The Monarch Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 29, 1944

56 N.L.R.B. 1749 (N.L.R.B. 1944)

In the Matter of W. E. LIPsauTz, DOING BUSINESS As THE MONARCIH
COMPANY and AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 10-C-1Jf58.Decided June :L9, 1944
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On January 31, 1944, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate,
Report in the above-entitled, proceeding, finding that the respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices,
and recommending that he-cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in a copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the respondent and counsel for the
Board filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and briefs in sup-
port of their exceptions. Oral argument was held before the Board
in Washington, D. C., on May 2, 1944.
The Board has reviewed the rulings on motions and on objections
to the admission of evidence made by the Trial Examiner at the hear-
ing and finds that, with the exception noted below, no prejudicial
error was committed. The rulings, other than the one hereinafter
discussed, are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, except insofar as they are inconsistent with our
findings and order hereinafter set forth.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the respond-
ent engaged in conduct which is violative of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
In one of his addresses to, the employees shortly after the commence-
ment of the Union's organizational campaign at the respondent's plant
in July 1943, Lipshutz stated that he would rather close the plant or
operate it with 20 "loyal" employees than permit the C. I. 0., or the,
War Labor Board, or any other organization 1 "to run his business?' 2
' At that time the Union, as part of its organizational campaign , was making an issue,
among other things, of the respondent' s failure to pay the employees for a 10-minute rest
period, which matter was then the subject of a dispute before the wage and Hour Division
,56 N. L. R. B., No. 312.
1749
1750 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shortly thereafter, he told a few employees that "before he would
operate under the union shop-... he would move to Villa Rica
and leave just enough work up here for about 2 days a week for the
union hands to do." 3 These remarks plainly constituted threats of
economic`- reprisal to combat the Union's organizational efforts and
were clearly violative of Section 8 (1). , The other anti-union, state-
ments by Lipshutz found by the Trial Examiner,4 if not per se unlaw-
ful, were at least an,integral' part of a course of conduct engaged in
by the respondent for the purpose, and which had the effect, of inter-
fering with, restraining, and coercing his employees in the exercise of'
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Moreover, the afore-
mentioned unlawful activity of the respondent during the Union's
organizational drive in 1943 was but a repetition of the anti-union
tactics',employed by the respondent in 1937, when the Union first
attempted to organize his employees. As found by us in Matter of.
W: E. Lipsluutz,5 the respondent at that time also threatened to close
the plant or to change its location if it were unionized, and made other
anti-union remarks which were violative of the Act. It is thus clear,
and • we find, that the respondent's aforementioned activities during
the Union's second organizational drive, in 1943, were part of a course
of conduct 8 followed by the respondent for the purpose of defeating
the Union, and which interfered with, restrained, and coerced his em-
ployees in violation of Section.8 (1) of the Act. We further find that
the coercive effect of the totality of the respondent's conduct in, his
efforts to defeat the Union was not removed by Lipshutz's remarks to
the employees during the Union's. second organizational drive that
they were free to join or not,to' join,the Union and that membership
therein would not adversely affect their employment with the
respondent., ,
2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that certain
advice given by Lipshutz to employees Grizzel and Wood on how they
of the United. States Department of Labor, as well as of the respondent 's delay in granting
the employees a' wage increase , application for the approval of,which was then pending
before the War Labor Board.
2 We have examined with particular care the conflicting testimony on whether Lipshutz
made the foregoing remark, and we , find, upon the entire record, that it was made by him
substantially as outlined above.
8 Lipshutz in effect denied making the foregoing statement , which was attributed to-him,
by employee West. We find West to be the more trustworthy witness.
