The Faulhaber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1971

191 N.L.R.B. 326 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Faulhab 'er Company and International Union,
United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America , UAW. Cases 8-CA-
5877, 8-CA-5928, and 8-RC-7840
June 21, 1971
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND KENNEDY
On March 24, 1971, Trial Examiner Lloyd S. Gree-
nidge issued his Decision in the above-entitled con-
solidated proceeding, finding that Respondent had en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged 'in the
complaints and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
further found that Respondent had not engaged in cer-
tain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaints and recommended that such allegations be dis-
missed. The Trial Examiner also found that
Respondent's unlawful conduct had interfered with the
election held on June 17, 1970, in Case 8-RC-7840 and
recommended that the election be set aside. Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board had reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
' Respondent excepts to certain of the Trial Examiner's credibility reso-
lutions It is the Board's established policy, however, not to overrule a Trial
Examiner's credibility findings unless, as is not the case here, the preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stan-
dard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3)
We find without merit Respondent' s allegations of bias and prejudice on
the part of the Trial Examiner. There is no basis for finding bias or partiality
because the Trial Examiner resolved important factual conflicts arising in
this proceeding in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses As the Supreme
Court has stated, "total rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn
the integrity. . of a trier of fact." N.LR.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Com-
pany, 337 U.S. 656, 659.
We hereby correct the following inadvertent error in the first sentence in
section III, B,l,e of the Trial Examiner's Decision. "Stephens" should be
changed to "Stevens "
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent,
The Faulhaber Company, Monroeville, Ohio, its offic-
ers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those allegations in
the complaints as to which no violations have been
found are hereby dismissed.
IT IS ALSO FURTHER ORDERED that the election
held on June 17, 1970, in Case 8-RC-7840 be, and it
hereby is, set aside.
[Direction of Second Election' omitted from publica-
tion.]
3 In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their ad-
dresses which may be used to communicate with them. Excelsior Underwear
Inc., 156 NLRB 1236; N.L.R.B. V. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U S. 759.
Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an election eligibility list, containing
the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed by the
Employer with the Regional Director for Region 8 within 7 days after the
date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the Regional Director
The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the
election. No extension of time to file this list shall be granted by the Regional
Director except in extraordinary circumstances Failure to comply with this
requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper
objections are filed
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LLOYD S. GREENIDGE, Trial Examiner: This consolidated
proceeding was heard at Norwalk, Ohio, on January 13 and
14, 1971; it had its roots in efforts of International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, herein called the Union or Peti-
tioner, to become the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees of The Faulhaber Company, herein called the Re-
spondent, the Employer or the Company. The representation
proceeding in Case 8-RC-7840 was initiated by a petition
filed by the Union on May 6, 1970, for an election in a unit
of the Employer's production and maintenance employees. It
was followed first by a Stipulation for Certification upon
Consent Election entered into by the Employer and the
Union and approved by the Regional Director for Region 8
of the Board on May 27, and then by an election on June 17,
which the Union lost' and to which it filed timely objections.
The complaint in Case 8-CA-5877, which was amended dur-
ing the hearing, issued on July 14, 1970; the complaint in
Case 8-CA-5928, which was also amended during the hear-
ing issued on July 31, 1970, and was simultaneously there-
with consolidated with Case 8-CA-5877; the consolidated
complaint in Cases 8-CA-5877 and 5928 was consolidated
further with Case 8-RC-7840 on December 11, 1970. The
complaint in Case 8-CA-5877 is based on a charge and an
amended charge filed on May 27 and July 2, 1970, respec-
' Of approximately 198 eligible voters, 187 cast ballots , of which 82 were
for the Union, 96 against , 8 were challenged , and 1 was void. The challenged
ballots were insufficient in number to affect the results of the election.
191 NLRB No. 49
THE FAULHABER COMPANY 327
tively; and the part of the consolidated complaint relating to
Case 8-CA-5928 is based on a charge filed on July 2, 1970.
The questions presented are (1) whether the election should
be set aside because of conduct affecting the results of the
election; (2) whether Respondent, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights; and (3)
whether Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act, discriminatorily discharged employee Jesse Rowe
on or about April 21, 1970, discriminatorily refused to permit
employee Martha Tackett to schedule a vacation on May 27,
1970, and discriminatorily reassigned employee Luther
Thornsbarry on or about June 4, 1970, in each instance, for
union-concerted reasons.' Respondent denies that it has en-
gaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged herein.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, their attitude and demeanor while on the witness
stand, and after due consideration of the briefs of the General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The amended complaints allege, and Respondent admits,
that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Persons-Majestic Mfg.
Co., a Massachusetts corporation; that it is engaged in the
manufacture of saddles for bicycles; and that annually it ships
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from its place of
business in Monroeville, Ohio, to points located outside the
State of Ohio. I find upon the foregoing, as Respondent also
admits, that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find, that International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
Prefatorily, it should be stated that the amended com-
plaints further allege and the answer admits that, at all times
material herein, the following named persons have been and
are agents of the Respondent acting in its behalf, and super-
visors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act: Vice
President and General Manager Martin J. Bird, Plant Super-
intendent Robert Tupps, Pressroom Supervisor Delmer Ste-
vens,' and Supervisor Richard Cheek.
In late March or early April 1970, a number of employees
dissatisfied with conditions of employment in the pressroom
presented their grievances to Plant Superintendent Tupps.
The chief spokesman for the employee group was Luther
Thornsbarry, an alleged discriminatee, who had arranged the
meeting. At the meeting, attended by Tupps and employees
Thornsbarry, Jesse Rowe, Carl Deskins, and Williard Boers,
Thornsbarry complained about Supervisor Stevens' treat-
ment of the employees, called the pressroom a "madhouse"
and predicted that "there will be a union here if the place isn't
straightened out." In response, Tupps declared that if some-
thing like that were to happen he would be the first to know.
Thornsbarry got up to leave but Tupps asked him to remain
as "nothing was settled yet." Rowe, another alleged dis-
criminatee, then remarked that there was no reason to remain
because "anything the setup man had said, it had gone in one
ear and out the other."
Dissatisfaction continued unabated and shortly after the
said meeting employees Rowe, Ruth Bloomfield, Martha
Tackett, and Juanita Drennen contacted International Or-
ganizer Hugh Smith and requested the assistance of the
Union in organizing the employees. Smith told them that it
was necessary to obtain signed authorization cards and sug-
gested a meeting of the employees . An organizing committee
was established the first part of April and approximately 16
meetings were held between April and June 17, all except the
last at the Union's office in Clyde, Ohio, about 17 miles from
the plant. According to Rowe, from the start of the organiza-
tional campaign, he carried union authorization cards in his
front shirt pocket while at work with the Union's seal thereon
exposed and visible. Rowe was assisted in his organizing
efforts by Bloomfield and Thornsbarry. All distributed union
authorization cards in the plant and parking lot during break-
time and after working hours. Bloomfield testified that she
and Rowe together obtained about 85 signed cards. Rowe
claimed credit for only 20 to 25.1 From the date of the posting
of the Labor Board's notice of election to the date of the
election, Thornsbarry wore a large button while at work with
the words "Join UAW Vote" on its face and carried a pencil
holder in his pocket with UAW insignia and the word "Join"
prominently displayed on its surface.
It is apparent that, as early as late March or the beginning
of April, Respondent was aware of the leadership roles of
Thornsbarry and Rowe in the employees' concerted activi-
ties. Vice President Bird readily acknowledged that on June
5 when he presented Thornsbarry with the option of becom-
ing a foreman on a second shift to be instituted sometime in
the future or reverting to his old position as punch press
operator, he knew Thornsbarry was close to the Union.
