The Grace Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1949

84 N.L.R.B. 435 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

11
In the Matter of THE GRACE COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL LADIES'
GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, A. F. OF L.
Case, No. 17-C-1543.-Decided June 21, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On August 18, 1948, Trial Examiner Earl S. Bellman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief ;
and the Union filed a reply brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the additions and modifica-
tions set forth below.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act prior to its amendment in 1947 and
Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act as then amended, by refusing
to bargain with the Union on and after July 16, 1947. We find that
the • Respondent was not excused from bargaining by a restraining
order issued against it by the Circuit Court of Henry County,
Missouri.
On July 8, 1947, following an election by secret ballot, we certified
the Union as the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of
the Respondent's employees.' Thereafter the Respondent was re-
' We modify the unit for which we certified the Union by changing the definition of super-
visory employees therein to conform to the 1947 amendments to the Act. See Marshall and
Bruce Co ., 75 N L. R. B 90 In all other respects we reaffirm the unit found appropriate
in our Decision and Direction of Election of May 27, 1947 As modified the unit descrip-
tion reads • All production employees employed by the Respondent at its Clinton , Missouri,
84 N. L.'R. B, No. 53.
435
436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
quired under the Act to bargain with the Union concerning wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment of the employees in the
unit.' This duty to bargain with the certified representative of its
employees, imposed by Federal statute, was paramount to any con-
flicting obligation which the State court order might have imposed
upon the Respondent.3 We are of the opinion that regardless of the
Respondent's possible good faith in refusing to bargain because of
the State court order, its refusal was violative of the Act. We are
charged, in the public interest, with enforcing the statutory require-
ment that an employer engaged in commerce bargain with the certified
representative of its employees. Because the Respondent has failed to
fulfill the duty to bargain prescribed by the Act, we must order it to
do so.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, The Grace Com-
pany, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor, as the exclusive representative of all production employees
employed by the Respondent at its Clinton, Missouri, plant, excluding
janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sewing operations, and all other
supervisors as defined in the Act; and
(b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts- of Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, to bargain collectively with it in behalf of
the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the American- Federation
plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sewing operations, and all supervisors
as defined in the Act.
We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that it was incumbent upon him
to pass upon whether the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the representation
case.
Y We do not determine what effect our certification of the Union had upon the contract
between the Respondent and the Independent, except to affirm that the certification made
clear the duty of the Respondent to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative,
within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, of the employees at its Clinton, Missouri,
plant See Klein v. Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417, 424.
3 We note that in 1947 and again in 1949 the Respondent could have removed any obli-
gation exacted by the State court order by terminating the contract with, the Independent
in accordance with the terms of that contract.
THE GRACE COMPANY 437
of Labor, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in
the above-described unit.with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment ;
(b) Post at its plant at Clinton, Missouri, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 4 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and main-
tained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material; and
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER GRAY took no part in the consideration of the above Decision
and Order.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with INTERNATIONAL
LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, affiliated with the AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR, as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to
wages, rates of pay,-hours of employment, and other terms or
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargain-
ing unit is:
All production employees employed at our Clinton, Missouri,
plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sewing op-
erations, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the
above-named union to bargain with us or refuse to bargain with
" In the event that this Order is enforced by' decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted before the words, "A Decision and Order ," the words, "A. Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing "
438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
said union as the exclusive representative of all of our employees
in the above-described appropriate unit.
Dated--------------------
THE GRACE - COMPANY,
Employer.
By ---------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Harry L. Browne, for the General Counsel.
Messrs. Burr S. Stottle and Robei t J. Ingraham, of Kansas City, Mo., for the
Respondent.
Messrs. John Manning and Clif Langsdale, of Kansas City, Mo., for the Union.
Messrs. Haysler A. Poague and Barkley M. Brock, of Clinton, Mo., for the
Independent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on July 30, 1947, by International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, A. F. of L, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director for the Seven-
teenth Region (Kansas City, Missouri), issued the complaint herein, dated March
15, 194S, against The Grace Company, herein called the Respondent, alleging
that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act,'49 Stat. 449, herein called
the Act, and of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the amended Act.2 Copies of the complaint
and notice of the hearing thereon were duly served upon the Respondent and
the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance:
(1) that, with certain exceptions, the production employees at the Respondent's
Clinton, Missouri, plant constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act and of the
amended Act ; (2) that, pursuant to an election 3 and by virtue of Section 9
(a) of the Act and of the amended Act, the Union has been at all times since
July 8, 1947, the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in said
3 The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are herein referred to as
the General Counsel ; the National Labor Relations Board as the Board.
2The provisions of Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act are continued in Section 8 (a) (1)
and (5) of the amended Act. The undersigned takes official notice that the Union was
at the time of-the issuance of the complaint and presently is in compliance with Section
9 (f), (g), and (h) of the amended Act. As to official notice of the Board' s records, see
Matter of Lion Oil Company, 76 N. L. R B. 565
3 The evidence shows that the election alluded to in the complaint was conducted pur-
suant to the Board's Decision and Direction of Election of May 27, 1947 , in a consolidated
representation proceeding in Cases Nos. 17-R-1696 and 17-R-1703, hereinafter referred
to as R Case. Matter of The Grace Company, 73 N L R B 1286
THE GRACE COMPANY 439
appropriate unit ; (3) that on or about July 16, 1947, and at all times thereafter
the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, in violation
of Section 8 (5) of the Act and of Section 8 (a) (5) of the amended Act; and (4)
that by said refusal to bargain, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained;
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act and of the amended Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act and 8 (a) (1) of the
amended Act.
