The Paymaster Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 15, 1966

162 N.L.R.B. 123 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

THE PAYMASTER CORP. 123
circumstances herein set forth, we believe that a separate unit of
maintenance employees is appropriate in this case and accords with
Board poliCy.5
Accordingly, we find that the following employees of the
Employer constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act :
All maintenance employees employed by the Gerber Products
Company at its Fort Smith, Arkansas, establishment, excluding
production employees, office clerical employees, professional em-
ployees, guards, watchmen, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.']
5 Sears, Roebuck and Co., 157 NLRB 32 ; American Cyanamid Company , 131 NLRB 909.
V An election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible
voters, must be filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 26 within
7 days after the date of this Decision and Direction of Election . The Regional Director
shall make the list available to all parties to the election . No extension of time to file this
list shall be granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances.
Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election
whenever proper objections are filed. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236.
The Paymaster Corporation and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 13-CA-7019 and 13-IC-10757. December 15,
1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 1, 1966, Trial Examiner Milton FF. Janus issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding , finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision . The Trial
Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in
certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended dismissal thereof. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel
filed cross -exceptions with a supporting and reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown , and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
162 NLRB No. 24.
124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,, conclusions , and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.2
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.]
[The Board ordered that the election held on March 2, 1966,
in Case 13-RC-10757, be vacated and set aside, and that said case be
remanded to the regional Director for Region 13 to conduct a new
election when he deems that circumstances permit the free choice of
a bargaining representative.]
In light of our adoption of the Trial Examiner's finding of numerous and substantial
violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, we find that it would be merely cumulative, and
therefore is unnecessary, to pass upon the General Counsel's exceptions to the failure of
the Trial Examiner to find certain other alleged 8(a) (1) conduct violative of the Act.
The General Counsel has moved to have this case remanded to the Trial Examiner for
consolidation with another charge against the Respondent alleging the commission of addi-
tional unfair labor practices. Since it is clear that remanding this proceeding would delay,
rather then effectuate, the prompt enforcement of our Order, the General Counsel's motion
is hereby denied.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND REPORT
ON OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION
This consolidated proceeding arises out of efforts by United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, to organize the employees of the
Respondent, herein called the Employer, or the Company. The campaign opened
on August 24, 1965, and culminated in an election held March 2, 1966.
The Union filed its charge in Case 13-CA-7219 on October 26, 1965. While it
was being investigated, the Union filed a petition in Case 13-RC-10757 on Novem-
ber 16, 1965, for an election among the employees of the Company. On Decem-
ber 15, 1965, the Regional Director issued his complaint in the unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) through surveillance of
employees' union activities, threats of loss of benefits, and promises of various
benefits. Two days later, on December 17, the complaint was withdrawn upon the
Regional Director's approval of an informal settlement agreement whereby the
Company, although not admitting the commission of any unfair labor practices,
agreed to post a notice to all employees that it would not engage in certain speci-
fied conduct. The notice was dated January 7, 1966, and was posted on the Employ-
er's bulletin boards on or about that time.
On January 31, 1966, the parties executed a stipulation for certification upon
consent election. On the basis of evidence presented by the Union of a lack of
compliance with the settlement agreement, the Regional Director, on February 21,
1966, notified the parties that he had withdrawn his approval of the settlement, and
thereupon issued a new complaint, including both the old matter previously alleged
and the new matter which had provided the basis for his revocation of the
settlement.
The election was held on March 2, 1966, as scheduled. The Union lost, receiving
42 votes as against 109 cast against representation, in a unit consisting of approxi-
mately 171 eligible voters. The Union filed timely exceptions to conduct affecting
the election, and on March 28, the Regional Director issued his report on Objec-
tions, recommending that the objections be consolidated with the pending complaint
proceeding since the factual issues were similar. The Board affirmed the Regional
Director's recommendations, and on April 15, the Regional Director issued his
Order consolidating the two cases and providing for a consolidated hearing.
A hearing was thereafter held before Trial Examiner Milton H. Janus on
April 18-20, 25, and 27, 1966, at Chicago, Illinois.' All parties appeared at the
'General Counsel's Exhibits 2(a) through (z) were properly offered and received in
evidence. The reporter, however, erroneously placed General Counsel's Exhibits 2(b), (k).
and (y) in a rejected exhibits file, apparently because he misconstrued a request of the
General Counsel, which I granted, to withdraw them temporarily so that they could be
reproduced . I hereby order them inserted in the General Counsel's Exhibits file in their
proper place.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 1.25
hearing and were afforded full opportunity to participate.2 The issues are whether
the Company engaged in unlawful interference, restraint, and coercion, in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) after, as well as before, the Regional Director's approval of the
settlement agreement, and whether it engaged in conduct during the critical period
between the filing of the petition and the election which warrants setting the election
aside.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and upon
consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Company is an Illinois corporation, engaged at its plant in Chicago, Illinois,
in the manufacture of checkwriting machines. During 1965 the Company shipped
goods valued in excess of $250,000 directly to points outside the State of Illinois.
The Company admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Party, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO is, and has been
at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The threshold question in the unfair labor practice proceeding is whether the
Company's postsettlement conduct justified the Regional Director in withdrawing
his approval of the settlement agreement of December 17, 1965.3 I answer that
question, for the reasons set out below, by holding that the Regional Director was
justified in taking the action he did, because of Respondent's posting on its bulletin
boards of a "second notice" at the same time that it posted the notice required by
the settlement agreement.
I do not consider it necessary, therefore, to deal immediately with other allega-
tions of postsettlement violations, recognizing, however, that those allegations
involving conduct which occurred between December 17 and February 21 undoubt-
edly led the Regional Director to conclude, as expressed in his letter of February 21,
that "events subsequent to the execution of the Settlement Agreement have demon-
strated that the efforts at adjustment have failed to accomplish their purpose."
A. Background of the settlement agreement; the official notice and other notices
With the start of its drive on August 24, 1965, to represent Paymaster employees
in collective bargaining, the Union began distribution of a series of handbills solicit-
ing employee support. In response to the Union's demands and claims, the Company
began to hold a series of employee meetings on plant premises and to distribute
its own literature. In October the Company granted its hourly and incentive work-
ers a retroactive wage increase. Early in the campaign, it also made known to the
employees its intention to institute a pension or profit-sharing plan, and improved
hospitalization benefits, responding to the fact that these types of supplemental
wage benefits were a matter of great interest and concern to the employees. It
referred to the fact that it was studying the possibility of a pension or profit-sharing
plan in five or six letters and at a number of its employee meetings between Sep-
tember and November.
Mr. Charles Chiakulas, a representative of the Union, entered his official apnearaice
on one of the latter days of the hearing, and Air. Benjamin Miiges, who did not enter an
appearance on behalf of the Respondent but who was present daring much of the hearing,
made a few remarks which have been recorded in the transcript of proceedings.
sPresettlement conduct may not be used as evidence of unfair labor practices "unless
the Respondent has failed to comply with the settlement agreement or has engaged in in-
dependent unfair labor practices since the settlement." Lar-ranee Tank Corporation, 94
NLRB 352, 353. To the same effect. Tompkins Motor Lines, inc., 142 NLRB 1, and Herm an n
Equipment Manufacturing Company, Inc., 156 NLRB 716. However, presettlement conduct
may be used as background evidence in establishing the motive or object of a Respondent
in its postsettlement conduct. Northern, California District Council of Ilodearriers and
Common Laborers of America, AFI CIO; Construction and General Laborers Union
Local No. 185, AFL-CIO (Joseph's Landscaping Service), 154 NLRI 1354.
126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Union filed its charge on October 26, and on December 15, the Regional
Director issued his original complaint, alleging violation of Section 8(a)(1) through
interrogation of employees by company supervisors, surveillance and creating the
impression of surveillance of its employees ' union activities , threats of loss of
benefits, the grant of the retroactive wage increase, the promise of a pension or
profit-sharing plan and improved hospitalization benefits, as well as other miscel-
laneous violations. Two days later, upon the Regional Director's approval of the
settlement agreement, the complaint was withdrawn. On or about January 7, 1966,
the Company posted the Board's official notice, pursuant to the settlement agree-
ment. Among the items of the notice was the following: 4
WE WILL NOT promise or grant our employees a pension and/or profit sharing
plan or improved hospitalization benefits for the purpose of discouraging mem-
bership in or support of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
On the same date the Company also posted on all its bulletin boards the follow-
ing communication to its employees, referred to herein as the second notice:
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
By posting the NLRB Notice on this bulletin board, the Company does not
admit that it has been guilty of any improper conduct or that it has interfered
with your right to join any union that you choose. Furthermore, the Company
has not been found guilty of any of the things stated in this Notice. These are
only accusations. There has been no trial and we have not had our day in
court. But, we did not ask for a trial because we did not feel that these charges
were worth the substantial expense of a trial and possible appeals to decide
these charges brought by the Steelworkers Union.
