local 1645, UAW
100 Prospect Street
Torrington, Connecticut 06790
Dear Mr . Franculli:
It appears that you continue to be under a misappre-
hension as to the relationship between the Standard
Plant where your, Local is the certified bargaining rep-
resentative and the operations of The Torrington
Company at its Morris, Bantam , Thomaston and Wa-
terbury facilities.
1240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As we have repeatedly told you since the 1968 Swag-
ing Department move , there has been no transfer of
operations or interchange of production or mainte-
nance employees between any of these plants and the
Standard Plant . The Standard Plant continues to oper-
ate as a separate production facility of the Standard
Plant to any of the other plants . Likewise , no bargain-
ing unit employees in your Local have been trans-
ferred nor , to our knowledge , are there any people
who are working both at the Standard Plant and at
any other plants mentioned above. Finally, the prod-
ucts at each plant continue to be manufactured, as
they have in the past, on a separate basis and without
any integrated production operations whatsoever.
I also reiterate the fact that Local 1645 has no legal
standing at any of our other operations and the Com-
pany will continue to decline to accord it any status
there.
Yours very truly,
William G. Milligan
Manager , Labor Relations
On October 3, 1974, the Union filed the charge in this
case (l-CA-10137), alleging a refusal to bargain in viola-
tion of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
furnish necessary and relevant information for bargain-
ing.14
Contentions; conclusions
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that the Union , by its letter of June 27, 1974, made a prop-
er request for relevant information necessary for the Union
to carry out its responsibilities of policing and administer-
ing its collective-bargaining agreement with the Respon-
dent . The General Counsel and the Union contend that
items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7, 8, 9, and 10 (of such June 27, 1974,
letter) constitute a request for relevant information in the
foregoing context . The Respondent contends in effect that
it has furnished such relevant information as required and,
as to those items not replied to, such information has not
been revealed to be relevant.
The Union's letter of June 27, 1974, reveals that it was
with reference to a prior letter of April 3, 1974. In such
letter of April 3, 1974, the Union made in effect a demand
that the Respondent recognize the Union as the bargaining
representative of its employees at Respondent 's Water-
bury, Thomaston , Bantam , and Morris operations. Such
letter further revealed in effect that the Union was con-
14 The Respondent, with the filing of its brief on August 15, 1975. offered
for receipt into the record Resp . Exh. 5, a copy of the Regional Director's
letter of December 13, 1974, relating to a refusal to issue complaint in Case
1-CA-10137, and Resp . Exh. 6. a copy of the G .C.'s letter of March 3. 1975.
a partial reversal of the Regional Director's action referred to in the Decem-
ber 13 , 1974, letter. No objection has been made to the receipt of such
exhibits. Resp . Exhs . 5 and 6 are received into the record and have been
considered . Such exhibits do not constitute probative evidence concerning
the issues herein . Nor do they reveal facts relating to policy considerations
warranting different findings of fact , conclusions of law , remedial order, or
ultimate disposition herein.
tending that the interrelationship of Respondent's Stan-
dard Plant and the four other operations (Waterbury,
Thomaston, Bantam , and Morris) was of such a nature that
the Union was entitled to recognition as bargaining agent
pursuant to the provisions of article 1, and article 15 (sec.
15.2) of the contract. The foregoing being so, it is clear that
the Union, by its letter of June 27, 1974, advised the Re-
spondent of its continuing contention that it represented
employees at the Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam, and
Morris operations, the reasons for its contentions, and that
it wanted the requested information in order to police and
administer contract clauses giving it a basis for su -; -ecog-
nitional rights.
There are several possible bases for recognitional rights
pursuant to article XV (sec. 15.2) set out above in section
III, C. One basis would be recognitional rights to be ac-
corded if the Union were the clearly designated bargaining
representative of such employees by means other than an
accretion or merged unit theory. Another basis would be if
the facts revealed that such operations had been integrated
with the basic Standard Plant unit so as to constitute one
bargaining unit on a merged or accreted unit type theory, 15
I do not find it necessary to determine in this case whether
the Union would be entitled to information to pursue rec-
ognition rights on a theory other than that of a merged or
accreted unit theory.
