The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 1964

147 N.L.R.B. 462 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Firestone Steel Products Company , Division of The Firestone
Tire & Rubber Company and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 11-CA-2.46 and 11-OA-2273. June 16,
1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 31, 1964, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his.
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices.
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's De-
cision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, to the itforesaid.
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at.
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was conunitted.l The
Board. has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions
.and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner,z'
with the modifications noted below?
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, Fire-
stone Steel Products Company, Division of The Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company, Spartanburg, South Carolina, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order, with the following modifications :
i The Respondent excepted to the Trial Examiner's refusal to permit it to cross -examine
General Counsel's witness, Howard Ivey, as to whether he had stated since being termi-
nated by the Respondent on July 31, 1963, that he had quit his job. However, the Re-
spondent was permitted to show through its own witness , that Ivey, in applying for
employment with another employer , had stated that be quit the Respondent 's employ. In
the circumstances , such a statement is not sufficient , in our opinion , to overcome the pre-
ponderance of the testimony establishing that Ivey was, in fact , discharged in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2 Respondent has also excepted to credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It is
the Board 's policy, 'however, not to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolutions with respect
to credibility unless, as is not the case here , the clear preponderance of all the relevant evi-
dence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry jVall Prodvvcts,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F. 2d 362 (C.A. 3).
8 As requested by the General Counsel, we shall include a provision in the Order, appar-
ently inadvertently omitted by the Trial Examiner, directed against the maintenance and
enforcement of Respondent ' s unlawful no-solicitation rule . In addition , We make the find-
ing, omitted by the Trial Examiner , that the Respondent had knowledge of the union
adherence of Ivey and Haynes prior to their discharge.
147 NLRB No. 57.
FIRESTONE STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY, ETC. 463
1. Add the following as a new paragraph 1(c) and make a corre-
sponding addition as a third paragraph in the Appendix:
(c) Maintaining and enforcing a no-solicitation rule which
prohibits its employees from engaging in union solicitation on
nonworking time.
2. Change the present paragraph 1(c) to 1(d) .
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by the above-named labor organization (on September 18,
1963, in Case No. 1l-CA-2246 and on October 15, 1963, in Case No. 11-CA-2273)
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board on December 20, 1963,
issued an order consolidating the cases , a consolidated complaint , and a notice of
hearing. On December 30, 1963, the Respondent filed its answer . The complaint
alleges and the answer denies that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and ( 3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended . Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held in Spartanburg , South Carolina,
on March 2 and 3 , 1964 , before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity
to present evidence pertinent to the issues , to argue orally, and to file briefs. Coun-
sel argued orally upon the record ; the filing of briefs was waived.
Upon the record thus made, and from his observation of the witnesses , the Trial
Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS , OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a corporation with a place of business located in Spartanburg,
South Carolina . During the year preceding issuance of the complaint the Respond-
ent purchased and had shipped to its Spartanburg plant, directly from outside the
State of South Carolina , supplies valued at more than $50,000 . During the same
period it manufactured , sold, and shipped from this plant finished products valued
at more than $50,000 to points outside South Carolina.
The complaint alleges, the answer does not deny , and it is here found that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE CHARGING UNION
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of the Respondent.
mI. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Setting and issues
The chief issues raised by the complaint include three discharges and three
suspensions , all alleged to have been for the purpose of discouraging union member-
ship and activity . The discharges occurred during the Union 's organizing compaign
and before a Board-conducted election held on September 19, 1963 . The suspensions
were invoked a few days after the Board had certified the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in an appropriate unit.
In addition to the issue of unlawful discrimination , the complaint alleges that
certain supervisory agents of the Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Interference , restraint, and coercion
There is no dispute as to the fact that during the period material to the complaint
the Respondent has had in effect a plant rule which states:
Collections of funds, pledges, solicitations, circulation of petitions or similar
activities are not allowed on company premises.
That the rule consisted not merely of words printed in the vacuum of the Respond-
ent's "Handbook for employees , Spartanburg plant" is established by events later
-464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
described. Unqualified and unlimited as it stands, however, it is clearly unlawfully
restrictive of employees' rights on their own time. Indeed, in his oral argument,
counsel for the Respondent candidly admitted that "as to persons who are engaging
in talking to other employees or in soliciting other employees on their own time, we
have got no legal defense." Credible and uncontradicted testimony, also, demon-
strates that this "no solicitation" rule was applied in a discriminatory manner-
many types of "solicitation" being conducted openly on company premises and
during working hours and only union solicitation so far as the record shows at any
time being prohibited.