On March 26, 1948, the Respondent filed its answer, admitting certain allega-
tions of fact but denying that it had engaged in any unfair labor practices. The
affirmative allegations of the Respondent's answer constitute, in essence, the
following three major defenses to the alleged refusal to bargain: (1) the
Respondent's production employees at both its Clinton and its Belton, Missouri,
plants constitute a single appropriate unit and the contrary holding in the R
Case that the production employees of the Clinton plant constitute a separate
appropriate unit was erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, and void; (2) by reason
of a valid contract signed on November 14, 1946, by the Respondent and the
independent Union of The Grace Company of Clinton and Belton, Missouri,
herein called the Independent, covering in a single appropriate unit the em-
ployees at both of its plants, the election in the R Case was "improper and
invalid" and the Board's decision and all of its actions therein were "erroneous,
arbitrary and invalid"; and (3) on July 15, 1947, upon application of the
Independent, the Circuit Court of Henry County, Missouri, issued "a temporary
restraining order" against the Respondent, "restraining and enjoining Respondent
from renouncing or breaching its contract" with the Independent ; since said re-
straining order has continued in effect, it "would have been a direct violation"
thereof "for Respondent to have recognized or dealt with" the Union.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Kansas City, Missouri, on March 26,
1948, before Earl S. Bellman, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated
by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Respondent and the
Union were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evi-
dence was afforded all parties. At the opening of the hearing, a document
entitled "ANSWER OF THE INDEPENDENT UNION OF THE GRACE COM-
PANY OF CLINTON & BELTON, MISSOURI," which the Independent had filed
with the Regional Director, was referred to the undersigned for ruling. In
substance, the Independent's answer, which was received in evidence, set out
appropriate unit and contract bar contentions which it had previously advanced
In the R-Case hearing ; ' contended that it was the duly designated bargaining
agent and had a valid contract covering the employees in both of the Respondent's
plants, which employees constitute the appropriate unit; and stated that the
Independent "i's interested in the present hearing and prays for permission
. . . to intervene in this case " The Independent, which had not been
served with notice of hearing, filed no request for a continuance and made no
appearance at the hearing. There was no indication in the Independent's answer
* An additional defense of the answer and also in the Respondent 's brief relates to the
question of the Union ' s compliance with certain filing requirements .of the amended Act.
See footnote 2, above
' These contentions were similar to the allegations in the Respondent's answer, which
are set out above as defenses ( 1) and ( 2). The Independent 's answer did not set up the
restraining order and did not advance any substantial contentions not raised in the Re-
spondent 's answer.
J
440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that it desired to intervene in order to introduce material evidence in the instant
matter which it had been unable to introduce in the R Case. The undersigned
stated that, under the circumstances, he was "not able to determine the extent
to which intervention, if any, should be granted," and denied the motion to inter-
vene without prejudice to its renewal.
During the hearing, motions by the General Counsel and the Union to strike
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the Respondent's answer, which contained the three
defenses set out above, were denied. A motion to make paragraph '5 of the
Respondent's answer definite and certain was granted and thereafter complied
with orally on the record. A motion by the General Counsel, concurred in by the
Respondent, to incorporate by reference in the record herein the transcript and
exhibits in the R-Case hearing,' was granted without objection. At the close
of the hearing, a motion to dismiss the complaint, which had been earlier denied
without prejudice to its renewal, was renewed by the Respondent. Ruling was
reserved on said motion ; it is hereby denied. The parties were afforded oppor-
tunity to argue orally before the undersigned and to file briefs and/or proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The General Counsel argued orally on
the record. Pursuant to extension by the Chief Trial Examiner of time for filing
to April 19, 1948, the Respondent and the Union have each filed briefs and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.' On May 19, 1948, the Inde-
pendent, which had been granted permission on May 7 by the undersigned to
intervene herein, also filed a brief.'
Upon the entire record in the case, including the record in the R Case, and
from his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, The Grace Company, a Missouri corporation with-its principal
office at Belton, Missouri, and with plants at Belton and Clinton, Missouri, is
engaged in the manufacture of children's wearing apparel. In the course of its
business, the Respondent annually purchases raw materials valued in excess of
$100,000, of which more than 50 percent is shipped to its two plants from points
outside the State of Missouri. The finished products of the Respondent's two
,plants have an annual value in excess of $100,000, of which more than 50 percent
is shipped to points outside the State of Missouri.
8 This consolidated R-Case hearing was held in Clinton, Missouri, on January 30, 1947.
The petition in Case No. 17-R-1696,,alleging,a unit composed of the production employees
of the Clinton plant, was filed by the Union on November 13, 1946. The petition in Case
No. 17-R-1703 alleging a unit composed of the production employees of both the Clinton
and Belton plants, was filed by the Independent on December 30, 1946. The Union, the
Independent , and the Employer ( Respondent herein ) were all duly served with notice of
hearing, were represented by counsel, and participated in the R-Case hearing.