The 8(a)(1) issues alleged in the amended complaints
herein relate to whether during the period between the filing
by the Union of its representation petition on May 6 and the
election on June 17 Respondent, through its supervisor
Delmer Stevens, engaged in one or more of the following acts:
threat to an employee by advising that he would be required
to perform additional tasks if the Union got in and threat to
an employee by advising that she would be bumped from a
favored job if the Union got in but would be permitted to stay
on the job if she voted against the Union. Additional 8(a)(1)
issues alleged in the amended complaints raise questions as
to whether during the period before the filing of the petition,
namely, on or about April 7, and also on numerous occasions
thereafter, Respondent, through its Supervisors Stevens and
Richard Cheek, engaged in one or more of the following acts:
threats to employees of discharge, of plant closure, or of
removal of the plant because of their union activity; threats
to discharge and harassment of employees who wore union
buttons and/or badges; telling employees they could not wear
union buttons and/or badges while allowing employees, gen-
erally, to wear a campaign hat distributed by the Respondent
containing an antiunion message; creating the impression
that the union activities of the employees were being kept
under surveillance; and keeping under surveillance the
Union's hall, at a time when some of its employees were
attending a union meeting there. And, finally, the amended
' At the hearing, I granted the motion of the General Counsel to with-
draw paragraph 9 of the complaint in Case 8-CA-5928 and all references
thereto in paragraphs 10 and 12 thereof. ' In May 1970, the Employer had a work force of about 198 employees
' The spelling of this name is corrected, sua sponte, to read as it appears but, as of the time of the hearing, the number had dropped to approximately
above. 155
328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaints present the issues of whether during the period
before the filing of the petition, namely, on April 21, Re-
spondent discriminatorily discharged Jesse Rowe for union-
concerted reasons, and whether, subsequent to filing of the
petition on May 6 and before the election on June 17, Re-
spondent discriminatorily refused to permit Martha Tackett
to schedule a vacation and discriminatorily reassigned em-
ployee Luther Thornsbarry from a job of die setter to one of
punch press operator for union-concerted reasons in each
instance.
Case 8-RC-7840, one of the consolidated cases herein,
involves the issue of whether the Union's objections to the
election have merit and warrant setting the election aside.
Insofar as the objections allege threats to close the plant in
the event the Union won the election, threats to discharge
employees who wore union badges, threats to increase the
workload of employees who voted for the Union, and reduc-
tion of an employee from die setter to punch press operator,
these allegations parellel those in the amended complaints
herein. However, additional issues raised by the objections,
and not specifically covered by the amended complaints, are
whether the Employer promised its employees promotions if
they voted against the Union, made misrepresentations by
telling employees that the UAW was a communist organiza-
tion, and intimidated employees by insisting that they had no
right to vote in the election.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to
Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The allegations of Section 8(a)(1) violations in the
complaint in Case 8-CA-5877, as amended
a. Paragraphs 7(a), (b), (c), and (e) of this amended com-
plaint allege in substance that on or about April 7, 1970, and
on numerous occasions thereafter, Supervisor Stevens threat-
ened employees by advising them that the Respondent would
get rid of its employees and close and move its plant to
Massachusetts if the employees did not cease their activities
on behalf of the Union or if the Union got in. The General
Counsel adduced testimony by Juanita Drennen, Eugene
Kifer, Luther Thornsbarry, Fred Isaac, and Martha Tackett
in this regard. Drennen testified that, about 2 weeks before
the election while at her press, Stevens approached and de-
clared that "if the Union got in-they [the Company] would
move away." Kifer related that, on an uncertain date proba-
bly before the election, Stevens informed him that if the
Union got in Respondent "would shut the Company down"
and then asked "what would I do because I was too old to
get another job." Thornsbarry recounted, in this connection,
that about 1 week before the election while in the restroom,
Stevens asked Thornsbarry in the presence of employee Carl
Deskins whether the employees would go out on strike if the
Union got in and Thornsbarry answered in the negative.
Stevens then stated that Mr. Persons, owner of the Company,
had said "the Union broke him in Massachusetts and that
they damn well weren't going to break him here and that he
would close the doors down." In a like vein, Isaac reported
that, about 1 week before the election, Stevens pulled into
Isaac's driveway, called Isaac to his car and said, inter alia,
"if the Union gets in, we are going to shut the doors. I have
the papers in my office and it says they are going to close
down the factory if the Union get in." Tackett recalled a
conversation with Stevens advised that "if the Union got in
one day, the plant would close down next." Pressed for an
explanation Stevens declared that "Mr. Persons said that a
union would never get in his place." Stevens did not specifi-
cally deny the testimony of Drennen, Kifer, Thornsbarry,
Issac, or Tackett. Questioned as to whether he made the
statements attributed to him by these witnesses, Stevens tes-
tified that Drennen had asked whether she and others would
be fired if the Union became the bargaining agent of the
employees and he had replied in the negative . As to the
statements imputed to him by the other witnesses , Stevens
evaded the question and related that unidentified employees
had inquired whether the plant would close if the Union got
in and he had replied that he "just heard rumors .among the
employees and as far as I knew the company wasn 't going to
do that." Stevens also related that unidentified employees, the
same or others, had told him that they were going to ask for
$3.50 to $4 . 50 per hour and that his only response was that
he did not know whether the Company could afford to in-
crease wages. Stevens was the only witness for the Respond-
ent on this phase of the case and , at virtually every significant
point, his testimony conflicted with that of the other wit-
nesses. In part because of his demeanor-he was clearly a
man obsessed with anger, emotionally volatile, and person-
ally hostile to the other persons, involved in the events-and
in part because of an incredible proclivity to turn questions
into unrelated matters and thus to avoid addressing himself
to the merits of the issues , I am unable to credit him. In
addition , Stevens' testimony with respect to an essential ele-
ment in another phase of this proceeding was evasive and
self-contradictory . Thus, questioned as to whether he was
aware of the Union 's organizing efforts before the discharge
of Rowe, Stevens vacillated, evaded and, at one point, tes-
tified that just before the discharge he heard rumors that the
Union was attempting to organize . However , inexplicably
Stevens changed his testimony shortly thereafter and averred
that it was not until sometime subsequent to the discharge
that he first heard such rumors. In light of the foregoing, as
well as demeanor , I regard Stevens ' testimony as generally
unworthy of reliance and credit it only when it conforms with
other credited testimony or constitutes an admission against
Respondent 's interest.
In view of the circumstantiality of the foregoing employee
testimony and on the basis of demeanor considerations, I
credit such testimony . Accordingly, I find, on the entire
record, that Stevens made it crystal clear to the aforenamed
employees that the Union 's presence in the plant would cause
the Respondent to close the plant and move away, thereby
making threats that this would be the consequence of a vic-
tory by the Union in the coming election . And, I conclude,
and find further , that the foregoing conduct interfered with,
restrained , and coerced employees in their Section 7 rights in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
b. Paragraph 7(d) of this amended complaint alleges that,
on or about April 7, 1970, and on numerous occasions there-
after, Supervisor Stevens threatened employees by telling
them that the Respondent would discharge employees who
supported the Union 'and hire new employees to replace them.
In this connection , the General Counsel offered , testimony by
employees Fred Isaac, Eugene Kifer, and Ruth Bloomfield to
the following effect: The day following Rowe's discharge on
April 21 and while on the way to work in Stevens' car,
Stevens announced to Isaac and others that he had "canned"
Rowe, warned that 'he would get rid of Thornsbarry and
Deskins as well, and stated that, "there is going to be a lot
more new faces before this thing is over." On an unknown
date probably before'the election, Stevens told Kifer "all old
faces would be fired off and they [the Company ] would get
new ones." One week before the election, Stevens cautioned
Bloomfield "to give up this Union," asked "what has it done
for you?," declared "Its a bunch of [a foul word]," and stated
"If we find anyone else soliciting cards we are going to fire
them."
