The Hartford Fire Insurance Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 1971

191 N.L.R.B. 563 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. 563
The Hartford Fire Insurance Company and Office &
Professional Employees International Union, Local
320, AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-4191
June 25, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND KENNEDY
On November 25, 1970, Trial Examiner George L.
Powell issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. There-
after, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and a supporting brief, and the Gen-
eral Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed.' The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the
entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act when it unilaterally
implemented certain alleged merit wage increases to
unit employees on August 25, 1969, and again on Feb-
ruary 17, 1970. We agree.'
The Trial Examiner further found that Respondent
independently violated Section 8(a) (1) by notifying the
employees of the August 25, 1969, unilateral increase.
Elsewhere in his Decision the Trial Examiner referred
to a letter sent to the employees on June 4, 1969, notify-
ing them of the prospective wage increase as back-
ground evidence in view of the provisions of Section
10(b). The General Counsel has excepted to the failure
of the Trial Examiner to include in his Conclusions of
Respondent contends that- the Trial Examiner demonstrated bias in
characterizing its counterproposal on a separability; clause as "poppycock"
and by equating,_ the need for the language suggested in Respondent's
proposal as equivalent to the "risk of forecasting a blizzard-n,Kansas City,
Mo, inrthe, middle of August." While we need not adopt theserliterary
figures, we are satisfied that a careful analysis of the record and of the Trial
Examiner's Decision reveals no bias or prejudice on the part of the Trial
Examiner
3 N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U S 736 at 746-747
Law a finding that the June 4 letter was violative of the
Act. As the Trial Examiner did not specifically find
that the June 4 letter violated Section 8 (a) (1), we find
no merit in the General Counsel 's exception . As there
is otherwise no evidence in the record that Respondent
notified the employees of the unilateral increase in a
manner violative of Section 8(a) (1), we do not adopt
this finding of the Trial Examiner.
The Trial Examiner inadvertently failed to include
the finding of unilateral wage increases in his Conclu-
sions of Law. The Conclusions of Law are modified so
that the conclusion designated below as 6 is inserted
after Conclusion 5 in the Trial Examiner 's Decision,
and the present Conclusion 6 is renumbered 7:
6. By unilaterally granting wage increases to unit
employees on August 25, 1969 , and February 17, 1970,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5)
and (1 ) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner, as modified below, and hereby or-
ders that Respondent, The Hartford Fire Insurance
Company, Kansas City, Missouri, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order, as herein
modified:
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(b) to the Trial
Examiner's recommended Order, and reletter the
present paragraph 1(b) as 1(c):
"(b) Granting unilateral wage increases to its em-
ployees without first bargaining with the Union about
them."
2. Substitute the attached Appendix for the Trial
Examiner's Appendix.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with Office & Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 1320, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive- representative of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT grant wage increases to our field
claims adjusters without first bargaining collec-
tively with the Office & Professional Employees
International Union, Local 320, AFL-CIO, as the
191 NLRB No. 78
564 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exclusive representative of those employees for
collective-bargaining purposes.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exer-
cise of their right to self-organization , to form,
join, or assist any labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing , and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from
any and all such activities.
WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request,
with this Union as the exclusive representative of
all our employees in the bargaining unit described
below with respect to rates of pay , wages , hours of
employment , and other terms and conditions of
employment , and if an understanding is reached
embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
The bargaining unit is:
All field claims adjusters at the Kansas City,
Missouri , office of Respondent , excluding
office clerical employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees.
THE HARTFORD
INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 610 Federal Building, East 12th Street, Kansas
City, Missouri 64106, Telephone 816-374-5181.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE L. POWELL, Trial Examiner: Upon charges filed
on January 20, 1970, amended on February 11, 1970 by Office
& Professional Employees International Union, Local 320,
AFL-CIO, herein called Charging Party or Union, against
The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Inc., herein called
Respondent, the Regional Director for Region 17 of the
NLRB, herein called the Board, issued a complaint on behalf
of the General Counsel of the Board on April 17, 1970,
alleging violations of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, (29 USC Sec. 151, et
seq.), herein called the Act. In its duly,filed answer, Respond-
ent, while admitting certain allegations of the complaint, de-
nied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice a trial was held before me in Kansas
City, Missouri , on June 30 and July 1, 1970, where the parties
were present, were represented by counsel, were afforded full
opportunities to be heard by examination and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses, and were permitted to present oral argu-
ment and file briefs. Counsel for Respondent gave oral argu-
ment and the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs on
August 19 , 1970. Respondent 's notion to dismiss made at the
conclusion of the case is denied . On the entire record of
evidence, my observation of the witnesses as they testified,'
and due consideration of the oral argument and briefs, I find,
for the reasons hereinafter set forth , that the General Counsel
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respond-
ent refused to bargain in good faith in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by engaging in "surface " bargaining
and by making unilateral changes in wages. I will recommend
that the violations of the act found be remedied by ordering
Respondent to cease and desist from its illegal conduct and
to bargain in good faith with the Union for a year from this
decision if necessary in an attempt to reach an agreement as
to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment,
reducing to writing any agreement so reached.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
I find as true the admitted allegations of Paragraph 2 of the
complaint respecting the nature and volume of business car-
ried on by Respondent, a Connecticut corporation engaged in
the business of selling various policies of insurance and ad-
justing claims thereon in various states of the United States
including the office and place of business located in Kansas
City, Missouri , and conclude therefrom that Respondent is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
I also find as true the admitted allegations in Paragraph 3
of the complaint that the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Union, on January 29, 1969, petitioned for an election
in a unit of "all field claims adjusters at the Kansas City,
Missouri, office of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company,
excluding office-clerical employees, guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act, and all other employees," in Case
17-RC-5948, of which I take judicial notice. At the election
on March 31, 1969, 13 ballots were cast of which 7 were for
the Union, 5 were against it, and 1 ballot was challenged. The
Union, on April 11, 1969, was certified as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining agent for the employees in the unit.
