The Stevens Machine Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 19, 1969

178 N.L.R.B. 144 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Richard V. Stevens, An Individual, d/b/a The
Stevens Machine Company ; Richard V. Stevens
and Robert L. Stevens, Partnership, d/b/a Stevens
Equipment Company and Lodge 1580,
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO. Cases 3-CA-3644
and 3-CA-3711
August 19, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND ZAGORIA
On June 6, 1969, Trial Examiner Henry L. Jalette
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also
found that the Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices and
recommended that said allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Richard V.
Stevens, An Individual, d/b/a The Stevens Machine
Company; Richard V. Stevens and Robert L.
Stevens, Partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment
Company, Belmont, New York, their agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE,Trial Examiner:'The original and
amended charges in Case 3-CA-3644 were filed on
November 7, 1968, and January 17, 1969, respectively; the
original charge in Case 3-CA-3711 was filed on February
24, 1969. The Charging Party is Local 1580, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union. The
charges are against the above-captioned individual
proprietorship and partnership as a single employer and
Respondent.
On December 18, 1968, pursuant to an agreement for
consent election arising out of a petition filed by the
Union in Case 3-RC-4542, an election was held in a unit
of Respondent's employees in which three challenged
ballots were cast which were determinative of the results
of the election. Pursuant to section 6 of the agreement for
consent election, the Regional Director directed a hearing
on the challenges on January 20, 1969.
On January 22, 1969, the General Counsel issued a
complaint in Case 3-CA-3644 and an order consolidating
that case with Case 3-RC-4542, for purposes of hearing,
ruling and decision, and providing that thereafter Case
3-RC-4542 be severed and transferred to the Regional
Director for further processing. On March 13, 1969, the
General Counsel issued a complaint in Case 3-CA-3711,
and on March 14, 1969, he issued an order consolidating
Case 3-CA-3711 with Cases 3-CA-3644 and 3-RC-4542.
The complaints allege that the Respondent engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that
Respondent discharged Richard Patterson, Larry M.
Cline, and Laverne Ramsey because of their union
activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Of the three challenged ballots in Case 3-RC-4542, two
are the ballots of Richard Patterson and Larry M. Cline,
the alleged discriminatees in Case 3-CA-3644. The third
challenged ballot is that of one David Mack whose ballot
was challenged by the Union on the ground he lived with
the owner of Respondent. On March 26 and 27, 1969, the
case was tried in Belmont, New York.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the brief filed by,
Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Stevens Machine Company is the trade name and
style of an individual proprietorship owned by Richard V.
Stevens, which is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of machine parts and related products at 3373
Riverside Drive in the town of Scio, New York.
The Stevens Equipment Company is the trade name
and style of a partnership consisting of Richard V.
Stevens and his son, Robert L. Stevens, which is engaged
in the manufacture, repair, purchase, sale and distribution
of farm implements and machinery and related products
at the same location as Stevens Machine Company.
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that
Stevens Machine and Stevens Equipment are affiliated
businesses under common ownership and management,
whose owners formulate and administer a single common
labor policy, and that they constitute a single-integrated
business enterprise and a single employer within the
meaning of the Act. As already indicated, Richard
Stevens is owner of one business and a partner in the
other, and both businesses are located at the same place.
They occupy a single building with a single office and
office staff. Richard Stevens is active in both businesses.
He fired alleged discriminatee Larry Cline, who was an
employee of Stevens Machine, and made the decision to
178 NLRB No. 26
RICHARD V. STEVENS
fire alleged discriminatee Richard Patterson, who was
employed by Stevens Equipment. The employees of both
businesses were included in a single unit in the Agreement
for Consent Election in Case 3-RC-4542 which was
executed by Richard Stevens on behalf of both businesses.
Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, I
conclude that Stevens Machine and Stevens Equipment
constitute a single employer within the meaning of the
Act. The complaint alleges , and the answer admits, that
the Respondent during the year preceding the issuance of
complaint, in the course and conduct of its business
operations, manufactured, sold and shipped from its place
of business in Scio, New York to points outside the State
of New York goods and products valued in excess of
$50,000. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is, and has
been at all times material herein , an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges , the answer as amended at trial
admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct
1. Interrogation, impression of surveillance, and
threats of discharge and plant closure
The independent 8(a)(l) conduct discussed under this
subheading is that alleged in paragraphs IX(A) and (B) of
the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644 and attributed to both
Richard Stevens and Robert Stevens. It is not clear from
the form of the pleading which conduct is being charged
to Richard Stevens and which to Robert Stevens. It is
clear from the record that both Stevens were not being
charged with all, or the same, 8(a)(l) conduct, although it
is not clear even now which act of which Stevens
constitutes which independent 8(a)(l) violation. In the
circumstances, I am setting forth those incidents which
appear to me to have been within the intendment of the
allegations, all of which were fully litigated without
objection of Respondent at the trial.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that we are dealing
here with what is basically a small family enterprise, with
approximately 10 employees during the events to be
described.
Following some discussion among the employees of the
desirability of a union, employee Richard Patterson
obtained some authorization cards of the Union which he
brought to the shop on September 19, 1968.' During the
lunch hour that day, all but two employees and Foreman
Harold Wyckoff signed cards and returned them to
Patterson. The record does not indicate what, if any,
union activity the employees engaged in after the initial
card signing, but on October 22, the Union made a
demand for recognition, which was rejected by letter dated
October 25. On October 30, the Union filed the petition in
Case 3-RC-4542.
According to employee Thomas Hickey, about a week
after the employees signed cards, Richard Stevens came
into the tool room and told him he had heard there was
union agitation going on in the shop, and he wanted to
'Unless otherwise indicated , all dates refer to 1968.
145
know if Hickey was part of it. Hickey told him no,
although he had in fact signed a union card. Stevens
remarked that he thought he knew who one of the
employees behind the Union was. "It's the guy you ride
with," (this was Larry Cline), and "I'm not about to let
anything like that get started." Stevens did not deny that
such a conversation took place, but denied that he made
the statement that one of the employees behind the Union
was the guy Hickey rode with.' I credit Hickey's
testimony.'
