The Hertz Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 26, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 96 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Hertz Corporation and Teamsters , Chauffeurs, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Warehousemen, Helpers and Food Processors Local
Union No. 657. Case 23-CA-3916
January 26, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On September 22, 1971, Trial Examiner Ramey
Donovan issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent,
The Hertz Corporation, San Antonio, Texas, its offic-
ers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order.
' The General Counsel and the Respondent have excepted to certain
credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibil-
ity unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91
NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings
' We agree with the Trial Examiner that Respondent discharged Silvia for
cause and not for his union activity, but we do not find it necessary to decide
whether Respondent had knowledge of Silvia's union activity
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
RAMEY DONOVAN, Trial Examiner: The charge was filed
on March 22, 1971, by Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men, Helpers and Food Processors Local Union No. 657,
herein the Union. The Respondent )employer is the Hertz
Corporation at its San Antonio, Texas, operation, herein the
Company, Hertz, or Respondent. The complaint issued un-
der date of April 30, 1971, and alleged violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Respondent's answer denied the
commission of unfair labor practices. On June 29 and 30,
1971, the trial was held in San Antonio, Texas.
195 NLRB No. 16
I JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware corporation and operates an
automobile rental business in various states, including the
State of Texas. At the airport in San Antonio, Texas, Re-
spondent operates and maintains an office and place of busi-
ness which is the facility involved in this proceeding.
During a representative 12-month period, Respondent in
the course of its car rental business has received in excess of
$50,000 for services to customers outside the State of Texas
and has, during the same period, performed services valued
in excess of $50,000.
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The first issue in the case is the alleged discriminatory
discharge of Robert Silvia, a garageman. The General Coun-
sel's position is that the evidence reveals that within 3 days
after Silvia had succeeded in securing union authorization
cards from all the employees in the unit and within 2 days of
Respondent's receipt of verbal advice from a union represent-
ative that it represented all the employees, Respondent dis-
charged Silvia on the pretext that he had, as an employee,
acted contrary to Company rules and policy in the discharge
of his duty as a garageman. Respondent's position is that
there is no evidence of Respondent's awareness of Silvia's
union activity prior to his discharge and that Silvia was dis-
charged for absenting himself from his work station in a
Company car without authorization. and for an excessive
period of time.
Respondent's top management official in San Antonio is its
city manager. Under his jurisdiction is a rental counter at the
San Antonio airport and another one at the Austin airport;
also a rental operation at a downtown motel in San Antonio
and one at Brownsville, Texas. The central business office is
on South Terminal Drive at the San Antonio airport. The
office is approximately 50 feet by 25 feet and the building also
houses garage facilities which are referred to as the service
center. The Company cars are parked in an area adjacent to
the general parking facilities of the airport and this area is
approximately a quarter of a mile from the rental counter in
the airport. The office area is occupied by the city manager,
the station manager, and at the time of hearing a maintenance
supervisor.' Also located there are a secretary and a car con-
trol clerk.
The garage facilities consist principally of a wash bay for
washing cars and a grease rack or lift for changing oil al-
though there is apparently space for the "utility maintenance
man," Dotrey, to perform "surface maintenance" on the
Company's rental cars. Such maintenance consists of tune
ups, relatively minor adjustments and repairs, and wheel bal-
ancing when required. If matters of major maintenance and
repair are required, the car is taken to the Company's car
dealer in town for such work either pursuant to the warranty
on the car or whatever other arrangement exists on such
matters between the dealer and Respondent.
Respondent also employs sales representatives who work
at the Company's car rental counter in the airport terminal.
These representatives fill out the car rental contracts with the
customers, entering thereon the appropriate date both at the
time the car is taken by the customer and when it is returned.
' Williams, the maintenance supervisor, assumed his duties in May, 1971
THE HERTZ CORPORATION 97
The remaining category of employees in Respondent's em-
ploy consists of garagemen . Including Dotrey , the utility
maintenance man, there were 5 garagemen on the day shift
and 5 on the night shift.'
When a customer returned a rented car to Respondent's
parking area , the customer went to one of Respondent's
rental representatives at the rental counter in the airport. The
rental contract form would then be completed by entering the
time of return of the car , the mileage , and so forth , and the
customer would return the keys to the car. In some instances
the keys would have been left in the car. The customer might
also tell the representative of some deficiency that he had
found in the car's performance , e.g., something did not work
properly , such as windshield wipers , radio , or shimmy and
vibration when car was driven at 65 miles per hour, and so
forth. In the event of a reported deficiency as aforementioned,
a yellow card, referred to as a "work order ," would be filled
out by the rental representative . The work order was a card
with the following printed legend:
Reri ei Repair Report
Car #
License #
Da to
To Hertz Mechanic:
(The reported deficiency
would be here set forth)
Signed
Location
The returned car keys together with the work order , if any,
would be picked up by a garageman from the rental counter.
He would then go to the car and drive it to the service center
garage If there was no work order with the car the garage-
man would make a routine check to ascertain that such things
as the windshield wipers , radio, and air conditioning were in
working order. He would empty ash trays and clean and wash
the car and then drive it to the Hertz parking area where it
would be ready for the next customer . In the event that the
car had had a work order , there is a conflict in testimony as
to the garageman's function . There is little doubt that if the
work order stated that the windshield wipers did not work the
garageman would turn on the wipers to see if this was the fact
since, work order or not , checking on such things as the
operation of the wipers was part of his normal duties in
preparing the car for the next customer . The conflict in tes-
timony apses over more major work order defects , such as,
car vibration and wheel shimmy at 65 miles per hour. The
General Counsel 's witnesses state that the garageman was
The shifts were 6 30 a in to 3 30 p in and 3 30 p in to approximately
I 1 p in , with some overlap on the shifts at 2 30 p in
supposed to and did take the car out on a nearby expressway,
drive it at 65 or more miles per hour , and verify the existence
of the defect before turning it over to Dotrey , the utility
maintenance man. Respondent 's witnesses state that such
road testing was no part of the duties of the garagemen and
that such matters were exclusively part of the duties of the
utility maintenance man. We note that on the work order
form , if for instance filled out by a rental representative re-
cording a customer complaint , there is no place for a garage-
man to indicate thereon that he has or has not verified the
complaint before turning the car over to Dotrey.