These charges against the Company are just part of the Union's propaganda
effort to get your support and your money in initiation fees, monthly dues,
fines and special assessments . As you know, the Steelworkers Union have been
trying to do this since last August. But in spite of their five-month effort, they
haven't got your support or they would have asked for an election long ago.
Oh, yes, they asked the NLRB for an election and then intentionally blocked
the holding of an election with these charges against the Company. In the
charges brought by the Steelworkers Union, they objected to your receiving
the wage increase granted last October. The Steelworkers Union also objected
to the Company promising or granting you a pension or profit-sharing plan
or improvements in your insurance benefits. The NLRB threw out the Union's
charges concerning the wage increase. However, the local office of the NLRB
feels that the Company cannot, in view of the fact that the Steelworkers Union
filed a petition for an election, promise or grant a pension plan or profit-
sharing plan or improved insurance benefits while the Steelworkers' election
petition is pending. Therefore, in the NLRB's view, the Company cannot prom-
ise or grant a pension or profit-sharing plan or grant any improvements in
your wages or benefits, while the Steelworkers Union election petition is pend-
ing, because such things would probably be considered a bribe interfering with
your right to join the Steelworkers Union.
Because of this, we have been advised that we should not discuss a pension
or profit-sharing plan or improvement in insurance with you because of the
possibility that such discussions might be considered unfair labor practices.
THE PAYMASTER CORPORATION
By: -------- (S)--------
T. B. HIRSCHBERG, JR.
President
On January 29, 1966, the Company removed the second notice from the bulletin
boards, replacing it with the following "Notice to Paymaster Employees":
Our foremen have again been instructed not to discuss with you pension or
improved insurance benefits. If you have any questions concerning these
matters, read the N.L.R.B. notice or telephone the N.L.R.B. offices.
• The other specific Items listed in the notice related to surveillance and creating an
Impression of surveillance ; questioning employees as to their union activities, membership
or desires; threatening plant closure or loss of cafeteria and parking lot privileges; and
ordering or instructing employees not to sign authorization cards.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 127
We have removed from our bulletin boards our notice to the employees
dated January 7, 1966. We reaffirm our intention to fully comply with all of
the terms of the N.L.R.B. notice.
THE PAYMASTER CORPORATION
T. B. HIRSCHBERG, JR.
President
On February 16, 1966, the Company posted another notice to employees, signed
by President Hirschberg, in which he said that since the NLRB notice arid settle-
ment agreement had been posted there had been complaints that he and his super-
visors had allegedly violated their provisions and the legal rights of the employees.
The notice goes on to say that the Company denies these complaints but because
of them he wants again to make the Company's position perfectly clear that
employees have a right to join a union and that the Company reaffirms its intention
to comply fully with all the terms of the NLRB notice; that the Company fully
recognizes the right of employees to join any union they desire, and that it will not
interfere in any way in order to persuade them to vote against the Union: and
that on several occasions the Union issued bulletins urging the Company to discuss
pensions, insurance and benefits, but that it has consistently refused to do so to
avoid possible violations of the law and the NLRB notice and agreement. The
notice also promises that no employee will be discharged, demoted, or discriminated
against because of his union activities, and notes that not a single employee has
been discharged since the start of the organizing campaign. The notice further
states that if any foreman has given an impression which could be construed as a
violation of the official notice or of the employees' right to join, support, or vote
for the Union, it has been against his repeated orders to them and against the
repeated advice of his attorneys. Finally, the notice lists 10 items which his written
orders to the foremen required them to observe, relating to proper company con-
duct with respect to the union activities of its employees.
The last two notices remained posted as of the date of the hearing.
The General Counsel urges that the "second notice," which was posted together
with the official notice, constituted sufficient justification for revoking the settlement
agreement, because Respondent did not admit any guilt as a result of entering into
the settlement, stated that a trial was not resorted to only because of the expense
involved, and that an important part of the Union's charges had been thrown out
by the Board. The General Counsel cites Bangor Plastics, Inc., 156 NLRB 1165,
as dispositive on this point. As a further ground for finding that the second notice
justified revocation of the settlement, the General Counsel argues that it inde-
pendently violated Section 8(a)(1) because its repeated references to the Com-
pany's earlier promise of a pension plan and improved hospitalization benefits
serve only to reinforce the impression it had previously sought to give, that post-
ponement of these promised benefits was the fault of the Union.
The Respondent argues that the posting of the second notice is not a violation
of Section 8(a)(1) because the notice does no more than attempt to answer a
union handbill distributed a few days earlier which represented the settlement
agreement as an admission of employer guilt, and to explain to employees its posi-
tion on a pension plan, while reiterating its intention to abide by the settlement
agreement. Persistent questioning of supervisors by employees concerning pensions,
it is argued, led the Company to remove the second notice and to substitute for it
the notice of January 29. Finally, to counter what it calls baiting by the Union and
accusations of violations of the agreement, it posted the February 16 notice, which
it claims to be a complete disavowal of any possible isolated unlawful conduct
which may have occurred.
I am satisfied that the Company's second notice derogated from and minimized
the effect of the official notice.5 Like the notice in the Bangor Plastics case, the
second notice here attempts to revive and keep fresh in the memory of the employ-
ees the issues which the settlement agreement had put to rest. It does so indirectly
but nonetheless effectively by the rhetorical device of attributing to others what
the Company wanted remembered (its promises of supplemental wage benefits).
Thus, it is the Union and the Board's Regional Office who, it is claimed, make it
impossible for the Company to carry out what the employees know the Company
would like to bestow, and the onus attached by the official notice to the Company's
5 Bangor Plastics , Inc., 156 NLRB 1165, and Southern Athletic Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 1051.
128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
efforts to influence the election by promises of benefits is shifted to the Union and
the Regional Directors
The second notice remained posted on the same bulletin boards as the official
notice for about 3 weeks. For at least that period of time the effect of the official
notice was vitiated, and the remedial action which the Company had bound itself
to take, was to that extent dissipated.? The flurry of additional notices did not, in
my opinion, undo the damage caused by the second notice. That of January 29,
referring all inquirers to the official notice or to the Regional Director, in itself
indicates what the Company could have done on January 7, if its sole concern had
been to fend off employees who wanted to know what the Company was going to
do about pensions. The notice of February 16, which Respondent claims to be a
complete disavowal of any isolated unlawful conduct which may have occurred
after January 7, also does not cure the violation of the settlement argeement in
the posting of the second notice. Remedial action, imposed by the Board, is in my
opinion now necessary to overcome the effects of Respondent's failure to comply
with the settlement agreement. I also find that the second notice implied that action
on a pension or profit-sharing plan had been delayed only by the Union's obstruc-
tive tactics, and that the antecedent promises of supplement wage benefits were
still effective. I conclude that this constitutes an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1)8
B. Other alleged violations
The complaint can be considered, for the sake of convenience, by treating
separately those allegations based on occurrences before, and after, the settlement
agreement, or in terms of dates, from late August to mid-October 1965, and from
late December 1965 through March 2, 1966, the date of the election, with one
postelection allegation,. The conduct alleged to be objectionable for purposes of the
election proceeding is the same as that alleged to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1),
occurring between late December and March 2, all of which is within the critical
period.
C. Before the settlement agreement
1. Surveillance and creating the impression of surveillance
(a) On August 30, 1965, shortly before the end of the workday at Paymaster,
Robert Christensen and another representative of the Steelworkers prepared for a
leaflet distribution by stationing themselves on Winnemac Avenue, a public street
on which the plant fronted. As employees emerged, they were offered these leaflets.
Mr. Hirschberg, the president of the Company, left the plant, accepted one of the
leaflets, then crossed Winnemac Avenue and proceeded to watch further distribu-
tion while partially concealed by another building. Several employees told
Christensen of Hirschberg's presence. Hirschberg continued to observe for 20 or
30 minutes, occasionally shifting his position as the union representatives moved
theirs. Christensen's testimony on these events was not refuted.
(b) Christensen also testified, without refutation, that on later visits to the plant,
on September 14 and 20, during leaflet distributions, he observed George Williams,
the plant superintendent, standing in the corridor of the plant which leads to its
main exit, watching employees as they accepted his leaflets. A number of employees
told Christensen about Williams' presence.