A few days later, Stevens remarked to Hickey that
Hickey must have signed one of the cards. Hickey assured
Stevens he had taken no part in such activity. This
testimony is undenied.
According to employee Richard Patterson, 1 week or 2
weeks after the union cards were signed, Richard Stevens
asked him, Laverne Ramsey and David Freeman if they
knew anything about the Union. Patterson said no.
Stevens added that he was footing the bills and he was
going to run the shop the way he wanted to.
Patterson could not recall that Ramsey or Freeman
said anything, and Freeman did not testify to such an
incident. Ramsey testified to an incident wherein Richard
Stevens remarked that the Union would never get in the
shop, but he placed only Freeman as being present. While
his description of the incident leads me to believe it was
the same incident described by Patterson, the record is not
sufficiently clear on the point to make such a finding. The
issue is not critical, because neither the testimony of
Patterson on this point, nor that of Ramsey, was denied.
About the first of November, employee John Shaw was
called into the office and was told by Richard Stevens that
because of defective work he had performed, Stevens
deemed it necessary to discharge him. Shaw explained to
Stevens that he had bought a new car on which he had to
make payments and he asked to be permitted to continue
working until the end of the year when he expected to
begin military service. Stevens acquiesced.
The foregoing is undisputed. According to Shaw,
however, at the conclusion of the foregoing, Stevens asked
him if he knew anything going on about the union matter,
and who was the head of it. Shaw said he did not know,
that there were rumors going around, and there had been
talk, but he did not know who started it. Richard Stevens
denied that there was any mention of the Union in this
conversation with Shaw, and he is corroborated by his son
and his wife who were present during the conversation.
I was favorably impressed by Shaw's demeanor and I
credit his testimony. I cannot say as much for either
Richard or Robert Stevens, and Mrs. Stevens' demeanor
conveyed such a strong sense of familial unity that I can
accord no weight to her testimony. If her description of
Shaw's behavior on this occasion is accurate, it is difficult
to conceive that Shaw was lying when he testified. For
example, she testified that when her husband talked to
Shaw, "... John sort of begged to stay. And I never saw
anyone shake so hard in my life, ."An. employee so
'According to Hickey, Robert Stevens was present during this
conversation , but Robert Stevens was not examined on this point.
'Respondent contends that Hickey is not a credible witness for several
reasons, including an alleged conflict between his testimony and that of
Foreman Wyckoff about statements made by Hickey to Wyckoff about the
work performance of Larry Cline. From my review of the testimony, any
conflict between the two is more apparent than real. In any event,
whatever conflict there exists between Hickey's and Wyckoff's testimony
affords no basis for discrediting Hickey in a conflict of testimony with
Richard Stevens . In such a conflict, for reasons appearing fully herein,
Richard Stevens emerges the loser.
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
frightened of his employer would hardly risk discharge by
fabricating a conversation, particularly where there is no
showing that he has a special interest in the outcome of
the proceeding. Shaw was still employed at the time of the
trial and was not scheduled to enter military service until
August.
On or about October 25, Stevens gave each employee a
slip of paper to read, sign, and hand back to him before
the end of the workday. This slip was never produced at
trial, but it is undisputed that it asked each employee to
indicate whether or not he was interested in having the
Union as a bargaining agent.
Only Wyckoff and Colesof, neither of whom had signed
union cards, returned the slips. Employee Utter, who also
had not signed a union card, had not received a slip
because he was on vacation when they were passed out.
At quitting time the same day, Stevens asked employee
Hickey if he had signed the slip. Hickey replied that this
was the third time Stevens had asked him (about his union
sentiments, that is) and that he did not want to hear any
more about it. Stevens said, "Well, I want to know your
position" and Hickey replied, "You know my position, I
wouldn't sign this for you or anybody else."
About the same time, Stevens also asked employee
David Freeman for his slip and when Freeman replied he
did not have it, Stevens stated he wanted it back. Freeman
repeated that he did not have it. Stevens also asked
employee John Shaw if he had signed his slip and when
Shaw said no, Stevens asked him where it was and Shaw
said he threw it away. Stevens then asked him whether or
not he was interested in the Union and Shaw, who was
leaving, did not reply.
Respondent offered no testimony relative to the
circulation of the slips and none of the foregoing
conversations was denied. However, the issue of
Respondent's purpose in polling its employees was opened
up by General Counsel on cross-examination and Stevens
thereafter set forth his reasons as follows:
I was trying to find out information; that's all. Just
to know who was interested in the Union. Also to
corroborate the information that Mr. Wyckoff had
given me that the fellows signed cards.
I wanted to find out if as stated, the majority of my
employees in the machine shop were in fact, in favor of
the Union as a bargaining agent. If they were, then I
would have determined to talk to the Union about it.
On recross-examination, Stevens disclaimed any
intention to recognize the Union stating that if he had
learned the employees were for the Union, "I was going
to look into it. I would have investigated the possibility of
the Union if the majority of the boys in the machine shop
wanted it."
In my view, this shifting and evasive testimony
indicates clearly that the purpose of the poll was not to
determine the truth of the Union's claim of majority. I so
find.
Summarizing the foregoing, I find that all the foregoing
interrogations and the attempted poll were coercive and
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The attempted poll
and the systematic interrogations apart from the
attempted poll were not conducted under the safeguards
enumerated by the Board in Struksnes Construction Co.,
Inc., 165 NLRB No. 102. Specifically, there was no
legitimate purpose, employees were not told of a purpose
and were not assured against reprisals, the attempted
written poll was not secret, and the interrogations
occurred in the context of other unfair labor practices.
Additional circumstances indicative of the coercive nature
of the interrogations are: In Hickey's case, the
interrogations were repeated and persistent; in Shaw's
case, the interrogation followed a conversation with all the
earmarks of a performance staged to frighten him; in
Patterson's case, he was to become a discriminatee.
