The Huntington Hospital, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 29, 1975

218 N.L.R.B. 51 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC. 51
The Huntington Hospital, Inc. and District 1199,
West Virginia, National Union of Hospital and
Health Care Employees, Retail , Wholesale and
Department Store Union , AFL-CIO. Case 9-CA-
8754
May 29, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND KENNEDY
On January 28, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Paul Bisgyer issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, fmdings,l and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, The Huntington
Hospital, Inc., Huntington, West Virginia, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C.A. 3, 195-1). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BISGYER, Administrative Law Judge: This proceed-
ing, with all the parties represented, was heard on
November 26, 1974, in Huntington, West Virginia, on the
complaint of the General Counsel issued on October 22,
i The complaint is based on original and amended charges filed by
District 1199, West Virginia, National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, on
September 5 and October 18, 1974, respectively, copies of which were served
on the Respondent by registered mail on September 6 and October 18, 1974,
respectively.
Z Sec. 8(a)(l) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7." Insofar as pertinent , Sec. 7 provides that
218 NLRB No. 15
1974,1 and the answer of The Huntington Hospital, Inc.,
herein called the Respondent or the Hospital . In issue are
the questions whether the Respondent, in violation of
Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended,2 discriminatorily discharged employees
Kermit Chapman, Homer Ross , and Shannon Patterson
because of their actual or suspected union sympathies,
membership, or activities and whether it independently
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by other conduct in
restraint of employee self-organizational rights. At the
close of the hearing, the parties waived oral argument and
thereafter only the General Counsel submitted a brief in
support of his position.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and with due consideration
being given to the arguments advanced by the parties, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a nonprofit West Virginia corpora-
tion engaged in the operation of a hospital at Huntington,
West Virginia, and as such is and has been at all material
times a "health care institution" as defined in Section 2(14)
of the Act. Its annual gross revenues from its operations
exceed $250,000. In the conduct of its hospital the
Respondent purchases goods and supplies valued in excess
of $50,000 per year which are shipped directly to the
hospital from sources outside West Virginia.
The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is undisputed, and I find, that District 1199, West
Virginia, National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Evidence
1. The advent of the Union; issues presented
On August 19, 1974,3 the Union instituted a drive to
organize the Respondent's employees. At about 6:15 in the
morning of that day, Larry Harless, an organizer of the
Union, stationed himself on the public sidewalk in front of
the Hospital's entrance and for an hour distributed union
leaflets and membership application card's to employees as
"[elmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ..
Sec. 8(aX3), with certain qualifications not material herein , prohibits an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ......
3 Unless otherwise indicated , all dates refer to 1974.
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they reported for work, informing some of them that a new
law was passed enabling them to organize.4 Two of the
employees who received a leaflet and membership applica-
tion card and were given information concerning their new
rights were the alleged discriminatees, Kermit Chapman,
whom Harless had recognized from the Union's prior
unsuccessful organizational effort at the Hospital, and
Homer Ross. When Ross received the union material he
put it in his pocket. As he was entering the Hospital, he
was met in the doorway by his supervisor, Friend Buckner,
the executive housekeeper, who removed the union leaflet
from Ross' pocket, commenting that Ross did not really
want it. Ross, however, replied that he wanted to read it
and secured its return.5
The Union's organizational drive did not prove to be
very productive since it received from the employees after
its August 19 appearance a total of four to six signed
membership application cards, approximately three of
which were received in the mails before the discharges here
involved. Two of these signed cards were from Chapman
and Ross to each of whom Harless, in accordance with the
Union's practice, thereupon mailed three blank application
cards to be used' in soliciting signatures from other
employees. Following the receipt of the blank application
cards, Chapman distributed them to his fellow employees
on the sidewalk in front of the Hospital. In addition, on
August 29 Chapman similarly passed out to employees
outside the Hospital the three blank cards previously sent
to Ross, which Ross had turned over to Chapman in the
basement of the Hospital near Buckner's office. While
Ross, himself, did not distribute any cards among
employees, he informed several of them that he had signed
a card.
On August 29, Chapman, Ross, and Patterson were
terminated under circumstances related below. It is the
General Counsel's position that they were discharged on
account of their actual or suspected union sympathies and
activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent, on the other hand, argues, that they were
discharged for cause-Chapman for insubordination and
poor performance; Ross for falsification of his employment
application; 6 and Patterson for insubordination in refusing
to wear uniform trousers. Also in issue is the question
whether the Respondent acknowledged to Chapman and
Ross its discriminatory motivation, thereby independently
coercing and restraining employees in the exercise of their
statutory rights, which Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits.
We turn to the evidence.
2. The employment and discharge of Chapman
Chapman was employed as a housekeeper in the
Respondent's housekeeping department for 3 years, work-
4 It is clear that Harless was referring to the new nonprofit hospital
amendments to the Act which gave the Boardjurisdiction over institutions
such as the Respondent's (Public Law 93-360, 93d Cong, S 3203.) These
amendments were approved July 26, 1974, and went into effect on August
25, 1974
5 This finding is based on Ross' testimony which , as later discussed, I
find to be more reliable than the testimony of Buckner who denied that the
incident ever occurred. I reach this conclusion fully cognizant of the fact
that this incident is not mentioned in the pretrial affidavit which Ross
signed during his interview by a Board agent concerning his discharge Ross
ing under the -supervision of Friend Buckner, the executive
housekeeper. Of approximately 18 employees in his
department, Chapman was the most senior in point of
service . During his tenure, he received at least two merit
increases , the last one being on Buckner's recommendation
about a month or two before his discharge.