6 In N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, Local 627 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Yelpers of America, -1FL-CIO, 241 Fad 428
(C.A. 7), the second notice which the court found not to be contemptuous of its decree.
stated as in this case, that the Respondent did not agree it had violated the Act, and that
it had agreed to the settlement in order to forestall further litigation. Beyond that, how-
ever, the second notice said only that the settlement agreement reserved to the Respondent
Union all its legal rights, including its right to strike and picket. There was thus nothing
in that notice, unlike the second notice here, to diminish the force and effect of the official
notice.
°"We think the settlement agreement clearly manifests an administrative determination
by the Board that some remedial action is necessary to safeguard the public interests in-
tended to be protected by the [Act]. It is equally clear that the settlement agreement
represents an agreement by [Respondent] to undertake promptly the remedial action set
out in the agreement rather than be put to the trouble and expense of litigation. . . .
Poole Foundry and Machine Company v. N.L.It.B., 192 F.2d 740, 743 (C.A. 4).
8 See American. Paper S- Supply Company, 159 NLRB 1243, and McCormick Longmeadoie
Stone Co., Inc., 158 NLRB 1237.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 129
I find that by their actions described above, Hirschberg and Williams deliberately
and actively engaged in surveillance of the leaflet distributions undertaken by the
Union, and were thus in a position to observe and note the response of the
employees in accepting or refusing the leaflets. Their presence could reasonably be
expected to have an intimidating effect on the employees, and I find that violations
of Section 8(a)(1) have been proved here.
(c) The Union's first general meeting for Paymaster employees was held on
September 9, shortly after 4 p.m. at a rented meeting hall located on Clark Street
near Winnemac Avenue about three or four blocks from the plant. Clark Street is
a major business thoroughfare in Chicago. George Eger, a Paymaster employee at
that time, testified that he left the meeting about 6:30 p.m. and returned 15 minutes
later. By then the only people left at the meeting had were two union organizers
and three employees who themselves left a few minutes thereafter. As Eger stood
talking to the organizers in a gangway alongside the hall, he noticed Williams, the
plant superintendent, and Vetrovec, a foreman, walking together on the other
side of Clark Street, engaged in conversation. At that moment, Williams shook
his fist. They then crossed Clark Street, stopped briefly at a tavern on the corner,
recrossed the street and entered another tavern. Williams, who testified on other
matters, was not asked about this incident, and Vetrovec was not called as a
witness.
Despite the lack of any explanation by Respondent for the presence of two
supervisors on Clark Street across from the meeting hall, I find that the General
Counsel has not established that it was their intention to keep the meeting under
surveillance or to create that impression. The meeting was already over when
Williams and Vetrovec appeared on the scene, and all the employees but Eger had
already left. They did not stop to watch the hall, and their crossings of Clark
Street did not bring them in front of it. Unless I were to speculate that they had
been walking back and forth along Clark Street while the meeting was in progress,
their presence at the exact moment Eger happened to see them, seems to me to be
quite fortuitous and unplanned. Nor does the fact that Hirschberg told Eger the
next day that he knew how many employees had been at the meeting, necessarily
establish that he got the information from these supervisors, since there is no evi-
dence that they had been near the hall when employees were entering or leaving.
(d) The next morning, Supervisor Georgen had a conversation with Eger in
which he suggested that Eger should talk to Hirschberg about what the employees
wanted. Georgen had introduced the subject by saying to Eger that he understood
there had been a union meeting the night before. The General Counsel argues that
he thereby conveyed the impression that the Respondent had had the meeting under
surveillance. I do not think so. The Union was actively building up employee sup-
port for its cause through leaflets which were being openly distributed in front of
the plant. The meeting held the night before was its first general employee meeting.
I assume, in these circumstances that the Union had widely publicized the holding
of the meeting, and that Georgen could have learned of it in any number of inno-
cent ways. His statement that he understood the meeting had been held does not
serve to create the impression that he had gained his knowledge by putting the
meeting under surveillance, or by keeping employees under surveillance. A more
reasonable inference would be that he had merely kept his eyes and ears open to
what the Union was openly proclaiming. I find no violation in Georgen's remark
to Eger that he understood there had been a union meeting the night before.9
(e) After this conversation with Georgen on September 10, Eger was called to
the office of the personnel manager. That afternoon he attended another meeting
with company supervisors which Hirschberg participated in through the office
intercom system. During this conversation, Hirschberg's disembodied voice asked
Eger how the meeting had gone the evening before. He also said that he had
observed the meeting and that there had been 15 employees in attendance. Unlike
Georgen's remark which could have been based on information easily and prop-
erly acquired, Hirschberg's open acknowledgement that he had observed the meet-
ing (whether or not he had in fact done so), and his specific reference to the
o The complaint did not allege this incident as a violation, nor was the complaint amended
at the hearing to include it. Eger's testimony was not refuted, as Georgen was not called
as a witness, so that in a sense the incident was the subject of litigation. I would have a
serious doubt, however, that the Respondent had been adequately put on notice that the
incident was to be litigated, if I were inclined to find Georgen 's remark as creating an im-
pression of surveillance.
264-047-67-vol. 162-10
130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
number of employees present (although it was in fact incorrect ) would obviously
serve to convince Eger that the Respondent was aware of the employees' activities
on behalf of the Union. Employee Hollars also testified that on at least two occa-
sions, in speaking at meetings of the employees in the plant, Hirschberg gave the
exact number of employees who had attended union meetings.
I find that Hirschberg's remarks conveyed the impression to Eger and to other
employees that Respondent had the Union's meetings under surveillance.
2. Interrogation of employees
(a) In their conversation the morning after the first union meeting, Georgen
told Eger that "they" would like to have someone talk to Hirschberg to tell him
what the employees wanted, but that he could not ask him to do so. Later that
morning, Georgen took him to see Gross, the personnel manager, and Williams,
the plant superintendent. In response to their questions, Eger told them the employ-
ees wanted a pension plan and better seniority and insurance plans. That afternoon,
Eger was again summoned to an executive office, and it was then that Hirschberg
spoke to him over the intercom. Hirschberg asked him what he wanted, what he
had found out from talking to the employees about what they wanted, and also
asked him the name of the union committeeman who, Eger said, had told him to
tell Hirschberg to go to hell because he had already been waiting 15 years for a
pension plan.
I find that these inquiries by Hirschberg, Gross, and Williams as to what Eger and
the employees wanted had as their purpose discovering the reasons why the employ-
ees might be interested in union representation. As later events show, the informa-
tion thus obtained was then used as the basis for promising to the employees the
benefits they were seeking. Interrogation for such a purpose is a violation of Section
8(a) (1), since it tends to inhibit employees from engaging further in concerted
or union activities.
(b) LeRoy Holm, a toolroom employee, testified that on September 10, the
morning after the first union meeting, which he had attended, his supervisor, Tony
Doczekalski, known as Tony Doc, asked him if he was a union steward. Later that
morning, Doc asked him if he had signed a union card. Doc was called as a wit-
ness for the Respondent but was not asked about this incident, and Holm's testi-
mony is therefore unrefuted. I find that Doc's interrogation of Holm would reason-
ably tend to coerce Holm and other employees, and that it violated Section 8(a) (1).
(c) In September or October, John Weber, a machine operator, was having
some unexplained problems with his work. Weber has difficulty understanding and
expressing himself in English. Weber had written a letter about his problems which
he wanted the president of the Company to read personally, and went to Foreman
Cervak for advice. Cervak obliged him by taking him to Hirschberg's apartment
during working hours for a personal interview. This seems like a rather unusual
way of handling a production employee's grievance, but it is explainable in view of
the Company's belief that its channels of communication with its employees needed
to be reopened. During their conversation, Hirschberg asked Weber if he had signed
a union card. I find this to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(d) Employee Hollars was one of the three or four most prominent union
adherents in the plant. Sometime in September, Foreman Cervak asked Hollars
if he was going to the big union banquet and when it was to be. Hollars answered
by asking Cervak if his stool pigeons had not told him, and that when he wanted
him to know he would tell him. Cervak's inquiry seems to me to be heavyhanded
sarcasm and needling of a prounion adherent rather than coercive interrogation. I
find no violation in this inquiry.