Considering the type of information requested in items
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, I am persuaded that such
information has a potential relevance in revealing whether
or not the interrelationship of the Standard Plant and the
four other plants (Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam, and
Morris) as to employment structure, employees and work
product, is of such a nature as to constitute a merging into
or accretion of the employees of Waterbury, Thomaston,
Bantam and Morris into the basic Standard Plant unit, and
the applicability of article XV (sec. 15.2) of the contract as
to bargaining rights on such basis. In my opinion article
XV (sec. 15.2) in and of itself reveals a basis for potential
relevancy of such information.
Thus, article XV (sec. 15.2) sets forth: "In any such plant
thereafter constructed or acquired within the above radius
of seventy-five (75) land miles, the Company agrees to
recognize Local 1645 as the bargaining representative for
such employees, if it is not illegal to do so." Item 1 of the
Union's June 27, 1974, letter requests information as to
when the Waterbury, Bantam, Morris, and Thomaston op-
erations were acquired. It is relevant as to a determination
of whether the Union, under certain circumstances, could
assert that it had a contractual right to be recognized as a
collective-bargaining representative for such employees.
Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in such letter all request
information having a potential relevancy to establishment
that there had been a merged or accreted unit wherein the
Union would have a contractual right to claim that it was
the collective-bargaining representative for such employ-
ees. Thus, such items relate to transfers of operations,
15 I have considered the fact that in 1969 it was found that the Waterbury
employees did not constitute an accretion to the Standard Plant unit. How-
ever. I am persuaded that changes could be made that might merge or
accrete the Waterbury employees into the Standard Plant unit at a later
date.
TORRINGTON CO. 1241
transfers of employees, production, products, community
interest, and relationship of production processes. In com-
posite effect, such information might reveal that there had
been a merged or accreted unit of such operations and
employees. Further, such information might reveal that
there had been transfers of operations, directly or indirect-
ly, and that contractural assertion of employee transfer
rights might be asserted which would have a bearing on the
question of a merged or accreted unit. In sum, the informa-
tion requested has a potential relevance relating to a possi-
ble merged or accreted unit contention by the Union.
The background facts relating to the Union's awareness
that ( 1) steel was being cut off at the Standard Plant for
apparent transportation to its Waterbury operation and
Respondent's remarks to union officials that such was not
subcontracting, and (2) that employee Hughes was being
sent from the Standard Plant on occasion to work a day or
two at its Waterbury operation, when considered with the
size of the Standard Plant employee complement (approxi-
mately 1,000 or more employees), reveal a basis for a legiti-
mate inquiry into the question of interrelationship of the
involved plants with respect to the Union's obligation to
police and administer the contract provision having a bear-
ing on representation rights as might be warranted in a
merged or accreted bargaining unit.
Considering this in connection with the Union's demand
for recognition on April 3, 1974, the subsequent unfair la-
bor practice charge relating to bargaining rights as to the
four facilities (Waterbury, Bantam , Morris, and Thomas-
ton), and the indication that the Regional Office was not
prepared to issue complaint therein because of lack of in-
formation, I am persuaded that the facts reveal that the
Union had a legitimate need to request such information as
set forth in items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in order to
intelligently police and administer the contract provisions
pertaining to potential recognition rights.
I am also persuaded that the Respondent clearly knew
what the Union was asking for in its June 27, 1974, letter,
why the Union wanted such information, and that the
Union needed such information in order not to be func-
tioning in the dark as an employee collective-bargaining
representative. Thus, the. Respondent was aware of the
Union's contention as to representation rights at Water-
bury, Bantam, Morris, and Thomaston, and the Respon-
dent knew the theory on which the Union was proceeding.