4 Since, as hereinafter indicated ,. we are making no determination as to the validity of
the respondent's no-solicitation rule as applied to union solicitation at the plant on the
employees ' own time , we do not rely, in support of our finding that the respondent violated
Section 8 (1), upon the respondent 's threats to discharge employees for engaging in such
solicitation . Nor, in view of the varying versions in the testimony of several employees
concerning the exact nature of the remark, do we rely upon Lipshutz' s alleged statement
to employees, as found by the Trial Examiner, that "if his hands were not tied" he would
"kick out" certain employees who were making statements in support of the Union's organi-
zational drive which Lipshutz characterized as "lies." -
814N L. R.B.1196
e Cf. N. L R. B. T. Trojan Powder Company, 135 F. ( 2d) 337 (C. C. A. 3), cert. den.,
320 U. S. 768.
THE- MONARCH COMPANY . , 1751
could recover their, union membership, cards, constituted a, violation
of Section 8 (1) of the Act. The record discloses that these two em-
ployees, having decided to,withdraw from the Union, approached Lip-
shutz and, asked him .how they .could recover ,their membership cards,,
and that Lipshutz, in reply to their inquiries, merely referred them to,
the persons who would be likely to'have,possession of such cards. - We
do not believe that Lipshutz's conduct in this respect interfered. with,
restrained, or coerced the employees, in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act.
3. The Trial Examiner found that shortly prior to the hearing here-
in, Mayer, counsel for the respondent, while interviewing six employ-
ees, as a group, in the presence of Lipshutz and Forelady Brown,
`,`asked some of them if they had joined the Union, who had solicited
them on the -premises , and whether or not they had observed any un-
rest in the plant," and the Trial Examiner concluded that the question-
ing of the employees about their union membership was not in further-
ance of- "the legitimate preparation of the respondent's defense" to
the charges in this case and was violative of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
We do not concur in the finding of the Trial Examiner that Mayer,
questioned some of these employees about their union membership.
The preponderance of the evidence is that such information was vol-
unteered by them, and we so find. We, deem it unnecessary to deter-
mine whether, had Mayer in fact questioned the employees about their
union affiliation, his conduct in that regard, under the circumstances
presented herein, would have been violative of the Act. -
4. Shortly after the commencement of the Union's membership
campaign at the respondent's plant in.July 1943, Lipshutz announced
to the employees that there was to be no solicitation of membership in
any organization on the premises of the respondent. Insofar as that
rule prohibited union solicitation at the plant on the employee's own
time, it was violative of the Act, unless special circumstances are shown
to have existed indicating that the rule was necessary in order to main-
thin production .7
The respondent contended that the organizational activities of the
Union on its premises resulted, among other things, in a loss of pro-
duction, and that it was "in an effort to correct this condition and
thereby protect respondent's business" that the respondent promul-
gated the rule. 'In attempting' to prove this contention, counsel for
the respondent asked Forelady Brown, who occupied a position similar
to that of general manager and who was familiar with the volume of
production before and after the commencement of the Union's organ-
.
Matter o f Peyton Packing Company , 49 N. L. R. B 828 ; Matter of Carter Carburetor
Corp, 48 N L R. B. 354, 140 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 8) ; Matter of Repnblie Aviation Cor-
poration, 51 N. L. R. B. 1186, 142 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2) ; Matter of The Denver Tent
and Awning Go, 47 N L ' R. B 586; Matter of North American Aviation , 56 N. L R. B.
959.
1752 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
izational activities, what effect such activities had on, production. The
Trial Examiner sustained an objection to this question, on'the ground
that the records of individual production kept at the time and avail-
able to the respondent,' and, not Brown's personal observations, were
"the best evidence." The Trial Examiner also rejected an offer by
the respondent, to prove, through the testimony of Brown, that the
Union's activities at the plant had adversely affected production to a
substantial degree. The respondent has excepted to the rulings of the,
Trial Examiner excluding the proffered evidence.
In the interest of avoiding unnecessary protraction of our hearings,
testimony of individual employees on the effect of union solicitation
on company premises upon'their production, might normally be prop-
erly excluded, at least where reliable production records are available.
