The Flavoripe Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsFeb 27, 1976222 N.L.R.B. 1144 (N.L.R.B. 1976) Copy Citation 1144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Flavoripe Co., Inc. and Daniel P . Reiser. Case 6-CA-8097 February 27, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND WALTHER A hearing in this case was held before me on September 25, 1975, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At the conclusion of the hearing oral argument was waived and the parties were given leave to file briefs which have been received from the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in this case, including my obser- vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT On November 28, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Davis S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun- sel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, The Flavoripe Co., Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 ( 1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: On June 2, 1975, a complaint issued pursuant to a charge filed on February 19, 1975, by Daniel P. Reiser, an individual. The complaint alleges that Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged Reiser and made threats and promises to employ- ees in relation to their union activities thereby violating Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. In its answer, Re- spondent denies the commission of any unfair labor prac- tices. 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with its sole place of business located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of syrups, ice cream toppings, and other restaurant items. During a rep- resentative 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint Respondent shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $100,000 from its plant to points outside Penn- sylvania. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction here- in. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, hereinafter re- ferred to as Local 249, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Beginning of Organizational Activity at the Plant On November 13, 1974, Daniel Reiser started to work at Respondent's plant as a warehouseman. At the time of his hire Respondent's president, Lewis Averbach, became aware that Reiser had previously worked as a house paint- er and had been paid at an hourly rate considerably higher than the $2 starting rate Respondent was prepared to pay. Averbach expressed concern that Reiser would not be hap- py at the salary being paid by Respondent and told him that he only had need for a temporary help. As a conse- quence of their discussion Reiser signed a statement which Averbach added to his employment application setting forth that Reiser understood that by mutual agreement he was being hired on a temporary basis. Shortly after Reiser was hired he discussed with Robert Gorse, a cousin and fellow employee, the desirability of obtaining union representation for Respondent's employ- ees. Before any further step was taken toward organization, Gorse was laid off,' and thereafter Gorse brought Reiser authorization cards for Reiser to pass out among the other employees of Respondent. There is no contention that Gorse's layoff was discriminatory 222 NLRB No. 181 THE FLAVORIPE CO., INC. 1145 On December 11 and 12, 1974, Reiser distributed Local 249 membership applications to Respondent 's employees and solicited them to execute the applications . He carried on this activity openly both during working and nonwork- ing time at the warehouse . A number of employees signed cards and returned them to Reiser at the warehouse during working and nonworking time . Reiser in turn returned the cards to Local 249. Although other employees also spoke in favor of union representation, Reiser was the only em- ployee who solicited signatures on application cards. On January 28, 1975, Local 249 filed a representation petition seeking an election among Respondent's employ- ees. In due course, a date for hearing on the petition was scheduled for Friday, February 14, 1975. On that day the parties executed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Con- sent Election. B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act In early February 1975, Respondent gave a raise to all employees .2 In the course of announcing the raise, Aver- bach called employee Pat Rauso into his office. After Av- erbach told Rauso about the pay raise, Rauso asked Aver- bach why he had fired a friend of Rauso's. The ensuing conversation led to a discussion of Local 249. Averbach told Rauso that he could not work with Local 249 and said that A & P and other supermarkets and employers had closed down and had to move out of Pittsburgh because of Local 249 after it became the representative of their em- ployees. Averbach said that if Local 249 represented the employees he was afraid the same thing would happen to him and there was a good chance he would have to close. Averbach also said that if Local 249 did not get into the plant , he would find a good union to represent the ware- housemen.' The complaint alleges that these remarks conveyed a threat that Respondent would go out of business if the employees chose Local 249 as their representative and a promise that Respondent would form, support , and/or rec- ognize an independent union if the employees rejected Lo- cal 249 . Respondent contends that Averbach's remarks to Rauso convey no threat or indication of antiunion hostility and were privileged free speech. It is true that Averbach's remarks do not convey that he was opposed to any and all unions, but they do clearly convey hostility and opposition to organization of Respondent 's plant by Local 249 , the union then seeking an election at the plant. The fact that his remarks were made in a discussion which followed Rauso's question about his friend does not alter their significance. Averbach's remarks cannot be dismissed as a mere pre- diction of the effects he believed unionization would have on Respondent. As the Court held in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) to avoid the proscription of Section 8(a)(1) such a "prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable conse- quences beyond his control..... Here Averbach recited 2 The raise is not alleged as a violation of the Act. 3 These findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of Rauso no objective facts but spoke in conclusions and drew a parallel between what he asserted had happened elsewhere and what he feared would happen at Respondent's plant without indicating any other similarity between Respondent's business and the others he named or the spe- cific circumstances which would lead to plant closure and removal . Here, as in Gissel, it is reasonable to conclude that Averbach intended to convey and his listener understood that if the employees chose representation by Local 249 based on that fact alone Respondent might close its plant and move .4 Averbach's further statement that he would find a good union to represent the employees if they rejected Local 249 also violated the Act, for it implied that if the employees rejected Local 249 Respondent would assist another union to become their representative without giving them cause to fear plant closure or removal. Thus Averbach's state- ment threatened further interference with the right of the employees to select a representative of their own choosing and promised by implication that in the event that Respon- dent were permitted to select the union to represent its employees the consequences of unionization would not be as drastic as they would if the employees chose Local 249 to represent them.5 I find that Averbach's remarks to Rauso threatened plant closure and removal if the employees selected Local 249 as their bargaining representative while promising rec- ognition and a more favorable response if the employees permitted Respondent to select their representative, there- by violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. C. Reiser 's Discharge 1. The facts There is disputed testimony as to whether in the course of informing Reiser of the raise given all employees in early February Averbach talked with Reiser about company benefits and a change in Reiser 's temporary status. Ac- cording to Reiser at that time Averbach told him that he wanted to describe for him some of the benefits employees received after 6 months of employment , such as hospitali- zation, life insurance, seven paid holidays , and an extra day off. Reiser testified that Averbach then asked him if he was still planning to leave when the painting season started and that he replied that he was not and was seriously con- sidering staying on with Respondent . According to Reiser, Averbach told him that he was happy about it because Reiser was intelligent and a good worker and Averbach said that he would like Reiser to stay. Averbach conceded that at one time he might have told Reiser that he was intelligent but otherwise denied that the conversation de- scribed by Reiser ever occurred or that he talked with Reis- er at all at the time of the raise. On February 10, after Local 249 filed its petition, Aver- bach transferred Reiser to a truckdriver's job . As a result his pay rate was increased by approximately $ 1 an hour to $3.50 an hour. 4 See also Jimmy-Richard Co., Inc, 210 NLRB 801 (1974). 5 See N. L.R.B. v. A & S Electronic Die Corp and A & S Steel Rule Die Corp., 423 F.2d 218, 221 (C.A. 2), cert denied 400 U.S. 823 (1970). 1146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On February 14 Reiser, Rauso, and two other employees appeared at -the representation hearing to give support to the Union if needed. Averbach was present with Respondent's attorney. Before the hearing opened, the Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election was agreed to, and the hearing did not take place. Later that afternoon Reiser returned to the warehouse and worked. Monday, February 17, 1975, was Reiser's next scheduled workday. That morning he reported for work as usual. Af- ter clocking in, he stood in the shipper's office near the timeclock and carried on a conversation with employees Larry Golightly and John Evanski about the benefits of unionization and the election. During this conversation Averbach passed by and Reiser terminated the conversa- tion abruptly. About 10 minutes later Averbach called Reiser into his office. Bob Freed, another company official, was present. Averbach concededly spoke to Reiser in a tone of voice loud-enough for Rauso, who was in an adjacent office, to hear. According to Reiser, Averbach told him that he did not want him talking to anyone after he punched in and that he was taking votes away from Averbach. However, Averbach testified that he only warned Reiser about de- taining employees from work and denied mentioning the Union or votes. After this reprimand Reiser left the ware- house with his truck and proceeded to make his deliveries. When Reiser returned to the warehouse that afternoon about 5 or 5:30, he was called to Averbach's office, where he found Averbach, Freed, and Don Averbach, a relative of Lewis Averbach and also a part of management. Lewis Averbach told Reiser that he had only hired him on a tem- porary basis, that things were slow, that they were only sending out half loads on the truck, and that Reiser knew that he was going to go back to painting. Averbach then handed Reiser a check and told him that there was a week's pay in it and that Averbach did not need Reiser any more. Reiser said nothing and left. On the next day, Reiser filed a claim for unemployment compensation, in which he stated as the reason for his se- paration, "lack of work (laid off)." There is, in fact, no dispute that business was slow at the time of Reiser's discharge and that trucks were being sent out at that time with half loads. In that connection Aver- bach testified that Respondent's business is seasonal, with May through August the busiest months, and that business usually starts to pick up in the middle of March and to taper off in the middle of September. According to Aver- bach, at the time of Reiser's hire Averbach only intended to keep Reiser for 2 or 3 months and in the ordinary course of events he probably would have terminated Reiser in mid-January -or possibly earlier, but did not do so