3. Threats
(a) During the 2-hour conversation between Hirschberg and Eger over the inter-
com on September 10, Hirschberg told him a number of times that he would close
the doors of the plant if the Union were brought in, and told him to tell the other
employees what he had said. Hirschberg also told Eger that he could take away
their cafeteria and their parking lot privileges. After Hirschberg signed off, Williams
turned to Eger and told him that Hirschberg had meant what he said about closing
the plant. Eger then asked Williams if he should tell the boys what Hirschberg had
said, but Williams and the other officials with him then decided that it would be
better if Eger did not repeat the threat. Eger, as a matter of fact, did tell a number
of employees the substance of his conversation with Hirschberg. I find that Hirsch-
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 131
berg's threats to close the plant and to withdraw the cafeteria and parking lot
privileges from the employees if the Union came in, and Williams' assurance that
Hirschberg was serious about it, are violations of Section 8(a)(1).
(b) When Foreman Cervak asked Hollars, as described above, if he was going
to the big union banquet, he also said to him, "You guys are trying to put the Com-
pany out of business." I consider Cervak's remark to mean that he considered the
Union's demands excessive, and that the Company would have trouble meeting
them, rather than that the Company was threatening to close down because of the
Union. I do not find Cervak's remark violative of the Act.
4. Promises and grants of benefits
The complaint alleges that on various dates in September and October Respond-
ent promised and granted a wage increase, and promised a pension or profit-sharing
plan and improved hospitalization benefits in order to induce its employees to
refrain from becoming members of the Union or to give it their assistance or
support.
(a) On October 15, 1965, the Company announced that it was granting wage
increases of 7 and 10 cents an hour to its incentive and hourly rated employees,
respectively, effective October 18, and retroactive to September 9. The first
announcement of its intention to do so had been made to the employees on Sep-
tember 9 at an employee meeting, and was repeated in various letters to them in
September and October. Respondent argues that a wage increase had been contem-
plated before the Union began its organizing campaign, but that the death of its
vice president for manufacturing, Dienstag, in July 1965, had forced a postpone-
ment until Hirschberg, the president, could familiarize himself with the production
end of the business. Hirschberg had previously devoted almost all of his time to
sales, being away from the plant a good part of the time. Respondent also points
out that the increases granted in October 1965, were in the same amounts as the
previous wage increases which had been granted in August 1964.
Gross, the personnel manager, testified that on the basis of a comparison of the
Company's wage rates with those of firms having similar metal working operations,
prepared by the National Metal Trades Association, he had reported to Dienstag
in April 1965, that the Company was somewhat below the average NMTA rates. He
met again with Dienstag on May 1, when Dienstag told him he would have to post-
pone consideration of a wage increase until later because he was busy with other
things. Gross did not bring the matter up again before Dienstag's sudden death in
July. Early in August, according to Gross, he took up the matter of a wage increase
with Williams, who had assumed some of Dienstag's responsibilities, but not that
of wage determination. On August 20, Gross met with Hirschberg and Williams,
and then recommended 7 and 10-cent wage increases. Hirschberg did not then
commit himself either as to the amounts or the date for the increase. About a week
later, and shortly after the Union's first public appearance at the plant, Gross,
Hirschberg, and Williams met again, and again Hirschberg refused to commit him-
self definitely. The first announcement that the Company was even contemplating
a wage increase was made on September 9, by Hirschberg at the first of the employ-
ees' meetings which were called in response to the Union's campaign.
Although the Company had used the NMTA survey of wage rates in the past to
decide where it stood in its industry with regard to labor rates, it had never fol-
lowed these surveys in any precise or predictable fashion. Of the two previous raises
granted, that of March 1962 had been announced even before an evaluation of the
then current NMTA survey, and that given in August 1964, had been announced
some 4 months after the survey was received. In 1965, the survey was received in
April, yet no firm commitment even to grant an increase was decided on until after
union activity had begun. Light is shed on Respondent's motivation in its wage
increase policy by the fact that the two previous announcements , in March 1962 and
August 1964, as well as the October 1965 announcement, were all made during
attempts by various unions to organize the Company' s employees.
This is not, therefore, a case in which an employer follows a regular and recur-
rent policy of evaluating the need for an increase, and pursuant to such policy,
announces or puts it into effect coincidentally with the start of union activities."',
Here, on the contrary, it was the fact of a new organizing campaign which, I find,
10 See Sheboygan Sausage Company, Inc., 156 NLRB 1490, and T11fT Trailer Ferry, Inc.,
152 NLRB 1495.
132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prompted the Company to push ahead vigorously in September on a matter that
had been simmering quietly for at least 4 months, and to seek to extract maximum
advantage from its decision by promising over the course of some weeks to raise
wages and, as the campaign progressed, to grant the increases retroactively, con-
trary to all past practice.
(b) The same considerations are also present with regard to the promise of a
pension plan and of improved hospitalization benefits. According to Gross, he had
mentioned these subjects to Dienstag as something in which the employees were
interested, and which the Company should think about. If Dienstag thought about
them before his death, he certainly initiated no action or study which might indicate
that the Company had decided to go forward with these projects. Not until Sep-
tember, when the Company began seriously to interest itself in what its employees
were concerned about, did it for the first time mention that these benefits too were
in the works and would be granted. Thereafter, pensions and improved hospital
benefits were repeatedly promised in the employee meetings and in the literature
distributed to the employees.
Admittedly, a pension system is a complicated matter which cannot be formulated
and effectuated without a great deal of planning, yet the timing of the Company's
announcement that it was now studying the institution of a pension system, and its
repeated pledges that the plan would become effective soon, were all, in my opin-
ion, put forward to convince employees that they could obtain a pension plan with-
out union representation.
I find that the promise and the grant of the wage increase in October, and the
promise of a pension or profit-sharing plan and improved hospitalization benefits
in September and October were made in order to interfere with the Union's orga-
nizing campaign, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)."
5. Demeaning and denigrating the Union
Employee Anna Beauprey testified that she and a group of about 35 other women
employees were called to a meeting in Williams' office sometime late in 1965. Wil-
liams said he wanted to know what the Company could do for the employees. The
women named some of the things they were interested in, and Williams then called
Hirschberg on the intercom to tell him about the meeting then in progress. Hirsch-
berg came on and told the women that he was working on a profit-sharing plan
and would let them know further in 30 days. The conference went on for almost 2
hours, until after the scheduled time for lunch. Williams then asked Hirschberg if
they shouldn't break for lunch, and Hirschberg answered with a vulgar, offensive
remark about the women, repeated it and then said, "To hell with the Union."
That afternoon, the women who had heard Hirschberg's unfortunate remark were
recalled to the office and, again over the intercom, Hirschberg said that he had
been kidding and asked them if they could not take a joke. Beauprey testified that
all through the morning conference, Hirschberg's speech sounded slurred, and
although she had not seen him, it was her impression that he was drunk.
I agree with the General Counsel that the interrogation of the women as to what
they wanted, and the promises of increased benefits made by Hirschberg, were part
of the Company's plan to impress on them that the employees would now be able
to obtain what they wanted without union representation and, as such, constitutes
additional and cumulative violations of unlawful interrogation and promises of
benefits in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
The General Counsel, however, urges that Hirschberg's offensive remark should
also be found to be an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) because it
degrades the concept of union representation. I do not doubt that under some
circumstances, holding a union or its representatives up to ridicule or scorn would
tend to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights to engage in union
activities. Nevertheless, in the arena of conflict over organizational rights, even
insensitivity to prevailing standards of decorum must be tolerated in order to allow
full scope for the presentation of views and arguments, rational or irrational, so
long as they are not an interference, restraint, or coercion of Section 7 rights.
Hirschberg's remark was degrading to the women employees (and to himself) but
its connection with their union activities was, in my opinion, too remote and slight
to warrant a conclusion that the concept of unionism itself was being degraded. I
shall recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint.
11 Scott's, Inc ., 159 NLRB 1795. See also N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 133
D. Alleged violations after the settlement agreement
1. The meeting of January 5
Sometime during the first week of January 1966, most probably on January 5,
Respondent held one of its series of employee meetings in the cafeteria. Occur-
rences at the meeting giving rise to allegations of Section 8(a)(1) violations are
described below as a composite of the testimony of a number of witnesses for the
General Counsel and the Respondent. In general, what happened at the meeting
is not in dispute, although there are differences in the testimony which raise issues
as to how the various incidents are to be characterized.
There were four employees who were regarded by the Company as the leaders
in the plant for the union campaign: Richard Munizza, Eugene Freeman, Clyde
Hollars, and Marian Grathause.