A variation of the procedure heretofore described of a
customer returning a car might arise . For instance, the cus-
tomer returns a car and parks it. Nearby he sees a garageman,
who may have happened to have just returned another car
from the garage to the parking area . The customer gives the
keys of his returned car to the garageman and possibly tells
him of some deficiency in the car before proceeding to the
rental counter to have the rental contract completed by the
rental representative. The garageman then takes the car and,
if the windshield wipers do not work as reported by the
customer, fills out a work order . Again , what has been said
previously as to the garageman 's duty or lack of duty , to road
test the car regarding more serious defects, applies
98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Silvia and 5 other employees were hired as garagemen in
June 1970. They replaced 6 or 7 garagemen who had been
discharged or quit in an incident relating to alleged theft of
Company tires and related items. Silvia was hired by City
Manager D'Estrada whose employment with the Company
terminated soon after, on June 16, 1970.' Bush was the station
manager and Dotrey was the utility maintenance man.` With
the advent of a relatively large number of new garagemen in
June 1970, Oyervides, a garageman who had been with the
Company since about August 1969, was the senior garage-
man in point of service. Although not a supervisor, nor even
a leadman, he was in large measure entrusted to breaking in
the new men and acquainting them with their work.
Charles Shafer became Respondent's city manager at the
San Antonio facility on July 16, 1970. Previously, he had held
the same position at Corpus Christi and had also been station
manager at Dallas. Kidd was station manager at San Antonio
from September 15, 1970, to May 1971, having previously
been station manager at Dallas.'
At the end of October or the first of November 1970, Silvia
telephoned Mull, business agent of the Union, and said that
the garagemen would like to join the Union. Thereafter, Mull
met Silvia and Crawford, another garageman, in the main
lobby of the airport terminal. They were soon joined by Har-
mon, another garageman, and all then went to a restaurant
in the terminal.' Mull gave Silvia some union cards and the
latter gave some to Crawford. Silvia states that he returned
to the garage and talked to his fellow garagemen about his
conversation with Mull. He did not secure any signatures on
cards that day and there is, in fact, no evidence that he
produced any cards at the garage at that time or sought
signatures. Within the next few days, Silvia testified that he
secured signed cards. Crawford returned cards to Silvia but
some were undated or unsigned. Silvia then contacted men on
the night shift and had these deficiencies corrected.' On Mon-
day night, November 2, Silvia gave the signed cards to Mull
at Silvia's home. Although the cards were not introduced in
evidence, the testimony indicates that all employees in the
unit had signed cards.
On November 3, 1970, a Board hearing was held in San
Antonio on a challenged ballot that had been cast in an
election among the rental representatives of Respondent at its
San Antonio facility. The election had been held in August
1970 on a petition filed by the Union to be certified as bargain-
ing agent for the rental representatives. The result of the
election could not be determined until the challenge to one
ballot was resolved. The hearing on this matter was held, as
aforementioned, on November 3.5
D'Estrada had been with the Company for 13 years in various capaci-
ties
At the time of the hearing Dotrey had been with the Company for 8
years
Kidd, therefore, had been station manager at San Antonio for about
1-'/, months prior to Silvia's discharge on November 5
6 Silvia worked on the day shift He states that Crawford was present as
a representative of the night shift Harmon had been hired about the same
time as Silvia He became a leadman shortly after Silvia's discharge Pursu-
ant to a union petition, a Board conducted consent election was held in
December 1970 in a unit of garagemen that included the utility maintenance
man and the leadman, both of the latter being nonsupervisory Harmon was
the union observer in the election which was won by the Union Respondent
and the Union then executed a contract
Silvia's shift ended at 3 30 p in The night shift came in about 3 p in.
and it was during this overlap that Silvia made the aforementioned contact
The Hearing Officer 's Decision , issued on November 19, 1970, held that
the challenge by the Union should be overruled and the ballot counted This
decision was affirmed by the Board on December 17, 1970 When the ballot
was counted, the Union lost the election
During a recess at the November 3 hearing, a brief conver-
sation ensued between Ray Shafer, president of the Union,
and Stoner, Respondent's labor relations manager who had
come from his New York office for the hearing.' Shafer said
that all the garagemen had signed up in the Union and asked
if Stoner recognized the Union on the basis of signed cards.
Stoner replied that if the Union would drop the matter of the
challenged ballot, perhaps something could be worked out.
Shafer rejected the suggestion." Later that evening, Stoner
told Charles Shafer what Roy Shafer had said about having
signed up the garagemen in the Union. According to Stoner,
he, Stoner, remarked to Charles Shafer that he thought "we"
should ignore the matter and go ahead with what "we" had
planned regarding a wage increase."
Silvia commenced work at his regular starting time, 6:30
a.m., on November 5. The record indicates that there were
two garagemen on duty that morning, Silvia and Oyervides.
Apparently Harmon was also supposed to be at work but he
had called in that he was ill and would not be in. Silvia and
Oyervides had been bringing cars that had been turned in by
customers from the parking area to the garage for washing
and related servicing and returning serviced cars to the Hertz
parking area for future rental availability. At or about 7:25
a.m. Silvia had just parked a car in the parking area when a
customer drove a car into a nearby parking space." As Silvia
walked over, the customer tossed him the keys, stating that
the car "was running rough." Silvia, when questioned fur-
ther, testified that the customer had told him that the car
"was idling roughly" and was not performing up to par and
had said that perhaps the driving in city traffic had caused the
difficulty.
After receiving the keys and the complaint from the cus-
tomer, Silvia states that he got in the car, told Oyervides, who
was nearby, that the customer had complained about the car
and Silvia was taking the car out to verify the complaint.
Silvia then drove the car out from the airport and to an
expressway, the entrance to which was approximately I mile
from the airport. On the expressway Silvia accelerated the car
to 70 miles per hour and drove it past at least 3 exit points.
He states that he made no stops during this road check and
returned to the airport, expecting to pick up Oyervides to give
him a ride from the terminal to the garage, and, not seeing
Oyervides, he drove the car to the garage for washing and
servicing. The evidence discloses, in our opinion, that Silvia's
trip was approximately 14-15 miles and that he had been
gone a half hour. Silvia states that his trip corrected what was
wrong with the car.