THE FAULHABER COMPANY 329
Stevens testified on behalf of the Respondent and denied
generally the aforestated complaint allegation. Accordingly,
since Stevens did not specifically dispute Bloomfield's tes-
timony that Stevens had a conversation with her as to the
consequences to employees of continued support of the
Union, and since Bloomfield impressed me as a more reliable
witness that Stevens, I credit her and find that conversation
took place and that her testimony accurately reflects what
Stevens said to her on that occasion. Accordingly, I find that
Stevens threatened Bloomfield with discharge in the event she
continued her activities in support of the Union. Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and I so find. I deem it un-
necessary to determine, however, what if anything Stevens
said to Issac or Kifer on April 21 and on some other date
before the election. For the purpose of this decision it will be
assumed, without deciding, that Stevens made the statements
attributed to him by Isaac and Kifer. If uttered, they cannot
in my judgment reasonably be construed as threats of reprisal
for the following reason. There is no showing that Isaac knew
what Stevens meant by the statement "there is going to be a
lot more new faces before this thing is over" or that Kifer was
aware of the meaning of the remark "all new faces would be
fired off and they would get new ones." Consequently, the
statements are ambiguous in nature and no significance ad-
verse to the Respondent may be attached to them. Accord-
ingly, I find that this part of the allegation in paragraph 7(d)
of the amended complaint has not been sustained.
c. Paragraph 7(f) of the amended complaint alleges that, on
or about April 7 and on numerous occasions thereafter,
Supervisor Stevens harassed and threatened employees by
advising that those who wore union buttons and/or badges
would be fired. In support thereof the General Counsel relies
on the testimony of Martha Tackett, Ruth Bloomfield, and
Fred Isaac to the following effect: About 2 weeks before the
election while Tackett was at her station with a union badge
on her clothing, Stevens approached and, according to Tack-
ett, directed that she not talk to anyone, cautioned Tackett
to watch herself, and warned that he would fire her at the first
opportunity. Bloomfield testified, corroborated in certain par-
ticulars by Tackett, that, on or about May 27 while Bloom-
field, Tackett, and Deskins were checking in, Stevens walked
up to them and asked why they were wearing union badges
and why they continued to support the Union as it was not
going to win. After this, Stevens forceably removed the
badges from the apparel of those employees and said, "I hope
by God you have permission to wear them," adding "By God,
you better prove it or you are going out the door." To this,
Bloomfield replied "All the proof we need is on the bulletin
board," referring to the Labor Board's notice of election.
Stevens rejoined "you have to have more proof than that."
The conversation ended with Bloomfield imploring Stevens
"to stay off her back" and Stevens rejecting the plea with the
statement "I'll stay on your back until it is dragging." On
June 10 or 19, Isaac was wearing a union badge during his
work shift. Sometime that day Isaac had occasion to enter
Stevens' office and while there Stevens said "Fred you know
the company has been awful good to you and the next time
you get in jail you know that you no longer will have a job
here with the Company if you keep on wearing them union
badges ... you know that we don't want a union in here,"5
adding "you better pull off those badges." Isaac complied
with the directive. There is no evidence of any rule which
prohibited conversations during working hours or barred the
display of a badge or button on company property. As to the
latter, Isaac testified credibly that he has displayed a button
in the plant area with the inscription-"Kiss me, I'm sweet"
-without censure or reproach.
Stevens denied generally having conversations with Tack-
ett, Bloomfield, and Isaac as reported above and gave tes-
timony concerning an alleged conversation with Thornsbarry
about whether the latter had the right to wear a union badge.
I credit the employee testimony over that of Stevens'. The
failure of Stevens to specifically deny telling Bloomfield,
Isaac, and Tackett, directly or by implication, that they
would be fired if they continued to wear union badges or to
deny confiscating union badges worn by Bloomfield, Tackett,
and Deskins warrants the finding-which I now make-that
Stevens had such conversations and that he said and did what
Tackett, Bloomfield, and Isaac reported in their testimony.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by the following conduct of Supervisor Stevens: (1)
Directing Tackett, about 2 weeks before the election and at
a time when she was wearing a union badge, not to talk to
anyone, cautioning her to watch herself, and warning that he
would discharge her at the first opportunity. As there is no
evidence of a company rule forbidding conversations during
working hours, the only purpose of the directive was to deter
Tackett in the exercise of a statutory right. (2) Forceably
detaching union badges from the apparel of Bloomfield,
Tackett and Deskins, on or about May 27 while these em-
ployees were in the plant area, coupled with the remark that
they would be discharged if they continued to wear union
insignia without permission. Inasmuch as there is no evidence
of a company rule barring the display of badges during work-
ing hours, Stevens' remark was calculated to inhibit em-
ployees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. (3) Directing
Isaac, on June 10 or 19 while Isaac was in Stevens' office, to
remove a union badge from his clothing coupled with a re-
minder that the Company had done Isaac a favor by reem-
ploying him following his release from jail. The reminder was
in fact a threat that, in a like event, the Company would not
again employ Isaac if he continued to wear a union badge.
d. Paragraph 7(g) of the amended complaint alleges that,
on or about April 7, 1970, and on numerous occasions there-
after, Supervisor Stevens threatened employees by advising
that they could not wear union buttons and/or badges evi-
dencing support for the Union while allowing employees,
generally, to wear hats distributed by the Respondent con-
taining an antiunion message. Insofar as this paragraph al-
leges threats against employees who wore union badges, such
allegation was considered and resolved in paragraph 7(f) su-
pra. The remaining portion of the allegation in paragraph
7(g), namely, permitting employees generally to wear hats
distributed by the Respondent is examined infra. In this re-
gard, the General Counsel adduced testimony by Bloomfield.
According to Bloomfield, about 1 week before the election,
the Company purchased a number of hats' and place them on
top of a safe in the plant area to be picked up by the em-
ployees. She gave the following account of an incident which
occurred shortly after the hats were made available: Bloom-
field left her station to procure a hat but was stopped by
Stevens who advised that "Bob Tupps said everybody in here
could wear one of these but Thornsbarry and you, and if you
two wore them, you would be fired over it."
I credit the foregoing testimony of Bloomfield over the
general denial of Stevens and find that Stevens made the
statement attributed to him by Bloomfield. Accordingly, I
find Stevens' statement that Bloomfield would be discharged
if she wore the Company's campaign hat was a threat of
S Isaac was incarcerated for driving an automobile at a time when his
license was suspended.
6 The parties stipulated that the hats were made of styrofoam material
and carried a white sweatband with the inscription "Vote No" in red letter.
mg.
330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
retaliation for her known support of the Union or, alterna-
tively, a denial of her right to change her mind and support
the Company in its campaign against the Union. In either
event, by this statement of Stevens, Respondent interfered
with the Section 7 rights of employees in violation of Section
8(a)(1). Additionally, I find that Respondent interfered with
the employees' organizational activities by inviting display in
the plant of its campaign hat with an antiunion message while
barring display of union insignia. The employees could only
view the disparate treatment of antiunion and prounion solic-
itation as harassment and an integral part of the Company's
campaign formally instituted only about 1 week before the
election.
e. Paragraph 8 of the amended complaint alleges that on
or about June 14, 1970, Supervisor Stephens threatened an
employee by advising that he would be required to perform
additional tasks if the Union got in. Employee Fred Isaac
testified, in this regard, that about 5 p.m., June 10, Stevens
drove up to Isaac's house, called him, and then said "Fred,
you know if the Union goes in over there ... two more jobs
will be added to your work as a stockboy. ... " Continuing
Stevens warned "You better not vote for it. You will have two
more jobs." As to the foregoing, Stevens generally denied the
complaint allegation then explained that, on the day in ques-
tion, he stopped at Isaac's house because the hood on Isaac's
car was up and he thought Isaac was having trouble; and,
that, following an inspection of the car, Stevens reported to
Isaac that the belt on the power steering was broken. After
this, Isaac complained of being overworked on the job and
requested assistance; announced that he had changed his
mind about voting for the Union and expressed a desire to see
Tupps; and in the end stated he was afraid of losing his job.
As to the job, Stevens reminded Isaac that the Company had
held it open for 1% months while Isaac was in jail. Stevens
gave testimony concerning the nature of his conversation
with Isaac but I am not persuaded that he reported the entire
conversation. Significantly, Stevens failed to specifically deny
that he told Isaac he would have two additional jobs if the
Union were successful in the election or to deny that he
directed Isaac to vote against the Union.
I have found from other testimony of Stevens in the record
that he has a propensity for evasive statements whenever he
believes a'truthful answer might incriminate him. This is
another such instance. In these circumstances, I credit the
foregoing testimony of Isaac. Testimony of Stevens at vari-
ance therewith is not credited. Accordingly, I find Stevens'
remarks to Isaac that Isaac's workload would be increased if
the plant were unionized and his admonition to Isaac not to
vote for the Union were deliberately calculated to deter Isaac
from engaging in union activity. I conclude, therefore, that by
Stevens' conduct on this occasion Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
f. Paragraph 9 of the same amended complaint alleges that,
on or about June 16, 1970, the day before the election, Super-
visor Stevens threatened an employee by advising that she
would be bumped from a job she favored if the Union got in
but would be permitted to remain on the job if she voted
against the Union. The General Counsel adduced testimony
in this connection by employee Drennen. Drennen testified,
on direct examination, that Stevens approached her sometime
the morning of June 16 and asked whether she liked the press
she was operating; Drennen replied in the affirmative and
explained that she "can' make piece rate easier" on the press
referred to by Stevens than on the one to which she was
regularly assigned. At this, Stevens stated that "if [Drennen]
voted for the Company [she] can run this machine all the time
[but] if the Union got inl they could bump her off this press."