The meeting began, after supervisors had passed out some literature, with
Hirschberg making some general remarks. He was apparently prepared to read a
statement, received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2(j), when he noticed
Munizza, who was seated with Freeman and Hollars near the podium. Hirschberg
then asked Munizza to come up and read the mimeographed statement.12 There is
some disagreement among the witnesses as to the tone of the request-whether it
was peremptory, friendly, hostile, or devoid of emotional overtones. It makes no
difference, in my opinion, what Hirschberg's tone was, because I am satisfied that
Munizza, like any employee confronted at a public meeting with a request by the
president of his employer to do something, could not afford to weigh the possible
consequences of a refusal. Munizza did what he was told to do-he read to his
fellow employees an antiunion speech prepared by his employer. It is a fair sum-
mary of the contents of the speech to note that in its two pages, it accuses the
Union of four separate lies. Munizza rushed through the reading, and as he finished
it he added his own personal peroration, "This is a lot of baloney-sign up."
The reading and Munizza's final comment were greeted with mixed applause
and booing. Hirschberg said to him, "How would you like to go to jail," or "I
will put you in jail for that," angrily, according to the General Counsel's wit-
nesses, or laughingly , according to one of the Respondent 's witnesses . Hirschberg
then turned to Freeman, one of those who had been sitting with Munizza, and
told him to come up and tell the employes why he thought they should vote for
the Union. Freeman did so and started on a prounion speech when he was inter-
rupted by one of the women employees who screamed that he was for the Union
only because he slept on the job. This caused a fresh disturbance, which continued
until Hirschberg rapped for order , saying "this is a free country, let the man
speak." Freeman then continued with his speech. There were some exchanges
between Hirschberg and Freeman about a union official who was then in jail
because of the New York transit strike, which of them was more willing to fight in
Viet Nam, and other side issues. I mention these only to indicate what seems to
have been the level of the discussion, and as a prelude to one further remark of
Hirschberg to the employees that it was these "nuts," referring to Freeman and
Munizza, who were preventing the Company from giving its employees a pension
plan.13
Based on the foregoing events, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), by (a) ordering Munizza to read the antiunion notice; (b)
threatening employees with court action or jail; and (c) demeaning and denigrating
the Union in referring to its leaders in derogatory manner.
(a) I find that Hirschberg's effective order to Munizza that he read an anti-
union statement violated Section 8(a)(1). It forced Munizza to act contrary to his
own convictions, and would thus tend to impress on employees the power and
willingness of the Respondent to intimidate employees who favored the Union.
To require an employee to assume or assert a position favored by his employer
19I do not credit Marlene Ilarbeck's testimony that Munizza volunteered to read the
statement after Hirschberg asked if anyone wanted to do so. Her story is contrary to that
of all the other witnesses, Including that of Rosella Gold, a secretary of the executive
officers. who was present on or near the podium.
13 This is based on Freeman 's credited testimony . Gratbause testified that Hirschberg had
referred to the prounion leaders at the plant as "nuts" at a different employee meeting
shortly before the election.
134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
clearly tends to inhibit employees from acting, in union matters ,' in accordance
with their own desires.14
(b) Considering the circumstances under which Hirschberg said he could put
Munizza in jail or take him to court, I„cannot agree with the General Counsel
that the Act has been violated. The remark does not strike me as being a con-
sidered statement, but rather as an off-the-cuff remark, typical of Hirschberg's
propensity for outlandish observations. Considering the relatively knowledgeable
audience to which it was addressed , and the personality of the speaker , I do not
believe it could reasonably tend to intimidate the employees.15
(c) According to Freeman, Hirschberg refereed to the informal union com-
mittee as "nuts" at the January 5, meeting, and according to Grathause, he used
the same term at a later meeting . Some of the Company's antiunion literature
also referred to these four employees as the "Chosen Few" or the "Chosen Four,"
stating that they would be the union stewards or officers if the plant became
unionized. The General Counsel urges a finding that these are terms which ridicule
and deride the employees referred to, for participating in protected activities. With-
out condoning the use of derision or vilification as an argument for or against
unionism, I note that there was in the use of these terms no imputation of
criminal, dishonest, or immoral conduct. At most they question the competence
or intelligence of prominent union adherents , or imply that they are self-chosen
and motivated by a desire for esteem. I cannot find that Hirschberg's remarks set
out above have a coercive or intimidating effect.16 I shall recommend dismissal of
these allegations.
2. The proposed transfer of Munizza
Munizza's job as a materials handler was to supply parts to production employ-
ees in various departments, and to remove them as they were finished. A number of
the workers whom he served were women, and among them were some who had
taken to wearing "Vote No" badges. This had understandably led to some conversa-
tion between these women and Munizza, who was an open and strong union adher-
ent. My recital of what occurred late in January with regard to a proposed transfer
of Munizza to another job is based on the testimony of Munizza and Cervak, the
production control manager. There are some factual discrepancies in' their testi-
mony, and omissions by one which are filled in by the other, but on the whole their
stories are essentially the same.
On Friday, January 28, Munizza had gone to the Board offices as part of a union
group to meet with Respondent's agents about arranging a stipulated election. Mun-
izza testified that shortly after he returned'to work the next morning he met Cervak,
apparently by chance, at the first floor plant office. Cervak told him that he had a
complaint from one of the operators that Munizza had refused to serve her with
parts. Munizza said he did not knows what Cervak was talking about, and Cervak
said he did know. Munizza then went back to work. According to Cervak, he told
Munizza that he had a report from a leadman that Munizza had refused to serve
Gloria Lampros, and that Munizza had told him he had kiddingly said to the lead-
man that he would not serve Gloria unless she took her badge off.17 Cervak testi-
fied that he had spoken to Lampros who said that Munizza had told her the same
thing, but that she did not want to make trouble for anyone. Nothing further hap-
pened that day.
The following Monday, January 31, Lampros signed a statement based on the
complaint she had made to the leadman.18 About an hour after Munizza started
work that morning, Cervak called him to the plant office, said he had several com-
plaints about him and even had a signed statement. Munizza said he wanted a wit-
14 The Employer's action here is closely comparable to that in which an employer requires
employees to support his own position by wearing badges Guy's Foods, Inc, 158 NLRB
936, and United Butchers A hbatoir, Inc , 123 NLRB 946, 948
15 Cf. Nsskayuna Consumers Cooperative, Inc , 155 NLRB 170 (Rosenblum-Pizzo incident)
16 Cf. The Rose Company, 154 NLRB 228 (the Bond handbilling incident), and Dairylee,
Inc, 149 NLRB 829, 836
14 Munizza admitted to having asked Gloria Lampros that day where the badge was
which she had been wearing before
1BLampros' statement (Respondent's Exhibit 14) although dated February 1, was in
fact prepared and, signed on January 31• Lampros was not called as a witness, and I do
not accept her signed statement as evidence that Munizza had in fact told her he would
serve her only if she removed her badge It is unnecessary to decide exactly what 11lunizza
had told her. It is enough that Lampros' complaint became the basis for Cervak's action
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 135
ness called in if Cervak was going to continue his questioning, but Cervak sug-
gested that the two of them go the cafeteria to talk about the matter. There, Cervak
repeated that there were complaints about how Munizza was servicing operators,
and he offered him a job in the Rebuilt Department where he said he needed a
replacement. They talked in the cafeteria for about an hour, and Munizza asked for
time to think about accepting the proposed transfer. Cervak insisted though that
they go to the personnel office where Gross, the personnel manager, joined Cervak
in urging Munizza to take the new job. At one point, according to Munizza's testi-
mony which I credit, Cervak told him he was refusing to work and could possibly
be dismissed for it. Munizza said he was very upset and did not want to talk any
more about it. Cervak told him to go to the dispensary to lie down. He did so until
noon when Cervak told him to take the rest of the day off. When Munizza returned
to work (either the next day according to Cervak, or the day after that, according
to Munizza), Cervak told him to return to his own job, and nothing further was
ever said about the transfer.
Munizza expressed his feeling to Cervak that the transfer was being offered to
him because of his union activity, and that the new job was less desirable than the
one he had.19 Cervak denied that had anything to do with the transfer, pointing out
that he could still use his rest periods and lunch time to solicit for the Union, but
that it was the recent complaints about his work and the need for a replacement in
the Rebuilt Department which prompted him to offer Munizza the transfer.