The Respondent clearly knew all of this by virtue of the
April 3, 1974, letter from the Union, and the unfair labor
practice charges in Case 1-CA-9811. With this background
I find it hard to believe, and do not believe, that the Re-
spondent did not know what information the Union was
seeking and why. I am persuaded that Respondent knew
that the Union's June 27, 1974, letter sought information to
determine whether the four facilities were merged into the
basic Standard. Plant unit and for information otherwise
having a bearing on possible representation rights.
The facts relating to the Respondent's replies to the
Union's letter of June 27, 1974, and subsequent correspon-
dence until November 25, 1974, reveal, in my opinion, that
Respondent failed and refused to furnish relevant informa-
tion pertaining to the Union's request, as to items 1, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, after June 27, 1974, and until November
25, 1974. The Respondent by its letter of July 9, 1974, took
a legal position that it was not obligated to furnish such
information. Not only is such legal position incorrect, I am
persuaded that the totality of facts reveal that the Respon-
dent reasonably knew the contentions of the Union and
the potential relevance of such information. Under such
circumstances I am persuaded and conclude and find that,
as of November 25, 1974, the Respondent had not fur-
nished relevant information requested in the Union's June
27, 1974, letter.
Considering the facts relating to Respondent's letter of
November 25, 1974, as supplying relevant information re-
quested by the Union, I am persuaded and conclude and
find that the facts do not reveal that the Respondent has
furnished the information requested in the Union's June
27, 1974, letter, as to items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
The Union's June 27, 1974, letter requested information
relating to the transfer of operations between the Standard
Plant and the Waterbury, Bantam, Morris, and Thomaston
plants. The Respondent's letter of November 25, 1974, ad-
vised the Union that there had been no transfer of opera-
tions . The General Counsel and the Union contend that
the response was conclusionary and did not furnish the
Union information, as an example, to evaluate whether
there had been covert transfers of operations.
Conceivably, the Respondent could continue all existing
operations at the Standard Plant, and, however, move an
operation in substantial effect by having the same opera-
tion performed.by one or more plants but interrelated with
other operations of the Standard Plant. Under such cir-
cumstances, a question could arise as to whether an opera-
tion had been moved. The very nature of some information
requests reveals a need for backup information for an intel-
ligent understanding or appraisal without blind accep-
tance. I am not persuaded that the Union's request for
transfer of operations information is of such a nature as to
reveal, in and of itself, a need for information to weigh the
possibility of covert transfers of operations. However, if the
Respondent has in fact engaged in covert transfers of oper-
ations, the letter is sufficient to apprise of the need for such
backup information.
If there have been no transfers of operations, directly or
indirectly, the Respondent has furnished the information
requested thereto by the Union. If there have been trans-
fers of operations, directly or indirectly, the Respondent
has not furnished the information as requested by the
Union as to transfers of operations.
Neither the General Counsel nor the Union has attempt-
ed to establish that the Respondent has in fact, directly or
indirectly, transferred operations from its Standard Plant
to the Waterbury, Thomaston, Bantam, or Morris opera-
tions. Considering the foregoing, the facts are insufficient
to reveal that the Respondent, by its November 25, 1974,
letter, furnished the necessary and relevant information re-
lating to transfers of operations. Nor, on the other hand,
are the facts sufficient to reveal that the November 25,
1974, letter, in and of itself, constituted evidence of a refus-
al to furnish such information.
In the Union's June 27, 1974, letter, information was
requested with respect to the transfer of bargaining unit
employees when there had been a transfer of operations
1242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from the Standard Plant to the other operations. Neither
the General Counsel nor the Union has attempted to estab-
lish that bargaining unit employees have in fact been trans-
ferred from the Standard Plant to the other operations. Es-
sentially for the same reasons as regards the question of
information relating to transfers of operations , the facts are
insufficient to reveal that the Respondent by its November
25, 1974, letter furnished the necessary and relevant infor-
mation relating to transfers of employees in connection
with transfers of operations. Nor, on the other hand, are
the facts sufficient to reveal that the November 25, 1974,
letter in and of itself , constituted evidence of a refusal to
furnish such information.