The evidence also discloses that on the same day as the
above events occurred, November 5, station manager Kidd,
who lived about 5 minutes away from the airport, arrived at
the airport about 7:35 a.m. Coinciding with his arrival, he
saw Silvia driving the company red Cougar" out the airport
road and going "rather fast out of the airport," heading away
'Charles Shafer, Respondent's city manager, a distant cousin of Ray
Shafer, was not present Silvia was not present at the November 3 hearing
nor was he at work that day November 3 and 4 were his regular off-work
days
10 The Union filed a petition for certification in the garagemen unit on
November 9, 1970 A consent election stipulation was thereafter signed and
executed by Stoner on November 24 and Shafer on November 30 The
election was held on December 17, 1970, with the Union winning as previ-
ously mentioned
The wage increase aspect will be discussed at a later point
" The record shows that the car was a new red 1971 Cougar with about
1,400 miles The customer had rented it in Austin on November 3 and
driven it 193 miles
" In his testimony, Silvia described the Cougar as being a very bright red
and a car that the Company had had but a short time
THE HERTZ CORPORATION 99
from the airport. Kidd recognized Silvia as a company ga-
rageman and recognized the car as a company car.
After the foregoing observation of Silvia's departure, Kidd
proceeded on to his office in the service center. In the office
he asked Wellman, the car control clerk, if she had sent Silvia
to pick up a customer or go someplace with a car. She said
no. Kidd then went out to the garage and looked out over the
car parking area. No employee was to be seen. He then called
the rental desk in the terminal and inquired whether either
of the sales representatives had sent Silvia anywhere. Again
the reply was negative. He then asked the rental representa-
tive if she had checked in a 1971 Cougar, license number
BLG55, and she replied that she had just checked it in. Kidd
then walked out of the garage into the parking area and again
could see none of the garagemen ." There were 4 or 5 cars
among the cars in the lot that had not been washed and
cleaned and otherwise serviced and were therefore awaiting
such service before being available for rental again . Kidd sat
down in the parking lot waiting for someone to appear. About
7:50 a.m. Shafer drove in. Kidd told him about seeing Silvia
departing the airport as Kidd had driven in and of Kidd's
subsequent check with the car control clerk and the rental
representatives and on what they had said. Kidd said that he
had no idea where Silvia was going with the car. Shafer told
Kidd that he wanted to talk to Silvia when he got back and
find out where he had been.
Kidd returned to the parking lot and waited until he saw
Silvia drive into the airport. The time was about 8:10 a.m.
When Silvia came from the terminal area and drove into the
service center parking area and parked, Kidd spoke to him."
Kidd asked Silvia where he had been. Silvia said, up at the
airport. Kidd asked, "How come you were going out to Route
410 (the expressway) and just came back that way?" Silvia
replied that he was road testing a car regarding a customer
complaint about the car. Kidd, expressing incredulity about
the explanation, remarked, "it takes you that long to road test
a car?" Kidd also said, "you know you are not supposed to
do things like that, that is Dotrey's responsibility." Kidd said
that he had to talk to Shafer about the matter.
Kidd then went into Shafer's office and told him Silvia was
back and had said that he was out road testing the car. Shafer
expressed disbelief about Silvia's reported explanation, say-
ing, "for thirty or forty-five minutes?", since evidently that
was Shafer's rough impression of the length of Silvia's ab-
sence. Shafer then asked Kidd, in effect, precisely how long
Silvia had been gone. Kidd said about 30 minutes. Shafer said
he wanted to talk to Silvia. Kidd then brought Silvia to the
office.
As to what then ensued in the office with Shafer, Kidd, and
Silvia being present, the following synthesized version, taken
from the testimony of the three men, represents, in our opin-
ion, an accurate description of the conversation.
Shafer asked Silvia where he had been for the last half hour
or more. Silvia said a customer had made a complaint about
the car and he, Silvia, was out driving the car to blow the soot
out of the carburetor. Shafer said that he did not "buy" that
(did not accept or believe the explanation). Shafer queried or
expressed disbelief that it took that length of time to blow the
soot out of a new car, less than a month old, with only some
1,400 miles on it. Shafer also said that Silvia was not author-
ized to road test a car as he had done or to take a company
" The 3 men scheduled for duty that day, commencing at 6 30 a in were
Silvia, Oyervides, and Harmon It was not until later that morning that Kidd
became aware that Harmon had called in sick and did not come in
" In describing what then was said we have considered the testimony of
both Silvia and Kidd which is not in substantial conflict as to the conversa-
tion, although varying in some respects
car for his personal use." Under all the circumstances, Shafer
said that he was discharging Silvia. Silvia then departed the
premises and Kidd punched out Silvia's timecard at 8:40 a.m.
Silvia, Harmon, Oyervides, and Martinez all testified that
as part of their duties as garagemen they road tested cars.
D'Estrada testified that such road testing was not part of the
duties of a garageman and that, when he was city manager,
no garageman, as far as he was aware , had ever taken a car
out on an expressway or highway to test it. Such testing was
the responsibility of Dotrey, the utility maintenance man.
Although Harmon testified that mechanical experience was
a hiring requisite in a garageman , D'Estrada denied this."
D'Estrada said that the garagemen were not hired to perform
as mechanics and that they were not qualified for analytical
testing. Dotrey, who in 8 years with the Company had been
a garageman , leadman , and then utility maintenance man,
testified that in the latter job he was the one who road tested
cars and he had not done so as a garageman or even as a
leadman. He tested cars mainly on the airport back roads,
but, if the complaint was, for instance, that a car shimmied
at 65 miles per hour, he would test it on the expressway.
With respect to setting forth the duties of a garageman, we
regard the Company's "Quality Control Slip" as an impor-
tant document. That slip listed 23 items that a garageman was
supposed to check on a car, and the garageman was supposed
to check each item on the slip to signify that he had per-
formed the task and then sign the slip in 3 places. The items
ranged from filling the gas tank; checking all fluid levels, such
as oil, power steering fluid and so forth; washing the car;
emptying ash trays; lights; heater; horn; brake operation;
steering; engine performance; to checking spare tires. There
is no item of road testing the car. Including brake operation
and steering , probably all checking could be performed in
driving the car from the terminal to the garage and if further
testing was required there is no indication that such was the
duty of the garageman.
In this connection D'Estrada, on November 18, 1969, had
issued a 3-page memorandum to all garage personnel, ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the way that they had been per-
forming their duty in carrying out the tasks listed on the
quality control slips. The memorandum went down each item
on the slip and described what the garageman was expected
to do in checking each item. On the items that are the nearest
to being mechanical type checks, D'Estrada, in the memoran-
dum, gave no indication that road testing was expected from
the garagemen, e.g.
