The Kroger Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 13, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 1469 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

THE KROGER CO.
The Kroger Co. and Thomas M. Rafferty . Case 6-
CA-8111
May 13, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On January 28, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Peter E. Donnelly issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent
filed a brief in answer to the General Counsel's ex-
ceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein .2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
below, and hereby orders that Respondent, The Kro-
ger Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, as so modified:
Insert the following as paragraph 1(d):
"(d) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act."
1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibili-
ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F .2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently omitted from his recom-
mended Order the Board 's narrow cease -and-desist language , although it
was included in his notice to employees . Accordingly, we shall modify his
recommended Order by inserting this language.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1469
PETER E. DONNELLY, Administrative Law Judge: The
charge herein was filed by Thomas M. Rafferty, an.indi-
vidual, on February 24, 1975, and the complaint thereon
was issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board on April 30, 1975, alleging that The Kro-
ger Co., hereinafter called Respondent or Employer, violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Raffer-
ty and by engaging in certain other misconduct as detailed
herein. The answer thereto was timely filed by Respondent.
Pursuant to notice, the hearing was held before me at Wes-
ton, West Virginia, on September 18 and 19, 1975. Briefs
have been timely filed by the General Counsel and Re-
spondent which have been duly considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT'
1. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
Employer is an Ohio corporation with its principal of-
fices located in Cincinnati, Ohio, and other locations in
several States of the United States including West Virginia,
and is engaged in the retail sale of groceries. During the
12-month period immediately preceding the issuance of the
complaint and notice of hearing herein, Respondent in the
course of its business operations, sold products the gross
value of which exceeded $500,000. During the same period
of time, Employer received goods valued in excess of
$50,000 transported to its place of business in West Virgin-
ia directly from states of the United States other than the
State of West Virginia. Respondent is now and has been at
all times material herein an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges that Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America , Food Store Em-
ployees Union Local No. 347, AFL-CIO, herein called
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act . The answer admits this allegation and
I so find.
1 After the close of the hearing, General Counsel on October 31, 1975,
filed a motion to introduce into evidence the collective-bargaining agree-
ment of October 14, 1973, to October 4, 1975, representing therein that
Respondent joined in said motion to be labeled as A. Exh. I. No objection
thereto having been received, the motion is hereby granted.
223 NLRB No. 220
1470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 2
The complaint alleges that on or about September 3,
1974, Respondent suspended Rafferty for 2 weeks and sub-
sequently discharged him on or about October 18, 1974, all
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Further, the com-
plaint alleges that Respondent 's store manager , James Oli-
ver, and Zone Manager Carl Martin engaged in coercive
misconduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act including surveillance of employees, threats, interroga-
tions, promises , and reprimands.
A. 8(a)(1) Allegations
In September 1974, Michael Mick, an employee in the
Respondent's Weston store, met with Store Manager Oli-
ver concerning his work performance. Also present at this
meeting, representing the Union, were Ilean Danley, shop
steward; James Burkhart, vice president of the Union; and
Elwood Wilt, Union business representative. In the course
of evaluating Mick's performance, Oliver told him that he
was a "troublemaker" and told him he should not advise
other employees concerning their rights under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement , notably work hours, and that
he was to refrain from such activity. Further Mick testified
that Oliver told him, "What I was going to have to do is
just keep my mouth shut and not to tell the other employ-
ees what to do, that that was the shop steward's job and his
job."
Again in about March 1975 Oliver spoke to Mick con-
cerning the matter of Mick's counseling employees about
the provisions of the contract. Mick testified:
This was, I believe, later, about March. And he again
told me that I shouldn't tell employees, you know, that
they could claim hours or whether they could have
earlier shifts; and I told him-told Mr. Oliver that I
planned on helping employees like I told him before
and that I would continue it.
Respondent contends that Oliver was essentially object-
ing to Mick's discussing grievances with employees "on the
clock." However, the record supports the conclusion that
Oliver was attempting to restrict legitimate protected activ-
ity, i.e., discussion among employees of contractual work-
ing conditions. Such remarks are coercive within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.'
Nor am I persuaded that Oliver's March 1975 conversa-
tion with Mick was essentially a demand that the proper
grievance procedure be followed. These remarks went be-
2 The complaint was amended , without objection, at hearing to add par.
6(g) which reads , "In or about September and November 1974, and in or
about January and March 1975, by Oliver at Respondent 's Weston, West
Virginia , store, prohibiting employees from engaging in union or concerted
activities by, inter alia, instructing employees not to discuss their rights un-
der the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Respon-
dent."