In the Union's letter of June 27, 1974, information was
requested concerning the names of employees who per-
formed work both at the Standard Plant in Torrington and
at the Waterbury, Thomaston, Morris, and Bantam opera-
tions . The Respondent 's November 25, 1974, letter set
forth: "Nor, to our knowledge , are there any people who
are working both at the Standard Plant and at any of the
other plants mentioned above." The facts reveal
Respondent 's awareness that its records reflected only
transfers when there were transfers on the payroll. The
facts would also indicate that the Respondent should be
aware of circumstances such as the occasions of Hughes'
working away from the Standard Plant and at the Water-
bury plant. Under such circumstances, a conclusionary re-
sponse as was given is not an adequate response so as to be
said to constitute that the information requested has been
furnished.
In the Union 's letter of June 27, 1974, the Union request-
ed information relating to products partially processed at
the Standard Plant and at Waterbury, Morris, Bantam, or
Thomaston. The Respondent's November 25, 1974, letter
indicated that there were no integrated processes . Clearly,
the Respondent was aware of steel being cut off at the
Standard Plant and being shipped to the Waterbury plant.
Under such circumstances, a conclusionary response, as
was given , is not an adequate response so as to be said to
constitute that the information requested has been fur-
nished.
The Respondent's November 25, 1974, letter did not
purport to answer the Union's request for information re-
lating to items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 in the Union's June 27, 1974,
letter.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded and
conclude and find that the Union had a legitimate need for
the information requested in items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 of its June 27, 1974, letter, in order to determine wheth-
er or not the Waterbury, Bantam , Morris, or Thomaston
facilities were part of a merged or accreted Standard bar-
gaining unit and, therefore, whether the Union had bar-
gaining rights and responsibilities for such unit as merged
or accreted. Such bargaining rights would not be merely
bargaining rights of the Union but rights in which all of the
employees in the Standard Plant unit had an interest.
In determining the Union's need for the information re-
quested and the relevancy of such information requested, I
have considered the facts relating to the 1969 determina-
tion that the Waterbury facility did not constitute an accre-
tion to the Standard Plant bargaining unit , and the proce-
dural facts relating to the Union's filing and withdrawal
without prejudice of an unfair labor practice charge in
Case l-CA-9811 alleging in effect that the Waterbury,
Morris, Bantam, and Thomaston employees were included
in the collective-bargaining agreement covering the Stan-
dard Plant employees. Although it may not be probable,
changed circumstances concerning the interrelationship of
the various facilities may now warrant a determination that
the Waterbury facility has been accreted to or merged with
the Standard unit. Although it would appear that a proper
and full investigation of the refusal-to-bargain charges in
Case l-CA-9811 would have subsumed therein an investi-
gation into the facts and information sought by the Union
in its request for information, and although a determina-
tion in effect that there was not sufficient evidence to pro-
ceed to complaint would be indicative that the Union's
request for information is in effect an exercise in futility, it
should be noted that a determination by the Regional Di-
rector, his staff, or staff members that the the Region does
not have sufficient evidence to issue a complaint is not a
litigated finding. The Regional Director, his staff, or indi-
vidual staff members may have incorrectly evaluated the
evidence that had been uncovered, may have incorrectly
evaluated the case in a legal sense, and may not have se-
cured or considered all of the necessary relevant evidence
touching upon the issues.16 Further, although the Regional
Office personnel may have discussed the investigative find-
ing with the Union as regards the charge in Case I-CA-
9811, it should not be assumed that such discussion would
reveal all of the details of the investigation, all of the evi-
dence uncovered, or whether or not the Region had se-
cured precise details as to all of the potential relevant evi-
dence.
Considering all of the foregoing, I find no reason to re-
veal that the Union should be estopped from attempting to
secure information from which it can evaluate and de-
termine whether to attempt by arbitration or even by a new
unfair labor practice charge to secure recognition as a bar-
gaining agent in a possible merged or accreted bargaining
unit. It is possible that the Union will receive information
not previously disclosed. It is also possible that the Union
might be able to make persuasive argument concerning in-
formation already disclosed to the Region but not to the
Union, concerning its rights. It is clear that the Union
would be in a better position to intelligently police and
administer its contract if it knew the details and facts first-
hand, rather than on a hearsay or secondhand basis.