Steering and Balance-I realize that you do not have
too much opportunity to check balance, but a look at the
tires (down on your hands and knees) will give you some
idea of the front end alignment.
Engine Performance-Do you listen to the motor to
see if there is anything out of the ordinary.
It would be our opinion that, since the memorandum was
discussing all the things that the garagemen were supposed
to do "to make certain that the entire car, was serviceable for
1' Silvia's testimony is the source of this reference by Shafer about Silvia
using a company car for a personal errand or personal use or purpose
11 Harmon testified that he had worked in a gas station and had been in
an Army motor pool Since no details are given, it is our opinion that such
job could have entailed some mechanical experience but not necessarily so
If pumping gas, lubrication, and changing tires were the duties, this is
scarcely mechanical work What mechanical background Silvia or other
garagemen had does not appear While the Company would no doubt re-
quire driving ability and general familianty with cars, it is doubtful that it
required or expected any substantial mechanical proficiency from its garage-
men whom it hired in June 1970 at $1 80 per hour Dotrey was higher paid
than the garagemen and was in fact the company mechanic although even
he performed only limited mechanical duties
100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rental service," it would have at least mentioned road testing
if such was part of the garageman's job and probably would
refer to where, how long, and how a car was to be road tested
and in what manner the road test would be reported when it
had been performed. But there is nothing of this nature.
There is testimony from the General Counsel's witnesses
that company cars were used for personal purposes e.g.,
rental representatives were seen coming back to the airport
with packages from department stores; company cars used to
pick up food at carryout shops; company cars used to trans-
port employees or to help employees start a personal car with
bad battery; company car used to take employee paychecks
to nearby bank on payday and cash group of checks; other
instances of same type. Respondent produced witnesses who
had, in various instances , been named in the aforementioned
testimony as well as other witnesses whose testimony on the
whole indicated that use of Company cars for personal pur-
poses was forbidden and had either not occurred or had been
sanctioned by a management official in a particular instance.
For instance, in May 1969, D'Estrada issued a memorandum
to "All Employees" concerning "Unauthorized use of Hertz
Cars." The memorandum stated:
In checking the mileage records of our Hertz cars it is
very evident that unauthorized use of our cars is being
made. ... Therefore, the following restrictions will be
effective this date:
1. No employee will be allowed to drive a Hertz car
for their personal use
2. No employee will be allowed to drive a Hertz car
to the bank or to pick up food for other employees
* s s * s
Failure to comply with the above regulations will termi-
nate your employment with the Company.
The City Manager and the station manager, as part of their
compensation and prerequisites, had the use of any available
Hertz car for their personal use, such as going to and from
work. They authorized office girls or rental representatives to
use Hertz cars to pick up decorations for a Christmas party
or authorized other errands. There were instances showing a
degree of indulgence by management in the use of Hertz cars
by attractive female personnel but these instances were au-
thorized by management . Whether entirely fair or not, rank
has its privileges, but the evidence, in our opinion, does not
establish that management knowingly tolerated rank-and-file
employee use of Hertz cars on employee initiative alone and
certainly not by garagemen. As far as appears, the garage-
men's principal personal use of a Company car had been to
cash paychecks on payday at a nearby bank. D'Estrada's
memorandum , above, which was not revoked by Shafer, deals
with the paycheck matter and trips to the bank in no uncer-
tain terms.
In some organizations, all rules are not always adhered to
by employees, either because of inadequate supervision or
because of the difficulty of close supervision. On an average
day, the Company's airport operation day crew serviced ap-
proximately 25 cars. There was obviously a considerable
movement of Hertz cars taking place in the course of the day.
Hertz cars driven by customers were being returned to the
Hertz parking lot; Hertz cars rented by customers and driven
by the latter were going out of the lot; Hertz cars driven by
garagemen were being driven from the terminal or lot to the
garage ; other Hertz cars driven by garagemen were going
from the garage to the terminal or lot; Hertz cars driven by
office personnel were used to pick up office supplies outside
the airport and the car could be going from, or returning to,
the parking lot; a supervisor might be leaving the Hertz lot
in a Hertz car to go on some personal errand or might be
returning ; a garageman might be going out of the lot in a
Hertz car to pick up a customer at a motel; an office secretary
would be driving a Hertz car to the bank to make the daily
deposit of cash receipts for the day; a rental representative
upon completion of her work would be driven by a garage-
man in a Hertz car from the terminal to the airport parking
lot (next to the Hertz lot); to enable her to go home in her
own car (this was authorized procedure); two Hertz cars,
each driven by a garageman, might leave the airport en route
to a downtown car dealer to leave one of the cars for repairs
with one car returning to the airport with the drivers; a
garageman and a rental representative might leave the airport
in a Hertz car to pick up a new car from the in-town dealer
and return to the airport in separate Hertz cars.
The evidence in the case indicates that at the Hertz airport
lot there was no checker or dispatcher, at entrance or exit,
checking and verifying the movement and destination of cars
or personnel as might be the case in a bus or truck terminal."
With a substantial number of cars dnven by a variety of
personnel on an assortment of missions such as we have
described above, and with no close control of each car move-
ment, the Examiner believes that probably cars were not
always used 100 percent in accordance with management
directives. And, with respect to road testing by garagemen,
we believe that most of that testing took place while the car
was being driven from the terminal to the garage." There
probably was some road testing by garagemen , with most of
it taking place on the airport complex of roads. We also
believe that some garagemen , including Silvia, had road
tested cars outside the airport and that this occurred without
management knowledge and due to lax management control.
We are not convinced that the circumstances of November 5
involving Silvia's road trip of 30 minutes that came to Kidd's
direct and personal attention in the manner previously de-
scribed, and with no one in the organization , despite Kidd's
inquiries, offering or having information regarding Silvia's
mission , and with no other garageman in view to attend to
cars awaiting service, had been presented to management or
had previously been condoned by management.