3 Oliver was not called as a witness by Respondent . Accordingly, this and
all other allegations involving Oliver are resolved without the benefit of his
testimony.
yond any legitimate request by Oliver to follow contractual
grievance procedures by inhibiting legitimate employee
discussion about contract provisions, a protected employee
right under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent further argues that the Spielberg 4 principle
should be applied to this allegation inasmuch as the griev-
ance was resolved at this meeting. The short answer to this
contention is the record does not support any finding that
the unfair labor practice allegation herein was "resolved"
in any manner sufficient to warrant application of the
Spielberg principle.
Mick testified further concerning this same conversation
as follows:
Yes, he [Oliver] also told us that-at more or less the
finalizing of the meeting that there had been too much
discussion of the contract between employees and on
the clock and off the clock; and he told us that this
was going to have to stop or he was going to complete-
ly stop all employees from talking to one another
while they were on the clock.
Respondent contends that Oliver was merely expressing
a legitimate employer interest in preserving compensated
time for productive work. However, Oliver's remarks ex-
ceeded permissible limits by threatening in the future to
impose limitation on employee discussions while "on the
clock." This could be interpreted as extending from the
time employees clock in until they clocked out, including
all breaktime. A threat to impose such a restriction violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Essex International Inc., 211
NLRB 749 (1974).
In October 1974, Otis Saunders, an employee at the
Weston store, visited the Bridgeport, West Virginia, store
along with Wilt, for the purpose of getting his first strike
benefit check which had been misdelivered to the Bridge-
port store. Martin was attempting to persuade some picket-
ing employees to accept the contract while Wilt and Saun-
ders were urging them to reject it. According to Saunders,
a conversation took place at the picket line as follows:
Well, Mr. Martin told me that I shouldn't be down
there talking with the Bridgeport employees. He called
me a radical, he told me that we had a good contract
and I should be happy with it and be ready to go back
to work; and he told me not to be influencing his
people to refuse the contract proposals as they were,
now.5
In my opinion such remarks constitute , in essence, an
unlawful attempt to restrict Saunders from discussing the
contract proposal with employees of the Bridgeport store
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Some 2 weeks after the strike ended on November 3,
1974, Oliver called Richard Smith and Robert Castro, both
employees, into his office. Smith testified 6 that Oliver told
them, "He told us that our work was going downhill, that
we should not listen to what everybody told us, to think for
ourselves and that if we would improve, that we would be
4 Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
5 This is Saunders ' version of the conversation which I credit, noting par-
ticularly that it is not contradicted by Wilt and that Martin did not testify.
6 Castro did not testify concerning this incident.
THE KROGER CO.
good management material." General Counsel contends
that these remarks were an attempt to create an impression
of surveillance of an employee's participation in concerted
activity engaged in for the purpose of their mutual aid and
protection. In addition General Counsel contends that
these same remarks constitute a coercive reprimand for the
employees' union activity and an illegal promise of benefit
if they "improved" which General Counsel defines as re-
fraining "from participating in union activities." Even
crediting Smith's testimony, I am not persuaded that these
remarks are coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. The strike over the wage reopener in the con-
tract had ended, the contract was in full effect, and there
would appear to be little to gain by coercion. I conclude
that the General Counsel's allegation of misconduct as to
this incident is grossly speculative, representing the prod-
uct of an overstrained interpretation of language.
On approximately the same day or the following day,
Oliver also spoke to Gary Donaldson, telling him, "He told
me that my hair was unruly and my dress wasn't fit and-
let's see-and not to talk to other employees while I was
working, that I had ruined two employees." The General
Counsel contends that these remarks constitute illegal in-
terrogation, created the impression of surveillance, and
were a reprimand of the employee for engaging in concert-
ed activities. I do not agree. While I credit Donaldson's
version of the remarks, I regard the General Counsel's in-
terpretation of these remarks as unwarranted and totally
unsupported by any probative evidence.
On about November 4, 1974, the day following the end
of the strike, Donaldson testified as follows:
Q. Directing your attention to shortly after you re-
turned to work, perhaps the'first day after you re-
turned to work after the strike, do you recall engaging
in conversation with Mr. Oliver on that day?