On August 29, Chapman was summarily terminated
without prior notice or warning. There is conflicting
testimony as to what transpired on this occasion. Accord-
ing to Chapman, the following occurred: At about 3
o'clock in the afternoon, a half hour before his shift ended,
Buckner approached Chapman while at work on the
second floor and directed him to come to his office. When
Chapman arrived there, Patterson, another discharged
housekeeper, was leaving. Buckner asked Chapman for his
keys. Chapman complied but inquired what this was all
about. Buckner answered that he was phasing out the ECD
(Extended Care Division) on the second floor.? Chapman
expressed disbelief that this was the reason for his
discharge. This evoked Buckner's response that "there's a
few more little friends that was tinkering with the union."
Thereupon, Chapman asked for a paper to show that he
was fired. Buckner declined to furnish it but advised
Chapman to see Administrative Assistant Robert Adkins
who had personnel responsibilities.
Buckner categorically denied telling Chapman at the
time of his discharge that he was "tinkering" with the
Union or making comparable statements . He further
denied any knowledge of Chapman's union interest or
activity or that he had informed Chapman that he was
being terminated because the ECD was being closed down.
Instead, Buckner testified, he told Chapman that he was
being discharged because his "work had dropped down,"
and "wasn't up to par." Buckner, however, admitted that
he did not indicate what specifically was wrong with
Chapman's work. Buckner also testified that Chapman
made no response to the reason given for his dismissal.
At the conclusion of his conversation with Buckner,
Chapman promptly proceeded to Adkins' office. Here, too,
there is a serious conflict in testimony as to substance of
the conversation between Chapman and Adkins. Chapman
testified, as follows: Adkins stated that the reason he was
being terminated was that the ECD on the second floor
was being phased out. In response, Chapman expressed
doubt that this was all there was no his, discharge. At this
point, Adkins inquired why Chapman would want a union
in the Hospital and Chapman answered with the question
why would "anybody else want a union?" On this note, the
conversation ended.
Adkins' version of this conversation is entirely different.
According to Adkins, when Chapman asked why he was
discharged, he replied it was ,"[b ]ecause of his work
performance; he wasn't doing his job correctly," and his
explained that he did not realize it was information the Board agent wanted.
The General Counsel notes in his brief that the complaint does not allege
Buckner's conduct on this occasion to be violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act
because it occurred prior to August 25, 1974, the effective date of the
nonprofit hospital amendments to the Act However, he correctly urges the
relevancy of this evidence with respect to the issue of motivation underlying
the discharges here involved.
6 During the hearing, the Respondent's counsel advanced an additional
ground that Ross was an unsafe person to be near patients in the Hospital.
7 The ECD was subsequently closed down October 1.
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC. 53
work "was haphazard." He further testified that this
response angered Chapman who inquired whether this was
the whole reason, adding that Adkins had not "heard the
last of this." Adkins also specifically denied that he told
Chapman that his discharge was due to the ECD being
phased out; or that he asked Chapman why he wanted a
union; or that he commented in any way that Chapman
was messing around with the Union.
From a careful evaluation of the irreconcilable testimony
concerning Chapman's discharge interviews with Buckner
and Adkins, I find that Chapman's account is entitled to
greater credence than the versions furnished by Buckner
and Adkins who appeared to me to be less than candid
witnesses. As later noted, Buckner and Adkins were far
from convincing in their testimony respecting the fortui-
tous nature of Chapman's termination as a byproduct of
the Respondent's decision to discharge Ross ostensibly for
falsif^'ing his job application. Also detracting from Buck-
ner's and Adkins' reliability as witnesses is their lack of
reasonable explanation for the suddenness of the discharge
of Chapman, an employee with the longest service seniority
in the housekeeping department, in midweek and without
prior notice or warning. Nor is their credibility enhanced
by their grossly exaggerated and implausible picture
painted of Chapman's work performance during his 3 years
of employment at the Hospital, which will be discussed
below. Moreover, similarly impairing the acceptability of
Buckner's and Adkins' testimony are the mconsistent
reasons, also to be subsequently considered, which they
gave to Ross for his termination, as well as the absence of
substantiation for the reason offered by Adkins.
In sum, I am persuaded that the testimony of Chapman,
who impressed me as a trustworthy witness not disposed to
fabricate a story, should be credited.
3. The employment and discharge of Ross
Ross worked for the Respondent as a housekeeper on the
day shift under Executive Housekeeper Buckner's supervi-
sion from about August 14 to August 29. Before being
hired, he filled out a job application and was interviewed
by Administrative Assistant Adkins in Buckner's presence.
One of the questions asked in the application was "Have
you been convicted of a crime in the past ten years,
excluding misdemeanors and summary offenses?-if yes,
describe in full." Ross truthfully answered this question in
the negative; at least no evidence to the contrary was
presented. Ross testified that in the course of his interview,
Adkins inquired whether he had ever been arrested and
that he replied that he had been arrested a few times; that
he was out on bond on a nonserious charge; 8 and that he
was just married and needed a job. Commenting that those
arrests related to "minor things," Adkins directed Buckner
to hire Ross and to give him a couple days trial.
Admittedly, Ross proved to be a "good" employee. Ross
further testified that during his period of employment he
s Although Ross' pretrial affidavit does not mention any discussions he
had with Adkins at the tune he was employed concerning his arrests, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the affidavit covered the substance of
Ross' employment interview.
9 Ross testified he was surprised at this development since only an hour
and a half before Buckner had told hum that he was pleased with his work
was permitted to leave his work to go to court on the
matter he mentioned in his job interview.