Drennen 's response was that she would vote her conscience.
During cross-examination, however, Drennen added a fur-
ther statement by Stevens to the effect that an employee with
greater seniority might be assigned to the press, presumably,
in the event of a union victory. Thus, she was asked and
answered:
Q. Did he also tell you that because of the other
employees having more seniority that you may not run
the press because of someone with more seniority.
A. Yes.
In regard to the foregoing, Stevens acknowledged having had
a conversation with Drennen on the morning of June 16 but
asserted that it was initiated by Drennen with a question as
to whether she could keep her job "if the Union got in" to
which Stevens responded in the affirmative.
The accounts given by Drennen on direct and cross-exami-
nation are complimentary, not inconsistent, and I am satisfied
that her version of the conversation itself is more reliable than
that of Stevens. I therefore credit her testimony. While Dren-
nen's first account fails to attribute to Stevens any reference
to seniority, I am convinced that the omission was inadver-
tent and that her testimony, when read together, accurately
reflects what Stevens said with regard to a union victory and
other matters. In the light of the foregoing, I find that Ste-
vens' statement that Drennen would be permanently assigned
to run the press she favored if she voted for the Company was
a promise of benefit to induce her to reject the Union.' His
accompanying remark that Drennen might be "bumped"
from the press by a more senior employee in the event the
Union won the election was not a reasonable prediction based
on "objective fact" but instead an implied threat of economic
reprisal in the form of the loss of a preferred job.' In truth,
it is apparent that no economic demands had as yet been
made by the Union upon Respondent. It is found, therefore,
that by the above-described conduct of Stevens Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1).
2'. The allegations of Section 8(a)(1) violations in the
complaint in Case 8-CA-5928, as amended
Paragraph 7 of this amended complaint alleges that on or
about April 17 Supervisor Richard Cheek created the impres-
sion that the union activities of the employees were being kept
under surveillance by telling an employee he had observed
that employee and other employees at a union meeting. Para-
graph 8 of the amended complaint alleges that on or about
April 27 Supervisor Cheek maintained under surveillance the
Union's hall in Clyde, Ohio, at a time when some of Respond-
ent's employees were attending a meeting therein . In support
of the allegation in paragraph 7, employee Thornsbarry tes-
tified that, after a union meeting on April 27, Jesse Rowe
invitedThornsbarry, Tackett and Drennen out for drinks and
that they walked to a bar down the street from the Union hall.
The next day, Cheek approached Thornsbarry in the press-
room and said "You went to the union meeting last night."
Thornsbarry, acknowledged he had attended the meeting.
Cheek then asked, in a jocular manner, "There were four of
you weren't there?';' To this, Thornsbarry replied that there
were about "four carloads." Cheek rejoined "Four is all I
seen . I saw you going in a place of business down there" and,
after this, proceeded to name the three individuals who had
accompanied Thornsbarry to the bar. In support of the, alle-
gation in paragraph 8, General Counsel offered testimony by
employee Marie Fouke that the following occurred between
' Not specifically alleged but litigated . See Monroe Feed Store, 112
NLRB 1336, 1337
° N.LR.B. v Gissel Packing Company, Inc, et at, 395 U.S. 575
THE FAULHABER COMPANY 331
4 and 4:15 p.m. on or about May 20.' On her way home
following the end of her shift, Fouke drove by the side of the
building where a union meeting was taking place and, while
waiting at a stop sign, saw Cheek in a parked car. According
to Fouke, Cheek was in the second car from the corner below
an unidentified crossroad on North Main Street, Clyde, Ohio,
and across from the union hall which is at the corner on the
opposite side of the street. Called as a witness for the Re-
spondent, Cheek denied the complaint allegations but did not
seriously challenge the testimony of Thornsbarry or Fouke.
In Cheek's version, on an unknown date, he left the plant to
inspect certain chairs of an unidentified individual who lived
south of Clyde.'° Enroute Cheek drove through Clyde and
finally stopped at a spot across from an A & P store. Ques-
tioned as to whether he was in Clyde about the time of the
union meeting, Cheek replied "I don't know when the meet-
ing was but if they were there, I would say I was there."
Cheek went on to admit asking Thornsbarry, the day follow-
ing the union meeting, who he was with the night before but
then asserted that the question was prompted by prior inqui-
ries from employee Ruth Stockmaster. According to Cheek,
Stockmaster reported seeing the aforenamed employees enter
a bar and inquired as to their marital status. Cheek also
related that, at the time he questioned Thornsbarry about the
meeting, he "assumed" Thornsbarry had attended a union
meeting "because they had supposedly been holding meet-
ings." In response to Cheek's question as to who he was with
the night previous, Thornsbarry advised, according to Cheek,
that "they were all over there," identified some of the in-
dividuals who had attended, and finally said "I bet it was
you." In Cheek's words, "I didn't say it was me or not me
and grinned at him and walked on." Still later the same day,
Cheek admittedly asked Tackett who 'she was with the night
before. To this, Tackett replied, again according to Cheek,
"Damn it I can't get away with nothing" and then inquired
if Cheek was there. According to Cheek, his response to
Tackett was "I didn't go into the town tavern." I infer from
this statement of Cheek that he was outside the tavern.
I credit the foregoing testimony of Thornsbarry and
Fouke, as corroborated in part by admissions of Cheek. Tes-
timony of Cheek inconsistent with the findings is not credited.
In view of the unlikelihood that Cheek would happen by pure
chance to park opposite the union hall at a time when a union
meeting was being held, I reject his explanations and find that
he went there for the purpose of surveillance and that he did
in fact so engage. Moreover, I find that by the statement to
Thornsbarry that Thornsbarry had attended a union meeting
the night before, by inquiries of Thomsbarry and Tackett as
to who they were with the night of the union meeting, and
by naming the employees who were with Thornsbarry the
night of the said meeting, Cheek knowingly gave these em-
ployees reason to believe that he was engaging in surveil-
lance." The fact that the statements to Thornsbarry were
uttered in a friendly and casual manner does not lessen their
unlawful effect. Accordingly, I find that by the foregoing
conduct of Cheek Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
' Considering the progression of events and attendant circumstances, I
think it more likely that the events related by Thornsbarry and Fouke took
place on the same day and that the date was April 27, as set by Thornsbarry.
10 In his spare moments, Cheek repairs chairs and other furnishings. The
chairs in question allegedly belonged to a friend of a female employee
" See Moore's Seafood Products, Inc., 152 NLRB 683-684.
3. The allegation in Case 8-CA-5877 of the
discriminatory discharge of Jesse Rowe
a. The nature and duration of Rowe's employment; his
concerted and union activities12
Rowe commenced his employment with Respondent on
June 8, 1964, and worked intermittently until April 21, 1970,
the date of his discharge. During this period, Rowe quit his
job on six different occasions but after each such voluntary
termination was reemployed on a plea of need and a promise
to work steady. His most recent term of employment with the
Respondent began on June 17, 1968. On March 3, 1969,
Rowe was promoted to group leader on the night shift and
continued in this position until the shift was discontinued on
October 14, 1969, at which time he was assigned the job of
setup man on the day shift. On April 2, 1970, Rowe requested
and was granted reassignment to the job of press operator, the
position he held on April 21. At all times material herein,
Delmer Stevens was his supervisor. In Stevens' view, Rowe
was a satisfactory employee when on the job. Acknowledging
absences on occasions, Rowe explained that on his return to
work after each such absence the foreman would request an
explanation, he would comply with the request, and that
would end the matter. Moreover, Rowe testified, credibly and
without contradiction, that about 1 month before his dis-
charge Stevens and Tupps complimented him on his work
and that one or the other stated that he was thinking of
making Rowe a foreman when the night shift was rein-
stituted. On March 17, 1970, Rowe was given a 3-day suspen-
sion for leaving the plant without permission.