Although it seems to me that Cervak had blown up Lampros' complaint beyond
its proper proportions, I am not wholly satisfied that the General Counsel has sus-
tained his burden of establishing that the reasonable effect of the proposed transfer
was to intimidate or coerce Munizza or other employees in the exercise of their
statutory rights. Munizza was openly carrying on work for the Union in his free
time, and Cervak had told him that he could continue to do so even if he trans-
ferred. There had been complaints about Munizza the past month, and it may quite
properly have seemed to Cervak that the fewer opportunities Munizza had to get
into arguments during work periods with the people he was serving, the better it
would be. I shall recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint.
3. Munizza's altercation with Hall and its aftermath
A few days after Munizza's proposed transfer was dropped, Munizza and
employee Don Hall engaged in a short altercation in the men's locker room. It
resulted from Hall's indignation over the fact that Munizza had left some union
literature on his wife's workbench. The altercation occurred about 2:30 p.m. during
a work break, in the presence of a few employees. Some blows were struck, but
injuries on both sides were minor. It quickly came to the attention of management,
and within the next half hour, Munizza and Hall were summoned to the personnel
office where Hirschberg, Cervak, Williams, and two secretaries were gathered. I
credit Munizza's unrefuted testimony that Hirschberg during the next few minutes,
said to him, "Look me right in the eyes, you s.o.b.; that Hirschberg asked Hall who
the biggest troublemaker around there was, and that Hall answered, on cue, that it
was Rich (Munizza); that Hirschberg repeated the expletive a few more times; that
he told Munizza that even if the Union got in, he was not going to get any place
around there; that he ought to fire him but would not because he believed in living
and letting live; and that he would clear out the cafeteria and beat the out
of Munizza." Hirschberg then told Cervak to escort Munizza out of the room, and
Cervak sent him home for the rest of the day. Hall was permitted to return to work.
Later that afternoon, Hirschberg came into the punch-press department and
addressed himself to a group of employees there, looking directly at Freeman, a
union supporter, who had witnessed the locker room fight. Hirschberg referred to
the fight, saying "That s.o.b. Munizza attacked a man in the locker room today, and
I am going to fire that s.o.b." He also said he would move out the tables in the cafe-
teria, bring in some boxing gloves and "beat the out of Munizza," and then
asked Freeman if he wanted to fight with him in the parking lot.
The complaint alleges, on the basis of these facts, that Respondent, through
Hirschberg, threatened known prounion employees with discharge and physical
assault because of their support of, and assistance to, the Union.
10 The new job has a lower maximum rate than btunizza's job, but he would not have
had to take a cut in pay. The new job did offer a possibility for advancement which would
have given Munizza a higher rate than he was presently getting.
136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I find that these allegations have been sustained. Hirschberg did say to Munizza
that he ought to fire him, and to Freeman that he was going to fire Munizza. Even
though Hirschberg also added to Munizza that he wouldn't fire him, the first part
of his statement still carries its own sting. Munizza was made to understand that he
deserved to be discharged, had escaped it this time, but that on another occasion he
might not be as lucky. Hirschberg also offered to fight Munizza and Freeman, and
however close to the ludicrous these threats may seem, it is reasonably evident that
employees are intimidated by threats of physical violence made by supervisors even
if they suspect that the threats need not be taken seriously. I find no merit in
Respondent's argument that Freeman had no reason to believe that Hirschberg's
remarks to him were inspired by his and Munizza's known sympathies for the
Union, since the locker room incident which had generated Hirschberg's remarks,
had started over Munizza's distribution of union literature.
4. Offer to assist toolroom employees to obtain other representation
On January 19, 1966, the seven or eight toolroom employees assembled in a
small cubicle used by their foreman, Tony Doc, to hear Hirschberg who was
accompanied by Williams, the plant manager. The meeting lasted 15 or 20 minutes
and was devoted mainly to toolroom practices and possible improvements. Hirsch-
berg then made a few remarks about the pending issue of representation by the
Steelworkers. The four witnesses who testified on this matter were Superson and
Holm, toolroom employees who were called by the General Counsel, and Williams
and Attaway, then a toolroom employee but now a nonsupervisory leadman, who
were called by the Respondent. Paragraph 20 of the complaint alleges that Hirsch-
berg offered to assist the toolroom employees to obtain representation by a union
other than the Steelworkers.
All four witnesses agreed, in effect, that Hirschberg said some of the toolroom
employees felt that as skilled craftsmen the Steelworkers could not represent them
properly, and that if they did not want the Steelworkers to represent them they
should get on the Paymaster's side and help defeat it; and that after the election
was over, if they still felt they needed representation, they could have another union,
or (in a different version) that they would talk about it then. Only Holm's testi-
mony goes beyond this. On direct examination, he testified that Hirschberg added
that if the Steelworkers were defeated, and they still wanted union representation,
he would help them get another union of their own choice. On cross and on redirect
examination, Holm was again asked three times what Hirschberg had said. Twice
he reiterated his testimony on direct, and once he failed to add the significant
phrase about Hirschberg's offer of assistance in obtaining another union to represent
them.
If it were necessary to decide whether Holm's recollection of Hirschberg's remarks
is more exact than that of Superson, Williams, and Attaway, I would credit Holm,
but in my opinion, even if Hirschberg said he would help the toolroom employees
get another union if the Steelworkers were defeated, there is no violation here.
Hirschberg was presenting the alternatives available to the toolroom employees:
if they wanted the Steelworkers, they could vote for it; if they thought that it
could not represent them satisfactorily, they should vote against it; and if they
voted against the Steelworkers but still wanted representation, he would assist
them. Hirschberg did not say, nor intimate to them, what form his assistance
would take, and I refuse to speculate that Hirschberg meant, or that the employ-
ees could reasonably understand him to mean, that he would recognize another
union as their representative without more. His "assistance" could legally encom-
pass only such matters as voluntary recognition on a showing of cards signed by
a majority of the toolroom employees, or on agreeing to an election whenever it
might appropriately be held. His offer of assistance then was merely the equivalent
of saying that he would place no obstacles in the way of the toolroom employees
if they decided that they wanted representation by another union. But that is only
what Respondent would be obligated to do under the Act, and I cannot construe
it as a promise to take such illegal steps as extending recognition to a minority
union, or to a union for an inappropriate unit.
5. Promises and reminders of benefits
(a) Marian Grathause went to the Board offices on Friday, January 28, as part
of the union contingent engaged in arranging for the stipulated election . The fol-
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 137
lowing Monday, the Company posted a notice (General Counsel's Exhibit 2(p))
in which it claimed that an election had been finally agreed upon despite the
Union's stalling tactics.
Grathause's testimony on what followed is uncontradicted and is credited. She
was indignant because she considered the notice to be unfair and asked her fore-
man, Vetrovec, for an opportunity to discuss it with Williams, the plant superin-
tendent. The next afternoon Vetrovec accompanied her to an office where Hirsch-
berg and a secretary were waiting. Hirschberg explained that Williams was very
busy, and that he was taking care of all complaints and union problems. She and
Hirschberg spoke for over an hour on a number of things, including the pending
campaign and election. Hirschberg asked her why she and the other employees
were in favor of the Union, and her response was that the Company was offering
a pension plan only because of the Union. Hirschberg said that all the Union
wanted was their money, but that he had given them a raise which the Union did
not want them to have, and was working on a pension plan, and after the election
was decided one way or the other, if the Union was defeated, the employees would
receive everything he had promised in 3 to 6 months.
I find that Hirschberg's reminder of the raise, the alleged union opposition to its
grant, and his promise that a pension plan would be effectuated after the election
would reasonably tend to impress Grathause that union representation was unnec-
essary and that it would hinder the grant of future benefits. As such, it was in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(b) I permitted the amendment of paragraph 12(c) at the hearing to include
an allegation as to another promise by Hirschberg to put a pension plan into
effect. The allegation is based on an incident occurring on March 29, 1966, after
the election and while the Steelworkers' objections to the election were pending.
Grathause and Hollars testified, without contradiction, that at an employees' meet-
ing on that date, Hirschberg held up what he said was a check for $50,000 as a
deposit toward a pension plan. Like the other promises that a pension plan was
forthcoming, this too would tend to restrain employees in the exercise of their right
to select the Union as their representative in the future if the Union's objections
were found meritorious. I find it to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
6. Institution of a suggestion box system
In October 1965, before the filing of the petition, an employee asked Hirsch-
berg, as he and Williams were walking through the plant, why there no longer
was a suggestion box for employees as there once was. Hirschberg said he did
not know it had been discontinued, that he would look into it, and something
would be done about it. Something was done about it 3 months later. Hirschberg
announced at an employees meeting in January, according to the credited testi-
mony of employees Hollars and Beauprey, that a suggestion box system was
being instituted, that he alone would have the key to the box, and that he would
discuss any suggestion with the employee who offered it. Paper was then distrib-
uted to the employees and they were encouraged to make suggestions. The next
day, a written announcement about the system was distributed (General Counsel's
Exhibit 2(k)) in which employees were again assured that Hirschberg would per-
sonally speak to employees about their suggestions, and if they were carried out,
they would receive proper recognition. They were also told that they could sub-
mit suggestions anonymously. Neither the oral nor the written announcement men-
tioned the Union.