The General Counsel pointed out that in reacting to Sil-
via's trip, both Kidd and Shafer had said in substance, it takes
that long to road test a car, or it took 30 minutes to blow out
the soot? Such statements, it is argued, indicate that Silvia's
road testing, as such, was not being challenged because, if it
was, the normal remark would have been, why were you road
testing a car, or some similar remark directed to the very
concept of road testing by a garageman. Even if we prescind,
for the sake of discussion, from the fact that Kidd and Shafer
also said, in substance, to Silvia, that he knew that he was not
supposed to do things like that and that he was not authorized
to road test cars, the argument of the General Counsel is not
compelling. As we view the limited remarks of the super-
visors that the General Counsel has cited, they were saying,
in effect, that your explanation, taken on its face, is not con-
vincing because it does not take 30 minutes to do what you
claim to have been doing. In short, even meeting Silvia on his
own explanatory ground, the latter was deemed so transpar-
ent that the initial supervisory response was to castigate the
" There was a car control clerk in the office but her principal duty was
keeping track of cars rented at another Hertz station and turned in at San
Antonio or of San Antonio cars at other stations
" There are no figures on the matter but we believe that the percentage
of cars requiring any kind of testing by a garageman with the car in motion
was small With the exception of brakes and steering, the 23 items on the
quality control slips would be performed on a stationary car, and brakes and
steering could normally be checked in the approximately quarter mile from
the terminal to garage
THE HERTZ CORPORATION 101
defense offered without invoking the more basic premise re-
garding road testing.20
Aside from all the evidence in this case about road testing
and whether or not it was part of the duties of a garageman
and whether or not it was authorized , or overlooked or not,
it is the Examiner 's opinion that Kidd and Shafer basically
did not believe Silvia 's story that he was road testing a defec-
tive car and it was necessary to take the car on a 30-minute
expressway drive to road test the car and cure its malady.
This is the clear import of Shafer 's remark , inter alia, to Silvia
regarding Silvia 's attempted explanation of his trip, when
Shafer said , "I don 't buy it [the story] ." This , too, is the
import of the skeptical comments of both Kidd and Shafer
that it did not take a 30-minute trip to do what Silvia claimed
he had been doing . They evidently believed that Silvia had
taken the car on a personal errand or a joy ride at high speed
on the expressway to break the monotony of parking and
unparking cars , washing them , emptying ash trays, and so
forth . This is the import of Shafer's remark to Silvia, inter
alia, to the effect that the latter "had no reason to use [the
car] for [his] personal use."21
It is not incredible to the Examiner that Shafer and Kidd
viewed Silvia's explanation with skepticism . Shafer had been
an automobile mechanic at one time . Kidd had been 5 years
with Hertz , including service as a garageman , and had been
station manager at Dallas and San Antonio . Presumably,
they knew something about automobile operational prob-
lems. Although they did not have, on November 5, all the
details of the incident that were revealed at the hearing re-
garding the 1971 Cougar , they did have the basic outline of
Silvia 's explanation and the basic explanation may well have
transmitted at least some of the same doubtful aspects as did
the details set forth in the testimony.22
30 An employer sends an employee to Jones Company to pick up a part
and tells the employee to reti rn directly with the part. The employer knew
that the task , i e the trip, normally takes no more than 30 minutes The
employee returns 90 minutes later. The employer asks the employee where
he had been The employee replies that, after picking up the part from Jones
Company, he went to Smith Company to pick up a screwdriver he needed
The employer , knowing that Smith Company is located across the street
from Jones Company and has ample clerks and quick service, says to his
employee, you mean it took you an hour to pick up a screwdriver from
Smith9 This remark was directed at what the employer considered to be a
very unconvincing story by his employee and does not mean that the em-
ployer had not told the employee to return directly from Jones or that the
employer was not aware of the basic dereliction by the employee The
employer was simply demolishing the employee 's own explanation on its
face quite apart from having to invoke the basic dereliction of the employee
in not returning directly as required
" The above quoted remarks of Shafer are set forth as described by Silvia
in his testimony
" Silvia testified that the customer complaint was that the car idled
roughly. He took the keys, said a few words to Oyervides , and drove the car
out the airport road rather rapidly, thence to the expressway , where he
drove at a high rate of speed . There is no testimony that he sat in the car
for a short period to listen to the engine 's performance at idle , or that, with
the motor idling , he got out of the car, raised the hood, and observed or
listened to the idling engine At one point, without saying where, or when,
or how , Silvia said he "had corifirmed that the customer said it was idling
roughly " About 35 pages of testimony later, Silvia said, "Well, on idling,
I was just going by the customer [going by what the customer had said,
namely that] it was idling roughly " An elementary first step in correcting
a rough idle is to listen and to observe the engine at idling speed and to make
simple adjustments on the carburetor with a screwdriver Silvia in his tes-
timony indicated awareness that a carburetor could be adjusted mechani-
cally Silvia said that he corrected the defect of rough idling by driving the
car at high speed and blowing the soot out of the carburetor and correcting
the functioning of the choke. An accumulation of soot in the carburetor of
a relatively new car is not explained , and a malfunctioning choke, as far as
any mechanic 's manual is concerned , is correctable by mechanical means
and this is the normal method of correction . In any event , although Silvia
The General Counsel places considerable emphasis on the
fact that Silvia was discharged 2 days after Shafer learned
that the Union had organized the garagemen . This timing
admittedly invites suspicion. But timing and suspicion are not
enough when the evidence also shows that 2 days after the
above union aspect took place , the evidently fortuitous cir-
cumstances occurred of Silvia being observed driving out of
the airport by Kidd about 7:30 a.m. with all the related details
previously described . No one ordered or directed Silvia to do
what he did on that particular morning . He would have
fulfilled all duties that he claims to have had by simply verify-
ing the customer complaint of rough idling . The complaint
could have been verified with the car standing still, and, in
our opinion , if Silvia then wrote on the work ticket (to Do-
trey) that the car idled roughly , Silvia would have fulfilled
any duty he had regarding the customer complaint . Diagnosis
and therapy were clearly Dotrey 's responsibility even if we
prescind from the previously discussed issue of whether verifi-
cation of customer complaints was not also his function.
An important issue is the matter of evidence on whether
Respondent knew that Silvia had been active in the Union.