7 Rulings on said proposed findings and conclusions are set out below.
By identical telegrams sent on May 7, 1948, the undersigned notified the parties that,
upon consideration of the entire record in the instant matter, the Independent's motion to
intervene had been reconsidered and was granted ; that the Independent was accorded 10
days within which to move to reopen the hearing for the receipt of evidence material to its
interest in the proceeding; and that the Independent was granted 15 days within which
to file a brief and/or proposed findings and conclusions, if it did not move to reopen the
hearing. In a letter dated May 15, 1948, which accompanied its brief , the Independent, by
Attorney Barkley M. Brock, stated :
We have made a check of the evidence that was introduced and we do not feel that
we need to introduce any additional evidence
The foregoing communications have been placed in the formal file and are hereby made a
part of the record herein.
THE GRACE COMPANY 441
The Respondent admits, and the Board found in its decision in the R Case,
that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The
undersigned finds that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act and of the amended Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, herein called the Union, is a
labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.
Independent Union of The Grace Company of Clinton and Belton, Missouri,
herein called the Independent, is an unaffiliated labor organization of employees
of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES e
A. The sequence of events fi om July through December 1947
On July 11, 1947, after the Board, pursuant to the R-Case proceedings, had
certified the Union on July 8, 1947, as the exclusive representative of the produc-
tion employees at the Respondent's Clinton plant, Morris J. Levin of St. Louis,
Missouri, the attorney who had appeared for the Union in^ the R-Case hearing,
telephoned from St. Louis to Robert J. Ingraham, an attorney in Kansas City,
Missouri, who had authority to deal on behalf of the Respondent about matters
pertaining to labor relations, and asked if a meeting could be arranged." In-
graham and Levin arranged for a meeting in Ingraham's office in Kansas City on
July 18.
On July 12, the Respondent received notice that the Independent, with which
it had signed an agreement on November 14, 1946, covering the production em-
ployees in both its plants," had filed on July 11 with the Circuit Court of Henry
County, Missouri, herein called the Missouri Court, a "Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Restraining Order" pertaining to said contract.
On July 15, the Missouri Court held a hearing on the Independent's petition
and issued a "RESTRAINING ORDER," a certified copy of which is in evidence 32
By this restraining order, the Respondent was "restrained from renouncing or
disclaiming the contract [with the Independent] . . . dated November 14,
1946." " It was further ordered that the Respondent "shall recognize the valid-
ity of this contract, shall not renounce the same and shall respect each and every
U Unless otherwise indicated , findings in this division of the report are made upon docu-
mentaiy evidence or upon evidence which is either undisputed or is at variance only as
to immaterial details
10 Prior thereto , on July 2, 1947 , Meyer Perlstein , vice president of the Union , had writ-
ten Mrs Grace Van Brunt, president of the Respondent , asking for a meeting, and had
been referred to Ingraham in a reply dated July 8.
11 The Board had held in its decision in the R Case that this agreement did not constitute
a bar to that proceeding
11 Neither the Board nor the Union were made parties to this suit ; neither received notice
of the above hearing. The undersigned deems it unnecessary to make findings as to what
information the Missouri Court may have had before it when it issued its restraining order.
ii Article XVI, "TERM," of said contract reads as follows :
This contract shall be in force from the date of execution thereof and shall remain
operative and binding upon the parties until November 1, 1947, and shall be deemed
renewed from year to year thereafter except that either party may terminate this con-
tract on November 1, 1947, or on November 1st of any subsequent year, by giving
written notice to the other party at least sixty ( 60) days prior to such November 1st
of its intention to terminate this agreement on the November 1st next following giving
of such notice. This contract may be altered from time to time by agreement of both
parties.
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
part thereof , and shall perform all obligations thereunder ." The final paragraph
of the restraining order read as follows :
The term of this restraining order shall be until the petition for declaratory
judgment is heard and determined by this court."
On July 16 , Clif Langsdale , a Kansas City attorney who was acting on behalf
of the Union , telephoned Ingraham ; informed him that he was "taking over" for
the Union in place of the St. Louis attorney ; and asked that the meeting set for
July 18 be changed to July 17, as he was otherwise engaged on July 18. In-
graham told Langsdale about the restraining order which had been issued the day
before. During the discussion which ensued , Ingraham stated that he could see
no purpose in meeting with the Union while the restraining order was in effect,
as he doubted that the Respondent "could legally negotiate until that matter was
disposed of." After Ingraham had taken that position and there had been some
vehement discussion of the restraining order, Langsdale said, "I suppose the
meeting is off." Ingraham replied, "Well, I suppose it is, as long as this restrain-
ing order is in effect ." 16 As a result of the foregoing conversation , the meeting
set for July 18 did not take place.
On July 24, the Respondent forwarded to the Board a motion in the R Case
that it set aside its finding as to the appropriate unit and its certification of
representatives . Among other things, this motion stated that the Board ' s deci-
sion was in conflict with an existing contract with the Independent which did not
"expire until November 1, 1947," " and that , upon suit which it had brought in the
Missouri Court, the Independent had "obtained a restraining order restraining the
company from breaching the contract."
