The Mather Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 1969

180 N.L.R.B. 417 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

THE MATHER CO. 417
The Mather Company, Fluorotec Division and
International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW). Cases 7-CA-5713 and
7-CA-5881
December 16, 1969
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On June 25, 1968, the National Labor Relations
Board issued its Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding ,' finding that Respondent had engaged in
certain conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and ordering Respondent to cease and
desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative
action , set forth therein . Thereafter , on June 16,
1969, the Supreme Court of the United States
issued its decision in N.L.R . B. v. Gissel Packing
Company,' wherein the Court laid down certain
guidelines relative to the propriety of finding
violations of Section 8(a)(5) and the issuance of
bargaining orders based upon such violations or
violations of other sections of the Act. In view of
the Supreme Court decision , the Board, acting on its
own motion , decided to reexamine the Decision and
Order herein.
Accordingly , the Board , on August 4, 1969, issued
a notice to all parties notifying them of its decision
to reconsider the matter in the light of Gissel and
advising them that they could submit statements of
position with respect to such issues . Such statements
were duly filed by Respondent, Charging Party, and
General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
We have considered the statements of position
and the entire record in this proceeding and, for the
reasons set forth below, shall reaffirm our original
finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to recognize the Union as
majority representative of the employees, and our
original determination that a bargaining order is
necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies of
the Act in this case.
In our initial Decision we found that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
engaging in systematic unlawful interrogation
following the Union's demand for recognition and
prior to a Board election; and that, after the election
was set aside and a second election was directed, it
further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
announcing to the employees that they would be
granted certain fringe benefits. We further found
that the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union
was motivated by its desire to gain time in which to
undermine the Union's majority status and that such
conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In
so finding, the Board relied on the facts that
Respondent prior to the election engaged in
unlawful systematic interrogation and after the
election unlawfully granted fringe benefits. This
conduct, and particularly the grant of benefits after
the direction of the second election, the Board
found, was not only designed to induce employees to
repudiate the Union, but insured that it would be
impossible to hold a fair election. Accordingly, the
Board ordered the Respondent to bargain with the
Union.
In Gissel, supra, the Supreme Court stated, inter
alia , that the Board may find an 8(a)(5) violation
and issue a bargaining order where "the possibility
of erasing the effects of [the] past practices and
ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use
of traditional remedies . . . is slight . . . [therefore]
employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a
bargaining order ..."'
In our opinion , a bargaining order is warranted
on the facts of this case under the Gissel standard.
As found in the original Decision and Order, after
refusing the Union's demand for recognition, the
Respondent not only engaged in systematic unlawful
interrogation prior to an election, but that, after the
election was set aside and a second election directed,
it unlawfully granted substantial new fringe benefits.
This unlawful conduct had the effect of precluding
the holding of a fair rerun election. In these
circumstances, we are of the opinion, and find, that
employee sentiment once expressed through
authorization cards would, on balance, be better
protected by a bargaining order. Accordingly, we
shall reaffirm the unfair labor practice findings and
the remedy provided therefor in the original
Decision and Order herein.
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
In view of the foregoing, and on the basis of the
record as a whole, the National Labor Relations
Board reaffirms its Order of June 25, 1969, in this
proceeding.
1172 NLRB No. 28.
'395 U.S. 575.
'/d p 614.
180 NLRB No. 19