On April 15, 1969, the Union wrote the following letter to
Respondent seeking information for bargaining.
Dear Mr. Shramek:
In view of the N.L.R.B. certification of this organization
as exclusive bargaining representatives of your claims
adjusters, we are requesting you to furnish the following
information:
1. Wage data showing starting rate, various incre-
ments and maximum rate.
' Cf. Bishop & Malco, Inc., 159 NLRB 1159, 1161.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. 565
2. Length of service of each adjuster.
3. Current rate of pay of each claims adjuster.
4. Vacation policy.
5. Holiday policy.
6. Insurance (life, health & accident) coverage.
7. Other fringe benefits.
8. Any Company rules or regulations concerning
conduct and working conditions of adjusters.
This information is needed for contract negotiations and
to allow the Union to properly represent the employees.
Your prompt handling of this matter shall be greatly
appreciated.
Yours very truly,
Larry O. Green,
Business Manager
Receiving no reply in 6 weeks in their request for informa-
tion the Union wrote Respondent the following letter on May
29, 1969:
Dear Mr. Shramek:
Please refer to my letter of April 15, 1969 requesting
certain information regarding the Claims Adjusters.
To date the information has not been received. About
four weeks ago, in a telephone conversation with your
attorney, Mr. Beck, I was told you were preparing the
data and it would be forthcoming.
Surely you recognize that the Union is legally entitled to
the requested information. Forty-five days to compile
the simple information is entirely too long , therefore, we
must insist on receiving the data by June 6, 1969 or we
will be compelled to take necessary action to effect re-
ceipt.
4. Vacation policy-See Schedule B.
5. Holiday policy-See Schedule C.
6. Insurance (life, health and accident)-See Exhib-
its D-1 and D-2.
7. Other fringe benefits:
(a) Furnishing company automobile.
(b) Reimbursement for relocation expenses.
(c) Reimbursement for specified educational
courses.
(d) Retirement plan-See Exhibit E.
8. Company rules and regulations. We have no writ-
ten rules or regulations which are furnished to the
adjusters in a booklet form, except for a book on the
handling of expenses which we will sent to you and
a book entitled General Information which is en-
closed. If we have overlooked any other publication
we shall send it to you. We, of course, have rules
and regulations regarding the handling of files and
office procedures. They are too lengthy to set out in
this letter, but if you have specific areas in mind we
will be happy to advise you.
Very truly yours,
MORRISON, HECKER,
COZAD, MORRISON &
CURTIS
By: Byron J. Beck
BJB:js
Enc.
Schedule A of the letter is a typed page listing the 13
employees, showing the date of employment and the present
salary for each as follows:
Yours very truly,
Larry O. Green,
Business Manager
Respondent furnished the requested information in a letter ATE RESENT
dated June 4, 1969 as follows: NAME EMPLOYED SALARY
Dear Mr. Green:
In reply to your letter of April 15, 1969, we enclose
the following information: James Ader 10/67 $7675
1. Wage data: Charles Ballah 12/68 6500
(a) Starting salary is based on experience and Ralph Blinston 6/64 8800educational background. The minimum rate for a
college graduate is $7400.00. Once an individual John Farley 10/67 8100
qualifies as a claims adjuster his salary goes to James Fling 9/61 9080
$7500.00 Tom Furr 7/68 7000(b) Maximum rate $11,300.00
(c) There are no set or scheduled increases from J. McElwain 6/66 726.
the minimum to the maximum , although each in- D. utiliser 5/68 6900
dividual is reviewed generally on an annual basis. Gary Olsen 12/67 9000This all depends on the ability and performance of
the individual involved. Charles Paddack 1/67 7300
2. Length of service of each adjuster-See Schedule Dennis Reaves 8/64 8268
A. J. L. Smith 7/68 75003. Current rate of pay of each claims adjuster-See
Schedule A. Richard 'Walker 6/67 7400
566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Schedule B, referred to in the letter, is a printed page dated
"4/1/66" from the personnel manual of The Hartford Insur-
ance Group entitled "Vacation Schedule" on which are listed
the rules governing entitlement to vacations and the number
of vacation days available to employees according to their
length of service.
Schedule C of the letter is a copy of a notice, dated Novem-
ber 12, 1968, to all department heads and managers listing the
eight holidays and the days off for their observance.
The Union notified Respondent it was ready to commence
bargaining in the following letter of July 2, 1969:
Dear Mr. Shramek:
We wish to advise that the Union is ready to commence
negotiations of the collective bargaining agreement cov-
ering your claims adjusters, and hereby request to meet
with Employer representatives at the earliest date possi-
ble for that purpose.
The employee members of our bargaining committee
will be Messrs. Dennis Reaves and Ralph Blinston.
May we suggest July 9th for the first meeting. The meet-
ing place is somewhat immaterial to us-it can be at
your offices, or, if your prefer, we can meet in our confer-
ence room at this address. If July 9th is satisfactory to
you, we would appreciate your suggestion as to time and
place. If July 9th is not satisfactory, please suggest a date
as soon thereafter as possible.
Looking forward to hearing from you regarding this
matter, I remain
Yours very truly,
Larry O. Green,
Business Manager
Also necessary as background to an evaluation of this case
is a letter from the Respondent on the same date it supplied
the Union's requested bargaining information (June 4, 1969),
and the Union's letter of reply on June 10, 1969. Respond-
ent's letter is as follows:
Dear Mr. Green:
Subject to your approval and the condition which is
explained below, we propose during the period of con-
tract negotiations to resume our policy of reviewing each
individual's performance and granting salary increases
to those who in our opinion merit an increase. Generally,
this review has been on an annual basis; however, it has
and could come in less time in the case of new em-
ployees.