In addition to the foregoing respecting the conduct of
Richard Stevens, General Counsel elicited testimony from
Foreman Wyckoff that a week or more after the union
cards were signed Richard Stevens told him that if the
Union came in, he might have to close the doors because
he would not know what demands they would make. I
have no indication what the General Counsel's position is
about this testimony which was undenied, but, apart from
any other considerations, it cannot be construed as an
unlawful threat because I find that Wyckoff was a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act°
General Counsel also elicited testimony from Larry
Cline that 2 or 3 weeks after he signed a union card,
Richard Stevens remarked to him that he had heard by
word of the grapevine that the employees were trying to
get a union there, and that he wanted nothing to do with
it. Stevens said if any of the employees were not satisfied
with their jobs they could leave any time they wanted to.
This testimony is undenied.
As noted under this subheading, General Counsel
alleges that Respondent conveyed the impression of
surveillance to its employees; however, it is not clear
which conduct is alleged to fall in this category. If he
contends that Stevens' remark, supra, that he had heard
"by word of the grapevine" of the employees' union
activities conveyed the impression of surveillance, I do not
agree. Apart from the card signing in the plant in the
presence of a supervisor, there is no showing what other
union activities the employees engaged in; for example,
there is no showing they were holding union meetings. In
these circumstances, it is difficult to understand how
Stevens could have engaged in surveillance or how his
remark could reasonably be construed as conveying an
impression of surveillance.'
The other remark that may fall under this complaint
allegation is that of Stevens to Hickey that he thought he
knew who one of the employees behind the Union was, a
reference to Cline. But Cline, like Hickey, was merely one
of the card signers and Hickey knew this. In this
circumstance, and the circumstances referred to in the
preceding paragraph, this statement could not reasonably
be construed as conveying the impression of surveillance.
Paragraph IX(b) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644
includes the phrase ". . . and advised its employees that if
they wanted the Union, they should resign from their
employment." The form of the allegation makes it
difficult to determine whether the allegation is directed to
Richard Stevens' remark to Cline, supra, that if the
employees were not satisfied they could leave anytime, or
to a somewhat similar remark attributed to Robert
Stevens by other employees, or both.
David Freeman testified that sometime after the union
cards were signed Robert Stevens stated to the employees
of Stevens Equipment that there was talk in the other part
of the building about getting union representation and that
if they wanted any part of it they might as well go out the
'There is undisputed testimony that Wyckoff is responsible for the
operation of the machine shop, that he assigns work to employees in a
manner requiring the exercise of independent judgment, and has the
authority to grant time off to employees.
'Cf. Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1546.
RICHARD V. STEVENS
door because he did not want any part of it.
Richard Patterson, described Robert Stevens' statement
to be if "we were talking about getting the union in there
we might as well look for another job."
Laverne Ramsey described the statement to be that
there was talk of a union in the shop and if "any of us
three were thinking of the Union, we were automatically
fired."
Robert Stevens did not expressly deny the statements
variously attributed to him above. He did deny them by
implication, in my view, by his testimony that after
hearing of the union activity, he called the employees
named above together and told them . there was
apparently some union activity in the machine company
and that if they were interested in the equipment end that
it was very possible that I would have to cease business
because at that time we weren't making any profit,
anyway."
I was not impressed by Robert Stevens' demeanor on
the witness stand and I obtained the impression that this
testimony was partly a recitation of what had occurred
and partly his statement for the record of the reasons for
his conduct I do not believe that he made any statement
which qualified the patent threat with a statement of the
company's profit position; if he did, I believe he omitted
from his testimony that part described by Freeman and
Patterson as "go out the door" or "look for another job,"
which are essentially the same in idea and which I credit.
I attach no weight to Ramsey's version which I believe
represents his interpretation of Stevens' remarks, although
offered by him as the remarks made.
In short, I find that Robert Stevens' statement as
described by Freeman and Patterson not only indicated
that the Union was not wanted, but also, that employees
in favor of one were not desired and impliedly would be
terminated. Respondent thereby violated Section 8( a)(1).
Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc , 164 NLRB No 100;
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 167
NLRB No. 110, enfd. 408 F 2d 374 (C.A. 5). The same
considerations apply to Richard Stevens' remark to Cline
which I also find violative of Section 8(a)(1) as alleged in
paragraph IX(b) of the complaint in Case 3-CA-3644. The
remarks of Robert Stevens are deemed to be the threats
alleged in paragraph IX(a) of the complaint in Case
3-CA-3711.
Employee Freeman testified credibly that on the date of
Cline's discharge, Robert Stevens came into the shop and
"kind of joking" said, "Well, now, we got rid of the
Union agitator." Freeman is corroborated by Hickey and
Ramsey and Robert Stevens did not deny making the
statement. Such a statement to employees, whether or not
it is in fact the true motive for the discharge, is coercive
as it clearly implies that the discharge was because of
union activity and implies that the employees to whom it
is made will also be discharged if they assist the Union.
Mid-South Manufacturing Company, Inc., 120 NLRB
230; Inland Motors, 175 NLRB No. 139. Moreover, it is
reasonable to conclude that whatever humor Robert
Stevens may have seen in the discharge of a union
agitator would not be shared by the employees. Freeman
did not testify that he considered the announcement
humorous.
A few days before December 3, Hickey asked Robert
Stevens how serious the union business was and remarked
that he thought it was something to laugh at. Robert
Stevens replied, no, it had gone beyond the laughing stage
He added, "Well, I'll tell you. If anything happens to my
dad in the way of a heart attack or say anything like that
147
and I find out he-I found out the one that started this-"
he said, "I'll take a gun and kill the son of a bitch."
Bob's wife remarked that that kind of talk would only get
him behind bars and Bob replied, "Well, this is the only
dad I've got."
This testimony is undenied and I credit it. Respondent
contends that the statement is so outrageous that it is
unbelieveable and, thus, hardly threatening I do not
believe, however, that it is necessary to conclude that
Stevens really meant what he said in order to hold that
the statement is coercive. The intensity of animus against
the Union and the employees adhering to it reflected in
such a statement is so great that the statement cannot but
have a coercive effect on employees, and I find the
remarks violative of Section 8(a)(1).