There is no evidentiary basis to indicate that the General
Counsel's Regional staff did not conduct a full and proper
investigation in the refusal-to-bargain charge in Case 1-
CA-9811. Nor is there any evidentiary basis to indicate
that the General Counsel and the Union have engaged in a
concerted effort to use investigatory means not otherwise
available in such case for a complete and proper investiga-
tion. Although a "request for information" may be some-
what similar to "discovery," the General Counsel's statuto-
16 The Region may have accepted conclusionary statements from the Re-
spondent as to some of the issues in the investigation of the refusal-to-
bargain charges, and may not , based upon practical judgment , have pursued
an inquiry into precise details relating to such conclusions.
TORRINGTON CO.
ry authority to investigate unfair labor practice charges is
broad and includes the use of subpena power . Such author-
ity and power clearly has as broad a sweep as "discovery."
There is no apparent reason why the General Counsel
would attempt to obtain indirectly that which he can ob-
tain directly . Nor is there a basis for belief that the Union
is attempting to circumvent the purposes of the Act. The
Union's actions are consistent with its prior contentions
that it represents the employees at Respondent's Bantam,
Morris, Thomaston , and Waterbury plants by virtue of a
merged or accreted bargaining unit theory and that it
needs information related thereto for considerations in
such regard and as for consideration as to actions to take
in such regard to protect the bargaining unit employees'
rights . The Union's entitlement to the information request-
ed flows from its statutory rights as a bargaining represen-
tative and Section 8(a)(5) of the Act itself."
The facts reveal that from June 27, 1974, to November
25, 1974, the Respondent did not purport to furnish the
necessary and relevant information for bargaining or polic-
ing and administering the collective -bargaining agreement
requested in the June 27, 1974, letter in items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, and 10. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude
and find that the Respondent , by such conduct, engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.18
The facts reveal that the Respondent on November 25,
1974, made a purported partial response to the Union's
June 27, 1974, letter as to some of the items referred to
above . The facts in such regard as to the items purportedly
responded to are not sufficient to reveal that the Respon-
dent has or had not furnished the necessary and relevant
information requested . As to some of the other items re-
quested in the Union's June 27, 1974, letter, and referred to
above, it is clear that the Respondent has continued to
refuse to furnish necessary and relevant information for
bargaining and policing and administering the collective-
bargaining agreement . By such conduct , it is clear that the
Respondent has continued to engage in conduct violative
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
. 171 find nothing in the Union 's actions in withdrawal of the unfair labor
practice charge (Case l-CA-9811) without prejudice, in thereafter request-
ing necessary and relevant information for policing and administering its
contract from the Respondent, and in filing an unfair labor practice charge
as to a refusal to furnish such information , to reveal an improper attempt to
use rights not accorded to the Union by law. But see General Electric Com-
pany, etc., 163 NLRB 198, 210 (1967), the facts, conclusions, and findings
therein relating to the dismissal of an alleged refusal -to-bargain allegation
for refusing to furnish relevant information on the basis that a "request for
information" constituted in effect an improper use thereof as "discovery."
purportedly not available to the General Counsel. I would note that in my
opinion such case should be narrowly construed since the General Counsel's
investigatory authority has as broad a sweep as does discovery. In any
event , I am of the opinion that the rationale of the General Electric case as
to the issue referred to has been removed by the underlying theory in the
Board 's Collyer case (Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971)) and
related cases involving the Board 's deferral to arbitration doctrine. Further,
the facts in the instant case are dissimilar to the facts in the General Electric
case in that the "request for information" was made at a time when unfair
labor practice charges had neither been dismissed nor were pending.
18 Herk Elevator Maintenance, Inc., 197 NLRB 96 (1972).
IV. THE REMEDY
1243
Having found that Respondent has engaged in, unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act, it will be recommended that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take appropriate and affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, specif-
ically, that Respondent be ordered to furnish to the Union
the information which it has been found that Respondent
has violated the Act by not furnishing.