There is no evidence of surveillance , interrogation of em-
ployees, or even one remark by management indicating
awareness of union activity among the garagemen or of any
role ofSilvia in such activity. All garagemen had signed union
cards by November 2 and Silvia had delivered them to the
union representative at his home on the evening of November
2. Since the General Counsel correctly cites the fact that
"Silvia was discharged less than 2 days after City Manager
Shafer heard of the Union 's organization of the garagemen
", one of the implications appears to be that management
had not even heard of the union organization until November
3, 2 days before the discharge , and presumably had heard
nothing about which employee or employees had been most
active in the organizing . Moreover , since the union represent-
ative told the Company on November 3 that "we" (the Union
or the union representatives) had all the Company 's garage-
men "signed up," the Company had as much reason to be-
lieve that a union representative had approached the garage-
men in a group or individually , and had secured their
signatures on cards , as to suppose that one or more individual
garageman had been the organizers or the persons who
secured the signatures.
The fact that all cards had been signed and delivered to the
Union on November 2 and the Company first heard of the
union organizing on November 3 would tend to indicate that
the Company had not seen any union activity taking place
among its garagemen or any such activity by Silvia either
prior to November 3 or between November 2 and 5 . 23 Aside
from the foregoing , the circumstantial evidence that the
Company could have been aware of Silvia 's union activity (or
any union activity) is, in our opinion , extremely weak. The
garagemen 's type of work and their work location was of a
diffused and ambulatory nature . At any given time they
might be sitting in one of many cars. Another garageman
could be parking an adjacent car; garagemen could communi-
cate with each other with ease and without detection in any
number of places , including in the garage as they were wash-
and others testified that garagemen road tested cars to verify the truth of a
customer complaint, none testified that garagemen were supposed to not
only verify the complaint but also were to analyze and diagnose the cause
of the trouble and then were to take steps to correct the problem Under the
unclear circumstances previously described , Silvia claims to have verified
the legitimacy of the customer complaint But he also assertedly diagnosed
the cause and then corrected the cause by applying the therapy of a high
speed journey on the expressway
" Silvia's regular off-work days were November 3 and 4 and he was not
at work
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing cars, changing tires, and so forth; they might also be in
the airport terminal with hundreds or more travelers, em-
ployees of various businesses in the terminal, and so forth;
they no doubt could go to airport coffeeshops and other areas;
and there was no immediate supervisor, like a foreman, who
worked in close physical contact with the garagemen in the
garage or any other place.
In our opinion, the General Counsel's reliance on the small
plant proposition, "that the small number of employees in the
plant or department concerned justifies a reasonable inference
that information as to union activities came to the attention
of management" is misplaced. In this case we do not regard
such an inference as reasonable because of circumstances
described above.
It is then suggested or implied by the General Counsel that
the problem of establishing company knowledge of Silvia's
union activity is solved by the possible existence of an in-
former. We are not convinced. The argument is that, al-
though all unit employees had signed union cards by Novem-
ber 2, in the Board election that was held on December 17
there were two votes against the Union; therefore one of the
two was probably an informer. Aside from the fact that no
one knows who voted against the Union (sometimes the least
likely suspects do), it does not follow that a negative voter is
also an informer. It is also quite possible that the negative
votes, more than a month after Silvia's discharge, may have
been due to changes in the voter's views after the discharge;
and since all voters had signed union cards prior to the dis-
charge, it is unlikely that there was an informer prior to
November 5. What the Company said about wage increases
after the discharge may have also affected the voters. All
these ruminations are speculative, including the General
Counsel's suggestion that there was an informer prior to
November 5. In any organizing situation and in most other
situations involving employees, unions, and employers, it is
possible that there may be an informer but broad possibilities
are not evidence. The fact that some (and probably all) em-
ployees in the garage unit knew of Silvia's union activity is
a decidedly inconclusive fact as far as proving the existence
of an informer.
The Trial Examiner finds that the complaint allegation that
Silvia was discriminatorily discharged is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and recommends dismissal of
that portion of the complaint. There is, in our opinion, not
only a deficiency in the proof of Respondent's knowledge of
Silvia's union activity, a fatal defect in itself, but also a defi-
ciency of proof on the merits, even assuming Respondent's
knowledge of union activity by Silvia.
The Wage Increase Issue
Stoner, Respondent's labor relations manager, testified
that, in the past, the Company had given wage increases to
all hourly paid personnel, rental representatives, and garage-
men at the same time. There is no evidence that such raises
had been given at any particular time, such as the first of the
year, annually, or so forth, or that raises were triggered more
or less automatically by a fixed percentage raise in the con-
sumer price index or by some similar factor.
At the time the Union filed a representation petition for
Respondent's rental representatives about July 6, 1970,
Stoner states that he discovered that there had been no gen-
eral wage increase for l% years at San Antonio. At that time,
according to Stoner, "we felt that shortly after the rental
representation election, if the rental reps voted the union
down, that we should shortly thereafter increase wages."
The implication is clear from the foregoing that Respond-
ent, being aware of the law, assertedly decided to neither
announce nor to grant a wage increase until it was determined
by the Board, as the result of an election, whether the Union
had achieved certification as the representative of the rental
representatives.24
The rental representatives' election was held August 17,
1970, but was inconclusive because of one unresolved chal-
lenged ballot. The hearing on the challenged ballot was held
November 3, 1970. The Hearing Officer's Report on the evi-
dence adduced at the hearing issued November 19, disallow-
ing the challenge. The Board affirmed on December 17, the
ballot was opened and counted, and the Union lost the elec-
tion.
Absent some other intervening situation, a scrupulous em-
ployer, as Stoner portrays Respondent to be regarding wage
increase announcements while a representation issue was
pending before the Board, would determine that on Decem-
ber 17, 1970, and not before, he was free to announce a wage
increase.
On November 3, 1970, the Union told Stoner that it had
signed up all the Company's garage employees and suggested
that Respondent recognize the Union. Stoner declined, and
then, on November 3, reported to Shafer the foregoing intelli-
gence about the union claim regarding the garagemen. After
the receipt of the aforementioned information and before the
Union filed its petition for the garagemen on November 9,
1970, Shafer convened the garagemen for a meeting after
Silvia's discharge." The meeting was either on November 5
or 6. At the meeting, Shafer said that the representation
matter involving "the girls," the rental representatives, was
now settled and, since that representation matter had been
the reason why the Company had not been able to grant a
raise to either the rental representatives or to the garagemen,
the Company was now granting a substantial wage increase
within the next few weeks or by December 1.