2. The granting of wage increases
The complaint in Case 3-CA-3711, as amended at the
trial, alleges that on December 4, Richard Stevens offered,
promised and granted wage increases and other benefits to
its employees if they refrained from union activity. The
only evidence offered in support of this allegation related
to wage increases given to John Shaw and Larry Cline.
At quitting time on December 4, Richard Stevens gave
Shaw his paycheck as usual and told Shaw there was
something extra in it, that Shaw had been doing better
welding and he appreciated it. Stevens added, "If you
could help me out . . I would appreciate it."
In his direct testimony about this conversation, Shaw
adverted to the fact that it was before the election, but he
did not quote Stevens as expressly referring to the
election. On cross-examination Shaw testified that Stevens
said, " . . would you help me out when election time
came," and Shaw indicated that his use of the word
election was not an interpretation of Stevens' remarks, but
that he was quoting Stevens "Without an if, and, or but."
Stevens denied mentioning the election, or voting, or the
Union. I credit Shaw. I have previously indicated my
reasons for crediting Shaw. In addition, I have considered
in connection with this instance the fact that the day
before he granted the wage increase, Richard Stevens had
signed an Agreement for Consent Election scheduling an
election for December 18, the fact that it had only been 3
months since Shaw had received an increase, that he had
not requested an increase and it came as a surprise to
him, and Stevens' failure to offer any credible explanation
for giving the increase at that time. Accordingly, I find
that the granting of the wage increase was violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. NL.R.B. v. Exchange Parts
Co., 375 U.S. 405.
Two or three weeks before his discharge, Larry Cline
received a 10-cent-per-hour wage increase. Cline had
asked for an increase several times (according to Richard
Stevens, Cline was "continually bitching for more
money"). Cline could not recall what Richard Stevens told
him when he granted him the wage increase, but according
to Stevens, when he told Cline there was a little more in
his check, Cline said, "Well, there had better be." I do
not know what significance is to be attached to this
remark other than as confirmation that Cline did not
deserve the increase. Stevens testified he had told Cline
several times that it was not in the cards, adding on the
witness stand, "And, as you know, he has been quite a
bad workman."
Stevens then added, "Now, Larry is a fellow who
doesn't have much. And he-upstairs either-and I did
feel sort of sorry for the kid and would have like to
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
help him along and try to. But it got to the point where
I said, `Well,' to myself, `Maybe a ten cent increase will
make him produce better or make him shape up.' So, I
gave him a ten cent increase."
Yet, on Stevens' own admission, when he gave Cline his
check he said nothing to him about his reasons. Had these
been his true reasons, it would seem that he would have
told Cline that Cline might have understood that
improvement was expected of him. Under all the
circumstances, I am persuaded that the wage increase to
Cline was motivated by Stevens' desire to combat the
union activity of his employees and to influence Cline to
refrain from supporting the Union. Accordingly, I find the
wage increase violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The Discharge of Richard Patterson , Larry Cline
and Laverne Ramsey
1. The facts relating to the discharges
a. Richard Patterson
Patterson was employed on June 24 by Stevens
Equipment as a mechanic and general laborer. He was
discharged on October 14. He was the employee who
procured union cards and who brought them to the shop
on September 19.
On Thursday, October 10, Patterson asked Richard
Stevens for, and received, permission to leave work early.
He gave no reason for wanting to leave early, but stated
at the trial that it was because he did not feel well.
According to Patterson, whom I credit, nothing was said
about his coming to work on Friday. On Friday,
Patterson did not report to work, nor did he report his
absence. He testified he did not feel well, had a slight cold
and a headache, that he went to a doctor, but that the
doctor did not prescribe anything. Patterson admitted that
after his visit to the doctor he and a friend went to a
cabin in the woods which they own where he spent about
three quarters of an hour checking things, returning home
at 3:30 p.m. He admitted he was probably well enough to
go to work that day.
Saturday was not a regular workday and Patterson did
not report for work. Patterson was not asked whether he
had been told to report to work on Saturday.
On Monday, October 14, Patterson reported to work
and was told by Robert Stevens that he was running short
of work and he did not need three guys anymore, and he
was going to let Patterson go. Patterson said nothing. No
mention was made of Patterson's absence from work
Friday and Saturday.
Robert Stevens confirmed that the only reason he gave
Patterson for the termination was lack of work, but he
testified that there were in fact other reasons, namely, his
tardiness, the lack of work, and the fact that he had told
Richard Stevens he would be in on Friday and he was not.'
He did not mention these other reasons because he
wanted Patterson to leave with a favorable attitude
towards Respondent and he did not want to appear to be
an ogre.
Richard Stevens testified that when he gave Patterson
permission to leave early on Thursday, he specifically
'On Friday, an investigator from the Bureau of Criminal Investigations
had made inquiries at the shop about Patterson whom he wanted to
interview about a burglary . This matter was discussed among the Stevens
and referred to by Robert Stevens when terminating Patterson ; however, it
was not asserted to be one of the reasons for discharging him.
asked him if he would be in the next day and Patterson
said he would. Richard Stevens also testified in the
following fashion that Patterson had been asked to come
in on Saturday: in answer to the following question by his
counsel, "You had asked him?" he replied, "Right." Yet,
when I asked him who had asked Patterson to work on
Saturday, he replied, "Bob had asked him ." Bob
testified he could not say whether Patterson had been told
to report to work on Saturday.
b. Larry Cline
Cline was employed on January 31, 1967, and
discharged October 23, 1968. At the time of his discharge,
he was the senior employee, only Foreman Wyckoff
having more seniority. He signed a union card on
September 19.
On Monday morning, October 21, Cline asked
Foreman Wyckoff for, and received, permission to take
the rest of the day off to do work at home.
On Tuesday, Cline reported to work and after about 2
hours, he asked Richard Stevens for permission to leave
early. Stevens gave him no answer. Shortly, thereafter
Cline left work without permission. (Cline testified he also
asked Wyckoff for permission on this day, but I do not
credit him. His testimony that he asked Wyckoff for
permission was elicited by a leading question, and when
testifying about his termination conversation with Stevens
he was again led to state that he told Stevens he had
received permission from Wyckoff; yet, when I examined
Cline, I found him to be uncertain about everything.