Thus, Respondent will be ordered to furnish the neces-
sary and relevant information (for policing and administer-
ing the existing contract) requested in the Union's June 27,
1974, letter, in items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. It is clear
that the Respondent had not furnished any information
relating to these items before November 25, 1974:'9 It is
also clear that the Respondent has not furnished. at any
time information as to some of the items referred to. As to
several of the items, the Respondent's letter of November
25, 1974, and other facts, in the total context of all of the
facts, do not establish that the Respondent has properly
furnished the information requested. Determination of
whether the Respondent has actually furnished such infor-
mation, however, can be made in the compliance stage of
this proceeding.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the fol-
lowing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Torrington Company, Standard Plant, the Re-
spondent, is an Employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 1645, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Standard Plant, exclusive of of-
fice, clerical and salaried employees, timekeepers, firemen,
engineers, gatemen, watchmen, guards, executives, fore-
men, assistant foremen and subforemen, and all supervi-
sors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act 26
4. Local 1645, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Ameri-
ca, at all times material herein , has been the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit described above within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act.
5. By refusing to furnish the above-named union infor-
mation necessary and relevant for the Union's policing and
administering the Respondent's and Union's existing col-
lective-bargaining agreement, Respondent has engaged in
19 Said letter was sent to the Union after the filing of charges in this case
and during the pendency of investigation of such charges.
20 Respondent 's Excelsior, Broad Street , and Wire plants , and Bonnie
Mills facility are deemed covered by the collective-bargaining contract con-
cerning such unit.
1244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 21
Respondent, The Torrington Company, Standard Plant,
Torrington , Connecticut , its officers, agents , successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 1645, In-
ternational Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America , as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
unit described below, by refusing , upon request, to furnish
information necessary and relevant for the Union 's use in
policing and administering the existing collective-bargain-
ing agreement , or other such agreements, between it and
the Union.
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Standard Plant, exclusive of
office, clerical and salaried employees, time-keepers,
firemen, engineers , gatemen , watchmen, guards, exec-
utives , foremen , assistant foremen and subforemen
and all supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the
Act.
Respondent 's employees at its Excelsior , Broad Street,
and Wire plant , and at its Bonnie Mills facilities are
also covered by the existing collective -bargaining
agreement concerning the above unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the
above-named organization , or any other labor organiza-
tion , to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
as such rights might be affected by a lawful agreement as
authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request , furnish to the Union information nec-
essary and relevant for the Union's use in policing and
administering collective -bargaining agreements between
the Respondent and the Union , including specifically, but
not limited thereto , the information requested in the
Union's letter of June 27, 1974, items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10.
21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings.
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations . be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(b) Post at its Standard Plant in Torrington, Connecti-
cut, and at other facilities covered by its existing collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 22 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region I,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative , shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
22 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Lo-
cal 1645, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees in the unit described be-
low, by refusing, upon request, to furnish information
necessary and relevant for the Union's use in policing
and administering the existing collective-bargaining
agreement, or other such agreements, between us and
the Union.
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by our Standard Plant, exclusive of office, clerical and
salaried employees, time-keepers, firemen, engineers,
gatemen, watchmen, guards, executives, foremen, as-
sistant foremen, and subforemen and all supervisors
as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
Employees at our Excelsior, Broad Street and Wire
plants, and at our Bonnie Mills facility are also cov-
ered by our existing collective bargaining agreement
concerning the above unit,
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist the above-named labor organization, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the
TORRINGTON CO. 1245
extent as such rights might be affected by a lawful ments between us and the Union, including specifical-
agreement as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. ly, but not limited thereto, . the information requested
WE WILL , upon request , furnish the Union informa- in the Union's letter of June 27 , 1974, item 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
tion necessary and relevant for the Union's use in po- 7, 8, 9, and 10.
licing and administering collective -bargaining agree-
THE TORRINGTON COMPANY, STANDARD PLANT