A. Yes I talked to him several times . When I came
to work, he shook our hands-
Q. Where did this take place?
A. In the conference room there. He shook our
hands when we first came. There was two of them that
came in a half hour early. I think it might have been
Henry Messenger . And we started working; and he
called us back at 10:00 o'clock, I think it was, when
the rest of them came to work and he talked to us and
he told us to forget about the contract and to forget
about the strike, that it was over and for us to go back
to work and forget about it.
General Counsel contends that by such remarks Respon-
dent was restricting employee rights by instructing employ-
ees not to discuss their rights under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. I do not agree. In this situation a strike had
just ended and the store manager was in substance doing
no more than greeting returning strikers and calling upon
them to put the unpleasant episode behind them, forget the
past, and return to a full work effort. I do not view such
remarks as coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.'
7 General Counsel in its brief contends that Oliver solicited employees to
bypass shop stewards and deal directly with him. However, the complaint
B. Rafferty's Discharge
1. Facts
1471
Thomas M. Rafferty was employed at Respondent's
Weston, West Virginia, store as head dairy clerk. Rafferty
was originally employed for some 9 years in a part-time
capacity and the last 8 years full time. His supervisor, the
store manager at the Weston store, was James Oliver who
had been the store manager at all times relevant herein,
except for a period of about 1 year from December 1972 to
December 1973, when Robert Shepherd was the store man-
ager.
The Union has represented the Respondent's employees
at several of the Respondent's stores including the Weston
store. The last contract was in effect from October 14,
1973, through October 4, 1975, with a wage reopener provi-
sion as of October 12, 1974. Failure to reach agreement on
the wage reopener resulted in a strike against the Respon-
dent from October 13, 1974, until November 3, 1974.
Rafferty was a union member and had been assigned by
Ilean Danley, the shop steward at the Weston store, as
relief shop steward to provide coverage when both Danley
and the assistant shop steward, Christine Jeffries, were un-
available. It appears that during the course of his employ-
ment Rafferty acted as counselor, or adviser, to the em-
ployees on a regular and continuing basis on matters
involving interpretations of the contract, particularly as to
work hours, shifts, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and re-
lated matters. On a few occasions, normally in the absence
of other shop stewards, Rafferty went directly to the store
manager in his efforts to settle the employee's problem.
Rafferty's activity insofar as actually filing grievances him-
self appears to have been limited to the filing of a group
employee grievance in 1972 concerning a dress code at the
store. It appears that Rafferty's consultations occurred
both on and off worktime. Having dispensed his advice,
Rafferty would sometimes refer the employee to a shop
steward for further action, including the filing of a griev-
ance where such was warranted. At other times he would
refer them to a shop steward without having first discussed
the problem with them.
At the time that Oliver was returning to the Weston store
to replace Shepherd in October or November 1973, Raffer-
ty and employee Otis Saunders opposed this change vocal-
ly at a union meeting indicating that they wanted Shepherd
to remain. The next day, according to Saunders, Shepherd
asked him about the meeting and Saunders told him that
both he and Rafferty had spoken against the change in
store managers. Rafferty further testified to another inci-
dent that same day with Zone Manager Martin as follows:
Yes. I believe it was the same day-at approximately
the same day, that I was putting up margarine in the
last aisle of the Weston store on West Second Street;
and Mr. Shepherd and Mr. Martin were checking the
store over and they walked by.
Mr. Martin approached me and the best that I can
recall he said that he did not want to hear of me mak-
contains no such allegation, and the incident was not litigated at the hearing
in these circumstances, and I decline to make any findings based thereon.
1472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing any more statements at any union meeting like I
had made previously, the night before, because if I
ever did it again, then, that would be it.
Shepherd, on the other hand, cannot recall speaking to
Rafferty or Saunders about their statements at the union
meeting , nor does he recall any conversation at that time
between Martin and Rafferty.
It appears that other employees besides Rafferty and
Saunders opposed the change as indicated in a letter dated
March 7, 1973, (Resp. Exh. 1) written to Robert E. Zincke,
Respondent's personnel manager, lauding Shepherd and
expressing the hope that Shepherd would remain as store
manager at the Weston store. This letter was signed by 18
employees, including Rafferty, Saunders, and both shop
stewards.