On August 11, the Board issued an order in which, "for the reasons already set
forth" in its decision of May 27, 1947 , it denied the above motion to set aside the
unit finding and the certification.
On August 20, Vice-President Perlstein , on behalf of the Union , wrote the Re-
spondent 's president , Grace Van Brunt, that , as "the accredited representatives"
of the employees at the Clinton plant, the Union was requesting a meeting "to
negotiate the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."
On August 22, Van Brunt wrote Perlstein , acknowledging his letter , and sug-
gesting that he "get in touch with Mr Ingraham as he has sole authority to
represent me and The Grace Company in this connection and in matters of this
kind."
On August 26, Perlstein wrote Ingraham that the Respondent had referred
the Union , which had requested a collective bargaining conference , to him as
its attorney. Perlstein ' s letter requested a bargaining conference for Friday
morning, August 29, at Ingraham 's office and asked that the Union be advised if
"some other place or near -by date would be more convenient."
On August 29, Burr S. Stottle , an associate of Ingraham , wrote Perlstein,
acknowledging his letter . Stottle stated that Ingraham was engaged in prepar-
14 Such hearing and determination had not taken place at the time of the hearing before
the undersigned in the instant matter.
15 The above findings are made upon the undersigned 's analysis of the testimony of
Ingraham and Langsdale which, upon careful scrutiny , proves more supplementary than
contradictory in nature . The quoted material is from Ingraham ' s direct examination.
Whatever words actually may have been used, the undersigned is satisfied that the con-
versation terminated with the understanding that it was the Respondent's position that,
as long as the restraining order remained in effect, it could not deal with the Union.
16 It should be noted that the Respondent did not thereafter see fit to give notice of
Intention to terminate the agreement as of November 1, as provided in Article XVI of the
contract.
THE GRACE COMPANY 443
ing for argument to be held in the Donnelly case in St . Paul. Minnesota , the fol-
lowing Tuesday and that Ingraham had asked him to write that "upon his return
to the office he will communicate with you."
Ingraham did not thereafter communicate with Perlstein. However, on
September 2, in St. Paul where they both were engaged in argument in the Don-
nelly case," Ingraham and Langsdale discussed the situation involving the Re-
spondent and the Union. The undersigned is convinced and finds, upon his
comparison of Ingraham's and Langsdale's testimony pertaining thereto, that
during their discussion on September 2, Ingraham's position was essentially
that which he had taken during his telephone conversation with Langsdale on
July 16, namely, that the Respondent could not negotiate with the Union as long
as the restraining order remained in effect ; that Langsdale took the position
that the restraining order was invalid and that the Respondent should bargain
with the Union, and that Langsdale would not agree to Ingraham's suggestion
that the Union intervene and file a motion in the Missouri Court to dissolve the
restraining order. Since this conversation, there has been no further com-
munication between representatives of the Respondent and of the Union con-
cerning a meeting for bargaining.
On December 5, Stottle, on the stationery of Reed & Ingraham, a law firm
of which lie is an associate and of which Ingraham is a member, wrote Field
Examiner Michael J. Lucero of the Board's Kansas City Regional Office, the fol-
lowing letter, which Ingraham testified stated his position:
Answering your recent telephone inquiry as to the status of the Grace
Company matter, beg to advise that, as you know, the Circuit Court of
Clinton County, Missouri, issued an order restraining the company from
violating its agreement with the independent union. We are seeking to
have this order dismissed but the earliest time the court will be sitting at
Clinton will be December 20
Mr Langsdale, attorney for the ILGWU, seemed to be of the opinion that
this injunction was improvidently issued and could be ignored. Even if his
position had merit, which we deny, nevertheless, it is well settled by the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Courts and
Missouri Courts that an injunctive order issued by a court of general
jurisdiction must be obeyed even though improvidently or erroneously
granted until it is vacated or dissolved. Courts have held that it would
be destructive of the very purpose of temporary restraining orders if the
party against whom the order is issued should be allowed to judge its pro-
priety or validity.
In view of the foregoing you can appreciate that we cannot advise our
client to violate the court's injunction. For your information we requested
Mr. Langsdale to intervene in the case on behalf of the ILGWU in order to
be heard 'on the matter, but he refused to do so
On December 18, the Respondent filed with the Missouri Court a "Motion to
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order," signed by Stottle and Ingraham, which
stated :
That the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union has filed a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board charging that this defendant
" The case in which argument was being held is not fully identified in the evidence.
However, it is identified in the Respondent ' s proposed findings of fact as, "Donnelly Gar-
ment Company v. National Labor Relations Board before the Circuit Court of Appeals at
St. Paul , Minnesota 11
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to deal with said union as
the bargaining agency for the employees of the defendant's Clinton, Mis-
souri, plant. Defendant states that it believed itself to be legally bound
by its contract dated November 14, 1946, to deal with plaintiff as bargaining
agency for its employees at both the Clinton and Belton plants, but if the
Labor Board sustains said charge and orders defendant to bargain with
the ILGWU as aforesaid , defendant will be faced with this court's restrain-
ing order on the one side and the Board's order on the other.