The General Counsel does not urge that a suggestion box system is per se an
employee benefit, but rather that its institution after the petition was filed, vio-
lated Section 8(a) (1) as a promise of such benefits as personal meetings with
Hirschberg and "proper recognition," and was undertaken in order to weaken
support for the Union. The Respondent argues that the "re-establishment" of the
suggestion box arose from Hirschberg's desire to familiarize himself with plant
operations and to improve them, and was without regard to any union
considerations.
I view the institution of a suggestion box system in January as another attempt
to reopen direct channels of communication with the employees so as to empha-
size that union representation was unnecessary. Suggestions were not to be limited
to work procedures but could also include individual or general grievances of any
sort. The fact that only Hirschberg had the key to the boxes and that he would
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
personally review all suggestions, even the anonymous ones, would indicate to
the employees that this was a system for bypassing the regular supervisory hier-
archy and would reassure them that they need not fear reprisals for airing their
grievances. Its effect can reasonably be said to be that employees could now have
a direct pipeline to the president of the Company, and to encourage them to use
that approach rather than relying on outside representatives to present their griev-
ances. It is in this respect closely similar to promising employees, during a union
organizing campaign, that their grievances and complaints may now be presented
and settled through personal contact with management 2°
7. Free sandwiches for overtime work
Paragraph 16 of the complaint alleges that Respondent initiated the practice
of providing sandwiches and beverages for overtime work in order to dissuade
employees from supporting the Union. Freeman, an employee in the punch
press department, testified that he has worked for the Company about 8 years,
and that before February 1966, employees who worked overtime hours on week-
days would receive, at the end of their regular shift, coffee, milk, and rolls left
over from breakfast. He testified that early in February, Foreman Kobus told
him that the Company would now provide free sandwiches for overtime work, and
proceeded to take employees' orders. Since then, be and other employees have
been given sandwiches and beverages during the break period between their regu-
lar shift and their overtime period. Foreman Kobus was not called as a witness,
but Freeman's story is substantially contradicted by Grathause, a witness for the
General Counsel, and Cervak, the production manager, who appeared for the
Respondent.
Women are prohibited under Illinois law from working more than 8 hours per
day, so that Grathause, herself an employee for about 14 years, has not worked
overtime hours on weekdays. She has thus not had any personal occasion to deter-
mine the Company's policy on free sandwiches. She did, however, testify that
People, presumably fellow employees, had told her that sandwiches were brought in
for overtime weekday workers, and she has actually seen them being brought in at
4 p.m., when the regular day shift ends. It is clear that she was referring to pe-
riods before February 1966. Cervak, who has been employed at Paymaster over
25 years, testified that the Company had always provided free sandwiches for
weekday overtime work. He named three types of occasions when sandwiches are
served for overtime periods: (1) when the plant is working on a special order
under a deadline; (2) whenever overtime is worked without advance notice to the
employees; and (3) whenever overtime is scheduled in advance. Logically, these
would seem to exhaust all the possibilities under which overtime is worked.
I find it difficult to believe that Grathause and Cervak should both be mistaken
in their testimony that sandwiches had been served for overtime work as long as
they had worked there. I cannot reconcile their testimony with Freeman's, although
he impressed me as an honest witness too. Perhaps the new element which was
added in February was that foremen were now asking overtime workers what
kind of sandwiches they wanted, while previously employees had had to take
whatever was offered. But whatever the reason for the discrepancies between
Freeman, on the one hand, and Grathause and Cervak, on the other, I am not per-
suaded that the General Counsel has sustained his burden of proof in regard to
this allegation, and I shall recommend its dismissal.
8. Creating an impression of surveillance
I granted the General Counsel's motion at the hearing to add subparagraph (e)
to paragraph 14 of the complaint, thus alleging that Respondent, through Hirsch-
berg, on or about February 21 and 25, 1966, created the impression that it had
kept the organizing activities of the Union under surveillance.
The evidence for this allegation comes from Freeman who testified as to two
company meetings, both in February, at which Hirschberg referred to what had
happened at union meetings which had been held a few days earlier. At the first
of these company meetings, Hirschberg stated in substance what was already con-
tained in a mimeographed sheet which had been distributed to the employees on
or about February 14 (General Counsel's Exhibit 2(t)), that only 13 employees,
including the "chosen four" had shown up at a union meeting the previous Thurs-
80 S. & H. Grossinger's, Inc., 156 NLRB 233.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 139
day, and that "two brave employees" had asked the union representative some
embarrassing questions, and had been ordered to leave the meeting.
At the second company meeting, held 2 days before the election, Hirschberg
referred to "four of our courageous employees" who had attended a union meet-
ing the week before, and who had not been given a chance to voice their opin-
ions or to vote on the question for which that meeting had been called.
I do not think it makes any difference whether Hirschberg said at these com-
pany meetings that he had learned about what had gone on at the union meetings
from employees who had voluntarily reported to the Company, or whether he said
nothing about his sources of information. In either event, it was made clear to
those who were in Hirschberg's audience that Hirschberg could have acquired his
knowledge only from someone who had been at the union meetings and had
reported back to him. The effect on employees who learn from their employer
that he is aware of what transpires at union meetings is equally coercive whether
or not they know the identity of the informer, and whether or not the informer
has volunteered his information to the employer or has been asked to report back.
The vice inherent in an employer's fostering an impression of surveillance is
that employees are thereby deterred from participating in union activities because
they are made fearful that they will be reported upon. That vice is not dissipated
by the Employer's boast that named or easily identifiable employees are volun-
tarily reporting to him. I find that Hirschberg's remarks about what had hap-
pened at the two union meetings in February created the impression of surveil-
lance on behalf of the Company, and that it constitutes interference , restraint, or
coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1).21
9. Interrogation
Paragraph 13 alleges that on or about January 5, 1966, and on or about Feb-
ruary 7, 1966, Hirschberg and Tony Doc, respectively, interrogated employees
concerning their union activities, membership, and desires.
(a) The only evidence relating to Hirschberg's supposed interrogation was
given by Anna Beauprey, that around Christmastime 1965, Hirschberg and three
other management people came to her department, and that Hirschberg said to
the employees there that if they had any problems to let him know, and he would
see what he could do for them. Beauprey did have a complaint about the way
her machine was operating, and she mentioned it to the management group. Dur-
ing the same conversation, Hirschberg told Beauprey and the others there, that
they should not speak about the Union during working hours, but only during
breaks and rest periods. Beauprey's testimony was apparently adduced in the
hope that it would support paragraph 8 of the complaint which alleges that Hirsch-
berg had promulgated and applied a rule prohibiting its employees, during non-
working time, from discussing the Union. Since Beauprey's testimony obviously
does not support paragraph 8, and there was no other testimony on the point, the
General Counsel understandably stated in his brief to me that he would not
present any argument in support of that paragraph. However, he has taken Beau-
prey's testimony that Hirschberg asked her and the others to let him know if they
had any problems, as supporting paragraph 13, which relates to unlawful
interrogation.
But not every invitation to employees during an organizing campaign to bring
their complaints out into the open constitutes unlawful interrogation. Management
must still be allowed the opportunity to carry out management functions, including
the opportunity to inspect the plant and to talk to employees about production prob-
lems. I find that Hirschberg's query about any problems the employees in Beauprey's
department might be having was not made with reference to union activities nor as
a prelude to a discussion about what the employees thought the Union might be
able to do for them. I shall recommend dismissal of this part of the allegation.
(b) On February 7, 1966, Tony Doc, the toolroom supervisor, was reviewing a
work progress report with LeRoy Holm, a tool-and-die maker. Holm disagreed with
Doc's evaluation of his work, and refused to sign the report. According to Holm,
Doc then asked him if he was a member of Local 113, a tool-and-die union, not
otherwise involved in this proceeding, and if he had signed a card for the Union
(not identified, but clearly referring to the Steelworkers). He also said, according to
Holm, "If I were you, I wouldn't have anything to do with the Union." Doc's testi-
mony on this incident differs in detail, but is not substantially at variance with
91 Boot-Ster Manufacturing Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 933, 944-945.
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Holm's. When Holm refused to sign the work progress report, Doc said he asked
him if he was a union steward,22 if he still belonged to Local 113, and that he hoped
Holm was intelligent enough not to become involved in an organization that could
not do him any good.