However, in the instant case, the Trial Examiner had already admitted
the testimony of individual employees on that subject which was
unfavorable to the respondent's contention, and the testimony which
the respondent sought to introduce to rebut that evidence, and which
the Trial Examiner rejected, was by .a person who was familiar with
production throughout the plant. Under these circumstances, we are
of, the opinion, and we find, that the Trial Examiner's exclusion of
the proffered testimony of Forelady Brown was prejudicial error.
We shall therefore make no findings on whether the no-solicitation rule
promulgated by the respondent, insofar as it applied to union solici-
tation'on the employees' own time, was violative of Section 8- (1) of
the Act. However, since some evidence was adduced at the hearing
tending to show that the promulgation of that rule was not in fact
induced by an impairment of production resulting from union solici-
tation on the employees' own time, it would be advisable for the
respondent, in order to avoid any possible future charge of unfair
labor practices, to rescind the rule insofar as it applies to. union solici-
tation at the plant on the employees' own time, unless special cir-
cumstances exist which clearly make such an application of the rule
necessary in order to maintain production.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent, W. E.-Lipshutz, doing busi-
ness as The Monarch Company, Atlanta, Georgia, and his agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall: -
i. Cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing his employees in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
THE MONARCH COMPANY. 1753
Industrial Organizations, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post immediately in conspicuous places in his plant at Atlanta,
Georgia, and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60), consecutive
days from the date of posting, notices to his employees stating that
the respondent will not engage in the conduct from which he is
ordered to cease and desist in paragraph,l of this Order; and
(b) Notify the Regional Director for- the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Dan M. Byrd, for the Board.
Mr. Albert E. Mayer, of Atlanta, Ga ., for the respondent.
Messrs. H. T. Denton and Carl F. Albrecht , of Atlanta , Ga., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge filed December 21, 1943, by Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers of America , CIO, herein called the Union, the National Labor Re-
lations Board , herein called the Board , by its Regional Director for the Tenth
Region (Atlanta, Georgia ), issued its complaint , dated December 21, 1943, against
W. E. Lipshuta , doing business as the Monarch Company , herein called the re-
spondent , alleging that the respondent had engaged in and .was engaging in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and
Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the 'National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein
called the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of hearing thereon were duly
served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint , as amended at the
hearing, alleges in substance : ( 1) that the respondent , through certain manage-
ment officials and his attorney , has orally published a rule forbidding union
solicitation on the respondent 's premises , has expressed disapproval of the Union
and of employees active on its behalf , has urged employees to 'refrain from join-
ing the Union , has threatened discharge to employees for union activities on the
respondent 's premises , has assembled all employees and required them to listen
to speeches expressing the respondent 's disapproval of the Union, has warned his
employees that he would close the plant if they joined the Union, has kept tinder
surveillance concerted or Union activities of his employees , and has interrogated
his employees concerning the Union ; and (2 ) that by these acts the respondent
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced his employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
In his answer, verified January 4 , 1944 , and amended during the hearing, the
respondent denied having engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged, but ad-
mitted having promulgated a rule forbidding solicitation , on the premises of the
respondent , of membership in any organization.
'1754 ' DECISIONS OF'NATIOIVAL'LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 10, 11,
and 12, 1944, 'before C. W. 'Whittemore, ,the Trial Examiner duly designated by
the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the respondent were represented, by
,counsel, the Union by two of its officers. All parties participated in the hearing
and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. -
During the hearing the Trial Examiner granted a motion by counsel for the
Board to amend the complaint to include conduct of the respondent's counsel 'as
i lleged unfair labor practices within the, meaning of the Act.' A motion by
counsel, for the respondent, to amend the answer to include denial of the allega-
tion with respect to himself, was also granted. At the close of the hearing the
Trial Examiner granted a joint motion by counsel for the Board and for the
respondent to conform the pleadings to the proof in minor particulars.
Following the receipt of all evidence and testimony, counsel for the Board and
for the respondent argued orally before the Trial Examiner, the argument ap-
pearing in the official 'transcript of the proceedings. Opportunity,was afforded to
all parties to file briefs with the Trial Examiner. A brief has been received
trom the respondent.