Despite reservations about certain aspects of Wyckoff's
testimony with regard to Cline, I credit his testimony that
Cline did not request permission on Tuesday.)
On Wednesday, Cline reported to work and punched
his timecard as usual. He was called into the office where
Richard Stevens told him that if he thought his work was
more important than the company's, he was going to let
him do it. According to Stevens, he gave Cline his check
and Cline left without saying a word. According to Cline,
he protested that he had received no warning and that he
had Wyckoff's permission. For the reasons given above, I
do not credit Cline about this conversation.
c. Laverne Ramsey
Ramsey was employed by Stevens Equipment in July
1967, and was discharged January 20, 1969. He signed a
union card on September 19. On December 3, Ramsey
went to Buffalo to attend the R case hearing on behalf of
the Union. Ramsey had owed a substantial amount of
money to Respondent for a long time and the day
following the hearing Robert Stevens handed him a
statement of account, putting it "right under his nose,"
which stated that unless the account was paid by
December 6, Respondent would file suit. Ramsey did not
pay and suit was filed.
Ramsey owns a large farm and he agreed to go to work
for Respondent after several discussions with Robert
Stevens in which Ramsey indicated that he would accept
employment only on condition that he would have
adequate time off to plant and harvest his crops. The
record does not indicate the specific terms of the
arrangement agreed to. Although Robert Stevens denied
making any special arrangements, he admitted to a
general agreement with Ramsey to take time off for
planting and harvesting, and the record shows , that
Ramsey took time off in the December 1967-January 1968
RICHARD V. STEVENS 149
period and the June-July 1968 period.
In the week before January 13, 1969, Ramsey had
made arrangements to have a field of his corn combined
by one, Roger Granger. On the day Granger started,
January 13, Ramsey's wife called Respondent to advise
that Ramsey was ill. Ramsey did not report to work
during the entire week of January 13, and during 4 days
of that week Granger was combining the corn and
Ramsey was in the field helping him. Although Ramsey
denied that he did any work in the field, he admitted that
on two or three occasions he moved the truck into which
the corn was loaded and that he was present during part
of the..time Granger was working. According to Granger,
Ramsey was there all the time he was combining. In fact,
Ramsey and he had agreed to meet in the field on
Monday when Granger started the combining.
Ramsey returned to work January 20, 1969, and was
discharged. Robert Stevens asked him where he had been
the preceding week and Ramsey told him he had been ill
and also that he had "visited" with the man combining his
corn. Robert Stevens remarked that Ramsey had visited
several times according to his understanding. He also
mentioned an account owed Respondent by Ramsey, but
Ramsey disputed the amount claimed.
Richard Stevens told Ramsey he was going to be
discharged, that he was among several others in the
organization costing them a lot of money. Ramsey asked
what he meant and Stevens replied "You know attorneys
cost a lot of money." Ramsey remarked that he could not
see how Stevens felt he was the one costing Respondent
money and Stevens replied, "Well, I, among others in the
organization, were costing them money."
According to Robert Stevens, on' the previous Tuesday,
he had heard that Ramsey had been seen with the man he
had hired to combine his corn, and on the same day his
father had called Ramsey's house with regard to a
machine part he could not find and had received no
answer. On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, Stevens
received information indicating that Ramsey was not in
his house, and on Sunday, January 19, he talked with
Granger, the combine man, who confirmed that Ramsey
was helping him.
When Ramsey reported to work on Monday, Robert
asked him why he had not been at work and Ramsey told
him he had been sick and he asked when Stevens was
going to get off his back. Stevens told him that was as
good a time as any and Ramsey replied that was perfectly
alright, but if Stevens thought he had trouble in the past,
he wanted him to know it was just beginning. Stevens
testified there was no mention of how much money
Ramsey had cost the Company or how expensive
attorneys were.
Richard Stevens did not testify about this conversation.
2. Analysis and Conclusions
The record in this case is a welter of inconsistencies,
contradictions, and plain falsehoods, and threading ones
way through it to determine Respondent's motive in
discharging Cline, Patterson, and Ramsey is not a simple
task. Although each employee gave cause for discharge,
this does not mean that Respondent may not have been
motivated, in part, by their union activities in deciding to
terminate them. "The circumstances of each case must be
weighed to determine what motivations truly dominated
the employer in laying off or discharging the employees."
N.L.R.B. v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d 878, 882 (C.A.
4).
One circumstance which weighs heavily in my findings
about the motivation of Richard Stevens in discharging
Cline and Patterson is Stevens' lack of credibility. From
my observation of Richard Stevens, at the time he
testified he was still angry with his employees because
they had signed union cards and he still conveyed the
impression of a determination to show them he was
"footing the bills" and running the shop. On the basis of
his demeanor alone, I would discredit him. However, there
are additional guides to his lack of credibility. I have
previously pointed out his shifting and evasive testimony
on the purpose of the attempted poll, and his testimony on
his reasons for giving Cline a wage increase is patently
incredible. Equally incredible, and patently so, is
Respondent's contention that Stevens had no knowledge
of Cline's and Patterson's union sympathies.
As noted earlier, the employees signed union cards on
September 19, in the presence of Foreman Wyckoff, who
testified that on the same day he told Richard Stevens
that the boys were trying to start a union, and he
mentioned specifically the boys involved in signing cards.
Stevens admitted that Wyckoff told him about the card
signing, but denied that Wyckoff mentioned any specific
names. I credit Wyckoff who appeared to me generally
credible, although his inclination to generalize in testifying
about Cline created false impressions about Cline's
attitude and cooperation. Moreover, Richard Stevens' own
testimony belies his assertion of a lack of knowledge. In
essence, his testimony amounts to no more than an
assertion that he did not have the certain knowledge of
personal observation. As Stevens stated, "The only
suspicion I could have was that Mr. Wyckoff had told me
these fellows had signed cards. I didn't see them do it."