Other independent items of interference, restraint, and coercion include:
(1) In July Foreman Sovetch, after asking employee Campbell how the organiz-
ing campaign was progressing, told him that if the Union came in Firestone would
not sign a contract.'
(2) About 2 weeks before the election General Department Foreman Salmon
told Campbell that if he would get out of the Union the Company would "take
care" of him, and that Plant Manager Loeven had him in mind as a-supervisor if
he would leave the Union.2
(3) It is undisputed that, just before the election Department Manager Folden
told the same employee, in effect, that the outcome of the election would determine
whether the Company expanded or decreased its local- operations. He added that
while he, himself, would go to California, the employee, being unskilled, would not
'be able to get a job.
(4) Also shortly before the election, Chief Engineer King told Campbell that he
should get out of the Union, and that if he would withdraw the Company would take
-care of him .3
C. The discharges of Ivey and Haynes
1. Relevant facts and conclusions
Employees Howard Ivey.iand Broadus T. (Ted) Haynes were discharged on the
same day, July 31, 1963, under identical circumstances. Both were active in the
union organizational campaign.
According to their credible testimony, supported fully by the inherent probabilities
even as described by company supervisors, events leading up to their summary
dismissal are as follows.
They worked in the assembly department under. Supervisor Kendrick. Both
punched in, as usual, before the beginning of the 7 o'clock shift on the morning of
July 30, and as was their practice took their timecards to Kendrick who remarked,
it is undisputed, "It looks like we have just about run out of something to do." (As
a witness Kendrick admitted that on both July 29 and 30 some of the employees in
his department "spent a large portion of their time sweeping," instead of "working
in production.") He then assigned the two to a welding machine.
While they were working at their machine, Kendrick came by about 8:15 to record
their first hour's production, as -was customary. At this time they asked him if they
could have the afternoon off, since things were slack and Ivey had some "business"
he would like to "see about." Kendrick did not give them an immediate answer,
and left.
They continued at the same machine until about 9:20, after their morning break.
As they returned from the break Kendrick came to them and told them to "stop off"
the machine and report to Foreman Salmon to help out in the buffing department.
At this time Kendrick gave them an "okay" to their request to be off "from dinner
,on.,,
I Sovetch denied making this statement, and claimed that the only time he discussed
the Union with Campbell was after the election, in September. Having observed both
witnesses during their examination, the Trial Examiner cannot believe the foreman's denial.
Salmon admitted that the'conversation took place on the occasion specified by Campbell,
and that he had told the employee that "Mr. Loeven thought a lot of him," but denied
reference to his being made a supervisor. His denial is not credited.
King admitted the conversation, but claimed that Campbell asked his advice about
getting out of the'Union. He said, "I told him I thought that he would be smart to.gct
out of it." King's version-to the effect that the employee, so active in the organization,
should ask him what he should do-Is implausible on its face and is not credited. Camp-
bell is .the president of the 17nion Local in Spartanburg.
FIRESTONE STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY; ETC. 465
Both employees reported to Salmon and after some preliminary conversation told
him they had permission to be off "from lunch time on." Salmon voiced no ob-
jection and made no comment.
While they were in the buffing department Kendrick came by, at about 10:30,
and told them their cards would be ready for them when they left. At this time
Haynes proposed, "How about being off tomorrow, if there's nothing to keep us
here?" Kendrick said he would see about it.
He had not returned, however, at 11 o'clock, when the assembly department reg-
ularly started its lunch time. Ivey and Haynes proceeded to Kendrick's desk and
found their cards as the latter had said, already made out for 4 hours, with pay
calculated. Kendrick was not at his desk at this time, and being unable to locate
him the two left the plant without learning whether they could also have the next day
off.
The next morning, July 31, both returned to the plant at the same time, with
lunches and prepared to work. Their cards were not in place, and they were sent
to the office of Department Manager Maas. Maas asked them what had happened
the day before. They told him they had had Kendrick's permission to be off. The
manager abruptly told them to leave Kendrick out of it, they had been assigned to
Salmon. He told them he considered them as having quit. Haynes protested such
treatment, and voiced his opinion that they were being fired for their union activities.