Before we resume this policy we believe it is important
to have an understanding that the Company's evaluation
and decision with respect to each individual will not be
questioned by the Union or the individual involved or be
made the subject of an unfair labor practice charge. As
you are aware, evaluation of performance involves both
objective and subjective considerations which might be
misinterpreted. We do not wish to take this action if it
means that we are placing ourselves in a position where
we may have to defend our decision against a charge of
discrimination.
We assure you that if the Union agrees to this proposal
our decision in each case will be based strictly on merit.
This procedure will continue until superseded by what-
ever is provided for in the contract to be negotiated.
We should also advise you that sometime ago the
decision was made to increase Hartford' s minimum sal-
ary for persons functioning as claims adjusters to
$7500.00. Thus, any adjuster who presently is below this
minimum will automatically receive at least $7500.00 at
the time of his review if his performance has been satis-
factory.
We are sending copies of this letter to the individuals
in the bargaining unit and ask that you let us know your
decision as soon as possible.
Very truly yours,
THE HARTFORD
INSURANCE GROUP
J. J. Shramek
Claims Manager
JJS js
The Union's reply on June 10, 1969 follows:
Dear Mr. Shramek:
This is in reply to your letter of June 4th requesting the
Union's approval, subject to certain conditions, of your
resumption of granting merit increases to employees in
bargaining unit.
Contrary to what we believe was your opinion, an em-
ployer is not prohibited from administering an estab-
lished and non-discriminatory policy during an organi-
zational campaign. Frankly, in our opinion, it would
have been more appropriate for you to have continued
your policy of merit review during the campaign than to
do so at this time.
However, the real crux of the matter is that the Union
cannot waiver [sic] its statutory right to file charges if it
believes the law to have been violated. And, further-
more, an individual has the same statutory right to file
charges and the Union has no authority to abrogate such
right.
Our proposal is nearing completion, and we should be in
position to start negotiations in about two weeks. We
suggest that this issue be resolved in negotiations.
Yours very truly,
Larry O. Green
Business Manager
B. The Bargaining
After exchange of the above letters, the parties met 13
times from July 14, 1969, to January 15, 1970, on the dates
set out below with bargaining representatives as noted:
1st Meeting: July 14, 1969. Present for Respondent were
Beck, company counsel, Shramek, regional claims manager,
and Morrison, attorney. The union negotiating committee
was composed of Green, business manager, Schmit, business
representative, and employees Reaves and Blinston.
2nd Meeting: July 21, 1969. Same persons were present.
3rd Meeting: August 18, 1969. Same persons were present
plus Lederer, attorney for Respondent, as observer.
4th Meeting: August 25, 1969. Same persons were present.
5th Meeting: August 28, 1969. Present: Beck, Shramek,
Lederer and the union negotiating committee.
,6th Meeting: September 4, 1969. Present: Lederer, Shra-
mek, and the union negotiating committee.
7th Meeting: October 3, 1969. Present: Lederer, Mullins,
claims department manager, and the union negotiating com-
mittee.
8th Meeting: October 16, 1969. Present: Lederer, Mullins,
and the union negotiating committee.
9th Meeting: October 17, 1969. Present: Same persons as
at the 8th meeting.
10th Meeting: November 17, 1969. Present: Lederer, Shra-
mek, Schmit, Green, and Blinston.
11th Meeting: November 18, 1969. Present: Lederer, Shra-
mek, Schmit, and Blinston.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. 567
12th Meeting: January 14, 1970. Present: Lederer, Shra-
mek, Green, Schmit, and Blinston.
13th Meeting: January 15, 1970. Present: Same parties as
were at the 12th Meeting.
A Summary of The Bargaining Meetings
The following is a summary of the proposals made and
discussed. No reference will be made to the many hours
during which other than contract matters were talked about.
1. The first meeting, on July 14, 1969, began at 5:00 P. M.
and lasted about an hour. Green presented Respondent with
the Union's contract proposal. Shramek said the company
would have to take up the proposal with the home office,
although both he and Beck told Green they had the authority
to negotiate and bind the Respondent.
2. The second meeting on July 21, 1969 was in Beck's office
and lasted about 2% hours beginning at 5:00 P. M. Beck
submitted Respondent's contract counterproposal and the
parties discussed both proposals with the exception of com-
pensation.
The Union agreed' to Respondent's recognition clause, and
the Respondent agreed to the Union's proposals on: article
XIII on bulletin boards; article XIV, section 1, on nondis-
crimination for union activity; article XV on separability of
invalid caluses; article XVII, Section 3, on rotating weekend
assignments of adjusters; and Article XIX, in which Re-
spondent agreed to continue existing welfare and pension
plans.
3. The third meeting, on August 18, 1969, lasting about 3
hours, began with Beck stating that Respondent was going
ahead with the wage review program discussed with Green
on June 2, 1969 (set out in the above letter of June 4, 1969,
and the Union's reply of June 10, 1969, above). Green told
Beck his position was the same as it was in the June 10, 1969,
letter, i.e. to resolve the issue in the negotiations. Beck gave
the figures of the increases for the eight adjusters who were
getting increases, and the parties discussed the reasons why
the remaining five adjusters did not get wage increases. Green
reserved the right to file charges if there was discrimination.
The parties stipulated that the wage increases were put into
effect on August 25, 1969.
Union's article VIII on sick leave was discussed. Neither
Beck nor Shramek was familiar with Respondent's policy so
Shramek read from Respondent's employee insurance benefit
plan which recently had been put into effect.'
Article IV-new employees, sections 2 and 3, was discussed
but no agreement was reached on them. Section 2 would have
obligated the Employer to pay the full fee of employees hired
from commercial or private employment agencies, and sec-
tion 3 would have prohibited the Employer from subcontract-
ing out work normally or customarily performed by em-
ployees.
The Respondent's proposal on filling vacancies with new
employees was agreed to take the place of the Union's
proposal in Article IV, Section 1.