On December 20, the Respondent's motion to dismiss was argued." The Mis-
souri Court denied the motion to dismiss It continued in effect the temporary
restraining order, pending the trial of the case which had not been set at the
time of the hearing before the undersigned.1B
B. Conclusions as to the refusal to baegain
1. The contentions in general
The issues in this case rest upon the facts set out'above, as the record shows no
material development since December 1947. In brief, the contentions of the
parties fall into two major groups: (a) whether, as a matter of fact, the Re-
spondent has refused to bargain with the Union, and (b) whether, as a matter
of law, there has been a refusal to bargain. No attempt is made herein to detail
the respective positions of each of the parties on the various phases of this two-
fold grouping 20 In general, the Board and the Union take the position that there
has been a refusal to bargain both in fact and in law ; the Respondent takes the
position that there has been no refusal to bargain on either basis ; and the Inde-
pendent's brief is devoted to the three legal aspects of the matter, the appropriate-
ness of the unit, the effect of the contract, and the effect of the injunction.
2. The refusal to bargain in fact
Upon consideration of the facts set out in Section III, A, above, the undersigned
is convinced and finds that, contrary to, its contentions, the Respondent, on July
16, 1947, and on September 2, 1947, refused as a matter of fact to bargain with
the Union, and that the Respondent's position thereafter has, in fact, constituted
a continuing refusal to bargain.
The facts in this case show that on July 16, Attorney Langsdale, acting for
the Union after it had been certified, attempted to secure a bargaining conference
with Attorney Ingraham who was duly authorized to act in such matters for
the Respondent and that this attempt resulted in Ingraham taking the position
that, as long as the restraining order remained in effect, the Respondent could
not negotiate with the Union.21 The facts also show that, following correspond-
11 It will be noted that the motion did not mention the Board ' s Direction of Election
or the Certification . Ingraham testified that he was "sure that came out" in the argument
on the motion ; he also testified that he did not furnish the court with copies of or cita-
tions for the Direction of Election or the Certification.
19 Ingraham testified that unlike Federal practice , it is the practice in Missouri to continue,
in effect such temporary restraining orders ; that the case had not been set for trial because
the attorney for the Independent, Barkley W Brock , had been in Illinois during February
because of the death of his mother ; that the Respondent had not filed its answer in the
Independent ' s suit for declaratory judgment ; and that the code in Missouri as to pleadings
provides that an answer be filed within 30 days of receipt of summons.
20 This grouping forms the basis of the Respondent ' s brief
21It should be noted that Ingraham did not raise the unit or contract -bar contentions
in his conversations with Langsdale on July 16 and September 2.
THE GRACE COMPANY 445
ence during August which renewed the Union's request for a bargaining confer-
ence, Ingraham, in St. Paul on September 2, during a discussion with Langsdale,
reiterated the position that the Respondent could not negotiate with the Union as
long as the restraining order remained in effect. The undersigned is satisfied that
this conversation between Ingraham and Langsdale, who were authorized agents
in bargaining matters for the Respondent and the Union, respectively, constituted
a negative reply, accompanied by an explanation, to the Union's second attempt,
through Perlstein's letters of August 20 and 26, to secure a bargaining conference
with the Respondent.22
Further, the record also shows that, by its letter of December 5, 1947, to the
Board's Field Examiner and by its position taken at the hearing in the instant
matter, the Respondent has continued to refuse to bargain with the Union as
long as the injunction remains in effect. We now turn to the question of whether
the fact of the Respondent's refusal to bargain constitutes a refusal to bargain
within the meaning of the Act and the amended Act.
3. Legal aspects of the refusal to bargain
a. The appropriate unit and the Union's majority therein
In its Decision and Direction of Election of May 27, 1947, in the R Case,23 the
Board set out the various elements which have bearing on the question of whether
the Clinton plant alone constitutes an appropriate unit or the Respondent's two
plants together constitute a single unit. In balancing the factors, the Board
stated :
The evidence of integration of the operations of the Belton and Clinton
plants indicates the propriety of joining the employees of these plants in a
single unit, as requested by the Independent and the Employer. On the other
hand, the geographical distance between the plants, 53 miles, and the absence
of any collective bargaining history previous to the filing of the AFL's peti-
tion indicates the equal propriety of a unit limited to the employees of the
Clinton plant, as urged by the AFL.' Under these circumstances, we believe
that the determination of the unit should depend, in part, upon the desires of
the employees themselves Accordingly, we shall direct an election among
the employees of the Clinton plant to ascertain their desires. If a majority
of those voting select the AFL, they will be taken to have indicated their
desire to constitute a separate unit.
3 See Matter of Cincinnati Chemical Works, Inc ., 58 N. L R. B. 939; Matter of
Bemis Bro . Bag Co, 73 N . L. R. B 32; Matter of Tyre Nursery Furniture Company,
72 N. L R. B 1427.
The election which the Board directed at the Clinton plant was duly conducted
on June 18, 1947, as is shown by the "Certification on Conduct of Election," signed
by the "authorized observers" of the Union, the Independent, and the Respondent,
and the agent of the Regional Director. The official "Tally of the Ballots," like-
wise duly signed, shows that all of the 49 eligible voters cast ballots, of which
26 were cast for the Union, 20 for the Independent, and 2 for neither labor organ-
22 The undersigned does not find , as the Union and the General Counsel contend, that
the failure of Ingraham to communicate with Perlstein upon his return from St. Paul
constitutes a refusal to bargain on the ground that the Respondent did not answer the
Union ' s second request , since Ingraham , under the circumstances of this case , had a right
to assume that his conversation with Langsdale in St. Paul constituted a verbal reply to
that request to bargain.