As noted, Rowe was active in the employees' concerted
activities and, at the meeting with Tupps in late March or
early April, openly expressed his frustration at the Respond-
ent's failure to alleviate some grievances. Shortly thereafter,
Rowe, Bloomfield, Tackett, and Drennen contacted Interna-
tional Organizer Smith for the purpose of discussing the feasi-
bility of bringing the Union into Respondent's plant. Prior to
his discharge, Rowe distributed from 20 to 25 union authori-
zation cards in the plant during breaks and at lunchtime, and
after work in an adjoining parking lot. Stevens has an office
near the periphery of the production area but spends most of
his time in the work area. However, Tackett testified that to
her knowledge Stevens was not present when Rowe dis-
tributed union cards in the plant. Rowe testified that every
workday before his discharge he carried a packet of authori-
zation cards protruding 1% inches above the top of his shirt
pocket with the UAW seal thereon exposed and visible. There
is no evidence, however, that any company official ever saw
the protruding cards.
b. The events leading to Rowe's termination; the
termination of his employment
On or about April 13, Rowe sustained an injury to his right
hand as a result of an accident in the plant." Shortly after
this, he was taken to a doctor and three stitches were required
to close the wound. Later, the area became inflamed and his
index finger went numb.
Sometime between 10 and 10:30 a.m., Friday, April 17,
Rowe approached Stevens in the restroom and, according to
Rowe, requested permission to leave the plant to see his
doctor and to procure license plates for his car. Stevens ac-
knowledged that Rowe requested leave that morning but as-
" Unless otherwise indicated, the findings in this section are based on
exhibits and credited testimony which are either admitted or undisputed.
" Rowe stuck a piece of steel into the palm of his hand somewhere
between the second and third fingers.
332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
serted that the only reason advanced by Rowe was a desire
to purchase a set of license plates. Both agreed , however, that
the request was denied. Shortly before noon Rowe again ap-
proached Stevens, this time in his office and in the company
of Bloomfield . Rowe had invited Bloomfield as a witness
because of an alleged rumor that he would be discharged. On
this occasion , according to Rowe and Bloomfield , Rowe told
Stevens he was leaving to see the doctor about his hand and
Stevens nodded indicating approval but said nothing ." Ste-
vens tells a different story . At first Stevens testified that,
following a second request for leave and another denial, Rowe
directed a foul word toward him , announced he was leaving
and left the plant at 5 p . m.15 Upon further questioning, how-
ever, Stevens omitted the use of the foul language by Rowe
and averred that, during the second encounter , Rowe stated
that he would return to the plant in the afternoon (April 17)
with a doctor 's slip and Stevens advised that he needed a slip
to cover the absence. With regard to the foul word , Rowe did
not recall using and Bloomfield did not hear any bad language
at the time in question. I credit the foregoing testimony of
Rowe as to his first encounter with Stevens on April 17 and
the mutually corroborative testimony of Rowe and Bloom-
field as to the second . Testimony of Stevens at variance with
the findings is not credited , particularly so much as attributes
to Rowe the use of foul language and asserts that Rowe left
the plant at 5 o'clock , because Stevens vacillated in his ac-
count of Rowe's remarks and his testimony is self-contradic-
tory and improbable on its face.
Rowe left the plant about noon on April 17 and returned
to his home in Willard , where he asked his wife to call and
request an appointment with the doctor for later that day.
Josephine Rowe, Rowe's wife, was unable to arrange an ap-
pointment for Friday so one was made for 4 p .m. Monday,
April 20, the earliest available time and date. Still later the
same, day, April 17 , Rowe went to Norwalk where he pur-
chased a set of license plates.
In accordance with the practice she had followed when
reporting Rowe absent , Josephine Rowe called the plant
about 10 a.m., Monday, April20, and advised that Rowe had
an appointment with his doctor and would not report for
work that day. In the afternoon of the same day, Rowe visited
the doctor who removed the stitches and gave him a slip
verifying the visit . According to credited and undisputed tes-
timony of Bloomfield , sometime the same day (April 20),
Stevens told her "there wasn't any use for [Rowe] to come
back because he was fired."
Tuesday, April 21, Rowe reported for work at his usual
time, 6 a.m., and gave the doctor's slip to Stevens. Stevens
told him that he would have to see Tupps before he could
return to work. Tupps arrived about 8 a.m. and Rowe and
Stevens then proceeded to Tupps' office. Initially, Tupps
asked why Rowe had not reported for work on Monday and
Rowe answered that it was because of an appointment with
the doctor to see about the wound in his hand which was still
causing him pain . At this, Tupps told Rowe he was fired for
absenteeism and for "what he pulled on Friday" adding that
he had pulled that stunt too many times . Rowe then turned
to Stevens and asked "Is that right?" and Stevens replied "If
Bob Tupps says you are fired , you're fired." Significantly,
there was no mention at the exit interview of the use of foul
language by Rowe.
About 1% hours after Rowe's departure from the plant on
April 21, Stevens approached Bloomfield at her station and
said, according to credited testimony of Bloomfield not in
dispute in this respect, "Get rid of the cards and this thing
will blow over and if it don't we'll get rid of some more."
Bloomfield asked if Stevens realized that the employees were
acting "within [their] rights" but Stevens evaded and de-
clared "We're going to get rid of the employees if this contin-
ues," adding finally that "if the Union got in they [the Com-
pany] would close the doors down and move to
Massachusetts." Sometime the same day, April 21, Personnel
Manager Michael Gula called the office of Dr. Camardese
and Was informed by the nurse that Rowe did not have an
appointment on Friday, April 17.
A report entitled "Termination of Employment" was al-
ledgedly prepared in the case of Rowe and signed by Tupps
or Gula.16 In addition, Tupps prepared and submitted to Vice
President Bird, on Bird's instructions, two reports detailing
the basis for the discharge, one dated April 21, the other
October 20." The first was admittedly altered" by the addi-
tion of the following notation at the bottom thereof:
"Jesse Rowe was discharged for the above reasons and
not because he was connected with union activities, since
at the time I was not aware of union activities being
carried on in the plant."
Further, the April 21 report refers to supporting memoranda
by Stevens and Security Officer R. Ackerman but neither was
presented at the hearing.
c. Conclusions
The complaint alleges that the Respondent discharged
Rowe on April 21 because of his union affiliation and con-
certed activities. Denying knowledge of Rowe's union affilia-
tion, Respondent maintains that the discharge was for cause.
On the basis of my findings that, at the meeting with Super-
intendent Tupps in late March or early April, Thornsbarry
and Rowe were active with fellow employees in presenting
grievances to Tupps; that Thornsbarry stated at the said
meeting that the plant would be_ organized if the employees'
grievances were not alleviated; and that near the end of the
meeting Rowe openly voiced his frustration to Tupps at the
latter's failure to redress the grievances, I conclude and find
that about 3 weeks prior to the discharge Respondent was
fully aware of the leadership roles of Thornsbarry and Rowe
in the employees' concerted activities. I have also found that
subsequent to the said meeting Rowe actively promoted the
Union by soliciting employee signatures to union authoriza-
tion cards both on and off plant premises and by carrying
such cards on his person while at work with the union em-
blem exposed and visible. As -I infer and find from Stevens'
statement to Bloomfield on April 20 and 21 taken together
that Stevens was referring to Rowe's union activity when only
l% hours after the discharge he directed Bloomfield to "get
rid of the cards" and warned "we'll [the Company] get rid of
some more" if the employees continued in their efforts on
behalf of the Union, I reject Respondent's contention that it
had no knowledge of Rowe's union activity prior to his dis-
charge on April 21 and find to the contrary. However, in the
face of what appears to be a formidable case in favor of the
General Counsel, Respondent contends that the real reason
6 The actual report was not produced at the hearing, but see G.C. Exh
5 for a copy of the form.
Rowe testified that he was unable to operate the levers on the lift truck " Bird acknowledged that additional reports are seldom prepared and, in
to which he had been assigned because of excruciating pain in his hand fact, are quite rare
11 Rowe's work shift ends at 3 30 p in 11 Compare G.C. Exh. 6 and 9.
THE FAULHABER COMPANY
for Rowe's discharge was an act of insubordination to his
foreman and an unexcused absence.
Considering first the alleged instance of insubordination, I
have previously found Stevens' testimony that Rowe directed
a foul word toward him to be not credible. This finding is
borne out by the fact that neither Stevens nor Tupps men-
tioned the use of abusive language by Rowe at the final inter-
view and there is no reference to it in either the April 21 or
October 20 memorandum, each of which recites in detail the
alleged basis for the discharge. The contention is totally lack-
ing in merit.