They confirmed their previous agreements on accepting
Respondent's recognition clause instead of article I of the
Union's proposal.
2 I find that the parties "agreed" to these clauses in order to advance the
bargaining to another stage Although such "agreements" were only tenta-
tive, they would keep the parties from rehashing them until time for final
agreement.
' This new employee benefit plan is not and can not be alleged as an unfair
labor practice in the complaint. It issued 3 days after the Union's certifica-
tion of April 11, 1969, although its effective date was April 10, 1969. Section
10(b) of the Act would bar a complaint based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring before July 20, 1969, in this case.
4. The fourth meeting on August 25, 1969, began with a
further discussion of article VIII relating to sick leave. The
parties again discussed sections 2 and 3 of article IV relating
to new employees (the Union had proposed some changes in
sec. 3.), and for the third time agreed to Respondents'
proposal for filling vacancies with new employees in place of
the Union's article IV, section 1. They discussed a counter-
proposal made by the Union on management rights and the
Respondent's proposal regarding discharges but reached no
new agreements.
5. At the fifth meeting on August 28, 1969, the Union gave
a counterproposal on Article XII, section 2, concerning dis-
charges and made a counterproposal on article XVIII, sec-
tion 1, concerning grievance and arbitration, but no new
agreements were reached. This meeting lasted some 2% hours
in the afternoon and 2 hours after dinner.
6. At the sixth meeting on September 4, 1969, and there-
after, Lederer, rather than Beck, was the negotiator for Re-
spondent. This meeting lasted about 5% hours with a break
for dinner. They again discussed article XVIII, grievance
machinery and arbitration. Shramek gave the definition of
"disability" as used in the salary continuance program and
they discussed the question of supervisors performing unit
work. No new agreement was reached.
7. The seventh meeting was on October 3, 1969. Article
VI-Holidays, Article VII-vacations, and article V-work
schedule of the Union's proposal were discussed with no
agreement being reached.
8. The eighth meeting took place on October 16, 1969.
Article V-work schedule was again discussed with no agree-
ment. Holidays and vacations were discussed and dropped
with Lederer to determine Respondent's experience in the
number of days sick leave employees took per year. Article
XVII-miscellaneous was discussed with some disagreement
by Lederer as to whether section 3 thereof had previously
been agreed to but the discussion ended with the agreement
that section 3 was tentatively agreed to.' Article IX-compen-
sation was discussed. The Union proposed automatic salary
step increases and Respondent argued for merit increases. No
agreement , was reached.
9. The ninth meeting on October 17, 1969, began with
further discussion of article IX-compensation. Blinston
proposed, "isn't it about time the company put something on
the table, let's come to some kind of an agreement with the
union regarding the items we have discussed." Green noted,
" .. we have had several meetings, and I am not sure what
direction the negotiations are going ... since Mr. Lederer has
come into the negotiations we haven't reached agreement on
anything." According to Green's credited testimony, "Mr.
Lederer replied that the company was holding in abeyance
any indication of movement until such time the union had
indicated a willingness to move." Lederer also said, "he
didn't know how long this discussion phase would go on, but
it wouldn't go on any longer than it would take for him to
convince us of their thinking." Lederer refused to take any
final position on anything at that time because things such as
wages, seniority, and discharge. articles were closely related
to each other and would "lock in an employer." Green sug-
gested grouping related matters and try to arrive at an agree-
ment but Lederer refused to do this as it would "hamper his
chance to persuade us to his thinking." Lederer knew how far
Respondent would go on any item but stated he "wasn't in
a position to say so at this time." Lederer said that at some
point in the negotiations, but not then, he would make a
° Article XVII-miscellaneous , section 3 , is as follows:
Sec 3. Regularly scheduled weekend assignments will be on a rotation
basis with each employee being assigned to work a weekend in turn.
568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
proposal on all the items he thought should be in the contract.
Lederer proposed additional discussion on article II-union
security, article III-checkoff of dues, article XI-layoff and
recall, article XV-separability, and article XVI-successors.
Green reminded him that article XV had been agreed to on
July 21, 1969, and, after checking through his notes, Lederer
remembered that it had been agreed to.
On article XVI-successors, Lederer asked why a successor
clause was wanted and Green replied that it was important
because of mergers and the rumor of a merger of Respondent
and I.T. & T was brought up. No agreement was reached.
The meeting ended with no agreement on anything after
the parties discussed article XI-layoff and recall. As to that
article, the Union wanted seniority and Respondent wanted
to use merit. This was the last meeting with Reaves on the
union negotiating committee, as he was promoted to super-
visor of claims adjusters.
10. At the tenth meeting on November 17, 1969, Lederer
asked to discuss article XVII-miscellaneous. Green reminded
him that agreement had been reached on section 3 relating to
weekend assignments (supra.) and Lederer said he had over-
looked it.
About 1Y, hours was spent on a counterproposal of Re-
spondent to article XVII.
Section 7. The Union's original proposal was:
Sec. Z All available work is to be divided equally among
the regular employees in the territory. Under no circum-
stances will any work assignments be made which are
discriminatory or prejudicial.
Lederer's counterproposal read as follows:
It is the employer's intent to divide as equitably as is
practical [sic] the available work among the regular ad-
justers. It is understood and agreed, however, that no
alleged deviations from this section will be subject to the
grievance machinery and arbitration.
Green rejected it as being merely an unenforceable expression
of intent on the part of the company. After dinner they again
discussed the section 7 counterproposal but reached no agree-
ment.