On the basis of the record as a whole, I find he had the
required knowledge.
The next circumstance which has been weighed in
evaluating Respondent's motivation is the evidence that
Richard Stevens regarded the employees' union activities
as an act of belligerence which he determined to meet
"head-on." Of course, Stevens did not state that he
regarded the employees' union activities as their act of
belligerence; rather, he claimed that they became
belligerent: "Well, there was a definite trend towards
belligerence as far as the employees were concerned, as far
as answering to any requests. You could tell there was a
definite attitude that apparently they were going to do
about what they saw fit."
This having been said, one would have expected specific
examples. There are none that are worthy of credence.
Thus, one example given was of an alleged drop in
production. Not a single detail, even less any records, was
offered to support such an assertion.
Another example of change of attitude was more
griping, the only example of which was a good deal of
talk about more wages, and the only two employees
identified with this talk being Cline and Hickey. In Cline's
case, on the basis of Stevens' own testimony it appears
that any talk about more wages antedated the union
activity. Cline only worked about 5 weeks after he signed
a union card, so he could only have asked for a wage
increase a limited number of times; yet, Stevens described
him as "continually bitching" for more money.' In
Hickey's case, the demand for more money had occurred
before he even reported to work several weeks before the
union activity occurred.
'Foreman Wyckoff also attributed a change of attitude to Cline, stating,
"He had gotten almost to the place to where he just simply didn't care
150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Stevens also included the conduct of Patterson and
Cline in being absent from work as part of the attitude of
belligerence and lack of cooperation. There is a superficial
appeal to this attempt to enlarge the absences of Patterson
and Cline just prior to their discharge into a pattern of
belligerence and lack of cooperation. The flaw of the
appeal, however, is that it is built up on the unsupported
assertions discussed above, it presupposes that there is
evidentiary support of a trend of belligerence I find no
such evidence. Rather, I believe the conclusion is
inescapable that Stevens construed the adherence of his
employees to the Union as belligerence and that his
animus against them because of such adherence was at the
root of the discharges, at least in the case of Patterson
and Cline.
There are several reasons why I conclude that
Patterson's discharge was discriminatorily motivated.
While it is true that he was absent without permission on
Friday, the evidence establishes that Respondent was very
permissive on the question of attendance. This was
attested to not only by employee David Freeman, but
Robert Stevens' own testimony about his alleged talks
with Patterson about his leaving work early or being
absent on Saturdays conveys a sense of permissiveness;
significantly, Robert Stevens did not say he warned
Patterson. The evidence of other discharges suggests the
same permissiveness and indicates a greater tolerance than
was shown to either Patterson or Cline.
Moreover, although Robert Stevens was the partner
who generally supervised the employees of Stevens
Equipment, it was his father who made the decision to fire
Patterson.' Although Patterson had not been told to
report to work on Saturday, Richard Stevens did not
inquire about his absence, but simply presumed he had
been told to report for work.
Next, there is the admitted fact that Robert Stevens
lied about the reason for discharge in the termination
conversation. Although he claimed that lack of work was
in fact one of the reasons, I do not believe him and there
.is no evidence to support the assertion. Nor am I
impressed by his stated reason for not telling Patterson
the true reason, if the reason was his prior absence. This
was not a reason to be hesitant to state, especially where
he claimed to have spoken to Patterson about the matter
before.'
In view of the foregoing, and in light of Respondent's
proven animus against the Union and its contemporaneous
8(a)(1) conduct, I find that the discharge of Patterson was
motivated not by his absence on Friday, but by his union
activities, and that Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
In the case of Cline, Respondent asserted two reasons
for his discharge: his work was poor and he absented
himself from work without permission. The first asserted
whether he came in and worked or not." Wyckoff based this statement on
the fact that Cline had applied for work elsewhere However, Cline had
applied elsewhere before the union activity and Wyckoff could not say
when this alleged change of attitude first manifested itself, gave no specific
examples, and did not even recall mentioning it to Richard Stevens I can
accord no weight to such generalizations
'On direct examination , Robert Stevens said the decision to discharge
Patterson was primarily his, on cross -examination , he stated the decision
had been made and "I was agreeable ." I believe this latter statement
reflects accurately that it was Stevens pere who made the decision
'Cf N L.R.B. v. Dominick 's Finer Foods, Inc, 367 F.2d 781 (C A 7),
where the reasons for discharge were the personal habits, including the
general appearance , of the alleged discriminatee , and the supervisor wanted
to spare her feelings.
reason is patently pretextuous. Cline was the most senior
employee and, whatever his shortcomings they can hardly
have been so bad else he would have been discharged
earlier. There are notably few details about his poor work
and no evidence of any warnings, for example, as was
given to John Shaw. Finally, nothing was said about his
work when he was discharged.
What of his unexcused absence? In rejecting
Respondent's assertion that this was the reason for his
discharge, I rely as I did in the case of Patterson on the
evidence that Respondent had a permissive operation. In
addition, I note the testimony of Foreman Wyckoff that
requests for permission to leave early happen frequently,
and "If someone of the employees has something he had
to tend to, why we let them go." Yet, Cline was abruptly
discharged for leaving work early without permission on 1
day. There was no warning, nor any inquiry about his
reasons. As a matter of fact, at the time of the discharge
Richard Stevens had not even bothered to inquire whether
Cline had permission to leave early the first day. Finally,
I cannot ignore the uncontradicted evidence that Robert
Stevens told employees that same day that "Well, now,
we got rid of the Union agitator." Cf. Inland Motors,
supra. Accordingly, and in view of Respondent's proven
animus against the Union and its contemporaneous 8(a)(1)
conduct, I find that Respondent discharged Cline to
discourage membership in or adherence to the Union and
that it thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The case of Ramsey has certain significant differences
which compel me to conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to warrant a finding that his discharge was
discriminatorily motivated.