Adkins, however, denied that the subject of Ross' arrests
was discussed at Ross' employment interview or that
subsequently Ross was allowed to leave work to go to
court. Buckner also denied knowledge that Ross at the
times in question was involved with the police or that Ross
asked or was given permission to go to court or to see a
justice of the peace.
On August 29 at about 3:30 p.m., at the close of his shift,
Ross was discharged. There is contradictory testimony
concerning the termination conversations on that day.
According to Ross' testimony the following occurred:
Buckner approached Ross at the timeclock and invited him
to his office. When Ross arrived there, Buckner told him
that "he was phasing [him] out" and wanted his keys. In
response to Ross' inquiry whether this meant that he was
fired, Buckner stated that he had "better believe it.-9 Ross
thereupon asked for the reason and Buckner replied that he
had been soliciting votes for the Union all over the
Hospital.10 Buckner also told Ross, "Don't feel bad, I've
got Shannon [Patterson] and Chapman, and I'm going to
get a few more around here. Ross disputed Buckner's
statement that he had been soliciting votes or passing out
cards in the Hospital.11 Buckner, however, disagreed,
asserting that Ross, Chapman, and Patterson had solicited
all the employees and that "if they got a union in there, it
would bankrupt the hospital." At the conclusion of the
conversation, Ross asked for his paycheck and Buckner
told him to see Adkins.
Contradicting Ross' version of their discharge conversa-
tion, Buckner testified that, pursuant to instructions
received from Adkins around August 27 or 28 to relieve
Ross of his job, he called Ross into his office on August 29
and informed him that he had to terminate him because
the ECD was going to be phased out and Ross' services
were no longer needed. Although Buckner testified that the
true reason for the discharge was Ross' falsification of his
employment application, Buckner admitted that this
reason was not given to Ross nor was Ross' police record
discussed. In an apparent effort to secure an explanation
from Buckner as to why he had withheld the true reason
from Ross, the Respondent's attorney questioned Buckner
on the witness stand whether it was because he was
concerned over his personal safety. However, Buckner
answered that he was not. After further interrogation ' by
the Respondent's attorney, Buckner testified that he had
no particular reason for withholding from Ross that his
discharge resulted from his falsification of his employment
application. Buckner also testified that Ross' union interest
or activity was not mentioned in the discharge conversa-
tion, nor, indeed, was he even aware at that time that Ross
favored the Union. Specifically, Buckner denied accusing
Ross of soliciting union votes in the Hospital or stating
that Chapman, Patterson, and other employees had been
or would be similarly terminated. When cross-examined
10 In his testimony, Ross used the phrase "soliciting votes" interchange-
ably with passing outcards.
11 As indicated above, Ross, however, did give Chapman the three blank
cards he had received from the Union, which Chapman subsequently
distributed.
54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
why he waited until August 29 to terminate Ross after
receiving instructions from Adkins on August 27 to take
that action, as Buckner had earlier testified, Buckner
explained that Ross was off on August 27 and 28.
However, although Ross contradicted Buckner and testi-
fied that he had worked those days, Buckner did not
produce the Respondent's records to dispute Ross, even
though Buckner stated on the witness stand that he had to
check to ascertain whether Ross was off on the indicated
days.
Having been discharged by Buckner, Ross proceeded to
Adkins' office. There, in the presence of the Respondent's
security officer, Wilbur R. Keeney, who had trailed him to
the office, Ross testified that he informed Adkins that he
was fired by Buckner for soliciting votes; that Adkins
disagreed with him, asserting that Buckner let him go for
lying to them; and that when he (Ross) denied that he had
lied, Adkins retorted that everything Ross had put in his
job application "was a damn lie." Ross further testified
that, since he saw no purpose in continuing the argument,
he asked Adkins for his paycheck and was told to return
the next day for it.
According to Adkins' account, there is no doubt that
Adkins at least told Ross on this occasion that Buckner
had terminated him because he had falsified his job
application in giving a negative answer to the inquiry,
whether he had been "convicted of a crime in the past ten
years, excluding misdemeanors and summary offenses."
Adkins further testified that he also informed Ross at this
time that the Respondent had run a check on him and
learned that he had been arrested four times in the last 3 or
4 months.12 However, Adkins conceded that he did not
know whether or not Ross had been convicted of any
offenses . Adkins also denied that Ross claimed that he was
fired for his union activity or otherwise brought up the
subject of unions . In this respect, Adkins was contradicted
by the Respondent's witness, Keeney, who testified that
Ross told Adkins that he heard that "the union got us
fired." Keeney also testified that he did not recall Adkins'
response, if any.,
I credit Ross ' testimony regarding his employment
interview and discharge conversations with Buckner and
Adkins. As shown above, both Buckner and Adkins
furnished Ross with different reasons for his discharge.
Buckner's reason was admittedly false while Adkins' was
unsubstantiated. Moreover, Ross' testimony that he in-
formed Adkins that Buckner told him that he was
terminated because of his union solicitation is supported,
at least in part, by Keeney's testimony that Ross, in his
discharge discussion with Adkins, brought up the subject
of the Union as the cause of his termination . In addition,
Buckner's, attempt to justify the delay in executing the
instructions he had received from Adkins to discharge
Ross was manifestly unconvincing. All facts being consid-
ered, I find Ross' testimony in question worthy of belief.