11. The eleventh meeting on the following day, November
18, 1969, took place without Green who became ill with the
flu on the evening of November 17, 1969.5 At this meeting
Lederer gave some answers to some questions the Union had
posed earlier in the meetings. He said Respondent was then
paying eight holidays per man (this was in Respondent's
letter of June 4, 1969), but he didn't know the answers to
what the, length of the waiting period was for collections or
the eligibility date for employees to join in the sick leave
policy and salary continuation plan. He said he would study
this further and give the answers at some meeting later on.6
They discussed holidays and had noted that eight holidays
was the most common number in the B.N.A. report for 1969
and Schmit had countered with the information that the
Union had a contract with Blue Cross-Blue Shield for 18 paid
days off-15 of which were paid holidays and 3 were for
personal leave. They discussed vacations with Schmit, asking
if Respondent would consider the common practice of 3
weeks' vacation after 3 years' service and asking Lederer's
S The 12th meeting, originally scheduled for November 19, 1969, was
cancelled because Green was still too ill to attend. On December 1, 1969,
Green wrote Lederer suggesting meetings on December 15, 16, 18, or 19,
1969. Lederer replied that he was unable to meet on those dates but sug-
gested December 22, 23, or 28 and 29. Green replied that vacations and
holidays precluded Lederer's suggested dates and suggested any days for the
week of January 12, 1970. Upon exchange of letters they agreed to meet
again on January 14, and 15, 1970.
6 No explanation was offered as to why he was so unprepared on a subject
which included in Respondent's letter of June 4, 1969.
reaction to a vacation plan patterned after the Government
employees' vacation plan. As to the 3-week proposal, Lederer
said he would have to consider the overall economic package
and as to the government employees' plan he was of the
opinion that the standards applying to Government em-
ployees were different from those in private independents.
Shramek agreed to check on the average amount of sick leave
used per year per employee and report on it at the next
meeting.'
At the evening session they discussed article XI, section 5,
with Lederer asking why a laid-off employee should be placed
on a recall list for 2 years. Schmit's reply was that that was
the maximum time he would be kept on the list. Article
II-union security was discussed with no agreement, with
Lederer maintaining that Respondent did not want to compel
an employee to join a union and that in his experience such
a clause tended to make the union complacent. Schmit's con-
tention was that union-security would stabilize employment
and reduce friction among employees, and a majority had
voted for the union.
Article III-checkoff of dues was discussed with no agree-
ment.
Article XV-separability was again discussed, although the
parties had reached agreement on it in the second meeting on
July 21, 1969, and a general discussion was had on layoffs,
transfers, and promotions. No agreement was reached.
12. The twelfth meeting was held on January 14, 1970. The
parties discussed article II-union security and article III-
checkoff of dues with Lederer maintaining that a good agree-
ment didn't need these proposals. Green asked if he planned
to make any counterproposals on them to which Lederer
replied in the negative.
At the afternoon discussion, Lederer reported that a rough
estimate of the average time taken in sick leave per employee
in a year was 5 days. He said he had no records to substantiate
this estimate. The Union had asked for 60 days' sick leave.
Lederer presented a counterproposal on article XV-sepa-
rability, although Green reminded him that this had been
agreed to on July 21,1969. The agreed-upon article XV and
this counterproposal are as follows:
ARTICLE XV-SEPARABILITY
[agreed to on July 21, 1969]
In the event that any provision of this agreement shall
at any time be declared invalid by any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction or through government regulations or
decree, such decision shall not invalidate the entire
agreement, it being the express intention of the parties
hereto that all other provisions not declared invalid shall
remain in full force and effect.
ARTICLE XV - SEPARABILITY
[Counterproposal of Respondent on January 14, 1970]
In the event that any provision of this agreement shall
at any time be declared invalid by any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction or through government regulations or
decree, such decision shall not invalidate the entire
agreement, it being the express intention of the parties
hereto that all other provisions not declared invalid shall
remain in full force and effect. Notwithstanding any
other provisions of this agreement, within ten (10) days
after receiving notice of any such declaration of invalid-
ity, either party may request the other in writing to
' No explanation was made as to why Respondent was unprepared on this
basic information.
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. 569
discuss incorporating something into the agreement in
substitution for the provision declared invalid and the
other party hereby agrees to meet and discuss such sub-
stitute provision in an effort to reach agreement thereon.
They also discussed article XVI-successors, for which
Lederer read an article about successorship, but no agree-
ment was reached.
Discussion went to article I-recognition, and when Green
pointed out that the Union had earlier agreed to the Com-
pany's proposal, Lederer replied that the Company was not
sure of its original position inasmuch as the Company was
considering reorganizing its Kansas City operation, making
the original proposal obsolete. The Union refused to budge
from the previous agreement and neither Lederer nor Shra-
mek indicated they would stick by the original agreement.
Green then requested a review of the negotiations to date
to determine where agreement had been reached. Lederer
wanted first to discuss article IX-compensation, some other
economic demands, and some "odds and ends," but Green
thought, "it was imperative that we stop at this time and
recap our progress to find out exactly what we were in agree-
ment on and what we were not in agreement on." They
adjourned at Green's request to come back the next morning
with their "respective positions in line." Lederer suggested
that the next day they go into the Respondent's proposal on
management rights and the Union's proposal on article IV-
new employees. Also he wanted to "rehash" the union's
proposal, item 1, concerning the preamble, article VI-holi-
days, article VII-vacations; article VIII-sick leave; article
XIV-nondiscrimination, section 2; article XVII-miscellane-
ous, sections 1, 5, and 8; and article XVIII-grievance ma-
chinery and arbitration.
13. The thirteenth meeting on January 15, 1970, began at
10:30 A. M. with Green announcing that his records showed
they had reached agreement on "several items." The first item
they had agreed to was article XIII-bulletin board. Leaderer
said that it was the company's intention when they agreed to
this that there would be no more than one bulletin board.
Green said that was not his understanding but he agreed that
one board would be sufficient.
Article XIV-nondiscrimination, section 1, had been agreed
to.
Article XIV-nondiscrimination, section 3, was not agreea-
ble to Lederer although Green believed the Company had
agreed to it in principle on July 21. Lederer could see no need
for a clause like that in the agreement and asked Green if he
would agree to the Company's proposal on intent and pur-
pose. Green told him the intent and purpose clause of the
Company said nothing. And there was no agreement on arti-
cle XIV, section 3.