Turning next to the unexcused absence and the alleged
decision to discharge Rowe for that reason. Tupps gave three
different dates on which the decision was reached as follows:
Tupps decided to fire Rowe (1) "pretty much on Friday
afternoon"-April 17; (2) "on Monday morning when I
found he had no appointment on Friday at the doctor's office;
and (3) after Gula called the doctor's office. As to (1), the
decision could not have been made on April 17 because Rowe
had received permission from Stevens to leave the plant that
afternoon, a fact later acknowledged by Tupps in his tes-
timony on the stand and memorialized by Tupps in his April
21 and October 20 memoranda to Bird. As to (2) and (3),
Gula did not call the doctor's office until Tuesday, April 21,19
and it is highly unlikely that he received a report from the
nurse before Rowe's discharge about 8 a.m. on April 21. For
his part, Stevens testified that the decision to discharge Rowe
was not finalized until sometime during the exit interview on
April 21 yet it appears from the credited account of Bloom-
field that Stevens told Bloomfield on April 20 that Rowe was
fired.
Despite the inconsistencies and contradictions disclosed
above, which raise serious questions as to the validity of the
defense, Respondent insists that Rowe was discharged for an
unauthorized absence. Although not clearly articulated, Re-
spondent's defense appears to be that the discharge was
prompted by Rowe's failure to produce a doctor's slip cover-
ing his absence the afternoon of Friday, April 17, and also
because he continued to stay away from work the following
Monday, April 20. It is true that Rowe did not have a doc-
tor's appointment at the time he requested and was granted
leave on April 17. However, the fact that Rowe had no ap-
pointment on April 17 and that his wife was unsuccessful in
her attempt to arrange one for that day is immaterial as it
appears from the credited account of Rowe that he was una-
ble to continue on the job because of an injury to his hand
sustained in the plant about 4 days prior thereto. Following
a normal practice, Mrs. Rowe called the plant Monday morn-
ing, reported that Rowe would be absent that day, and gave
the reason therefor. In light of the foregoing, Rowe's explana-
tion for his inability to produce a doctor's slip for Friday
afternoon and for his absence on Monday seems entirely
plausible. However, assuming the absence cannot be justified
on the basis of a physical disability, it is clear that it was not
inconsistent with Respondent's policy or Rowe's record.
Thus, both Tupps and Gula acknowledged that the Respond-
ent has a liberal policy with respect to absenteeism and, as to
Rowe, company records reveal that from June 17, 1968 [the
beginning of his last term of employment] to December 31,
1968, Rowe was away from the slant on 15 separate occasions
without permission . Apparently between December 1968 and
January 1970, there was a hiatus in his record of absenteeism
and the initiation of a period of normal attendance. However,
on January 19, 1970, Rowe resumed the practice of absenting
himself from work but, except for a 3-day suspension on
19 See attachment to G.C Exh. 6.
333
March 17, 1970, no action was ever taken against him. Cer-
tainly, Rowe's union activity did not require that the Re-
spondent suffer repeated absences. But the Respondent had
overlooked and tolerated excessive absences-before and, in
spite of Rowe's record, rated him "very satisfactory" in
December 1968, promoted him to group leader in March
1969, and suggested that it might make him a foreman about
1 month before his discharge in April 1970. In all these
circumstances, I conclude and find that Rowe's inability to
produce a doctor's slip to cover his absence the afternoon of
April 17 and his failure to report for work on April 20 were
not the real reason for his discharge.
From the record as a whole, including the facts that Rowe
was active in the Union; that Respondent had knowledge
thereof; that, so far as appears, Respondent had not, except
for the one instance in March 1970, taken disciplinary action
against Rowe for absenteeism during his irregular tenure of
employment of almost 6 years; that Respondent exhibited a
union animus, as shown by the unfair labor practices already
found herein; that Rowe was terminated in the midst of the
Union's organizational campaign; and, considering too, Ste-
vens' statements to Bloomfield shortly after the discharge-
reported above and reviewed before-which graphically re-
veal Respondent's true motivation in making the discharge,
I conclude and find that the asserted reasons for the discharge
were only pretexts to conceal the fact that Respondent dis-
charged Rowe because of his union activity. I find further
that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act. Moreover, even if the record had shown that Rowe's
absenteeism to some extent entered into Respondent's deci-
sion to discharge him, I would still be constrained to find on
all the facts that his union activity was also a motivating
factor, in which event the discharge would still be unlawful.2°
I have heretofore found that, within hours after Rowe's
discharge on April 21, Stevens directed Bloomfield to "get rid
of the cards", advised that "this thing will blow over [but] if
it don't we'll get rid of some more", warned that "we're going
to get rid of the employees if this continues" and finally
declared that "if the Union got in [the Company] will close
the doors down and move to Massachusetts." As these state-
ments were clearly threats of reprisal for union activity, they
are additional violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and I
so find and conclude.
4. The allegation in Case 8-CA-5877 of the
discriminatory refusal to permit Martha Tackett to
schedule a vacation
Tackett was employed by the Respondent as a press opera-
tor for a period of 2 years ending July or August 1970. As
related above, she was active in the Union's organizational
campaign.
Tackett testified that on May 27 Stevens approached her
and said "Your husband called and asked if you could have
a vacation." Continuing Stevens declared, according to Tack-
ett, that he would discuss the matter with Tupps but, after
glancing at a union badge Tackett was wearing, asked "Are
you going to vote for the Union?" Upon Tackett's assertion
20 N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F 2d 883, 885 , (C.A 1);
Magnolia Petroleum Company v . N.L.R.B., 200 F 2d 148 , 149 (C.A. 5),
N.L.R.B. v. WTPJ, Inc., 268 F.2d 346, 347-348 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B. v. J. H.
Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Company, 229 F.2d 816,819 (C.A. 5); N.L.R.B.
v. Associated Naval Architects, Inc., 355 F.2d 788, 792, where the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said , in part:
The charge is sufficiently established if, in addition to an economic
ground shown in the Labor Board hearing , there is proof from which
the examiner may fairly find . that the layoffs were motivated by a
purpose to interfere with union organizational activities.
334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that she intended to do just that Stevens advised that he
"wouldn't do a damn thing for anyone that voted for the
Union." Later Stevens returned to report that Tupps had said
the he (Tupps) did not know when Tackett could take a
vacation. On cross-examination, however, Tackett testified
that, sometime later, Stevens also advised that he would pur-
sue the matter and let her know her vacation date as soon as
one was established. Tackett testified further that she re-
quested a vacation beginning May 27 or 29 but instead re-
ceived one commencing about the latter part of June and, in
addition, a 3-week leave-of-absence.21 In regard to the forego-
ing, Stevens testified that, in the latter part of May, Tackett
requested a vacation; he told her he did not have a schedule
but would inquire about the request and let her know; as soon
as a schedule was established Tackett was so advised; she told
him when she wanted to leave, was granted a week's vacation
and concurrent therewith a leave-of-absence. I credit the tes-
timony of Tackett and Stevens concerning Stevens' explana-
tion for the delay in processing her vacation request and the
steps he took with respect thereto. I also credit the remaining
portion of Tackett's testimony relative to Stevens' inquiry as
to whether she was going to vote for the Union. Testimony
of Stevens in conflict with this finding is not credited.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to permit Tack-
ett to schedule a vacation and that the refusal was dis-
criminatorily motivated because Respondent's purpose in de-
nying the request was to retaliate against Tackett for having
evidenced support of the Union. I do not agree. The fact that
the application was not granted at once was due to adminis-
trative considerations involving the scheduling of work and
not to any desire by the Respondent to seek reprisal against
Tackett for her support of the Union, Stevens statement that
he would not help a union supporter notwithstanding. In
truth, Stevens promptly relayed the request to Tupps and
Tackett received a vacation in due course. All things consid-
ered, it seems highly unreasonable to expect an employer with
a sizeable work force" to process a vacation request the same
day it is presented or 1 or 2 days later. Accordingly, I must
conclude that the evidence does not establish that Respond-
ent refused to permit Tackett to schedule a vacation. I find,
therefore, that the allegations of the amended complaint that
Respondent discriminatorily refused to permit Tackett to
schedule a vacation in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act have not been sustained . I also find, however, that
Respondent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) by Ste-
vens' interrogation of Tackett about her union sentiments and
desires. The question served no legitimate purpose and was
designed to impede Tackett in the free exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. I conclude and find there-
fore that by eliciting information from Tackett regarding her
union sympathies Stevens engaged in interrogation pro-
scribed by Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.23
5. The allegation in Case 8-CA-5928 of the
discriminatory reassignment of Luther Thornsbarry24
a. Prefatory statement
Thornsbarry's employment with the Respondent began in
July 1964 and, for the first 6 months thereof, he was a punch
press operator. In December 1964, Thornsbarry was pro-
moted to foreman on the second shift, a position he held until
June 1968 when the shift was eliminated. He was then trans-
ferred to the day shift as a die setter and also as a part-time
stockboy in the siren department.