As advised, Ross returned to the Hospital the next day
where he received his paycheck. Although Keeney stated
12 According to Security Officer Keeney, Adkins told Ross, in answer to
Ross' question, that he was discharged because of his police record about
which the Respondent had learned after making a police check. He,
however, could not remember whether Adkins stated that Ross was fired for
falsification of his application.
that, in his opinion, Ross was intoxicated on this occasion,
it is clear that no incident developed from his purported
inebriation. At any rate, it is undisputed that Ross was
never-intoxicated while at work.
4. The employment and discharge of Patterson
The account of Patterson's employment history was
given at the hearing by Buckner and Adkins.13 Patterson
did not appear. The General Counsel stated for the record
that Patterson had left the State without leaving a
forwarding address and could not be located.
Patterson worked as a housekeeper on the afternoon
shift for almost a year before he was discharged on August
29. His big problem on the job was his refusal to wear
uniform trousers, although he did wear a uniform shirt.14
This problem had persisted for several months before his
discharge. Prior to that time, Patterson was in full uniform
until he tore the trousers and discarded them and began
wearing ordinary pants. Despite warnings that he would be
terminated if he did not wear uniform trousers, Patterson
refused to buy a new pair for the alleged reason that he
could not afford it. Nor would he accept the Respondent's
offer to advance the money because he would have to
repay the loan.
On August 29, at about 3 p.m., when Patterson reported
for work, he was called into Buckner's office where
Buckner informed him that his failure to wear uniform
trousers had been tolerated long enough and that he had
been warned several times about the consequences of his
failure to be in full uniform. Accordingly, Buckner
discharged Patterson. Buckner denied that union consider-
ations motivated this action and, indeed, he and Adkins
denied knowledge of any union interest or activity on
Patterson's part.
The next day Patterson, accompanied by his pregnant
wife, returned to the Hospital where he saw Adkins.
Adkins offered to speak to Executive Director Robert G.
Via about reinstating Patterson if he got into uniform.
Although Patterson at first agreed to the proposition and
Adkins left and secured Via's permission to reinstate
Patterson on those terms, Patterson changed his mind and
stated that he would rather go on welfare or leave the area
for Columbus to get a higher-paying job. This ended
Patterson's efforts to return to work at the Hospital.
5. The discharge decision
The Respondent strenuously denies that it was motivated
by union considerations in discharging employees Ross,
Chapman, and Patterson and presented testimony of the
circumstances which led to its decision. According to the
testimony of Executive Director Robert G. Via, the
decision had its origin in a telephone call he had received
on or about August 27 from the wife of a member of the
Hospital's board of directors concerning Ross.15 Via
further testified that the informant told him that she had
13 Although this testimony was uncontroverted , its credibility will be
assessed in "Concluding Findings ," infra
14 Buckner testified that he had to admonish Patterson frequently to put
his shirttails in his pants.
15 Administrative Assistant Adkins testified that on August 26 or 27 Via
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC. 55
heard from some of her friends that Ross was not the type
of a person who should be permitted to work at the
Hospital since he had a record of drinking and perhaps
used dope.16 Because of this call, Via testified, he
determined to investigate this charge and directed Security
Officer Keeney to run a police check on Ross.
Probably the next morning, August 28, Keeney testified
that he proceeded with his assignment and telephoned the
Huntington Police Department,17 made an inquiry about
Ross' police record, and was informed that Ross had a
police record of having been arrested for driving while
intoxicated and for two offenses of public intoxication.
Keeney was also told in this conversation that Ross was
"pretty rowdy" when drinking.18 In addition, Keeney
testified that he did not know whether Ross had been
convicted of the indicated offenses or what were the dates
of these offenses. Later, in the afternoon, Keeney testified,
he came to work and reported the above police informa-
tion to Via.
Continuing with his testimony, Via related the following:
Either the afternoon of August 27 or the next morning,
Keeney advised him that Ross had a police record of
"driving while intoxicated and threatening people, I think
... of fighting . . . [and] losing his wallet and so forth."
Keeney also told Via that Ross "was and could be a danger
to patients." Upon receiving Keeney's report, Via sum-
moned Adkins to his office and, apprising him that he had
evidence that Ross had a criminal record, inquired whether
Adkins was aware of it. Adkins answered that he was not
and, at Via's request, procured Ross' job application from
the files. After reviewing the application, Via concluded
that Ross ' negative answer, to the question whether he had
been "convicted of a crime in the past ten years, excluding
misdemeanors and summary offenses" was untrue and a
falsification of the application. Via then instructed Adkins
"to investigate the matter, and if necessary, dismiss .. .
[Ross] because he was a danger to the patients."
Admittedly, Via on this occasion did not know of any
crime of which Ross was convicted; nor did Keeney's
report to Via disclose any. Indeed, there is absolutely
nothing in the testimony of Huntington Police Officer
Paden, who appeared as a witness , or in the FBI report that
indicates that Ross' negative answer to the conviction
question in his job application was a falsification.
Via also testified that, because of his concern that a
person with Ross' record would be employed by the
Hospital, he directed Adkins in the same conversation to
review with Buckner the entire personnel in the housekeep-
ing department with the view of terminating any employee
in the same situation as Ross or who was not doing his
told him that he had received a call from a person that an employee at the
Hospital wasn't fit to work there or that he was dangerous to the patients.
However, under cross-examination, Adkins testified that an anonymous
telephone call was received at the Hospital by a switchboard operator who
reported to him that the caller stated either that Ross wasn't fit to work at
the Hospital or that he was "very dangerous or something" l ke that . Adkins
also testified that he conveyed this information to Via.
1B The Respondent's attorney correctly acknowledged that this hearsay
testimony did not establish the truth of the accusation.