Maas denied this, but added that they did not need a union in the plant. He sent
them home and said he would give them final word later.
Late that afternoon Ivey went to Hayne's home, not having a telephone himself.
When no call came from Maas, Haynes finally called the plant. He was referred
to Salmon by the operator. Haynes asked the foreman what was going on, and
the foreman replied that he did not know but would try to locate Maas and have him
call. Later Maas did call Haynes and informed him that the verdict was the same
as that morning-he was considering them as having quit. Haynes protested that
if they had quit why would they have reported for work that morning with their
lunches, and again accused Maas of taking this action because of the union activity.
Neither employee has been offered reinstatement.
The foregoing facts, as had been noted, are based upon the credible testimony of
the two employees and the probabilities inherent in the situation as admitted by
Kendrick-that work was slack in the assembly department. On the other hand,
the testimony of Kendrick, Salmon, and Maas is plainly implausible on its face.
An analysis of their combined testimony is a prime example of how difficult it is for
three individuals to attempt to make the same falsification ring true. Kendrick flatly
denied that the two employees had at any time that morning asked permission to be
off that afternoon. He asserted that at 10:30 they had come to him and told him
they were leaving at 11 o'clock and would stay at home the following day if he had
nothing for them to do. The falsity of this assertion is marked. In the first place,
at 10:30 the two were working for Salmon in the buffing department. In the second
place, it is unreasonable to believe that any supervisor of a department, worth his
salt to management, would stand mute when two of his own employees come to him
and tell him they are taking off without permission. Under the circumstances as
Kendrick described them, it is more reasonable to believe that he would have fired
them on the spot, or at least warned them that if they did leave they would be fired.
Furthermore, later in his testimony Kendrick said that after this 10:30 announcement
by the employees he went looking for Department Manager Maas to tell him about
the "boys wanting to go home." He could not find him, he said, so came back to
his desk and made out their cards. Kendrick's account is further deprived of
credibility by the undisputed fact that during the previous 2 weeks he had let others
go home at noon and because work was slack had even asked employees if they
wanted to go.
Foreman Salmon's testimony on the point is equally incredible. He claimed that
the two asked him for permission to go home, but he declined because he needed
them. He said they told him they wanted to go because the work in the buffing
room was with "niggers" and was as filthy as a cotton mill. It is undisputed-indeed
admitted by Kendrick-that both employees had frequently in the 10 months of
their employment been assigned to work in the buffing room for. days at a time-and
there is no evidence or claim that they ever had complained about such assignment.
Furthermore, it is obvious that had the two employees left after being refused his
permission, either he or Maas would have discharged them at once upon their re-
turn. Yet he admitted that when he talked with Haynes by telephone late in the
day of July 31 he told him he knew nothing about their case.
756-236-65-vol. 147-31
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Finally, the testimony of Maas and Salmon is in direct conflict. According to
the department manager, about 11:15 Salmon came to him, while he was in con-
ference, and told him that Kendrick "had told him that Haynes and Ivey had told
him they were leaving." Why Salmon should give Maas this version, if in fact the
two men had walked out after his own refusal to permit them to go, is unexplained.
The Trial Examiner is convinced and finds that the testimony of Kendrick, Salmon,
and Maas on this point does not warrant belief.
It is concluded and found that employees Ivey and Haynes were discharged on
July 31, 1963, to discourage union membership and activity, and that thereby the
Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
D. The discharge of Jerry L. Goodson
1. Relevant facts and conclusions
Until his summary discharge on August 19 Goodson had been employed as a
fork-lift operator in the tractor department. Goodson was, apparently, the most
active of the employees in the organizing campaign, having obtained authorizations
from more than 80 of his fellow workers. That his activity was well known to man-
agement is established by the testimony of Department Manager Folden. It is un-
disputed that Foreman Sovetch accused him of being the "head" of it.
Shortly after he began his organizing efforts, Folden and another supervisor ap-
proached Goodson outside the plant. The former accused him of engaging in con-
duct "not of benefit to the company." Goodson admitted the fact, but said he
was doing so on his own time. Folden said he understood it was on company time,
and added, "You know what I am talking about, don't you?" Goodson replied,
"Yes, sir, I sure do, the union."