23 Matter of The Grace Company, 73 N L R B 1286.
853396-50-vol 84-32
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ization. One ballot was challenged The Union thus won a clear majority of
ballots of all the employees at the Clinton plant who were eligible to vote u
On July 8, 1947, the Board issued its "Supplemental Decision and Certification
of Representatives," stating that no objections to the election had been filed and
finding that the appropriate unit for collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act consists of all production employees employed at the
Respondent's Clinton, Missouri, plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor
of sewing operations, and all other supervisory employees. The Board therein
also, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, certified the Union as "the exclusive
representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment." On August 11, 1947, the Board denied a motion by
the Respondent that it set aside its unit finding and certification.
In essence , the Respondent and the Independent contend that the Board's
finding that the production employees at the Clinton plant constitute a separate
appropriate unit is arbitrary and capricious. Upon careful consideration of
the entire record in the instant matter, including the evidence introduced in the
R Case, the undersigned finds that such contention is without merit 26 The
Board ' s decision weighed the factors pointing toward a one-plant unit and toward
a two-plant unit, respectively, and found those factors so nearly in balance that
it chose to defer its determination of the appropriate unit until the desires of
the employees at the Clinton plant had been determined by an election. This
modified Globe procedure has long been used by the Board in such situations.
Three examples were cited (in the above-quoted footnote 3) in the Board's
decision wherein that method was used in very similar situations where the
factors favoring one-plant units as opposed to units combining two plants like-
wise were evenly balanced 27
It is clear that the Board, in using the desires expressed by the Clinton plant
employees as a factor in determining the appropriate unit, followed reasoned
precedent28 Hence it cannot be said that the Board acted arbitrarily or ca-
23 There was no dispute in the R Case as to the categories of employees to be included
and excluded ; the one challenged ballot could not have influenced the result
25 The Board's decision of May 27, in describing the voting unit, used an explanatory
phrase after the words, "and all other supervisory employees " This same explanatory
phrase, namely, "with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect
changes in status of employees, or effectively recommend such action," also appears in
the appropriate unit description, as alleged in the complaint. This variation between
the complaint and the Board's certification is not material either under the Act or the
amended Act, and has not been raised as an issue The undersigned hereinafter uses the
fuller description of the appropriate unit.
26 In view of the circumstances of this case, and in the absence of any declared policy
that the Board, in complaint cases based upon facts certified in representation cases, will
not pass upon charges that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously in such representation cases
but rather will leave such contentions for review by circuit courts of appeals, the under-
signed deems it incumbent upon him to pass upon this issue Matter of City National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago, 76 N. L R. B. 213; Matter of Midland Steamship Line,
Inc , 66 N. L. R B 836.
27 It is noteworthy that in each of those three cases the factor of distance between the
respective pairs of plants militates less strongly against a unit composed of both plants
than the distance factor in the instant matter does The distance between the Respondent's
two plants is 53 miles, while the distances between the three pairs of plants in the deci-
sions cited are , respectively , 3 miles, 6 miles , and 15 miles.
28 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co v. N L It B , 313 U. S. 146, the Supreme Court said,
at page 156:
Naturally the wishes of employees are a factor in a Board conclusion upon a unit.
They are to be weighed with the similarity of working duties and conditions, the
THE GRACE COMPANY 447
priciously in determining that the production employees at the Clinton plant
constituted an appropriate unit. In the absence of evidence warranting a find-
ing that such unit determination was arbitrary and capricious, the Board's find-
ing as to the unit in the R Case was conclusive under the Act and the amended
Act 29
On all of the evidence, the undersigned finds, in accordance with the Board's
previous determination, that all production employees employed by the Respond-
ent at its Clinton, Missouri, plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of
sewing operations, and all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote,
discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or
effectively recommend such action, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act and
the amended Act. The undersigned further finds that on and at all times after
July 8, 1947, the Union has been the duly designated bargaining representative
of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid unit and that, pursuant to Sec-
tion 9 (a) of the Act and the amended Act, the Union was on July 8, 1947, and
at all times thereafter has been and now is the exclusive representative of all
employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment.
b. The contract between the Respondent and the Independent
With respect to the contract of November 14, 1946, between the Respondent
and the Independent, the Board, in its decision in the R Case, found and con-
cluded as follows :
On October 7, 1946, the Independent requested recognition of the Em-
ployer as the bargaining representative of the production and maintenance
employees in the Employer's Clinton and Belton plants. Thereafter, the
Independent and the Employer entered into negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement. On November 8, 1946, the two parties reached an
understanding on terms and conditions of employment and reduced their
understanding to writing. However, they did not sign the contract at that
time. On November 13, 1946, the AFL filed its petition with the Board.