17 Keeney testified that he also telephoned the sheriffs office in
Lawrence County where he resides for information concerning Ross.
work properly or who was not observing the Hospital's
rules and regulations.19
According to Adkins' account of the above conversation,
Via told him that he had run a check on Ross, which
disclosed that he had three or four arrests in the last 2 or 3
months.20 After examining Ross' fob application, Via and
Adkins concluded that Ross had falsified his application in
answering no to the conviction question and in failing to
disclose his arrest record. Via then directed Adkins to
discharge Ross for "falsification of application." At this
point, Via further instructed Adkins that "if you have any
other people that you know are troublemakers or that we've
been working with over a certain period of time and they
have not come up to the hospital standards, to separate
them also." (Emphasis added.)
Thereupon, according to the testimony of Adkins and
Buckner, Adkins promptly went to Buckner's office where
he transmitted to Buckner Via's instructions to terminate
Ross for falsely answering the conviction question in his
job application and withholding, his arrest record and to
consider discharging other employees in the housekeeping
department with whom he was having problems. Buckner
and Adkins then selected for discharge Chapman and
Patterson-the former because of his unsatisfactory job
performance and the latter on account of his persistent
refusal to wear uniform trousers.
Concerning Chapman who, as indicated above, had been
in the Respondent's employ for some 3 years and possessed
the greatest service seniority in his department, Buckner
and Adkins presented such an exaggerated picture of an
inadequate employee as to leave one perplexed why the
Respondent had not gotten rid of him sooner. Thus,
Buckner gave the following account of Chapman's perfor-
mance : he was inefficient and "negligent," slowed down
his work, and refused to follow instructions. This conduct
continued "over a long period of time" with the result that
Buckner was obliged to speak to Chapman about it
"several times ." Because of Buckner's efforts, Chapman's
performance would "at times" improve but then it would
"drop off again." About a month before Chapman's
discharge, Buckner conferred with Adkins regarding
Chapman's retention and it was decided that Buckner
would try, as he had previously done, to induce Chapman
to do better work. When Buckner discussed the situation
with Chapman about this time and at three subsequent
occasions at least, Chapman simply responded with a
shrug of his shoulders and a declaration that he was doing
the best he could.
Under cross-examination, Buckner also found fault with
Chapman's lack of diligence in doing and completing
assigned tasks. Buckner testified that, when he asked
'Keeney, however, did not indicate what, if anything , he bad learned from,
this source.
18 Although at one point in his testimony Keeney stated that the police
informed him that Ross was considered "dangerous" when drinking , later,
under cross-examination, he testified that he did not know whether he
"should use the word dangerous or not, but rowdy or something like that."
19, Via testified that Adkins subsequently informed hum that, in addition
to Ross, Chapman and Patterson were terminated-Chapman for not
following orders, and Patterson for not wearing a uniform while at work.
20 Under cross-examination, Adkins testified that Via told him that Ross
was arrested four times in the last 3 or 4 months. He also testified that he
'could not remember what Via stated about the nature of the offenses nor
did he (Adkins) know at that time whether Ross had been convicted.
56 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Chapman to do a particular job, Chapman would answer
that he did not have the time; that Chapman would not
"fully" finish an assigned task; that it would take Chapman
a few hours to do a job that should take an hour; and that
this state of affairs lasted for "several weeks." When the
General Counsel pursued his questioning with the remark
that he thought that this situation had persisted for several
years, Buckner replied that "it would add up to several
years." " Buckner also testified under cross-examination that
Chapman's work was bad "off and on" for about 2 years
and that the last time it was bad was a month or so before
his discharge. Although Buckner initially indicated that he
had warned Chapman "several times" about his work, the
final time being a week before the discharge, when asked
during his cross-examination whether he had threatened
Chapman with discharge if his work did not improve,
Buckner answered that he believed that he had.21
At the conclusion of his cross-examination Buckner
added another of Chapman's shortcomings which contrib-
uted to his discharge, namely, smoking in the halls and
lobby while working. Buckner further testified that
Chapman had indulged in this conduct since the inception
of his employment. Buckner also pointed out that, while he
warned Chapman for smoking on duty, he similarly
warned other employees who smoked on duty.
Adkins' assessment of Chapman's performance was of
the same general tenor as Buckner's. Adkins testified that
Chapman "was doing lousy work" which had been going
on for "a couple of years" and fluctuated between "good
and bad." He was specifically critical of the way Chapman
washed the floors. Adkins further testified that, although
he had not personally warned Chapman about his work, he
had directed Buckner to do so. In Addition, Adkins
testified that, when Buckner complained to him that
Chapman was not "listening" or trying hard enough in his
job, he told Buckner to help Chapman improve his
performance. However, Adkins testified, Chapman's per-
formance never really improved, although it might have
become "a little bit" more "tolerable." Finally, during his
cross-examination, Adkins listed other deficiencies on
Chapman's part which brought about' his discharge-
Chapman's backache complaints, smoking a pipe in the
nurses' -station, efforts "to trade off little gadgets and
things," and taking up other people's time. Adkins also
testified that Chapman engaged in this conduct during the
same time period "as everything else."
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is clear that Chapman
received at least two merit increases, the last one about a
month or so before his discharge on Buckner' s recommen-
dation . Although Buckner testified that "everyone else"
received a merit increase, Adkins testified that "most" of
the employees were given merit increases .22 I also credit
Ross' testimony that, when he was hired about 2 weeks
21 At the unemployment insurance hearing involving Chapman's claim
for benefits , Buckner gave the following testimony:
Q. How long was it before ... [Chapman] was discharged that
you last warned him about his puformance?