on ad- vice of counsel when that time arrived for fear that he would be accused of having terminated Reiser because of Reiser's union activities. Averbach testified that he had heard of Reiser's union activities in December. According to Averbach, he changed his mind on Febru- ary 17 and decided to discharge Reiser immediately be- cause Averbach and his nephew had reviewed Reiser's em- ployment application, noted an apparent similarity between Reiser's printing and some obscene and anti-Se- mitic graffiti which had appeared on a wall in the ware- house several weeks earlier, and concluded that Reiser was responsible for the graffiti. Averbach testified that his be- lief that Reiser was the author of the graffiti, which was offensive to him personally, caused him to decide to risk discharging Reiser immediately. He testified that he did not mention that belief to Reiser as a reason for his dis- charge because he felt the reasons he mentioned were suffi- cient to let Reiser go and because he did not want to get involved in an emotional discussion with Reiser. 2. Concluding findings Resolution of the issue raised by Reiser's discharge de- pends to a large extent on resolution of the credibility is- sues raised by the testimony of Reiser and Averbach. For a number of reasons I have concluded that Averbach's testi- mony cannot be credited. With respect to the disputed reprimand,of Reiser on the morning of his discharge, Averbach's version is patently unworthy of credit. Averbach did not deny that he raised his voice or was aware of Rauso's proximity. To the con- trary, he testified that he deliberately raised his voice so that Rauso would hear, because "I knew what I was going to tell [Reiser] had nothing to do with anything except the fact that I did not want him to keep my employees from doing their proper work" and "I felt that. [Rauso] could attest to that particular fact if necessary." This testimony is in marked contrast to later testimony, in conjunction with his efforts to reconstruct the sequence of events on the last 2 days of Reiser's employment, that at the time they oc- curred the events leading up to Reiser's discharge were so insignificant that Averbach could-not recall how they oc- curred and that he then had no way of knowing he would be involved in the instant proceeding. Moreover, Averbach had a witness Freed available in the office with him, and even after Rauso testified in this proceeding to corroborate Reiser, Freed was not called to give support to Averbach's testimony. I have little difficulty concluding that Averbach's alleged reason for raising his voice was pure fabrication and that he did angrily reprimand Reiser be- cause of his belief which he voiced to Reiser that Reiser was gaining votes for the Union. Averbach's testimony concerning the sequence of events leading to Reiser's discharge on February 17 and the al- leged conclusion that Reiser was the author of offensive graffiti is equally unworthy of credit. In his testimony Av- erbach vacillated as to when he and his nephew discovered the alleged similarity between the printing on Reiser's ap- plication and the graffiti and as to the timing of the events which followed. Initially Averbach testified that he and his nephew made this discovery and that he visited his lawyer to discuss the matter on the same day that Reiser was dis- charged. When his attorney then asked whether the discov- ery and visit to the lawyer were on the same day as the discharge or on the previous day, adding that he was not himself sure, Averbach testified that it might have been either day. In response to a further suggestion by his attor- ney that his visit to the attorney's office occurred in the evening, Averbach then testified that he had to have visited his attorney on the day before Reiser was terminated. Av- erbach then was asked why he waited until the end of the THE,FLAVORIPE CO., INC. 1147 next workday to discharge Reiser. He testified that it was not an easy decision to make, that there were many emo- tions involved, that it took him a while to get his emotions separated from the objective facts, and that he gave it con- siderable thought to make certain that he was making the proper decision. Subsequently, Averbach reverted to the possibility that the discovery of Reiser's alleged authorship of the graffiti, Averbach's visit to his attorney, and the discharge all occurred on the same day. He testified that while he still had no clear recollection, that possibility was "most likely" and adopted that version as his testimony .6 I find it difficult to believe that, if the events had hap- pened as Averbach testified, he would not have recalled with greater certainty whether they happened on I day or on 2 days most likely separated by a weekend. Despite Averbach's claim that at the time these events seemed in- significant and he had no way of knowing he would be involved in this proceeding, if he is to be believed he very well understood the possible consequences of Reiser's dis- charge and sought legal advice more than once before dis- charging him. Moreover, by February 20, he received a copy of the charge in this case. Certainly then while the events were still fresh, he had cause to understand their significance and review them. Furthermore, even if Averbach's uncertain recollection were understandable, the readiness with which he supplied the reason for waiting until the evening of February 17 to discharge Reiser, after he testified that he visited his lawyer on the evening of February 16, destroys all confidence in his testimony, for after portraying himself as a troubled man with a difficult decision to make who let Reiser work a full day after learning of his alleged perfidy and visiting his lawyer so that he could master his emotions and be objective, Averbach ultimately testified that he returned from his lawyer's office around 4:30 p.m. and discharged Reiser shortly thereafter on the same evening. The readi- ness with which Averbach at the hearing supplied a reason for something which he later testified was not likely to have happened undermines all of his testimony as to his mental operations, his uncommunicated reasons for acting or not