Green asked if there was still agreement on article XV-
separability and Lederer replied that he would like the Union
to give consideration to his counterproposal.
Article XIX-welfare and pension. Green asked if they were
still in agreement on this and Lederer replied, "Yes, if you
understand that the welfare and pension benefits are subject
to unilateral change." Lederer said this meant changing the
plans without negotiating the changes with the Union. Green
told him this was not what they had agreed to on July 21.
Green asked if they were still in agreement with the com-
pany's proposal on recognition. Lederer replied, "yes, pro-
vided you are talking about the present Kansas City claims
office." Green said they had agreed to the unit in the Board
certification. Accordingly, they no longer were in agreement.
Green asked if they were still in agreement on article IV,
section 1, and Lederer said they were in agreement.
Green asked if they were in agreement on article XVII,
section 3 (requiring weekend assignments to be made on a
rotation basis). Lederer replied, "yes, we agreed to it but we
have some language which is more acceptable to the com-
pany." He read. "Regularly scheduled weekend assignments
will be made on the same basis as the company has practiced
in the past." Green found this unacceptable and wanted the
language previously agreed upon.
This covered the items Green believed they had reached
agreement on and he told Lederer that it now appeared that
"we were not in agreement on most of them" Green requested
adjournment to talk to the employees and to seek legal advice
and he told Lederer he would contact him later with regard
to resuming negotiations. He accused Lederer of drawing out
the negotiations with no intent of reaching an agreement.
Lederer denied attempting to drag out the negotiations-he
said he only wanted a contract satisfactory to both parties
and said he had tried to speed things up but it was the
nonavailability of the Union that had slowed things down.
Green told Lederer that they had agreed on some six or seven
items and it now appeared that, "we were not in agreement
on at least six of those seven or eight items." Lederer gave
dates of January 21 and 22 and the week of February 2 as
being dates he was available for further negotiations and the
meeting adjourned at 12:30 P. M.
On February 9, 1970, Respondent wrote Green about
another contemplated salary adjustment to four adjusters to
which Green did not reply and which went into effect (by
stipulation of the parties) on February 17, 1970, or a little
after that date.
At the January 15, 1970, meeting, Lederer expressed sur-
prise at Green's actions in terminating the negotiations and
testified, "I said that I had contemplated presenting further
counterproposals, which I had all ready and prepared, at the
next meeting or perhaps at the meeting after that, that there
were a few things I thought should be clarified, and that I felt
there were a few matters which I would like to change, to
change the union's thinking on before trying to present such
counterproposals, that I begged the union to change its mind
and to resume meeting in an effort to reach an agreement."
The above facts are largely uncontroverted but in cases
where there was conflicting testimony I have credited Green
or Schmit, as the case may be, basically because of their
demeanor. Notes had been kept of the meetings and were
used throughout the trial to refresh recollections of the wit-
nesses.
The General Counsel has submitted certain proposed cor-
rections for the record, which, in the absence of objections
and to the extent the corrections accord with the notes and
independent recollection of the Trial Examier, are approved.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
Trial Examiners for the Board, and the Board itself, have
amassed a great deal of experience in cases alleging a refusal
to bargain in good faith with the representative of the em-
ployees. And all recognize that these cases present problems
of great complexity and ordinarily, as is the present case, are
not solvable by pointing to one or two instances in bargaining
as proving an allegation that one of the parties was not bar-
gaining in good faith. In fact, no two cases are alike and none
can be a determinative precedent for another as good faith
"can have meaning only in its application to the particular
facts of a particular case." N.L.R.B. v. American National
Insurance, 343 U.S. 395. It is the total picture shown by the
evidence that either supports the complaint or falls short of
the quantum of affirmative proof required by law.
570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The statute clearly states that neither party to the bargain-
ing process need yield its positions on any lawful proposal:
Section 8(d) of the Act reads, in pertinent part,
"such obligation [to bargain in good faith] does not com-
pel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession."
But lack of good faith in bargaining cannot be tolerated
though done with sophistication and finesse. "Consequently,
to sit at a bargaining table or ... to make concessions here
and there, could be the very means by which to conceal a
purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail."
N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage, 275 F.2d 229(C.A.5). The re-
quirement on an employer to bargain with the representative
of the employees is not just to engage in a dialogue but to
engage in a dialogue with a sense of understanding and a
sincere desire to reach an agreement over wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Man's greed tends to outstrip his
desire to live with other men but the national policy of the
United States urges and requires employers to develop the
capacity to deal with the problems of their employees when
these problems are presented by the representatives and not
to develop the capacity to obscure these problems. A constant
ethical motivation is a basic requirement.
The law starts with Section 7 of the Act: "Employees shall
have the right ... to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing." Section 8(d) then specifies"to
bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and 'other conditions of employment." It is
with this caveat of good faith as an essential element of bar-
gaining that Section 8(a) (5) then makes it illegal for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentative of his employees."
In my judgment, the record in this case, in its entirety,
requires a finding that the Respondent, as alleged in the
complaint, refused to bargain in good faith and thereby vi-
olated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion,
I have considered each and every aspect of the proposals that
were exchanged, the timing of the related and pertinent
events, all that was said between the representatives of the
parties in the 13 meetings as detailed by the various witnesses,
the minute items of proposed contract language offered from
time to time, and the briefs, arguments, and theories of coun-
sel to the parties. Some of the counterproposals, and the
resultant disputes, were far more important, and therefore of
greater meaning here, than others. Some, though of cumula-
tive weight, were of much less significance . Decision here
rests upon all pertinent matters, both those set out above and
those too minor to warrant mention.