As noted above, Thornsbarry was one of the employees
who assisted the Union in its attempt to organize the plant.
In this regard, he distributed union authorization cards in
and outside the plant at lunch time and during break periods.
He also attended union meetings and, while at work, wore a
large union button which urged employees to "Join UAW
Vote" and carried a pocket pencil holder with the union
insignia thereon. On an unspecified date, Organizer Smith,
Thornsbarry, and other employees met with Vice President
Bird and other management representatives to make arrange-
ments for the election. At this meeting, the Company asserted
that Thornsbarry was ineligible to vote allegedly because he
was a supervisor.
b. The session of Thornsbarry with management on June 5
at which he was reassigned,- subsequent events
About 2 p.m., June 5, Thornsbarry was summoned to a
meeting in Bird's office. In attendance for the meeting were
Bird, Stevens, Assistant Superintendent Richard Walton, and
another officer named George Horan. Bird explained that the
unusual assemblage of a top company officials was necessary
because he knew Thornsbarry was close to the Union and had
anticipated "trouble." He also explained that the meeting was
called because the Company had an accumulation of orders
and needed a foreman for a new night shift to be instituted
sometime in the future. Shortly after the meeting was con-
vened, Bird told Thornsbarry that the Company was carrying
him as a foreman even though he had not performed any of
the duties of a foreman since the second shift was discon-
tinued in, June 1968,25 that it needed him "for supervision" on
a new second shift to start in the future, that the Company
had an oversupply of die setters but not enough punch press
operators, and that he (Bird) preferred that Thornsbarry ac-
cept the "supervisor's job." Following this Bird informed
Thornsbarry that he had a choice for him to make, either to
consider himself a foreman for the Company or revert to his
old job as a punch press operator. Significantly, Bird did not
tell Thornsbarry that he could remain a die setter, the posi-
tion he held at the start of the meeting. After reflecting a
moment, Thornsbarry announced that he would take the
punch press job. Bird then asked Thornsbarry to sign a state-
ment to that effect but he refused. At this point, Bird called
another witness and directed Thornsbarry to repeat before
her the statement that he "accepted" the punch press job.
Before the meeting closed Bird told Thornsbarry to start on
the punch press Monday morning, June 8, and he did. As a
consequence of the reassignment of job positions, Thornsbar-
ry's hourly rate dropped from. $2.75 to $1.71 per hour plus
piece rate. The Company challenged Thornsbarry's ballot at
" Tackett was entitled to a 1-week vacation.
22 In the instant case, as noted, the Employer's work complement totaled
198 employees as of May 1970.
" See Engineered Steel Products, Inc., 188 NLRB No. 52 Again, not
alleged but litigated. Monroe Feed Store, supra.
2° In major part, the evidence in this section is not in serious conflict.
" The reference to Thornsbarry' s status as a foreman related to the fact
that, after the second shift was eliminated and Thornsbarry was assigned to
the job of die setter, the Company continued to pay him the same hourly
rate and to provide the same insurance coverage he had received as a
foreman.
THE FAULHABER COMPANY 335
the election on the ground that he was a supervisor but raised
no question as to his status at the hearing.
The new second shift was instituted in August or Septem-
ber 1970 and Thornsbarry was again offered and declined a
foreman's position thereon. He did, however, accept a job as
die setter on the new shift at an hourly rate of $2.75 and
continued in that position until the shift was discontinued in
November when, once again, he became a punch press opera-
tor on the day shift at $1.71 per hour plus piece rate.26
c. Conclusions
The complaint alleges that on or about June 4 Respondent
discriminatorily reassigned Luther Thornsbarry from a job as
die setter to one as punch press operator because of his union
activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent attributes the reassignment solely to eco-
nomic considerations.
Thornsbarry was an exemplary long-time employee. He
began his service as a punch press operator in June 1964 and
6 months later was promoted to foreman on the second shift.
When the second shift was discontinued in June 1968,
Thornsbarry became a die setter on the day shift but con-
tinued to receive the same hourly rate of pay ($2.75) and the
same insurance coverage he had enjoyed as a foreman. He
distributed union authorization cards in and outside the plant
area, attended union meetings, and wore a large union button.
He also attended a meeting with management officials at
which arrangements were made for the election and at which
Respondent's representatives expressed the view that Thorns-
barry was ineligible to vote allegedly because he was a super-
visor. That Respondent was fully aware of Thornsbarry's
union activities prior to the June 5 meeting is admitted and,
indeed, such knowledge was the reason for the presence of top
management officials at the meeting and for Bird's apprehen-
sions and fears that "trouble" might ensue.
Respondent contends that Thornsbarry was reassigned on
June 5 because he rejected-its offer of a foreman's position on
a new second shift. It is undisputed that the new shift was not
instituted until August or September. Consequently, had
Thornsbarry accepted the June 5 offer he would have been `a
captain without a crew' and Respondent's stated objective,
namely increased production, a goal unattained. Having re-
jected the offer Respondent had no alternative, the contention
continues, but to reassign Thornsbarry to a job as punch press
operator because (1) it had more die setters and fewer punch
press operators than it required and (2) Thornsbarry's per-
formance as a die setter was not satisfactory. The contention
is devoid of merit. As to (1), no corroborative proof was
presented to support Bird's testimony of an imbalance in
Respondent's staffing requirements and I do not accept his
naked assertion. As to (2), Bird admitted that, after the sec-
ond shift was discontinued in June 1968, the Company con-
tinued to pay Thornsbarry $2.75 per hour, or 75 cents above
the hourly rate of the other rank-and-file die setter, and to
provide the same insurance coverage he had received as a
foreman. Further, it clearly appears from the evidence that,
when the new shift was instituted in August or September
1970, Respondent again offered to make Thornsbarry a fore-
man and, in fact, reinstated him as a die setter. Finally,
Thornsbarry testified, credibly and without contradiction,
that sometime prior to June 5 Tiipps complimented him on
his performance as a die setter and suggested that he devote
more, time to die setting and less to "fooling around with the
siren line."
I6 These findings are based on a composite of the credited testimony of
Thornsbarry and Bird.
Rejecting Respondent's defense, I am convinced and thus
find that Thornsbarry's purported unsatisfactory work per-
formance was only a pretext and not the real reason for the
action taken against him. In short, the weaknesses and incon-
sistencies in Respondent's defense serve to strengthen the
General Counsel's case.27
Reassigning, or more appropriately demoting, an ex-
perienced employee in the circumstances described above
without warning or reprimand was an act of retaliation for
union activity against an employee whom the Respondent
had once favored and also a warning to other employees of
the risks they assume in continuing to support the Union.
This conclusion finds ample support in the facts that, before
and at the time of the election, Respondent took the position
that Thornsbarry was ineligible to vote because he was a
supervisor and in Bird's insistence at the June 5 meeting that
Thornsbarry accept the job of foreman because he was needed
for supervision. When Thornsbarry rejected the offer of a
supervisory position and thus asserted his right to vote in the
election, Respondent retaliated by demoting him to a punch
press operator.
In view of Thornsbarry's excellent employment record, his
activity on behalf of the Union, the summary and precipitate
nature of the demotion, the timing thereof (less that 2 weeks
before the election), and the unfair labor practices already
found herein, I am pursuaded and find that the demotion was
in fact caused by Thornsbarry's union activity. Accordingly,
I further find the demotion to be in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
IV FINDINGS AS TO THE UNION' S OBJECTIONS TO THE
ELECTION IN CASE 8-RC-7840
From the findings heretofore made with respect to the
allegations in the amended complaints, it is evident that the
Employer violated the Act during the critical period between
the filing of the petition on May 6 and June 17, the day of the
election. It follows that there is merit in those objections to
the election which have their counterpart in the sustained
allegations. Accordingly, I find merit in and sustain objec-
tions 1(a) and 3(b) relating to threats to close the plant in the
event the Union won the election, 1(b) relating to promises
of promotion if employees voted against the Union, 1(c) relat-
ing to threats to discharge employees who wore union badges,
1(e) relating to threats to increase the workload of employees
who voted for the Union, 1(f) relating to threats to discharge
employees who expressed a wish to wear company hats," and
5(b) pertaining to reducing an employee from die setter to
punch press operator because of his union activity.