With respect to the matter of Rafferty's attendance, cer-
tain documents were introduced concerning this matter,
including a performance rating dated April 1, 1974, signed
by Oliver and Martin, rating Rafferty "average" with a
notation , "Mr. Rafferty has some personal problems that
he needs to work on so as to further his career, i.e.-per-
sonal finances , absenteeism ." On May 20, 1974, Rafferty
was issued a "constructive advice" or disciplinary action
form (Resp. Exh. 5) specifying, inter alia, his absences since
December 12, 1973, and showing him as being put on pro-
bation until October 20, 1974. He was also required at this
time by Oliver to bring in a doctor's excuse at any time in
the future when he was absent for illness. Wilt testified that
such a requirement is "more or less standard procedure
where there is any question for repeated absences that the
Company does ask for doctor's excuses ." On June 4, 1974,
Rafferty was again issued a "constructive advice" form by
Oliver (Resp. Exh. 3) for being out sick without providing a
doctor's excuse and apparently suspending him until a
doctor's excuse was provided, although the record does not
fully elucidate this matter.
On August 31, 1974, Rafferty called in sick and did not
work. On Tuesday, September 4, 1974, the day after the
Labor Day holiday, Rafferty returned to work. Rafferty
testified that he was ill on August 31. However, it is undis-
puted that he did not see a doctor on that date. On Tues-
day, September 4, Rafferty was called into Oliver's office
about 3:45 p.m., some 15 minutes from Rafferty's quitting
time at 4 p.m. When Rafferty was unable to present a
doctor's excuse he was suspended for 14 days by Oliver
despite his plea that he had a doctor's excuse at home. This
suspension became effective at 4 p.m. that same day. I
conclude that the evidence better supports a finding that he
did not have a doctor's excuse at the time he was suspend-
ed by Oliver despite his representation to the contrary, and
that the doctor's excuse was obtained some time after 4
p.m., on September 4, 1974. In this regard I credit the testi-
mony of Doctor E. A. Trinkle' s assistant , Carolyn Gissy,
to the effect that Mrs. Fitch, Rafferty's ex-wife, obtained
the excuse for him after the office had closed at 4 p.m. on
September 4. In making the above findings, I note particu-
larly with respect to Gissy that she was not a party to this
matter with no apparent personal interest in the results.
These findings are supported by Respondents Exhibits 9
and 10.
On September 16, 1974, Rafferty returned to work, and
on September 23, 1974, he filed a formal grievance stating:
This grievance is filed concerning a suspension that I
received on 9/3/74 until 9/16/74 I had a doctor's ex-
cuse for missing work 8/31/74 but it was not accepted,
I believe this is nothing but harassment to me by man-
agement. To my knowledge all employees of this store
are not required to have a doctor's excuse. I feel that
the two week suspension was unfair and I should be
paid for that period. I would also like for this to be
removed from my records.
On October 18, 1974, Oliver sent a letter to Rafferty
reading:
This is to inform you that your employment with The
Kroger Co. has been terminated, effective October 18,
1974, due to a false statement you made to me con-
cerning a doctor's slip for work missed on August 31,
1974.
On September 3, 1974, I talked to you, stating that a
doctor's permit would be necessary before you re-
turned to work. At that time you informed me that the
permit was at your home. On October 18, 1974, it was
verified that you did not have the permit, and in fact
had your wife pick the permit up after the doctor's
office closed on September 3, 1974.
In light of your past record of absenteeism, you have
left us with no choice but to terminate your employ-
ment.
By letter dated October 20, 1974, (G.C. Exh. 5) the
Union protested Rafferty's discharge. However, by letter
of January 20, 1975, Rafferty was advised by the Union
that it would not take his case to arbitration because he
had not actually seen the doctor on August 31, 1974.
2. Analysis and recommendation
The record herein discloses that Rafferty was consulted
quite extensively by other employees concerning their
rights under the contract . Rafferty was the alternate shop
steward at the Weston store acting on behalf of the Union
only when a shop steward or an assistant shop steward
was unavailable . Rafferty had little involvement with the
actual filing of grievances on behalf of employees . He nor-
mally referred the employees to a shop steward for the
purpose of filing a grievance.