Paragraph 13 alleges that Doc's remarks on February 7, constitute unlawful
interrogation of Holm, and paragraph 14(a) alleges that Doc thereby also threatened
Holm with loss of employment or changes in working conditions.
The General Counsel has apparently abandoned the latter allegation, as he does
not refer to it in his brief to me, but even if the omission was inadvertent, I find no
basis for finding a threat as to employment or working conditions in Doc's remarks,
whichever version is credited. In effect, Doc was telling Holm that it was not in his
interest to get involved with the Steelworkers, but no threat, explicit or implicit, is
joined with that bit of advice.
The reverse is true, however, with regard to the allegation on interrogation. I am
satisfied, from Doc's own admission, that he related Holm's purported union activi-
ties with his asserted dereliction in work, and his inquiry as to whether Holm still
belonged to Local 113 was an unwarranted and coercive intrusion into Holm's right
to belong or not to belong to a union, or to engage in union activities. I find that
Doc's questioning of Holm on February 7, was in violation of Section 8(a) (1).
IV. CONDUCT AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION
As I have pointed out in my prefatory recital of the chronology of these pro-
ceedings, the Regional Director found that the objections filed by the Union to the
election of March 2, 1966, raised substantially the same issues as certain conduct
alleged in the complaint, and he therefore consolidated the representation and
unfair labor practices proceedings for purposes of hearing and disposition.
I have found above that Respondent interferred with, restrained, and coerced its
employees' self-organizational rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), between the
filing of the petition and the conduct of the election. Specifically, after the Regional
Director's approval of the settlement agreement on December 17, 1965, and con-
temporaneously with the posting of the required notice, Respondent posted the
"second notice" and retained it on its bulletin boards for 3 weeks, thereby vitiating
and dissipating the effect of the official notice, and continuing in effect its earlier
promises to grant supplemental wage benefits; it required a prounion employee to
assert, publicly an antiumon position; it threatened employees with discharge and
with physical assault; it reiterated its promise of a pension plan and reminded an
employee that it had granted a wage increase over the Union's alleged opposition;
it instituted a method for bringing employee grievances directly to the attention of
is president; fostered the impression that it had the Union's meetings under sur-
veillance; and it interrogated an employee about his union affiliations. After the
election, and while objections were pending and unresolved, it repeated its promise
that a pension plan would soon be forthcoming.
I find and conclude that the Respondent's conduct, as set forth above, interfered
with the exercise of a free choice in the election, and that the postelection promise
was made as a further inducement to vote against the Union should the opportunity
arise.23 Accordingly, I recommend that the election of March 2, 1966, be set aside,
and a new election be conducted at a time to be determined by the Regional
Director.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with its operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent , The,Paymaster Corporation, is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
22 It is possible that either Holm or Doc confused wbat Doc said in February with what
he said in a different conversation between the two of them the previous September Holm
had testified , as to the September conversation , that Doc had then asked him if he was
a union steward , and if he had signed a union card.
23 Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136, 1145.
THE PAYMASTER CORP. 141
2. United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO , is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices other than as found
herein.
THE REMEDY
It is the conventional practice of Trial Examiners and the Board , in cases involv-
ing only violations of Section 8(a)(1), to order the Respondent to cease and desist
from engaging in the conduct found to be unlawful, and from any like or related
conduct, and to post notices. The General Counsel has urged me to find that the
conventional remedy would be inadequate in this case "to undo the effect of the
massive and deliberate unfair labor practices committed by Respondent in its suc-
cessful efforts to frustrate organization by its employees ." He has therefore sug-
gested that additional safeguards be imposed in order to recreate the conditions
and relationships which existed before the commission of any unfair labor practices.
I consider that only two of these proposed additional safeguards are necessary
in this case . I agree with the General Counsel that ( 1) a broad , rather than a
narrow remedial order is called for here, in view of the variety of violations which
have already occurred , and the fact that the remedial action provided for in the
withdrawn settlement agreement has proved to be ineffective ; and (2 ) that Hirsch-
berg personally be required to sign the notice , with certain additional language, in
order to overcome the effect of the "second notice" which appeared over his signa-
ture.24 Other specific remedial actions were offered by the General Counsel on the
assumption that all the allegations of the complaint had been proved , but in view
of my recommendations that some of these allegations be dismissed , there is obvi-
ously no need to provide for these.
Finally, other remedial safeguards were proposed as necessary , through a com-
parison of this case with the cases cited below . 25 But these, in my opinion , are not
opposite . They involved flagrant violations of Section 8(a)(2), (3 ), or (5), in
addition to the types of Section 8(a)(1) violations committed here, and they were
particularly effective in aborting the union 's organizational campaigns almost from
their inception. Here, on the contrary, the Union was able to contact employees, to
publicize its case, and to carry on without the additional handicaps imposed on the
unions in the cited cases . The campaign lasted about 6 months and culminated in
an election . It is true that the Union lost that election , and that the unfair labor
practices committed undoubtedly contributed to the loss , but in my opinion, their
coercive effect can be dissipated without the additional and unusual remedial
actions which the General Counsel has suggested.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that The Paymaster Corporation, its
officers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist front:
(a) Granting or promising wage increases, a pension or profit-sharing plan,
improved hospitalization benefits, or a new system for determining and handling
employee grievances , in order to interfere with the employees ' choice of a bargain-
ing representative , or as an inducement to reject or refrain from activities in sup-
port of United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO , or any other labor organization.
(b) Keeping under surveillance or creating the impression that it is keeping
under surveillance , the activities of its employees in support of United Steelworkers
of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
(c) Interrogating its employees as to whether they had signed union cards, if
they belonged to a union , or what benefits they wanted from their employer, in a
manner constituting interference , restraint , or coercion within the meaning of
Section 8 ( a)( I) of the Act.
=^ Southern Athletic Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 1051.
2511. T. Bison Bottling Company, 155 NLRB 714, and J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc., 157
NLRB 869. See also Scott's, Inc., 159 NLRB 1795.
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) Threatening to close its plant or to withdraw cafeteria or parking lot privi-
leges if United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion succeeds in organizing its plant.
(e) Threatening its employees with discharge or with physical assault because of
their support of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
(f) Requiring its employees publicly to read an antiunion statement or to assert
an antiunion position.
(g) Posting notices which modify, alter, or detract from notices posted pursuant
to orders of, or agreements with, the National Labor Relations Board.
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees
in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form, join , or assist United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant at Chicago, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 26 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 13 after being duly signed by T. B. Hirschberg, Jr., shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing , within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.27
I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the complaint be dismissed as to any alleged viola-
tions not found herein; and that the election held on March 2, 1966, in Case
13-RC-10757 be set aside, and that said case be remanded to the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 13 to conduct a new election when he deems that circumstances
permit the free choice of a bargaining representative.
26 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice . If the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals , the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing all Order " for the words "a Decision
and Order."
27 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT grant or promise wage increases , a pension or profit-sharing
plan, improved hospitalization benefits, or a new system for determining and
handling employee grievances , in order to interfere with our employees ' choice
of a bargaining representative , or as an inducement to reject or refrain from
activities in support of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT keep under surveillance or create the impression that we are
keeping under surveillance the activities of our employees in support of United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees as to whether they had signed
union cards, or if they belong to a union , or what benefits they want from us,
in a manner constituting interference , restraint , or coercion within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
SMITH'S TRANSFER CORP. 143
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our plant or to withdraw cafeteria or park-
ing lot privileges if United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization succeeds in organizing our plant.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge or with physical
assault because of their support of United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT require our employees publicly to read an antiunion state-
ment or to assert an antiunion position.
WE WILL NOT post any notices which modify, alter, or detract from, this
notice or from notices posted pursuant to agreements with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to self -organization , to join or assist
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities.
All our employees have the right to join , or not to join , United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
THE PAYMASTER CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provision , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 881
U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago,
Illinois 60604, Telephone 353-7597.
Smith 's Transfer Corporation of Staunton , Virginia and Team-
sters Local No. 29, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America.
Case 5-CA-3p214. December 15, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 27, 1966, Trial Examiner Herzel H. E. Plaine issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam-
iner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint, and dismissed the complaint with respect to these
allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision, and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria].
162 NLRB No. 5.