Upon the entire record in the,case and, from his observation of the ^vitnesses,
the Trial, Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT ,
1. THE BUSINES'S OF THE RESPONDENT -
W. E. Lipshutz, an individual doing business as The Monarch Company, is
engaged, at a plant in Atlanta, Georgia, in the manufacture and sale of men's and
boys' cotton' wearing apparel, consisting principally of suits, trousers and jackets.
The principal raw materials used in such manufacture, are cotton cloth,
thread, buttons, needles, machinery, and parts. About 75 percent of such raw
materials originate outside the State of Georgia. The respondent's annual
sales amount to about $250,000, of which approximately 75 percent are shipped
to points outside the State of Georgia.
The respondent employs more than 100 employees at its Atlanta plant.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED s
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization' ad-
witting to membership employees of the respondent., . , ,
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES,
' •'A.''B w1cground
On August 29, 1939, the Board,issued a Decision- and-Order involving the,same
respondent and the, same Union,' in whicht it concluded among other things,' that
by "anti-union statements and activities of the. respondent and his forelady,
Brown, the respondent indicated to his employees his hostility toward the Amal-
',Although the amendment was not specific, as to, the alleged conduct; the record •is clear
that counsel for the Board referred to evidence already adduced that counsel- for the re-
spondent, before the hearing, had questioned employees as to their, Union membership. It
is likewise clear that counsel for''th a respondent so understood the amendment.
a The findings in Sections 1 and II rest upon stipulations entered into between the pa'rties
at the hearing.
In the Matter of W. E. ldpshutz, doing business as The, Monarch Company and,Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America, 14 N. L. R. B 1196.
-THE MONARCH COMPANY 1755
gamated, influenced them against and interfered with their participation in the
Amalgamated, and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced his employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." 'In its order,
the Board required that the respondent, among other things, should post notices
stating that it would cease and desist from conduct found to have been, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the Act. - . ' - '
At the hearing in the present proceedings, counsel for the respondent conceded
that no appeal was taken from the Board's conclusions in ,the above-described
case, and stated that the Order had been complied with.
B. Interference, restraint and coercion
1. Anti-Union speeches and conduct by Lipshutz and Forelady Brown
In the case above referred to the Board found that the Union conducted. a
membership campaign among the respondent's employees in 1937 and iearly 1938.
There is no evidence of any organizational activity at the plant from-1938 until
July 1943. -
Early in July 1943, the Union began another membership campaign. Circulars
were distributed to employees outside the plant. Employees West, Oxford and
Elkins were active leaders in the drive.
Soon after the campaign opened, Lipshutz asked Elkins,why _ he wanted to
joint'the Union. , The employer pointed out that he had recently given him a
raise and asked if he had not treated him fairly. He told the employee that if
he did not quit soliciting members in the plant he would discharge him. Lipshutz
later, interviewed West,' in the stockroom, where he asked her why the employees
were dissatisfied and inquired why they went to some organization instead of
coming to him or to Forelady Brown. During the conversation Elkins entered
the stockroom. Referring to employees attempting to organize, Lipshutz indi-
cated Elkins and said, "Such squirts as that one coming there."'
At' about the same time Lipshutz assembled all employees in the plant during
an' afternoon "recess," a period for which employees were not paid: The em-
ployer declared that he wanted to know what all the "whispering" and disturb-
ance was about, told them to come to him or to Miss Brown when they wanted
anything,- and stated that neither the "Labor Board" nor any labor organization
would tell him how to run his business. Lipshutz further declared that before
he would permit a union to run his business he would either -close down or
operate with only 20 loyal employees. He warned them that there must be no
solicitation of'members on the premises.
In September and October Lipshutz again convened the employees during their
recess period. At one or both of these times he asked what the girls wanted
and why they were dissatisfied. He -repeated his query and finally employee
Oxford answered that the girls had been depending upon, his promise to give
them pay for the 10-minute rest period and resented the.fact that he was then
fighting the demand "in court."' Lipshutz then accused Oxford, Westand'Elkins
of trying to organize the Union and of spreading rumors and lies to the effect
that employees must join the organization. He declared that they*,were the
ringleaders and that if his "hands were not tied" they would already have been
"kicked out."