Respondent has given several explanations for announcing
to the garagemen on November 5 or 6 that it was granting
them a substantial wage increase by December 1.26 Stoner at
one point testified, as we have seen, that around July 1970,
after Respondent became aware of the petition filed with the
Board by the union regarding the rental representatives in
July, Respondent decided "that shortly after the rental repre-
sentative election, if the rental reps voted the union down,
that we should very shortly thereafter increase wages." Al-
though Respondent neither announced nor granted a wage
increase between July and November 1970, while the repre-
sentation matter of the rental personnel was pending before
the Board, it announced a wage increase to the garagemen on
November 5-6, while the rental personnel matter was still
pending before the Board," and 2 or 3 days after the Union
had informed Respondent that it had signed up all the garage-
men and had requested recognition. Stoner also testified that
"Prior to the hearing [the November 3 hearing in the rental
representatives' election], sometime prior to the hearing
... we determined that shortly after the hearing we would
" Stoner's testimony about discovering in July 1970 that no wage in-
crease had been given for 1 % years implies that, but for the union petition,
a wage increase would have been granted soon after his discovery of the
1'/,-year gap
Silvia was discharged November 5 at approximately 8.35 a.m
Although there is no evidence on the matter, we assume that in some
other meeting, either on the same day or about the same time, the Respond-
ent gave the same message to the rental representatives since Stoner testified
that he believed the rental representatives were granted the wage increase
on December 1 If no prior announcement had been made to the rental
representatives, the announcement to the garagemen alone on November
5-6 is the more striking
" The issue of the rental representatives was not decided by the Board
until December 17 and even the Hearing Officer's Report had not issued
until November 19
THE HERTZ CORPORATION 103
announce a general wage increase [for rental representatives
and garagemen] to be effective December 1, regardless of the
outcome [in the rental representative case]."28
Stoner testified that in Respondent's organization, the city
manager at a station initiates the recommendation for a wage
increase (Shafer, of course, was city manager at San An-
tonio). The recommendation then goes to the zone manager
in Dallas; and then to the regional manager in Chicago. If the
latter concurs in the recommendation, then the word goes
back down the chain of command aforementioned, which
would mean that the zone manager in Dallas would advise
Shafer that his recommendation for an increase had been
approved. Stoner states that "there is quite a study that has
to be made prior" to a recommended wage increase.
If Shafer, Stoner, and other officials had decided on a wage
increase around July 1970 but deferred its announcement
until the representation matter of the rental personnel was
processed and completed by the Board, they had adequate
time intramurally to go through channels and make the study
between July and November. But Stoner admits that on
November 5-6 when Shafer announced to the garagemen that
there would be a substantial wage increase about December
1, neither the formula nor the amount of the increase had
been decided on. Nor is there any evidence by way of memo-
randa or other documentation that the matter of the increase
had gone through the chain of command that Stoner had
described. It was Stoner who, on November 4, after the
November 3 hearing, told Shafer to inform the garagemen
that there would be a wage increase. Shafer gave no indication
to Stoner at the time that he, Shafer, had already been advised
by the zone manager that the wage increase had been ap-
proved by the regional manager and Stoner did not know if
Shafer had heard anything on the subject; all Stoner states is
that the word to announce the increase was given by Stoner
to Shafer on November 4, after the November 3 hearing, and
after the Union had informed Stoner that it had signed up the
garagemen .29 A substantial wage increase, therefore, was an-
nounced to the garagemen on November 5-6 although the
decisive challenge ballot issue in the rental representatives'
case was still pending before the Board and although the
pendency of the Board proceedings has been cited by Re-
spondent as the reason it had held up wage increases or wage
increase announcements for many months.
It is the Examiner's opinion that either Respondent had
not processed a recommendation for a wage increase through
channels in the normal manner prescribed in its organization
prior to November 3 and had not received normal chain of
command approval, or, if some recommendation was in the
pipeline before November 3, it was precipitously transformed
into an announcement of a wage increase on November 5-6,
at Stoner's direction, almost immediately after Stoner was
informed by the Union that it had signed up the garagemen
" Shafer testified that the November 5-6 wage increase announcement
was made contingent upon the outcome of the still pending rental represent-
atives' case, i e., "Pending, of course, the outcome of the hearing itself,
which we did not know for sure at that time "
19 Another thing that Stoner stated in his testimony is that the decision
to grant an increase was made "sometime prior" to the November 3 hearing.
Respondent, despite the procedure the Company had for such matters,
never produced anything to support Stoner's assertion and Stoner offered
nothing more than the statement that it occurred sometime prior to Novem-
ber 3 Shafer adds nothing to Stoner's testimony except to say, regarding
what occurred on November 5-6 when he announced the wage increase,
that " . I had been planning to submit the general wage adjustment scale
for approval through the chain for many, many months previously to this
And due to the election and due to the hearing on the challenged ballot, I
had not been able to do this."
and was seeking recognition for that unit.'° This action was
taken despite the fact that the representation issue in the
other case, the subject of the November 3 hearing, was still
pending before the Board and awaiting Board decision; and
the hasty nature of Respondent's action is further shown by
the fact that it had not determined the formula or the amount
of the increase when it made its announcement. We conclude
that Respondent adopted and put into effect its action in
announcing a substantial wage increase to the garagemen in
order to influence the garagemen either to not sign cards if
they had not done so, or not adhere to the Union if they had
signed cards, or, probably most importantly, not vote for the
Union in any Board election that might be held." We find
such conduct to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent and the Union on November 24, 1970, entered
into an agreement for a Board-conducted consent election in
the garage unit." Stoner states that, sometime before Novem-
ber 24, a decision had been made to go to a consent election.
He, therefore, "sometime after November 19 or 20," had
called Shafer to advise him that a consent election had been
agreed upon and, consequently, the Company would no
longer be in a position to grant the garagemen the wage
increase on December 1, since the Company, although it had
on November 5-6 promised a wage increase, had not an-
nounced the amount of the increase.
Accordingly, Shafer met with the garagemen on November
24. He told them that the Union had filed a petition and a
consent election had been agreed upon and an election was
scheduled for December 17. He stated that as a result the
Company could not give the garagemen a wage increase as
previously promised. During the meeting some discussion
took place regarding working conditions in Hertz stations
where there was a union. Shafer said that in Dallas the men
were not allowed to sit around but were kept busy at all times
and that supervisors had made the garagemen wash cars
twice in order that they be kept busy. He said that here at San
Antonio the men, if caught up on their work, could take a
break, smoke, or drink cokes, or whatever, but if they were
going to be making more money, it would not be that way.