acting, and his claimed intentions. Averbach's testimony concerning the alleged discovery of Reiser's authorship of the graffiti adds further cause to discredit him. As noted, Averbach vacillated as to when he and his nephew examined Reiser's application and made their discovery, but ultimately he testified that the discov- ery occurred on February 17 after Reiser left the plant on his delivery. According to Averbach in the process of ex- plaining to his nephew why his lawyer had advised against terminating Reiser, Averbach took out Reiser's application to show his nephew the statement- Reiser had signed con- cerning his temporary employment. Averbach never ex- plained how the topic of Reiser's possible termination arose at this particular time or why it was necessary to look at his application in explaining to his nephew that even though Reiser was a temporary employee, Respondent's lawyer had advised against his termination. The timing of this discussion and the examination of the application in relation to the reprimand of Reiser only shortly before sug- gests an obvious cause. Despite the obvious weakness of Averbach's testimony in this regard,7 his nephew was not called as a witness to give it support. Even if one assumes that the discussion and examination of Reiser's application came about innocently, Averbach's testimony as to the basis for concluding that Reiser was the author of the graffiti is also wholly unconvincing. On the one hand, Reiser's printing was allegedly so striking that without expert aid Averbach and his nephew reached a conclusion on which Averbach acted in discharging Reiser. On the other hand, Averbach did not even compare any other applications to the graffiti because, according to Av- erbach, they were in a type of printing which could not be compared with other printing or writing. The elusive qual- ity which distinguished Reiser's printing from that of other employees and labeled him author of the graffiti appears to have been a distinctive way of printing the letter "n." Aver- bach testified, "He is a painter, and his `n's' were different than any that I had ever seen, and it was noticeable imme- diately, when I looked at his application." Just what the relevance of Reiser's former occupation as house painter was to this conclusion is far'from apparent, but whether or not Reiser's "n's" were different from any Averbach had ever seen, they are in fact not distinctively identical to those which appeared in the graffiti on the warehouse wall. In the context of Averbach's testimony as a whole, exami- nation of Reiser's application and the photograph of the graffiti in evidence gives further cause to discredit Aver- bach. These glaring deficiencies do not exhaust the examples which contribute to the discrediting of his testimony, but they are sufficient to demonstrate why Averbach's testimo- ny cannot be credited in any material respect. I find under all the circumstances that Reiser's discharge was caused by his union activities and specifically that it was triggered by his attendance at the scheduled represen- tation hearing on February 14- and his conversation about the -Union and the election with other employees in the plant on the morning of February 17. That Respondent entertained animus against Local 249 is established both by the findings with respect to Averbach's statements to Rauso and Averbach's angry accusation on the morning of Reiser's discharge that Reiser was taking votes away, from him.' Although Respondent contends that it wanted to ter- minate Reiser for the reasons it gave him, Averbach con- ceded that he discharged Reiser for a reason different than those Averbach stated to Reiser, and the record evidence is convincing that that reason was a pretext seized upon for getting rid of Reiser after his appearance at the hearing and his campaigning in the plant for the Union. In reaching this conclusion I am mindful that Respon- dent claims that Averbach was aware of Reiser's union 7 In its brief Respondent refers to Averbach's testimony on this point as "somewhat confused" and states "it seems likely that the desirability of continuing Reiser's employment was a subject of discussion." Nowhere is a reason for that discussion suggested 8 I reject Respondent's contention that Averbach' s reprimand of Reiser 6 Counsel for the General Counsel had in the meantime called attention was not evidence of animus There was no rule against talking or solicitation to the fact that February 17 was a Monday so that the day before Reiser's in the plant, and as Averbach's statement to Reiser indicates, Averbach's discharge was a Sunday anger was attributable to the nature of Reiser's conversation. 1148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD activities for 2 months before his discharge and gave him a raise and moved him to a driver's job after becoming aware of his union activity. This contention can be no more con- vincing than the testimony of Averbach that he knew of Reiser's union activities from their inception, and the doubts raised by Averbach's testimony as a whole must extend to this "concession" as well.' Moreover, even if Av- erbach was aware of Reiser's union activity from the start, it does not follow from his prior forbearance and consider- ate treatment of Reiser that he continued to remain toler- ant when Reiser displayed continuing adherence to Local 249 following his transfer to driving and the sizeable in- crease he received as a consequence. In a closer case with a witness more convincing than Averbach, these facts might raise doubts. In this case they do not. Accordingly, I find that Respondent discharged Rieser because of his attendance at the representation hearing and his union activities thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.1o IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent contends that Reiser should not be awarded reinstatement and backpay because he was hired as a tem- porary employee and would have been terminated in Janu- ary by Respondent except for an exercise of an abundance of caution . However, I find it impossible to conclude that Reiser would have been discharged in January . I do not credit Averbach 's testimony