The findings as to Lipshutz',remarks on these occasions -rest upon the credible testimony
of West and-Elkins . Lipshutz admitted , in substance, ,West's account of his interview with
her, but stated that he did not remember , referring to Elkins as a "young squirt"' He
denied having asked Elkins -why he wanted to join the-Union, but admitted "I don 't remem-
ber much of the discussion with him "
3 The question of recess pay was then in litigation before another governmental agency
1756 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In October, at a time when a change was made in the pay date, Forelady Brown
told the gathered employees that soliciting Union membership on the premises
would be cause for discharge"-
Following Lipshutz' speeches, two employees who had signed Union cards
told the employer that they had withdrawn from the organization and asked his
advice on getting their cards back. Lipshutz advised one of them to communicate
with a Union official, whose name he provided, and told the other to see West.
In October, after being informed by Brown that West had solicited member-
ship from an employee in the rest room, Lipshutz summoned the Union leader
to his office and-threatened to take her "to jail." 7
2. Questioning of employees as to their Union Membership by counsel for the
respondent
A few days before the hearing in these proceedings, Forelady Brown sent five
or six employees,in a group to the respondent's stockroom where, in the presence
' of Lipshutz and herself, Attorney Mayer asked some of them if they had joined
the Union, who had solicited them on the premises, and whether or not they had
observed any unrest in the plant.$,
3. Contentions of the respondent
In its answer the respondent contends that the rule against solicitation of Union
membership on the premises was a "reasonable and necessary" regulation, calcu-
lated to prevent "personal animosities" among employees which, if not pre-
vented, would impair efficient operation of his business. The Trial Examiner
notes that the claim as to the "reasonable and necessary" nature of the regula-'
tion is based upon the hypothesis that, if the rule were not imposed, "personal
animosities" and impaired operating efficiency would follow. In view of the
fact- that both Lipshutz and Brown testified at the hearing that the order was
given to remedy ° an existing condition of ill-feeling and loss of production, it
appears unnecessary here to determine whether or not, under other circum-
stances, such a condition might reasonably have been expected to be the probable
or inevitable result of failure to impose the rule.
Both the employer and his forelady stated that the rule was decided upon and
announced after she had reported to him that production was falling off due to
friction and unrest among the employees. The record is without any credible
evidence that her report to Lipshutz, if actually made, had the slightest founda-
tion in fact. No production data were produced, although Brown admitted that
they were recorded and available. A number of witnesses called by the respond-
" The findings as to these "recess" speeches are based upon the credible testimony of
several employees , some of whom were witnesses for the respondent, as well as upon
admissions by both Lipshutz and Brown.
4 Lipshutz denied making this threat , but admitted the occasion and that he had told
West that he would discharge her. The Trial Examiner does not accept his denial as
true.
:This finding rests mainly upon the testimony of employee Wood, a witness called by
the respondent , while being cross-examined . After the noon recess Wood and other
witnesses for the ' respondent were recalled by counsel for the respondent . Upon being
recalled , Wood at first testified that "No one else asked me that , asked me If I belonged,"
and then denied that anyone had asked her., On re-cross -examination , however, she ad-
mitted that the testimony given by her before the recess, that Mayer had asked her , was the
truth. Other witnesses also recalled either denied that Mayer had queried them as to their
Union membership , or stated that they did not recall what questions were asked . Mayer-
did not testify . The Trial Examiner does not accept the denials as true.