A. I suspect about two weeks.
Q. Did you tell him he was in danger of being fired?
A. I didn't use those exact words.
before Chapman's discharge, Buckner told Ross that if he
had any problems, and he (Buckner) was not available, to
see Chapman whom he described as "one of the best
custodians they had." Finally, I accept the testimony of
Chapman, who impressed me as a reliable and credible
witness that he was never given a warning regarding his
performance.
From my review of the evidence, I find that the
testimony of the Respondent's officials concerning Chap-
man's inadequacies and poor performance is grossly
exaggerated and beyond reasonable belief-While,While, in all
probability, Chapman's work was not faultless, it is
incredible and unnatural that the Respondent would have
granted him merit increases and tolerated his retention for
as long as it did, if he had been the unsatisfactory
employee he was depicted to be. On the contrary, it seems
to me that the reason Chapman was not terminated sooner
was that he really was not regarded by the, Respondent as
an unsatisfactory employee. Accordingly, I reject the
above testimony of Adkins and Buckner.
Turning to Patterson's case, Adkins and Buckner
testified that they reached their decision to terminate
Patterson only after they had tolerated too long his refusal
to comply with the Respondent's requirement to wear
uniform trousers while at work. Moreover, Adkins also
testified that, even though he had arranged for Patterson's
reinstatement the day after his discharge if he would get
into uniform, Patterson declined the reinstatement offer.
B. Concluding Findings
1. With respect to discrimination
The question whether an employee was illegally dis-
charged because of his actual or suspected union sympa-
thies or activities is not susceptible of easy determination
as it largely involves an' inquiry into the employer's state of
mind. In resolving this question, therefore, all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the separation must be careful-
ly appraised with due recognition being accorded to the
settled principle that an employer may terminate an
employee for any reason, good, bad, or indifferent,
provided he is not motivated by union considerations. Of
course, it is equally well established that the existence of a
"justifiable ground for dismissal is no defense if it is a
pretext and not the moving cause." 23
From my analysis of the record, I find that the General
Counsel proved a case of discrimination against Chapman,
Ross, and Patterson, as discussed below.
a. Chapman
Without repeating the details, it is clear that Chapman
joined the Union shortly after it initiated its organizational
When asked at the Board hearing what words he did use, Buckner replied,
"You could be disnussed."
22 Adkins testified initially that "most" of the employees receive merit
increases. He, however, subsequently corrected his testimony to indicate
that "all" of the employees are given merit increases, which testimony was
soon changed back to his original statement that "most" employees receive
merit increases.
23 NLRB. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F.2d 521, 528 (C.A. 8, 1956).
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC. 57
campaign, and that subsequently he handed out to
employees in front of the Hospital membership application
cards which he had received from the Union. In addition,
on August 29, earlier in the day he was discharged,
Chapman similarly distributed the cards Ross had received
from the Union for solicitation purposes. Against this
background, it appears to be more than an odd coinci-
dence that in midweek at the close of his shift Chapman
should be suddenly discharged without prior notice or
warning. Such timing, coupled with the precipitateness
with which the Respondent acted, certainly reflects
adversely on its motivation. Especially is this so when one
considers that Chapman, who had the greatest service
seniority in the housekeeping department, was told by his
supervisor, Buckner; that his discharge was necessitated by
the closing of the ECD,24 While it is true that an employer
not contractually bound to observe seniority in a reduction
in force may disregard seniority in selecting employees to
be terminated, it is, nevertheless, not normal for him to
ignore completely the seniority factor and the experience
and reliability which length of service connotes. Reinforc-
ing this inference of discrimination is the fact that not only
was there no immediate need for Chapman's hasty
discharge since the ECD did not actually close down until
a month later, but also Buckner himself betrayed the
pretextual nature of the assigned reason when, in response
to Chapman's expression of disbelief that the planned
discontinuance of the ECD had prompted his termination,
Buckner referred to Chapman's "tinkering with the uirdon."
Similarly revealing that Chapman's discharge was unlaw-
fully motivated are Buckner's cynical remarks to Ross at
the time of the latter's discharge to the effect that Ross
should fmd solace in the fact that Chapman and Patterson
were also terminated for union solicitation. The statements
which Administrative Assistant Adkins made to Chapman
also support a fording of discrimination. Thus, when
Chapman protested his termination to Adkins and ques-
tioned the truth of the ECD reason, which Adkins also
advanced, Adkins inquired of Chapman why he wanted a
union in the Hospital. This inquiry takes on added
significance in the context of Adkins' own testimony that
when Executive Director Via instructed him to discharge
Ross he also directed him to get rid of the "trou -
blemakers" - a familiar euphemistic term for union
supporters. Certainly, tote cited statements of Buckner and
Adkins, as well as the other circumstances surrounding
Chapman's discharge, negate the Respondent's disavowal
of knowledge of Chapman's union interest and involve-
ment at the time of its decision to terminate him.
The foregoing evidence clearly undermines the Respon-
dent's argument that it was Chapman's poor performance
or insubordination, as it was expressed at the hearing, that
brought about Chapman's discharge. As found above, not
only was this purported reason not given to Chapman at
the time of his discharge, but the Respondent's testimonial
24 As indicated above, Buchner testified that he falsely told Ross that he
was discharged because the ECD was being phased out.
25 J. P. Stevens & Co, Inc. v. N.L.RB., 380' F.2d 292,300 (C.A. 2, 1967),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); NLRB. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp, 211
F.2d 725, 726 (CA. 2, 1954).