There remain to be considered objections 1(d) and 4. Ob-
jection 1(d) reads as follows: The Employer made misrepre-
sentations to the employees by telling them that the UAW
was a communist organization.
According to the credited testimony of Kifer, Drennen,
Tackett, and Bloomfield, at various times between the filing
of the petition and the election, Stevens told employees that
"whoever wore badges was a Communist," labelled the UAW
"a bunch of Communists" and advised that the employees
"shouldn't wear [union] badges." Stevens denied making the
remarks attributed to him by the employee witnesses but I do
not credit his denial. Stevens' statement characterizing the
Union and its supporters as "Communists" were privileged
expressions under Section 8(c) and thus an insufficient
2' Cf N..L.R. B. v. Georgia Rug Mild 308 F 2d 89, 91 (C.A. 5), NL.R.B.
v. Schell Steel Products, Inc., 340 F.2d 568, 573 (C A. 5).
28 The word "union" not company appears in this objection, but since
there is no evidence that the Union furnished hats to the employees I assume
the reference is to the Company 's campaign hat.
336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ground for sustaining the objection." Accordingly, I recom-
mend that objection 1(d) be overruled.
Objection 4 states: The Employer by and through its agent
Mike Gula intimidated employees by insisting that they had
no right to vote in the forthcoming elections.
The record shows that, during the entire period of ballot-
ing, Personnel Manager Guma stationed himself on the fourth
floor near a stairway the employees were required to use to
reach the polling area on the fifth floor. Gula estimated that
he was about 35 feet from the polls. The Employer's explana-
tion for Gula's presence in the above-described area is that it
sought to make certain that employees left their departments
on time and in proper sequence, to prevent loitering, and to
keep out unauthorized persons.
The evidence is that the Company made elaborate prepara-
tions for the election to avoid confusion and reduce conges-
tion in the plant. In this regard, it prepared and distributed
to all parties a voting schedule showing the times employees
would be released from work to vote. Gula received a copy
of the schedule. It also appears that, on the day of the elec-
tion, 25 to 30 employees were on leave-of-absence or in layoff
status; and that, to assist the employees in locating the voting
area, the Company had posted written instructions, signs
with arrows, and, in addition, had detailed Gula and others
to further assist in this effort. Except for an occasional ex-
change of greetings, there is no evidence that Gula spoke to
any of the employees on their way to vote.30 Thus, the record
stands barren of proof that Gula or any other management
representative ever "insisted" that the employees had no right
to vote. Moreover, there was nothing improper in the pres-
ence of Gula about 35 feet outside the polling place. Accord-
ingly, I recommend that objection 4 be overruled.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE ELECTION
As I have found merit in objections 1(a), (b), (c), (e), and
(f), 3(b), and 5(b), I find that this objectionable conduct by
Respondent, as well as the unlawful demotion of Thornsbarry
[objection 5(b)], all occurring subsequent to the Union's filing
of its representation petition herein but before the election,
were sufficient to interfere with the laboratory conditions
necessary for a free and fair election. I therefore recommend
that the results of this election be set aside and a new election
be conducted at a time to be determined by the Regional
Director.
VI THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing the free flow thereof.
VII. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,
I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that
a Board order issue designed to protect the rights of its em-
ployees.
2s Southwester Co., 111 NLRB 805, 806 , Editorial "El Impartial" Inc,
92 NLRB 1795, 1796; Globe Wireless, Ltd, 88 NLRB 1262, 1263-1264.
2° Cf Milchem Inc., 170 NLRB 362
I shall further recommend that the Respondent offer to
Jesse Rowe and Luther Thornsbarry immediate and full rein-
statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges and make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered
by reason of the discrimination against them, by payment of
a sum of money equal to that which each would normally
have earned as wages from the dates of Jesse Rowe's dis-
charge and Luther Thornsbarry's demotion and reassignment
to the dates or date of the Respondent's offers of reinstate-
ment, less their net earnings during said periods in the man-
ner prescribed in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per
annum, as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Company, 138
NLRB 716.
Upon the basis of the foregoing finding of fact and upon the
entire record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act in the manner hereinabove found, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discharging employee Jesse Rowe on April 21, 1970,
and by demoting and reassigning employee Luther Thorns-
barry on June 5, 1970, because they engaged in union activity
protected by the Act, Respondent has discriminated in regard
to the hire or tenure of employment of its employees, and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not discriminated against employee
Martha Tackett in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act, nor has it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in any
respect not found herein.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
I hereby issue the following recommended:"
ORDER
Respondent, The Faulhaber Company, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in and activity on behalf of
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, or any
other labor organization, by discharging, demoting and reas-
signing employees or by discriminating against employees in
any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union sentiments and desires, threatening employees with
plant removal or closing down and terminating operation if
they continued their union activities or if the Union prevailed
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes
THE FAULHABER COMPANY 337
in a pending election, threatening to discharge employees
who supported the Union, threatening to discharge em-
ployees who displayed union insignia or who expressed a wish
to wear the Company's campaign hat bearing an antiunion
message, directing employees to remove union insignia from
their apparel while at work and forceably relieving them of
these items, harassing employees who displayed union in-
signia while permitting employees generally to wear the Com-
pany's campaign hat, threatening employees with added
workloads in the event of a union victory in the election,
threatening an employee with the loss of a favored job if the
Union won the election but promising to retain the employee
in the favored job if she voted against the Union, and engag-
ing in surveillance of union activities among its employees
and making known to employees that it had so engaged by
naming employees who attended a union meeting.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to join or
assist a union, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Jesse Rowe and Luther Thornsbarry immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equiva-
lent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
pay which they may have suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation practiced against them, in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "the Remedy."
(b) Notify immediately the above-named individuals, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of their right to full reinstatement, upon application after
discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.
(c) Preserve and upon request make available to the Board
or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
determine the amount due as backpay.
(d) Post at its place of busines in Monroe, Ohio, copies of
the attached Notice marked "Appendix."32 Copies of said
Notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 8, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said Notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to
comply herewith."
" In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the amended complaints be dis-
missed insofar as they allege violations of the Act not specifi-
cally found herein.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their right to support Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW
(herein called the Union), or any other labor organiza-
tion, as their collective-bargaining representative by:
Coercively interrogating them concerning their
union sentiments and desires.
Threatening them with plant removal or closing
down and terminating operations if they continued
their union activities or if the Union prevailed in a
pending election.
Threatening to discharge employees who supported
the Union.
Threatening to discharge employees who displayed
union insignia or who expressed a wish to wear our
campaign hat bearing an antiunion message.
Directing employees to remove union insignia from
their clothing while at work and forceably removing
these items from their clothing.
Harassing employees who displayed union insignia
while permitting employees generally to wear our
campaign hat.
Threatening employees with added workloads in
the event of a union victory in an election.
Threatening employees with the loss of favored jobs
if the Union won the election but promising to re-
tain them in favored jobs if they voted against the
Union.
Engaging in surveillance of union activities among
our employees and making known to employees
that we have so engaged by naming employees who
attended union meetings.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities
on behalf of International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW, or any other labor organization, by
discharging , demoting , and reassigning employees, or by
discriminating against our employees in any other man-
ner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or
any terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
right to join or assist a union, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any and all such activities.
WE WILL offer to Jesse Rowe and Luther Thorns-
barry immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to
their seniority and other rights and privileges and make
them whole in the manner provided in this Decision for
any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of our
discrimination against them.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain
from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named
or any other labor organization.
338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE FAULHABER Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
COMPANY Service Act.
(Employer) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
Dated By This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
(Representative) (Title) from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, orcovered by any other material.
WE WILL notify immediately the above -named individuals, Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, its provisions , may be directed to the Board 's Office, 1695
of their right to full reinstatement , upon application after Federal Office Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland,
discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-522-3715.