Shafer testified that these were not his exact words although
he may have said something to that effect. He states that he
said that the men in Dallas were obliged to stay busy and the
supervisor sometimes made them wash cars twice. We believe
the first-mentioned version by Harmon is substantially credi-
ble and is, in substance, not controverted.
A further relevant fact is that on November 24, the union
representative, the business manager of the Union, wrote to
Shafer. He cited Shafer's promise, in early November, of a
raise to the garagemen by December 1 and also that "today"
Shafer had advised the men that he could not give them a
raise because of the Union. the letter concluded:
I would like to advise you that I have no objections to
your giving your employees a raise. In fact, we ask you
to give them a raise as you have promised.
The evidence persuades the Examiner that the Respondent
has interfered with the rights of employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) first, by its hasty announcement of a wage
increase on November 5-6 to be effective December 1, as
previously analyzed and found; and, secondly, by on Novem-
' ° Respondent evidently believed that because the Union had not yet filed
a petition for the garagemen with the Board, a quick wage announcement
before the petition was actually filed would have an immunity that might not
exist if the wage increase was announced after a petition was filed
" Since the Union had claimed that it had signed up the garagemen and
since Stoner had declined to grant recognition, the probability of a Board
election was great
" The Union had filed its petition on November 9
104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ber 24 shifting to the union presence the onus of causing the
withdrawal of the promised increase, creating the impression
that it was solely the union presence that was responsible for
the fact that the increase would not be forthcoming as prom-
ised . If Respondent had been acting in good faith , it certainly
could be expected to have held another meeting after receipt
of the union letter of November 24 and there announce that
since the Union had waived any objection to a wage increase
before the election and had requested that the Company fulfill
its promise of an increase, the Company was therefore going
to grant the increase on December 1 as promised.
Even without the union letter, in our opinion, the Com-
pany could have and should have gone forward with its prom-
ised increase rather than calling off the increase and attribut-
ing its action to the union's efforts to gain representation
rights. The Company's premise, after all, has been that s wage
increase had been in the Company pipeline and had been
decided upon before any knowledge of union interest in the
garagemen was known to the Company. It is also the Com-
pany's position that the promise of a wage increase was not
illegal . With such premises , therefore , the withdrawal of the
promised increase was an inconsistent act, attributable to
other considerations. The amount of increase had not been
decided upon but if the Company went forward with an
increase in an amount that was attributable to some objective
standard, the action, in our opinion, would not have been
illegal . If, in past years the Company had granted general
wage increases ranging from 8-15 cents per hour , an increase
in this range would not have been illegal in fulfillment of the
November 5-6 promise. Indeed, even if in past years the
increase had been in the 8-15-cent range, the Company could
justify a higher increase in 1970 if there was some objective
fact to support its action.33
Regarding Shafer's statements on November 24 that, with
a union at the Dallas station , the employees there were re-
quired by management to work harder, including the require-
ment of washing cars twice , it is our opinion that the implica-
tion was clear that this was management policy in response
to unionization . While there was no express statement that
the foregoing conditions of work at Dallas under a union
would be imposed at San Antonio if the latter went union, it
was reasonablly clear that the impression was conveyed that
such would be the case or, at least, was a good possibility. In
view of Shafer's statements as to what conditions of employ-
ment company management had imposed in a unionized sta-
tion, the listeners could reasonably conclude that company
management in the same Company would follow a similar
policy in San Antonio. 31 Certainly this is true since Shafer did
not say that conditions at Dallas did not represent company
policy or that such policies were not to be expected at San
Antonio in the event of unionization. In the light of the
evidence, we find a further instance of Section 8(a)(1) viola-
tion in the aforementioned portions of the November 24
meeting.
" We need not mention the obvious fact that an increase below the past
pattern of 8-15 cents would require little justification . An increase of say 20
cents could be justified if attributable to objective factors , e g , Company
profits higher than past years and 20 -cent increase bore the same ratio to
current profits as 8-15 -cent increases had borne to lower profits in past
years
" Both Shafer and Kidd in the past had been station managers at Dallas
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by the discharge of employee Silvia.
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
(a) On November 5-6, 1970, promising garage employees
a substantial wage increase in order to affect their sentiments
toward, or their support of, the Union.
(b) By announcing on November 24, 1970, to the garage
employees that the promised wage increase could not be
granted because of the representation procedure initiated by
the Union to secure recognition.
(c) By stating on November 24, 1970, to the garage em-
ployees that in a unionized company station the policy and
situation was that the employees were required to work
harder and to perform needless tasks so as to be kept busy.
THE REMEDY
Posting of a notice and a cease-and-desist order directed to
the unfair labor practices committed will be recommended.
RECOMMENDED ORDER"
Respondent, the Hertz Corporation, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Using and timing the announcement of a wage increase
to employees during a union organizational campaign in or-
der to influence employees regarding the Union.
(b) Using and timing the announcement of the withdrawal
of a promised wage increase to employees in such a way and
without legal justification so that the withdrawal is attributed
to the union effort to secure recognition as bargaining agent.
(c) Conveying to employees that when employees are
represented by a union in Respondent's organization they are
required to work harder and to perform useless and repeti-
tious tasks so that they are kept busy at all times.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its San Antonio, Texas, operation, in the garage
and service center, in places normally used for notices to
rank-and-file personnel, the notice attached hereto as "Ap-
pendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 23, shall, after being signed by
Respondent, be posted immediately in conspicuous places
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive
days. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days of receipt of the Trial Examiner's Decision what steps
it has taken to comply therewith.31
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
" In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED
BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD"
shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR-
DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD."
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
THE HERTZ CORPORATION
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
As the result of a trial, a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor Relations Board has found that we committed certain
unfair labor practices in November 1970.
WE WILL NOT use or time announcements of wage
increases to employees during a union organizing cam-
paign in order to influence employees ' attitudes towards
a union.
WE WILL NOT withdraw wage increases promised to
employees in order to influence employees ' attitudes to-
wards a union.
WE WILL NOT state or indicate to employees that in a
unionized operation the Company requires more work
from employees and will require them to perform useless
and repetitious work.
105
All our employees are free to join a union , to remain in a
union , or to refrain from union activities since such rights are
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.
THE HERTZ
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions , may be directed to the Board 's Office , Dallas-
Brazos Building, 1125 Brazos Street , Houston , Texas 77002,
Tel. 713-226-4296.