On one occasion when in discussion with Supervisor Powell, the latter told him
and others. that they had better leave the Union alone, and warned them that the
one he believed had "started" it, one Moore, was then working somewhere else for
$1.15 an hour .4
On August 19, a month before the election, management posted a notice on the
bulletin board announcing a 10-cent an hour increase in pay. (This increase, dur-
ing the pendency of an election, is not alleged as violative of the Act.) Early in
the afternoon, while on his way to the restroom, Goodson noticed a sticker placed on
the glass of the bulletin board near the notice. He and a "clean-up" boy, one
Emory, stopped to look at the notice and the sticker. Goodson went on to the
restroom, leaving Emory standing there. When he returned by the board it occurred
to him that the sticker, upon which was written "Ninety cents short," looked some-
what silly and he reached up to pull it off the glass. As he did so Supervisor
Starosto came up and accused him of putting up the sticker. Goodson denied it,
and said he was taking it down. He held it out to the supervisor, showed him what
it said on it, and as he walked off tossed it in a trash can. Not long thereafter
he met Powell, previously identified, and told him of the incident. Later in the
afternoon Goodson was called into the personnel office where the personnel manager,
Culclasure, was gathered with Powell, Folden, and Starosto. Folden told him that
he had a written report from Starosto to the effect that he had been caught putting
up the sticker on the glass. Despite the fact that Powell corroborated Goodson's
testimony as to his earlier conversation with the employee and despite the fact that
as they were in conference Goodson observed the cleanup boy, Emory, passing by
and urged the supervisors to call him in to substantiate the fact that it had been put
up long before Starosto came by (the latter fact is corroborated by Powell), the
management officials refused to call in Emory, and Goodson was discharged.
Starosto, as a witness, endeavored with great vigor to have it believed that he
actually saw Goodson putting up the sticker, demonstrating with his own thumbs,
and asserting that he had'walked away while Goodson was still in the act of putting
it up. This claim is absurd on its face. Had the offense been real, and of sufficient
.moment to require his written report on it, there is no explanation as to why he did
not order Goodson to take it down. Moreover, his failure to follow logic in his
mendacity is shown by his testimony that later he came by and looked in the "trash
can" for the sticker-and then made out his report. When asked, on cross-examina-
* Powell admitted the occasion and the 'conversation in part, but claimed that one of the
employees asked him where Moore was working, and how much he was making. His ver-
sion is implausible and is not credited.
FIRESTONE STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY, ETC. 467
tion, who told him to look in the trash can, he replied, "Mr. Sardones" of plant
production control. When immediately thereafter asked what Sardones had said
about the trash can, Starosto promptly reversed his direction and said, "He didn't tell
me to look in the trash can." He then lamely admitted that no one asked him to
look in the can. His final admission leaves unexplained, other than by Goodson's
credible testimony to the effect that Starosto was nearby when he threw the sticker
in the trash, why the latter went looking for it there.
Finally, as a rebuttal witness, an employee still working at the plant, who was
reluctantly called by General Counsel, when pressed by counsel for the Respondent
made it plain that he, not Goodson, had put up the sticker long before Goodson
came by it.
It is clear, and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, that management had
no intention of ascertaining the truth of the incident as reported by Starosto-which
could easily have been obtained by calling in Emory, as Goodson had urged. The
Trial Examiner is further convinced, and finds, that management sought, and in this
incident believed it had found, a reasonable pretext for ridding the plant of the
most active employee organizer. It is concluded and found that Goodson was dis-
charged to discourage union membership and activity, and that such discrimination
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
E. The suspension of Ballenger and Wilson
Both of these employees were suspended for a week on October 1 following the
same minor incident, in which both were involved.
Ballenger is a tool-and-die repairman; Wilson operates a tow-motor. Early in
the morning of October 1 (both worked the night shift) Ballenger was repairing a
die in the press department. During his break period Wilson came to Ballenger,
while the latter was at work, and asked if he had any union checkoff cards. Ballenger
told him there were some cards in the top of his toolbox, nearby, and to help himself.
Wilson did so, and then departed. Supervisor Powell, previously identified, was
apparently watching them from behind another machine. According to his own
testimony he promptly came over to Ballenger, demanded to know if he had per-
mission to carry on union activities in the plant, advised him he was suspended, and
told him to report to another foreman later in the morning.