To begin with, I do not credit Ramsey. His conduct
during the week of January 13 as described by Granger
belie his claim that he was sick. Ramsey did not go to a
doctor until after he was discharged, and it is clear from
Granger's testimony, which I credit, that Ramsey had
planned to work with him and that the claim of illness
was a pretext to be absent from work. For this reason, I
see no relevance to all the testimony that Ramsey had an
agreement with Robert Stevens that he could have time
off for planting and harvesting his crops. When the time
arrived to combine his corn the week of January 13,
Ramsey did not assert his right under the agreement to
take time off to harvest his corn, but instead chose to
report that he was sick. In this circumstance whatever
agreement there was between Ramsey and Robert Stevens
cannot be relied upon as justification for his absence for
the week in question.
I conclude, therefore, that Ramsey was not sick and
that his absence from work constituted ground for
discharge. As in the cases of Patterson and Cline, one
must still look to Respondent's true motive in discharging
him, only in this instance, I find no parallel to Ramsey's
conduct, and Respondent's permissiveness adverted to
earlier was not shown to extend to a week's absence, in
particular, an absence for which the Respondent had been
given a false reason and which it had learned was false.
Under these circumstances, including the fact that the
discharge occurred several weeks after the election and
that Ramsey's discharge could in no way affect the
results, I am not persuaded that there is a preponderance
of evidence to support a finding that the discharge was
discriminatorily motivated.
In arriving at this conclusion, I have carefully
considered Robert Stevens' action on December 4 in
putting right under Ramsey's nose a statement of account
with a threat of suit on December 6. Such action can be
RICHARD V. STEVENS 151
attributed to nothing other than Stevens' resentment of
the fact that Ramsey was a union adherent and that he
had attended the R case hearing. The debt in question was
one of long standing, and although Robert Stevens may
have discussed payment with Ramsey before December 4,
Respondent had not seriously pressed the matter before.
In other circumstances, the malice in this action would be
sufficient to warrant a finding that the subsequent
discharge was unlawfully motivated. In this case, however,
the discharge did not occur until 6 weeks later, after an
election had been held and after Ramsey had absented
himself for a week by falsely claiming he was ill.
The circumstances surrounding Ramsey's discharge
offer no evidentiary support for a finding of unlawful
motivation. The statement attributed to Richard Stevens
by Ramsey about costing the organization money, if
credited, arguably had reference to Ramsey's union
activity. However, I do not credit it. Ramsey was a
generally unreliable witness, and I perceive no reason to
credit this particular bit of his testimony.
For all the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend that
the allegation that Ramsey was discriminatorily
discharged be dismissed.
IV. THE CHALLENGED BALLOTS: CASE 3-RC-4542
The tally of ballots in the Case 3-RC-4542 showed four
votes cast for union representation, four against, and three
challenged ballots. Two of the challenged ballots were
those of Cline and Patterson who were challenged by the
Board agent on the ground they were not on the eligibility
list, and they were not on the eligibility list because they
had been discharged prior to the election. Since I have
found that they were discriminatorily discharged, it
follows that they were eligible to vote.
In the case of Patterson, Respondent asserts that
should it be concluded that he was discriminatorily
discharged, the challenge to his ballot should nevertheless
be sustained because the Union paid Patterson because he
voted. After his discharge Patterson went to work for an
employer in Rochester, New York, and on the day of the
election he took a day off to travel to Scio, New York, in
order to vote. After Patterson had cast his vote, and as he
was leaving the shop, he met Union Representative John
Jackson who told him that the Union had a policy of
compensating individuals who lost wages to cast their
ballots in a Board election. Jackson asked for his address
in Rochester and his rate of pay. Both Patterson and
Jackson testified that they had never discussed the
question of such a payment at any time prior to the
election, and Patterson had not been promised payment.
There is no evidence to the contrary and I credit both
Patterson and Jackson.
Patterson testified that long before the election, even
before his employment by Respondent, he had discussions
with a relative who was a union member in which mention
had been made of situations where an employee would be
reimbursed for loss of pay incurred in going to the polls,
and Patterson thought he might get reimbursed when he
traveled from Rochester to Scio to vote, although "I was
coming down anyway to vote."
Respondent contends that Patterson's testimony about
a conversation or conversations with a relative presents an
incredible story and that it must be concluded that
Patterson was in fact told prior to the election that he
would be reimbursed. Alternatively, Respondent contends
it must be found Patterson knew he would be paid, and
that, coupled with the fact of reimbursement, is enough to
invalidate his vote. I find no merit to these arguments,
and I do not deem any of the cases cited by Respondent
apposite.
The parties to a Board election have a legitimate
interest in seeing that employees exercise their franchise.
For this reason, the Board has long held that a union may
provide transportation to employees in order that they
may vote (Charles T. Brandt, Inc., 118 NLRB 956, 959)
or even make payments constituting a reasonable
reimbursement for expenses of transportation (Federal
Silk Mills, 107 NLRB 876). Whether or not a particular
payment is improper must depend upon all the
circumstances of the case. Included among these
circumstances is the fact that Patterson was the employee
who brought the union cards to the shop and signed one
himself, and that at the time of the election there was
pending an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union
on his behalf alleging that he had been unlawfully
discharged. In my opinion, neither a promise nor the
reimbursement of actual wages lost by an alleged
discriminatee in casting his ballot in these circumstances
can be deemed to be improper. In any event, not only was
there no promise of reimbursement prior to the voting,
but also Patterson had decided to vote and had cast his
ballot before he learned that he would be reimbursed.
Under the circumstances, there is no basis for invalidating
his ballot.10
The remaining challenge is that of the ballot cast by
David Mack on the ground that he lived with the Stevens
family
Mack was a student at a nearby college and had
boarded at the home of Richard Stevens during his first
year of college in 1967 and again in the second year
beginning September 1968 In the fall of 1968, Mack
asked Richard Stevens for employment because he was
low on money and needed money for a trip to Europe that
he was planning on. Stevens agreed to give him
employment and Mack began working at the beginning of
November and worked until March 19, 1969. He received
$1.75 per hour and worked regularly from 2 to 4:30 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, and sometimes on Saturday.