in support of this contention. In addition , Reiser's testimony as to his conversation with Averbach in February indicates that Averbach expressed interest in keeping Reiser as a permanent employee and spoke to him of company benefits which were of no signifi- cance to Reiser unless he remained with Respondent. Reiser's transfer to driving with a substantial increase in pay brought his earnings much closer to what he had previ- ously earned as a painter . While Averbach testified that he had no need for Reiser as a driver and put him on driving only because he was needed even less in the warehouse, as Averbach himself conceded , the size of the loads carried on the trucks had only partial impact on the need for drivers, and there was useful work for Reiser as a driver . The slack season was coming to an end, and while Respondent did 9 Averbach sought to bolster his claim of early knowledge of Reiser's union activities with testimony that he received a notice from the NLRB probably in late December. However, the representation petition was not filed until January 28, and there is no indication of any other cause for the NLRB to have sent any kind of notice to Respondent before it was filed This testimony was adduced in support of the claim that Respondent want- ed to terminate Reiser in mid-January but refrained because of knowledge of his union activities. Quite clearly no NLRB notice contributed to any decision to retain Reiser, and Averbach's claim further renders all of his testimony suspect. not replace Reiser by hiring another driver, the remaining four drivers were not adequate to Respondent's needs as business picked up, and it utilized temporary employees from a manpower service to meet increased needs, I find both from Reiser's early February conversation with Aver- bach and his subsequent transfer to driving that but for his continuing union activity he would not have been termi- nated by Respondent. Accordingly, I shall recommend that Respondent be or- dered to offer Reiser immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job is no longer available, to sub- stantially equivalent employment, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges. I shall further rec- ommend that Respondent be ordered to make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his discharge by payment to him of the amount he normal- ly would have earned from February 17, 1975, until the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less net earn- ings to which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Flavoripe Co., Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening that Respondent would close its plant if Local 249 were selected by the employees as their bar- gaining representative and by promising that Respondent would assist in finding another union to represent them without adverse consequences if the employees rejected Local 249, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their protected rights and has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. By discharging Daniel P. Reiser because of his activi-' ties on behalf of Local 249 Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommended: 1° I find it unnecessary to decide whether Reiser's discharge also violated Sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act, as it is clear that his attendance at the scheduled representation hearing was in furtherance of his union activities and the remedy would in any event be the same. THE FLAVORIPE CO., INC. ORDER " Respondent, The Flavoripe Co., Inc., Pittsburgh, Penn- sylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership and activities in General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, or any other labor organiza- tion, by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Respondent's employees or by discriminat- ing in any other manner in regard to any term or condition of their employment. (b) Threatening employees that it will close its plant in the event they elect to be represented by the above-named Union. (c) Promising that it will assist in finding a labor organi- zation other than the above-named Union to represent its employees without engaging in reprisals against them if they reject representation by the above-named Union. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed-in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Daniel P. Reiser immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job or, if that job is not available, to substantially equivalent employment, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights or privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his discharge in the manner set forth in the section of the Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, 'upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records rele- vant and necessary to a determination of compliance with paragraph (a) above. (c) Post at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, place of busi- ness, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi- ately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,-includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 1149 (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discourage membership and activities in General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 249 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of our employees or by discriminating against them in any other manner in regard to any term or condition of their employment. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that we will close our plant in the event that they elect the above- named Union to represent them. WE WILL NOT promise our employees that if they re- ject the above-named Union we will assist in finding another labor organization to represent them without engaging in any reprisals against them. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Daniel P. Reiser immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job is no longer available, to substantially equivalent employ- ment, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of his discharge. THE FLAVORIPE CO., INC. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation