0120080322
10-02-2009
The Estate of Mary L. Jones-Barker, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.
The Estate of Mary L. Jones-Barker,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southeast Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120080322
Hearing No. 410-2006-00225X
Agency No. 4H-300-0104-06
DECISION
On October 18, 2007, complainant's estate filed an appeal from
the agency's September 24, 2007 final decision concerning her equal
employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is
accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,
the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the events giving rise to this complaint, complainant
worked as a City Letter Carrier at the agency's Briarcliff Post Office
in Atlanta, Georgia. On or around March 22, 2006, complainant filed an
EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis
of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when, on
February 1, 2006, complainant was instructed to clock-out, leave the
building, and not report back to work until further notice because she
had rejected a limited duty job offer.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and a notice of her right to request a
hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested
a hearing, but the AJ denied the hearing request after complainant's
death, prior to the hearing, on the grounds that complainant's estate
failed to respond to the AJ's Show Cause Order "or otherwise name a
representative of the estate to move forward with the case." The AJ
remanded the complaint to the agency, and the agency issued a final
decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded
that complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to discrimination
as alleged. Specifically, the agency's decision found that complainant
established a prima facie case of discrimination based on reprisal for
prior protected EEO activity but failed to establish that the agency's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were a pretext
for unlawful discrimination.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Neither complainant's estate nor the agency submitted a statement on
appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo
review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management
Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that
the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine
the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,
and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy the
three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support
an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending
on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804
n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,
complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination based on reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, we
find that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions. Complainant's supervisor stated in the record that,
on January 31, 2006, complainant rejected the agency's limited duty
job offer. As a result, the supervisor did not have any work for
complainant within her medical restrictions, and the Manager Customer
Service ordered the supervisor to advise complainant not to report to work
until further notice. The supervisor further stated that complainant
ignored her instructions and reported for work on February 1, 2006.
The supervisor then ordered complainant to leave, reiterating that she
was not to return to work until further notice because complainant had
rejected the agency's limited duty job offer, and management did not have
any work for complainant within her medical restrictions at that time.
Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for
discrimination. Upon review, we concur with the agency's determination
that complainant failed to establish pretext. We find that the record
is devoid of any evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by
discriminatory animus. We note that both complainant's supervisor and the
Manager Customer Service stated in the record that they were not aware of
complainant's prior EEO activity. Complainant's estate did not submit
a statement on appeal, and, as a neutral party, we are not persuaded,
based on the record of investigation, that complainant has shown that the
agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for unlawful
discrimination based on reprisal for her prior protected EEO activity.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on our thorough review of the record, the Commission
determines that the agency's final decision finding no discrimination
was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
___10/02/09_______
Date
2
0120080322
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
4
0120080322