26 As indicated above , although in his opening statement the Respon-
dent's attorney attributed Ross' discharge to his falsification of his
appraisal of his performance and habits was grossly
exaggerated and incredible and, indeed, was refuted by the
absence of any wanting that Chapman risked dismissal if
his work did not improve; by the granting of merit
increases, the last one about a month or so before his
separation; and by his retention during the period of
alleged unsatisfactory performance. In short, it is a fair
assumption that the reason why Chapman was not
disciplined or warned before his discharge is that the
Respondent did not honestly consider him to be the
inadequate employee he was described to be at the hearing.
Accordingly, I find that Chapman was discharged
because of his union sympathies and activity and that his
purported unsatisfactory performance was, at best, a
pretext designed to hide its true motivation to nip the
Union's organizational effort in the bud. Such conduct, I
conclude, constitutes discrimination in employment to
discourage union membership violative of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act. Even were it assumed that Chapman's
asserted poor performance to some extent entered into the
Respondent's decision to discharge Chapman, I find that a
substantial moving cause was his union support and that
therefore his `termination would still violate the same
provisions of the Act.25
b. Ross
The evidence persuades me that Ross' discharge was also
prompted by his actual or suspected union sympathies and
not by his alleged falsification of his employment applica-
tion, as the Respondent urges. As found above, the record
does not sustain the Respondent's assertion that Ross
falsified his employment application by answering in the
negative the question whether he had been "convicted of a
crime in the past ten years, excluding misdemeanors and
summary offenses." Indeed, the information which Securi-
ty Officer Keeney reported to the Respondent after making
police inquiries and upon which the Respondent ostensibly
relied in making its decision to terminate Ross clearly dealt
only with an arrest for driving while intoxicated and two
arrests for public intoxication. Concededly, the Respon-
dent was unaware at this time of any criminal convictions.
Moreover, the arrest information Keeney uncovered
appears to be of the same general nature as the information
Ross disclosed to Adkins at the time he was hired and
which Adkins considered too inconsequential to bar Ross'
employment.26
Viewing Ross' discharge in this context, serious doubt is
generated respecting the purity of the Respondent's
motive. When to this is added the fact that Ross,
admittedly a good worker, was abruptly discharged in
midweek at the end of his shift without prior notice or
warning, or opportunity to explain his arrests, it becomes
more apparent that it really was Ross' union interest that
brought about his discharge. Further supporting an
employment application, later on in the hearing he stated that it was the
Respondent's concern that Ross could be a source of danger to the patients
in the Hospital which also contributed to its discharge decision. However, it
is undisputed that at no time while at work was Ross ever intoxicated or did
he otherwise conduct himself in a manner dangeroiis to patients. On the
basis of the record evidence, I find the asserted concern to be simply an
afterthought and not a motivating factor in Ross' discharge.
58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
inference of discrimination is Buckner's testimony in which
he conceded that he had given Ross a false reason for his
termination that the ECD was being discontinued. It is
incomprehensible to me, if falsification of the job applica-
tion were the true reason, why Buckner would conceal it
and resort to subterfuge. Probably, the ready answer is that
the falsification reason was but a sham and not the moving
cause. Indeed, whatever doubt there might be about the
underlying motivation for the discharge, it is dispelled by
Ross' credited testimony that Buckner attributed his
separation to his union solicitation and by Adkins' own
testimony that he (Adkins) was instructed by Executive
Director Via to terminate Ross and other "troublemakers."
The Respondent, nevertheless, argues that it was
unaware of Ross' union sympathies or activities. However,
Buckner's above statement to Ross at the time of his
discharge and Adkins' testimony concerning his instruc-
tions from Via clearly belie the validity of its position and
establish the Respondent's knowledge and, at least, its
suspicion of Ross' union interest and involvement. More-
over, there is evidence indicating that Ross made no effort
to conceal his .union support. Thus, as previously related,
when, at ^ the inception of the Union's organizational
campaign on August 19, Buckner took from Ross' pocket a
leaflet he had received from the Union's organizer, Ross
was not reluctant to demand its return. In addition, he
unformed other employees that he had signed a union
membership application card and openly handed blank
union cards to Chapman in the hallway near Buckner's
office. In any event, it is unimportant to a finding of
discrimination to demonstrate how the Respondent ac-
quired knowledge of Ross' union sympathies. It is
sufficient that it was aware or suspected his union
involvement and penalized hum for this reason.
In short, I -find that, as in the case of Chapman, the
ground advanced by the Respondent for Ross' discharge
that he falsified his job application was a pretext designed
to cloak its true antiunion motivation. Accordingly, I
conclude that Ross' discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act. Moreover, even assuming that Ross' police
record played a part in the Respondent's discharge
decision, I find that the same statutory provisions were
violated because Ross' suspected union activity would still
be a substantial cause of his termination.27
c. Patterson
A careful analysis of the record leads me to the
inescapable conclusion that the antiunion considerations
which motivated the discharge of Chapman and Ross also
dictated Patterson's termination. In so doing, I find, in
disagreement with the Respondent's contrary contention,
that' Patterson's alleged refusal to wear uniform trousers
was pretextual. This is plainly evident in Buckner's
admission to Ross, related above, that Patterson, as well as
Chapman, were fired for union solicitation.28 The Respon-
dent's account of Patterson's stubborn and persistent
refusal to wear uniform trousers over a period of several
months, despite the Respondent's alleged repeated threats
of discharge if he did not conform to its requirement, is
utterly unbelievable. It is even more so in light of the
Respondent's testimony that Patterson declined its offer of
an advance with which to buy the trousers. It strains one's
credulity to believe that an employee would jeopardize his
livelihood to save the price of a pair of work trousers. In all
likelihood, the reason Patterson continued to wear nonuni-
form trousers 29 while at work, for several months, as the
Respondent claims, was the Respondent's indifference to
his attire until it suspected him of engaging in union
solicitation.