At the time he asked for and received the job, there
was no special understanding about the duration of his
employment, although Mack had advised Richard Stevens
of the possibility that the school might assign him to work
block" in the spring of 1969, in which event he could no
longer work. If that did not materialize, Mack intended to
quit in June 1969, when he graduated and to return to his
hometown, Utica, New York.
The basis of the challenge "lives with family" is legally
insufficient. Mack is not a relative of the Stevens and
enjoyed no special privileges as an employee. However, it
appears that Mack's ballot is subject to challenge on
another ground, namely, that he was a temporary
employee, with no community of interest with
Respondent's regular employees.12 Respondent contends
that a regular part-time employee, even a student, is
eligible to vote, and that the evidence clearly shows that
Mack was a regular part-time employee. However,
Mack's eligibility is not to be determined solely on the
"Respondent also contends that the payment to Patterson constitutes
ground for setting aside the election , and that unusual circumstances (i.e ,
Respondent lacked knowledge of the payment ) justify an exception to the
5-day rule for filing objections contained in Sec 102.69(a) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations . Since the payment was not improper , there is no
need to reach this contention
"A program whereby a student works for a company and receives
college credit
"Although this was not the basis of the challenge , Respondent does not
dispute that the Regional Director could rely on any other grounds for
invalidating a ballot discovered in the course of his investigation
Mitchiyoshi Uyeda , d/b/a Udaco Manufacturing Company. 164 NLRB
No. 84
152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
basis of his status as a regular part-time employee.
"Eligibility to vote depends on whether an employee is
sufficiently concerned with the terms and conditions of
employment in a unit to warrant his participation in the
selection of a bargaining agent." N.L.R.B. v. Belcher
Towing Co., 284 F.2d 118 (C.A. 5). It is abundantly clear
in this case that Mack's employment was of a temporary
nature and that he lacked a community of interest with
the regular employees. While he could theoretically have
continued to work for Respondent as long as he wanted
to, the expiration of his period of employment was in fact
certain, the only uncertainty being the causal event,
assignment to-work block or graduation. Mack admitted
he "had no interest in the Union and I paid very little
attention about it, because I was just working there to go
to Alfred." The only reason he voted was that he was
asked to do so by Stevens. Under all the circumstances, I
find that Mack was a temporary employee ineligible to
vote.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
As I have found that Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Richard Patterson and Larry Cline, I shall
recommend that it be ordered to offer them immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for
any loss of earnings they may-have suffered by reason of
the discrimination against them by payment to them of a
sum of money equal to that which they normally would
have earned as wages from the date of their discharge to
the date of the offer of reinstatement, less net earnings, to
which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices
committed, and the substantial evidence of Respondent's
disregard for the Section 7 rights of its employees, in
order to prevent the commission of other unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that Respondent be placed
under a broad order to cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the rights of employees
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
In accordance with the order consolidating cases and
the terms of the agreement for consent election providing
for a final decision of the issues in the R case by the
Regional Director rather than by the Board, I shall order
that Case 3-RC-4542 be severed and remanded to the
Regional Director for Region 3 for further processing as
he deems appropriate.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Richard V. Stevens, an individual, d/b/a The
Stevens Machine Company, and Richard V. Stevens and
Robert L. Stevens, partnership, d/b/a Stevens Equipment
Company, constitute a single employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By interrogating its employees under the
circumstances described herein, by threatening employees
with discharge and bodily harm because of their union
activities, and by granting wage increases to induce
employees to withdraw support from the Union,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
4. By discharging Richard Patterson and Larry Cline
because of their union activities, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. General Counsel failed to establish by a
preponderance of evidence that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Laverne
Ramsey.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, I
hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent, Richard V. Stevens, an individual, d/b/a
The Stevens Machine Company, and Richard V. Stevens
and Robert L. Stevens, partnership, d/b/a Stevens
Equipment Company, its agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf
of Lodge 1580, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor
organization of its employees, by discharging or otherwise
discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment or any terms or conditions of employment of
its employees.
(b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union
activities or desires in a manner constituting interference,
restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
(c) Threatening employees with discharge or bodily
harm because of their union activities.
(d) Granting wage increases to employees to induce
them to withdraw their support from the Union.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to
RICHARD V. STEVENS
self-organization to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any
or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Richard Patterson and Larry M. Cline
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or a
substantially equivalent position without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights or privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them by payment to
each of them a sum of money equal to the amount they
normally would have earned as wages from the date of
their discharge to the date of their reinstatement in the
manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify the above-mentioned employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service and Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board and its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
relevant and necessary to a determination of the amounts
of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended
Order.
(d) Post at its Scio, New York, place of business copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of
said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 3, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
As to the allegations of the complaints found not to
have constituted violations of the Act, it is recommended
that they be dismissed.
ORDER SEVERING AND REMANDING CASE 3-RC-4542
Case 3-RC-4542 is hereby severed from the
consolidated proceeding and remanded to the Regional
Director for Region 3 for further action as he deems
appropriate in accordance with Section 102.62(a) of the
Board ' s Rules and Regulations.
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . If the Board's
Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the
notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words
"a Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
153
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act , as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations
Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered
us to post this Notice and to keep our word about what
we say in this Notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form , join , or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representative of
their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with those
rights. More specifically,
WE WILL NOT question you about your union
membership , desires or activities , unless we have a
lawful purpose , and then we will tell you our purpose
and we assure you we will not punish you because of
your answers.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, bodily
harm , or any other reprisals , because of your union
membership , desires or activities.
WE WILL NOT grant wage increases to induce you to
withdraw support from the Union.
Since the Board found that we violated the law when
we fired Richard Patterson and Larry Cline We will
offer them their jobs back and pay them for any loss
of pay they may have suffered because we fired them.
You are free to become and remain members of Lodge
1580, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, and we won't punish you in any way if you
do.
Dated By
STEVENS MACHINE
COMPANY AND
STEVENS EQUIPMENT
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
Note: Notify Richard Patterson and Larry Cline if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their rights to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor,
The 120 Building , 120 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New
York 14202, Telephone 716-842-3100.