9 In his brief ; counsel for the respondent likewise contends that the rule was promulgated:
as a remedy. '
THE MONARCH COMPANY 1757
ent testified that neither their relationship with other. employees nor their pro-
duction had been affected by having been asked to join the Union Supervisor'
McGibony testified, as a witness for the respondent, that she observed no differ-
ence in employee relationships during the campaign, and did not believe that
it caused unfriendly relations. And Brown herself admitted that she overheard
no conversations among employees and that whatever "unrest" there might, have
been could have been caused by the employer's failure to pay for the rest period
or grant a pay increase. Two witnesses for the respondent testified that their
production had been affected adversely. ' One admitted, however, that she "made
the same amount of money each week," and the other admitted that her troubles
,in production had occurred during the first day she operated a machine, imme-
diately after being employed, and that she never before had been employed any-
where. In the latter case, moreover, the employee was not hired until late in
the summer, long after the rule had been imposed. The Trial Examiner concludes
and finds that there is no merit in the respondent's contention that the rule
against soliciting Union membership on the premises was reasonable or neces-
sary to assure the efficient conduct of his business.
4. Conclusions as to the respondent's anti-Union conduct
No rule against talking among employees exists at the respondent's plant.
Solicitation for the Red Cross and Community Chest funds is permitted on the
premises. In view of these facts, and when considered in connection with other
conduct on the part of Lipshutz, the Trial Examiner is convinced and finds that
the imposition of the rule against Union solicitation was discriminatory, and
designed solely to discourage membership in the organization.
The assembling by Lipshutz of all employees, during a rest period for which
they were not paid, and his above-quoted remarks to them were likewise effective
efforts on the part of the employer to discourage organization among his work-
ers. As found above, at least two employees, after his speeches, reported to him
that they wished to revoke their Union membership and he advised them as to
the procedure, they should follow. Since it is reasonable to believe that his
speeches caused the desire to revoke their membership, his conduct in advising
them how to withdraw from the Union was plainly illegal. The employer's ques-
tioning of the leaders in the organizing campaign, as well as his disparaging
remarks about Elkins and his threat to "jail" West, all were acts violating the
freedom of employees to organize.
In the absence bf any explanation for such conduct, the questioning of em-
ployees about their Union membership by counsel for the respondent, in the
presence of Lipshutz and Brown, is found to exceed the legitimate preparation
of the respondent's defense. The question of Union membership did not relate
to any issue in this proceeding.'°
In summary, by the above-described conduct, remarks, and speeches of Lip-
shutz and Brown, and by the questioning of employees by Mayer as to their
Union membership, the respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The record contains no evidence to support the allegation in the complaint that
the respondent engaged in surveillance of Union activities.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE'
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above, have a
10 Matter of Industrial Life and Health Insurance Company, 47 N. L R . B. 395.
587784-45-vol. 56-112
t
1758 DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL •LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of the Act, it will, be recommended that he cease and,desist
therefrom and take certain, affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-
1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization.
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing his employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of
the Act. - . •
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of, the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Trial Examiner recommends that the respondent, W. E. Lipshutz, doing business
as The Monarch Company, and his officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coer-
cing his employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain 'collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Trial Examiner finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post immediately in conspicuous places in his plant at Atlanta, Georgia,
and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date
of posting, notices to-his employees stating that the respondent will not engage
in the conduct from which it is recommended that he cease and desist in para-
graph 1 of these recommendations; and-,
(b)' Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing within ten
(10) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps
the respondent has taken to comply therewith. '
It is further recommended that unless on or' before ten (10) 'days the receipt
of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies said Regional Director in
writing that he will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the action,
aforesaid. '
As provided in Section 33 of Article 'II of the Rules and Regulations of the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, effective November 26, 1943,, any
party, or, counsel for the Board may within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 32 of
THE MONARCH COMPANY 1759
Article II of said Rules-and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Build-
ing, Washington, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing
setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of
the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as
he relies upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support
thereof., Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or
brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof
upon each of the other parties `and shall file a copy with the Regional Director.
As further provided in said Section 33, should any party desire permission to
argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made 'in writing within
ten (10) days from the date of the order transferring the case to the Board.
C. W. WHITrEMORE,
Trial Examiner.
Dated January 31, 1944.