The background to this case, which may be useful in
throwing light on subsequent developments in an effort to
understand them, shows a remarkable disparate treatment in
dealing with the duly elected representative of the claims
adjusters in the Kansas City office, and the promptness with
which it required these adjusters to act in carrying out the
business of adjusting claims. Respondent demanded prompt
action and hard work by its adjusters. I know of no insurance
company, that would wait 50 days to begin checking out a
routine claim yet Respondent did wait 50 days before sending
the Union the material it needed to commence bargaining, i.e.
a sheet of paper listing the names of its 13 adjusters with their
month of hire and salary plus several other documents which
perportedly were in existence and only had to be assembled.
Also as background, the record shows that at this very
same time of giving the Union the requested material, Re-
spondent gave the Union notice of an intent to "resume" its
annual review of employee performances and granting salary
increases on merit plus automatically raising the minimum
salary to $7500 which would raise the salary of 6 of the 13
listed employees. Respondent sent copies of this promise of
benefit to each of the 13 employees with the statement that
the salary increases would not be granted if the Union would
raise a charge of discrimination. Thus, instead of bargaining
in good faith with the employees' representative over wages,
hours, and conditions of employment as required to do, Re-
spondent by this tactic of "one-upsmanship" undertook to
bypass the Union and give the employees a benefit, weaken
the need for a bargaining representative for _the employees
and be in a position to blame the Union and not grant any
raises should charges of discrimination be filed. The self-
serving statement in the letter that "We assure you that if the
Union [apparently talking to the employees at this point be-
cause the letter was addressed to the Union in which it asked
for "your" approval] agrees to this proposal our decision in
each case will be based strictly on merit," probably would
carry no weight because one of the reasons why employees
want to bargain collectively is to get down in writing that
which previously had come under the heading of "merit."
The complaint alleged that: a) since on or about August 18,
1969, and continuing to date, Respondent has engaged in
surface bargaining with the Union without any real intention
of reaching an agreement with the Union; and b) that on or
about August 25, 1969, and again on or about February 17,
1970, Respondent unilaterally increased the wages of certain
unit employees without prior bargaining in good faith with
respect thereto with the Union. A finding of the facts in either
a) or b) is then alleged to violate Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of
the Act in that it would constitute interference with, restraint,
and coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, and would constitute a refusal
to bargain in good faith with the representative of the' em-
ployees.
At the first two meetings the parties exchanged proposals
and at the second meeting on July 21, 1969, they reached
agreement on some of the proposals. It is well to list them
again here because of subsequent actions of Respondent. The
Union agreed to Respondent's recognition clause and the
Respondent agreed to the following proposals made by the
Union: article XIII relating to bulletin boards; article XIV,
section 1, in which Respondent agreed not to discriminate
against an employee because of his activity as a member of
the Union; article XV on separability of invalid clauses; arti-
cle XVII, section 3, on rotating weekend assignments of ad-
justers; and article XIX in which Respondent agreed to con-
tinue existing welfare and pension plans.
At the third meeting on August 18, 1969, and thereafter,
reads the complaint, Respondent began to show it had no
intention of reaching a contract and unilaterally raised cer-
tain wages. As to the unilateral wage raises, the record shows
that this third meeting began with Beck stating that Respond-
ent was going ahead with the wage review program. In the
light of the realities of the organizational activities among
workmen, the Union representatives had no''choice but not to
want these raises withheld from the employees. The amount
had been fixed independently of any desires of the employees
on the subject; the time for the raises had been set and an-
nounced to all. There was really no alternative to going for-
ward with the increases in the absence of facts showing dis-
crimination. If the Union agents had said, "hold the raises
while we tell management what the employees think the
amounts should be," they, the chosen spokesmen of the em-
ployees, would have been looked upon by their principals as
causing them an immediate salary hurt. If, on the other hand,
they said, "go ahead with the raises as planned," they would
seem to be, as Respondent now argues, in the position of
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. 571
having bargained the matter to the employees' satisfaction.
Such a Hobson's choice is not good-faith bargaining as con-
ceived by the statute. In fact, this amounts to no real bargain-
ing on a subject which normally goes to the heart of condi-
tions of employment. By this patent device of preempting the
entire matter of basic economics, the Respondent effectively
eliminated from any possible consideration the collective
view of its employees. This is what is meant by refusing to
bargain, or refusing in "good faith" to deal with the bargain-
ing agent properly selected by the majority of its employees.
The Respondent effectively denied the Union the opportunity
to function in accordance with the policy of the Act. Accord-
ingly, I find that when the Respondent put these wage raises
in effect on August 25, 1969, it refused to bargain in good
faith within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Also by its action in notifying the employees of this unilateral
action it interfered with, restrained, and coerced the em-
ployees in their Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736; General Electric,
163 NLRB 198. The second instance of unilateral action
which took place on or about February 17, 1970, suffers from
the same disease and it too violates Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act for the same reason. It must be remembered in this
respect that the remedy for a refusal to bargain in good faith
does not take away any raises put in effect so that employers
who do raise the wages of their employees, while unfair labor
practices are pending, subject themselves only to a cease-and-
desist order which, in this case, is the same as the order will
be for the unilateral raise in August 1969.
D. The Surface Bargaining Allegation of the Complaint
After exchanging proposals, the parties, with Green and
Beck leading their respective groups, reached agreement on
6 or 7 items during the second negotiation session and an
additional item during their third session. However, from this
point on during the next 10 sessions, there was no further
agreement reached, even though the Union made several
counterproposals in an attempt to get closer to the Respond-
ent's position. Lederer admitted that he engaged in article
reading, story telling and philosophical discussions on several
of the articles in order to convert the Union to the Company's
position but made no serious effort to reach an agreement
with the Union. Time and again Lederer would seek to rehash
parts of the contract that had been agreed upon. At the ninth
meeting, Green stated that he didn't know what direction the
negotiations were going and that the parties had not reached
agreement on anything since Lederer came into the negotia-
tions. Green then said that the Union needed to know how
long the discussion phase was going to go on so that he could
have a meeting of the minds on what was going into the
contract and asked Lederer to "get something on the table."