Equally dubious is the Respondent's testimony" concern-
ing the episode on August 30, the day after Patterson's
discharge, when Patterson returned to the Hospital
apparently to seek reinstatement. On this occasion,
according to Adkins, Patterson agreed to his proposal that
he (Adkins) speak to Executive Director Via about
reinstating Patterson on condition that Patterson get into
full uniform but, when Adkins succeeded in convincing
Via to accept this proposition, Patterson rejected reinstate-
ment on those terms. I find this story unpersuasive
especially since, as Adkins' testimony indicates, Patterson
was in need of hospitalization for his pregnant wife, which
would be available to him as an employee of the Hospital.
In view of the foregoing, I find that Buckner's above-
quoted remark to Ross exposes the Respondent's antiunion
motivation for Patterson's discharge. Otherwise stated,
Patterson was selected for separation because he- was
suspected of being a "troublemaker" whom Adkins was
instructed to eliminate. Accordingly, I conclude that
Patterson, like Chapman and Ross, was discriminated
against in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,
whether or not his failure to wear uniform trousers
contributed to the discharge decision.
2. With respect to interference , restraint, and
coercion
I have found above that at the time of Chapman's
discharge Executive Housekeeper Buckner indicated to
him that it was his "tinkering" with the Union that brought
about his discharge and that a few other employees who
engaged in this conduct would be similarly treated. In
addition, I have found that when Ross was discharged.
Buckner informed him that his termination was due to his
union solicitation and named Chapman and Patterson as
employees who had also solicited and were separated. On
this latter occasion, Buckner further indicated that a few
other employees who engaged in such activity would be
similarly terminated.
Plainly, Buckner's blunt statements, revealing as they do
a threat of punitive action the Respondent was disposed to
take against employees in reprisal for their union activity,
constitute interference, restraint, and coercion of employ-
ees exercising their statutory self-organizationlrights and
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
27 See fn . 25, supra.
28 As previously noted, on the occasion of Chapman's earlier discharge,
Buckner indicated to him that he was aware that Chapman and a few other
employees were "tinkering" with the Union.
29 He did wear a uniform shirt
THE HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, INC. 59
IV. THE REMEDY
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, as amended, it is
recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices
found and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent unlawfully
discharged employees Chapman, Ross, and Patterson
because of their actual or suspected union activities. To
remedy these violations, it is recommended that the
Respondent offer these employees immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them
by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to
that which each one normally would have earned from
August 29, 1974, the date of his discharge, to the date of
the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during the
said period. Backpay shall be computed with interest on a
quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in F.
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). To
facilitate the computation, as well as to clarify the named
employees' right to reinstatement, the Respondent shall
make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and
other records necessary and appropriate for such purposes.
The posting of a notice is also recommended.
In view of the nature of the discrimination for union
support and sympathies which "goes to the very heart of
the Act,1130 there exists the danger of the commission by
the Respondent of other unfair labor practices proscribed
by the Act. Accordingly, I recommend that the Respon-
dent be ordered to cease and desist from in any other
manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed employees in
Section 7 of the Act.31
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is a "health care institution" as
defined in Section 2(14) of the Act, and an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of Kermit Chapman, Homer Ross, and
Shannon Patterson to discourage membership in, and
activities on behalf of, the Union, the Respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct and by declaring, warning,
and threatening employees that they were being discharged
on account of their union sympathies and activities and
30 N L R B. v Entwistle Mfg. Co, 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941).
31 N.L RB. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426,433 (1941).
32 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
that fellow employees were or would be similarly terminat-
ed in reprisal for their union involvement, the Respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of their statutory rights within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER32
The Respondent, The Huntington Hospital, Inc., Hunt-
ington, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in District 1199, West
Virginia, National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging employees or in any other manner discriminat-
ing against them in regard to their hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Declaring to, warning, or threatening employees that
they were being or will be discharged on account of their
union sympathies and activities or that their fellow
employees were or will be similarly terminated in reprisal
for their union interest or involvement.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
the above-named Union, or, any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any ,and all such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Kermit Chapman, Homer Ross, and Shannon
Patterson immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of their
unlawful discharge, in the manner set forth in the section
of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary or useful in analyzing the amount of backpay
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
60 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
due and the right to reinstatement and employment under
the terms of this recommended Order.,
(c) Post at its Hospital in Huntington, West Virginia, the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 33 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places where notices to, employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
33 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The Act gives all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain as a group through a representative
they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of those activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or lay off any employee or
otherwise discriminate against him because of his
membership in, or activities on behalf of, District 1199,
West Virginia, National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT declare to, warn, or threaten our
employees that they were being or will be discharged
on account of their union sympathies and activities or
that their fellow employees were or will be similarly
terminated in reprisal for their union interest or
involvement.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist the above-named Union or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized by Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer Kermit Chapman, Homer Ross, and
Shannon Patterson immediate and full reinstatement to
their former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges, and wE
WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered
by reason of their unlawful discharge.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of District
1199, West Virginia, National Union of Hospital and
Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in 'a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized by
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
THE HUNTINGTON
HOSPITAL, INC.