Rafferty was an active union member speaking against
the proposed contract at union meetings and participating
in the ensuing strike , originally as picket line captain for
about a week and later as a shift captain for one of the
three 4-hour picketing shifts . I am satisfied that Rafferty
was an active union adherent , and I am also persuaded
that the Respondent was aware of his involvement in such
protected activity. However , I am not satisfied that this
activity resulted in either his suspension or termination.
In this regard the record discloses that Rafferty had an
employment history of absenteeism . A work performance
evaluation covering the period from November 17, 1973, to
April 1, 1974, rating Rafferty "average ," notes the problem
THE KROGER CO. 1473
of absenteeism . Again on May 20 , 1974, a "constructive
advice" form was given to him for absenteeism , noting his
absences since December 4, 1974. At this time he was ad-
vised by Oliver that in the future he would be required to
provide a doctor's excuse for any absenteeism due to ill-
ness and he was placed on probation until October 20,
1974. Another "constructive advice" form dated June 4,
1974, reflects an absence and a suspension because Raffer-
ty failed to submit a doctor's excuse for an absence. This
documentary record of absenteeism is supported by the
testimony of both Store Manager Shepherd and fellow em-
ployee Otis Saunders.
Respondent contends that Zone Manager Martin threat-
ened Rafferty in November 1973 with discharge for voic-
ing his opposition to Oliver 's return as store manager to the
Weston store . Shepherd who appears to have been present
at the time does not recall the incident. In my opinion this
remark , even if made , is too ambiguous and remote in time
from Rafferty 's discharge to serve as a basis for concluding
that the suspension and discharge were motivated by dis-
criminatory considerations. Nor does the record show that
Martin as the zone manager was in any way involved in the
decision to either suspend or discharge Rafferty.
On these facts I am constrained to conclude that
Rafferty 's 2-week suspension on September 3, 1974, was
brought about by his history of absenteeism and more spe-
cifically his failure to provide a doctor's excuse for his ab-
sence on August 31, 1974.
Rafferty returned to work on September 16, 1974, filed a
grievance over his suspension on September 23, 1974, and
participated in the strike which began on October 13, 1974.
On October 18, 1974, by letter while the strike was still in
progress, and during his probationary period, Oliver termi-
nated Rafferty for lying to him by saying on September 3
that he had a doctor's excuse at home when in fact he did
not and none was obtained until after 4 p.m. on September
3, 1974. As noted above, I conclude that Oliver's evalua-
tion is correct and factual. It is undisputed that the doctor's
excuse is a "phoney" since Rafferty did not see Dr. Trinkle
at all on August 31, 1974. On these facts I am constrained
to conclude that Respondent's discharge of Rafferty was
justified by his misconduct in connection with his absence
of August 31, 1974.
In summary I conclude that Rafferty was an active
union adherent and he was involved in certain protected
employee activity and that the Respondent was aware of
this . However , even having reached these conclusions,
there remains another element which is essential to any
finding of an unfair labor practice, to wit, the employee
must have been discharged for having engaged in such ac-
tivity. Participation in union or concerted activity does not
confer immunity from discharge for sufficient cause. In my
opinion the facts in this case establish sufficient cause for
the suspension and subsequent discharge and I shall rec-
ommend dismissal of that aspect of the complaint.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above , have a close, intimate , and substantial relationship
to trade , traffic , and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct-
ing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and from infringing in
any like or related manner upon its employees' Section 7
rights, and that it take certain affirmative action designed
to effecutate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record in this proceeding, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. The Employer did not otherwise violate the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, I hereby issue the fol-
lowing recommended:
ORDER'
Respondent, The Kroger Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, its offi-
cers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully instructing employees to refrain from
discussing their rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement in force between Respondent and Amalgamat-
ed Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
Food Store Employees Union Local No. 347, AFL-CIO.
(b) Coercing employees by threatening to restrict their
contract discussions on nonworktime.
(c) Unlawfully attempting to prevent employees from
discussing collective-bargaining proposals.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its retail store in Weston, West Virginia, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of
8In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
9In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
Continued
1474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
said notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 6, after being duly signed by the Employer's
authorized representatives, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places , includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
insure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Company has taken to comply herewith.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT instruct our employees to refrain from
discussing their rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL NOT coerce our employees with threats to
restrict their right to discuss the collective-bargaining
agreement on nonworktime.
WE WILL NOT attempt to prevent employees from dis-
cussing collective-bargaining proposals.
WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
THE KROGER CO.