On November 14, 1946, the Independent and the Employer formally executed
the agreement reached on November 8. At the time of signing, the con-
tracting parties were unaware of the filing of the AFL's petition. Con-
trary to the contentions of the Independent and the Employer, neither the
written agreement of November 14 nor the oral understanding of November
8 is a bar to the present proceeding. The November 14 contract is not a
bar because it was executed after the AFL had filed its petition with the
Board;' the understanding of November 8 is not a bar because it was oral.'
I Matter of Public Service Corporation of New Jersey, 72 N. L R. B. 224 ; Matter
of Ste Genevieve Limed Quarry Company, 70 N. L R. B. 1259.
2 Matter of Eicor, Inc., 46 N L R. B. 1035.
character of the various plants and the anticipated effectiveness of the unit in main-
taining industrial peace through collective bargaining.
See also Matter of Underwood Machinery Company, 74 N L. R B 641.
28 The undersigned finds nothing in the amended Act which places limitations , appli-
cable-in the situation involved herein, upon the basic scheme of vesting in the Board the
authority to determine the appropriate unit. Nor does the undersigned's study of appro-
priate unit determinations made by the Board during approximately a year of operation
under the amended Act indicate any change in policy applicable in the instant matter as to
factors considered material in the determination of appropriate units.
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The above facts found by the Board are in accord with the preponderance
of the evidence in the R Case and the Board's conclusion that there was no con-
tract barring the proceeding was in accordance with precedents which it cited
The undersigned is aware of no change made by the amended Act or of any shift
in applicable decisional policy thereunder which in any way negates the effect
of the Board's decision that the contract was not a bar. In the undersigned's
opinion, the evidence does not support the contention that the Board's action
in the R Case with respect to the contract of November 14, 1946, was erroneous
or arbitrary.
As to the challenged propriety and validity of the Board's determination, clearly
the determination as to whether or not any given contract is a bar to any given
representation proceeding is a function implicit in the Board's determination
of whether or not a question of representation exists. And it is equally clear
that the statutory scheme of the Act and the amended Act vests in the Board
the determination of representatives and certification thereof, where a question
of representation affects commerce Admittedly, the Respondent's operations
do affect commerce. Hence in the R Case, the Board was required to determine
whether a question of representation existed. In doing so, it determined that
the contract advanced in the R Case by the Respondent and the Independent
as a bar was, in fact, not such a bar. When the Board so held, that contract
became defeasible, subject to the outcome of the representation proceeding.
When thereafter the Board, on July 8, 1947, certified the Union as the bargain-
ing agent for the production employees of the Clinton plant, the contract of No-
vember 14, 1946, between the Respondent and the Independent, covering em-
ployees at both of the Respondent's plants, became inoperative and void as a
matter of law, at least insofar as it relates to the employees at the Clinton plant
for which the Board has certified the Union as the bargaining agent 30 Ac-
cordingly, the undersigned finds that said contract cannot operate as a defense
to the Respondent's refusal to bargain in the instant matter.
c. The restraining order
As to the Missouri Court's temporary injunction, the undersigned is of the
opinion, everything considered, that such restraining order does not as a matter
of law excuse the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union and cannot
operate to preclude the Board from issuing an order requiring the Respondent
to bargain, whatever may be the Respondent's belief with respect to its obliga-
tion not to bargain with the Union so long as the restraining order remains in
effect 33
30 Matter of Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L R. B 111, particularly the position of
Chaiiinan Madden at page 141. See also N. L. R. B. v J I. Case Co, 134 F. (2d) 70
(C A. 7), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said
Contracts must be understood as having been made not only with reference to exist-
ing legislation but also with reference to the possible exercise of any rightful author-
ity of the Government, and no obligation of existing contracts may be invoked to defeat
that authority. . . . Inasmuch as the Congress has been authorized by the Con-
stitution to enact the National Labor Relations Act, it follows that subsisting agree-
ments, negativing, abridging or infringing upon full effectuation of the legislative
purpose must fall.
ai For the purposes of this report. the undersigned assumes the Respondent's good faith
as to its position, summarized in its above quoted letter of December 5, 1947, regarding
the injunction, in spite of several aspects of the case, pointed out by the General Counsel'
in oral argument and by the Union in its brief, which raise doubts as to its good faith
THE GRACE COMPANY 449
Clearly the Act and the amended Act are paramount, and the Board thereunder
has been vested with exclusive authority to effectuate public policies of national
concern which have been embodied therein by Congress n Manifestly, no holding
in a private suit to which the Board was not a party can nullify rights guaranteed
by Congress or serve to avoid obligations imposed by paramount national legis-
lation 33 In any event, whatever other course may have been open to the General
Counsel or to the Board in this situation,' the statutory scheme of the Act
and the amended Act contemplates that Board certifications which are not
voluntarily honored shall be required to be honored, upon Board orders enforce-
able in proceedings in appropriate circuit courts of appeals, when applications for
enforcement of such orders are made in complaipt cases wherein respondents
have been found guilty of refusing to bargain with unions duly certified by the
Board. Hence, whatever the Respondent's obligation or jeopardy under the
restraining order of the Missouri Court, the undersigned deems the above-
described statutory procedure to be appropriate in the instant matter. Accord-
ingly, the undersigned is satisfied that the Respondent should be ordered to
bargain with the Union. Since orders of the Board are not self-enforcing, if the
Missouri Court's temporary injunction should continue in effect, any plea of
"double jeopardy" can be addressed by the Respondent to the Missouri Court
and to the appropriate circuit court of appeals, in the event of enforcement
proceedings.