Lederer replied that he was not in any position to take a final
position on anything at that time. Finally, at the thirteenth
meeting on January 15, 1970, Green learned that Lederer
only agreed to two of the eight items previously agreed to
during the second and third bargaining sessions.
The rejection, at the thirteenth meeting, of the party's
agreement to article XIV-discrimination, section 3, or the
insistence by Respondent to put this thought in the intent and
purpose part of the agreement rather than in the body of the
agreement is so shallow and petty as to be frivolous and hence
an inference can be raised that it was put forth with no real
purpose of entering into an agreement but only to stall and
frustrate and obscure an agreement.
It further tends to prove that Respondent never intended
to reach an agreement when it rejected, at the thirteenth
meeting, the previous agreement on article XIX-welare and
pension, the recognition clause, and article XVII, section 3,
requiring rotation of weekend assignments . Respondent then,
and for the first time after all these sessions, demanded in
their stead that Respondent have the broad freedom to act
unilaterally to change the welfare and pension benefits when
it chose to do so and to what extent it deemed feasible, to
change the Board unit by changing its local operations, and
to continue to operate the weekend assignments as it had
done in the past. This substitute denies an amicable and
definite method for final resolution of the predictable and
recurring disputes in the administration of the contract and
demands the surrender of the employees' statutory right to
act in concert. It persuasively indicates a pervasive intent to
deny the employees the right to an effective collective voice
in their economic destinies. It appears to me that what Re-
spondent really sought, behind the formal facade of the col-
lective bargaining process, was the right to continue to oper-
ate its business quite as though a majority of the employees
had not chosen to be represented by an exclusive bargaining
agent. It will not suffice as a defense that the Respondent was
ready and willing to sign a contract which in its preamble
gave lip service to statutory recognition of the Union as cer-
tified by the Board. Collective bargaining is not simply an
occasion for purely formal meetings between management
and labor, while each maintains an attitude of `take it or leave
it'; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreements
." N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
361 U.S. 477. And "ultimate agreement" here means an hon-
estly negotiated arrangement, not an imposed fiat as to what
conditions of employment shall be.
The same reasoning applies to Respondent's counter-
proposal, at the tenth meeting, of article XVII, section 7,
which not only took out of the contract the equal division of
work (putting it rather as an "intent and purpose") but
removed this vital concern from the grievance procedure.
At the thirteenth meeting, when Green indicated he be-
lieved Respondent was not bargaining in good faith, Lederer
said that he had all ready and prepared some counterpropos-
als which he was contemplating presenting at the next meet-
ing or the meeting thereafter. His reason for not presenting
them earlier was that he wanted to change the "Union's
thinking" first. I find that this is not bargaining collectively
under the Act. These bargaining meetings are not for debat-
ing or getting the "Union" to change its thinking. There is no
difference between what the employees want and what the
Union wants. The Union is the agent of the employees and
gets for his principal as much as possible in the give and take
of bargaining collectively. If Lederer had some constructive
counterproposals it would seem he should make them, con-
sidering that 8 months had elapsed since the Union was cer-
tified and had asked for the bargaining information it felt it
needed. This deliberate withholding of counterproposals (as-
suming they were designed to bridge nonagreement) under all
these circumstances tends to show an effort to draw out the
bargaining.
As for the counterproposals of Respondent it is well to see
if they are really of substance or, if not, then to add this fact
to the mounting evidence that Respondent was only drawing
out the bargaining. At,the twelfth meeting on January 14,
1970, Respondent made a counterproposal to article XV-
separability (supra.). All that this amounted to was to provide
that either party, within 10 days, could request bargaining to
substitute language for that declared invalid by a court and
the other party had to meet and discuss this in an effort to
reach agreement thereon. On its face, and to someone who
knew little or nothing about the contract the Union had
proposed, it looks like the Respondent is really plugging an
apparent gap and is interested in providing new bargaining if
necessary. But this is poppycock! It is only a self-serving
572 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
statement having little or no value (other than to waste time)
in the contract, because few contracts have ever been found
to have illegal clauses in them, particularly contracts of the
nature involved here. Using insurance language, the risk of
any of the clauses proposed by the Union in this case ever
being held illegal by a court would somewhat approximate
the risk of forecasting a blizzard in Kansas City, Missouri, in
the middle of August. Wasting time discussing such risks
adds to the evidence on which mference can be made that the
Respondent was not bargaining in good faith but was drag-
ging out the negotiations with no real effort to reach agree-
ment.
IV THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in an unlawful
refusal to bargain with the Union in good faith, I shall recom-
mend that it be ordered to do so upon request and to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practices in the future. I
shall construe the initial year of certification as beginning on
the date Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with
the Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the
appropriate unit . See: Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136
NLRB 785; Commerce Company d/b/a Lamar Hotel, 140
NLRB 226, 229, enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 379
U.S. 817; Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419,
1421, enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (C.A. 10).
V THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III,
above occurring in connection with the operations of Re-
spondent described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All field claims adjusters at the Kansas City, Missouri,
office of Respondent , excluding office clerical employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. Office & Professional Employees International Union,
Local 320, AFL-CIO, was on April 11, 1969, and at all times
thereafter has been , the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent 's employees in the appropriate unit,
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain with the above-named labor orga-
nization in good faith the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a) (5) and (1) of the act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
Office & Professional Employees International Union, Local
320, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organi-
zation, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the
appropriate unit described above, with repsect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions
of employment, and if an understanding is reached embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The initial year of
certification begins on the date Respondent commences to
bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bar-
gaining representative in the appropriate unit.
(b) Post at its place of business in Kansas City, Missouri,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 17, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's rep-
resentative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasona-
ble steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken
to comply herewith.10
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , recommendations , and recommended Order herem shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
' In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
'° In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, notify said Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this order, what steps Respondent has taken
to comply herewith.