At the end of his shift Wilson was sent to Department Manager Maas, who asked
him if he had gone for cards. Wilson replied that he did, but on his own time.
Maas then suspended him.
Both employees later received a letter from Personnel Manager Culclasure con-
firming their suspension for the week "for union organizing activity."
The credible testimony establishes that the work of neither employee was inter-
fered with in the slightest degree by the incident. And Culclasure's letter makes
no such claim. Indeed, the letter does not even accuse either employee of indulging
in "union organizing activity" on company time and/or company premises.
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that both employees were unlawfully
suspended , for the purpose clearly expressed in the letters, to discourage "union
organizing activity," and that such discrimination interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
F. The suspension of C. V. Lemaster
Even more trivial than the foregoing incident was that for which Lemaster was
suspended for the same period of time , on September 30. During his break period
he met another employee , Norville, at the company "drink" machine . Norville
had a union card and asked Lemaster where he should sign it . Lemaster pointed
out the space for his signature. As he. did so Kendrick, previously identified,
walked up and looked over Lemaster's shoulder. Shortly after this Lemaster was
sent to Culclasure 's office . Kendrick came in, accused him of "signing up" Norville,
and the Personnel Manager suspended him for a week . A similar letter to that sent
to Ballenger and Wilson was forwarded to Lemaster.
The Respondent offered no evidence in defense of its action. Indeed , in oral
argument counsel for the Respondent in effect conceded that employees ' rights had
been unlawfully interfered with in this suspension.
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the suspension of Lemaster was for
the purpose of discouraging union membership and activity , and therefore interfered
with , restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent , described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate , sand substantial, relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States , and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices the Trial
Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent were of a nature
which violates the policies of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist
from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
It will be recommended that the Respondent offer employees Ivey, Haynes, and
Goodson immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equiv-
alent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal
to that he would normally have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination
to the date of offer of reinstatement , less his net earnings during said period. It
will also be recommended that employees Ballenger , Wilson , and Lemaster be made
whole by payment to each of them of a sum equal to that which he normally would
have earned during the week of his unlawful suspension . Backpay provided for
herein shall be computed in accordance with Board formula set out in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with interest thereon as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case , the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating against employees, as found herein , to discourage member-
ship in and activity on behalf of the above -named labor organization , the Respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7 ) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law , and upon the entire
record in the case , it is recommended that the Respondent, Firestone Steel Products
Company, Division of The Firestone Tire .& Rubber Company, its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall: 5
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or
in any other labor organization of its employees , by discharging , refusing to reinstate,
suspending , or in any other manner discriminating against employees in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Promising benefits and threatening reprisals to discourage union membership
and activity.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
51n the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the following
paragraph shall be substituted for the above:
Upon the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders
that Respondent , Firestone Steel Products 'Company, Division of The Firestone Tire &
,Rubber Company, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns , shall: '
FIRESTONE STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY, ETC. 469
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer employees Ivey, Haynes, and Goodson immediate and full reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions , and make them and employees
Ballenger, Wilson , and Lemaster whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of
the discrimination against them , in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying , all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amounts of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under terms of this Recom-
mended Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Spartanburg , South Carolina, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Di-
rector for the Eleventh Region , shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative , be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced , or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director , in writing , within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Trial Examiner 's Decision ,, what steps it has taken to comply
herewith?
6In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board ' s Order be enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
7 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to conduct our labor relations in compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act, we notify you that:
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discourage you from being members of United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promise you benefits or threaten reprisals to persuade you to
stay out of any union.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights you have under the National Labor
Relations Act, to join a union of your own choice or not to engage in any union
activities.
WE WILL offer reinstatement to Ivey, Haynes, and Goodson , and will give
them backpay from the time of their discharge. We will also pay employees
Ballenger , Wilson , and Lemaster for the week they were unlawfully suspended.
FIRESTONE STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY, DIVISION
OF THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
NoTE.-We will notify Ivey, Haynes, and Goodson, if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States , of their right to full reinstatement upon applica-
tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act of 1948 , as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1831
Nissen Building , Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Telephone No. 724-8356 , if they
have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.