4. Concluding findings and rulings
In view of all of the foregoing and upon the record as a whole, the undersigned
finds that on July 16, 1947, and thereafter, the Respondent has refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the duly certified and exclusive representative of
the employees at its Clinton, Missouri, plant, in a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining, as required by the Act and the amended Act, and has thereby inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and the amended Act.
The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Union, which consist of several
pages of unnumbered proposed findings which are in narrative form, are re-
jected.i The two specifically numbered conclusions of law proposed by the Union
are accepted.
However , should the Respondent have continued to fail to give written notice to the Inde-
pendent that it desired to terminate its contract , at least insofar as said contract applies
to the employees of the Clinton plant, the Respondent 's inaction will have cast grave
suspicion upon its desire to remove itself from such jeopardy under the restraining order
as it pleads
32 The exclusiveness of the Board ' s authority as it pertains to matters involved herein
has not been altered by the omission of the phrase containing the word , "exclusive,"
from Section 10 (a) of the amended Act That this is so is plain from the analysis of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Amazon Cotton Mills Co. v Textile Workers Union of
America, 167 F. (2d) 183 (C. A 4), April 1, 1948, 21 LRRM 2605.
33 Matter of National Electric Products Corporation , 3 N. L. R . B. 475, 502 ; Matter of
Mason Manufacturing Co., 15 N L R. B. 295, 315, enforced , as modified, 126 F. (2d)
810 (C. A 9).
34 The Union, which was relying upon its certification by the duly authorized Federal
agency under Federal law , was under no obligation to attempt to intervene in the pro-
ceeding before the Missouri Court, and was justified in relying upon the Board's processes
to secure for it the bargaining rights for which it had been certified.
35 It should be noted that in many respects the facts found hereinabove accord with facts
proposed by the Union
450 ]ECTS1ONS Oli NATIONAL- LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As to the Respondent's proposed findings of fact, the undersigned accepts
proposed findings numbered 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10, and rejects proposed findings
numbered 2, 3, 7, and 9.38 The Respondent's proposed conclusions of law num-
bered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are rejected.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The undersigned finds that the activities of the Respondent set forth in Section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent de-
scribed in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act. Having
found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, it will be
recommended that the Respondent, upon request, bargain collectively with the
Union. It will further be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist
from in any manner interfering with the efforts of the Union to bargain collec-
tively with it.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2 (5) of the Act and the amended Act.
2. All production employees employed by the Respondent at its Clinton, Mis-
souri, plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sewing operations, and
all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend
such action, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act and the amended Act.
3. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, was on July 8, 1947, and at all times since has been and
now is, the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9 (a) of the Act and the amended Act.
4. By refusing on July 16, 1947, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collec-
tively with the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in, and
is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the
Act and Section 8 (a) (5) of the amended Act.
5. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
30 Some of the rejected findings are in several respects in agreement with findings made
by the undersigned herein.
THE GRACE COMPANY 451
in Section-7 of the Act and the amended Act, and has thereby engaged in, and -is
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the
Act and Section 8 (a) Cl) of the amended Act.
6 The aforesaid, unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act and the
amended Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
entire record in the case, the undersigned recommends that the Respondent, The
Grace Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, as the ex-
clusive representative of all production employees employed by the Respondent
at its Clinton, Missouri, plant, excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sew-
ing operations, and all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, pro-
mote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees,
or effectively recommend such action ; and
(b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, to
bargain collectively with it in behalf of the employees in the aforesaid appro-
priate unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, as the exclu-
sive representative of all of its employees in the above-described unit, with
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
ployment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement ;
(b) Post at its plant at Clinton, Missouri, copies of the notice attached hereto
and marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Seventeenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Re-
spondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days there-
after in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ; and
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region in writing
twenty (20) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that, unless the Respondent shall, within twenty (20)
days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, notify said
Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommen-
dations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Re-
spondent to take such action.
As provided in Section 203 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 5, effective August 22, 1947, any party may, within
twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to
the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with
the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate
Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon
all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and six
copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party may, within the same period,
file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties.
Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be
promptly made as required by Section 203.85 . As further provided in said
Section 203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the
Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10)
days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203 48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections and exceptions thereto shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
EARL S. BELLMAN,
Trial ETamIver.
Dated August 18, 1948.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with INTERNATIONAL LADIES'
GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described herein with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or other terms or conditions of employment, and if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargain-
ing unit is:
All producfiion employees employed at our Clinton, Missouri, plant,
excluding janitors, foreladies, supervisor of sewing operations, and all
other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge,
discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or
effectively recommend such action.
WE wILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named
union to bargain with us or refuse to bargain with said union as the exclusive
representative of all of our employees in the above-described appropriate unit.
THE GRACE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.