The Deutsch Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 1969

180 N.L.R.B. 8 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Deutsch Company , Electronic Components
Division and International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO).
Case 21-CA-7989
December 12, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND ZAGORIA
On April 3, 1969, Trial Examiner Louis S.
Penfield issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The
Trial Examiner also found that Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices.'
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision, a supporting brief, and a
request for oral argument.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
entire record in this case, including the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as
modified herein.'
'No exceptions were filed to the Trial Examiner ' s failure to find these
unfair labor practices.
'This request is hereby denied since, in our view , the record , exceptions
and brief adequately present the issues and positions of the parties
'In the light of our other findings and the remedy provided therefor, we
deem it unnecessary to decide whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act by Supervisor Schum 's photographing of union handbilling
activity or by Respondent's rule requiring operators to stand while at
work
We agree with the Trial Examiner's findings of Section 8(aX3)
violations . In respect to the unlawful discrimination against employee
Frances Montgomery , Respondent asserts that the Trial Examiner
erroneously found that there was no explanation in the record for the
abolition of Montgomery 's tool crib attendant job. While there is some
testimony showing that Respondent had shifted the tool crib attendant's
tasks to other job classifications, this evidence does not affect our
agreement with the correctness of the Trial Examiner 's ultimate conclusion
that Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Montgomery
In adopting the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) by invoking an unlawfully broad no-solicitation rule, we
note that even if the language of the rule might be regarded as ambiguous,
the manner of its enforcement makes clear that the rule was designed to
inhibit all in -plant union activity. In agreeing that the rule violated the
Act, Member Zagoria does not however rely on any asserted disparity as
between union activity and United Fund solicitation.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified herein, and orders that the Respondent,
The Deutsch Company, Electronic Components
Division, Oceanside, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order,
as so modified:
1. Delete paragraph 1(a) and 1(b) and substitute
the following:
"(a) Discharging, laying off, suspending,
eliminating overtime, denying wage increases, failing
to transfer, or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to hire, tenure of employment,
or any term and condition of employment, in order
to discourage membership in International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(AFL-CIO), or any other labor organization, except
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
"(b) Coercively interrogating employees
concerning their union membership or activities,
threatening them with reprisals and promising
benefits to dissuade them from union and concerted
activities, invoking and enforcing an unduly
restrictive prohibition on union soliciation, assisting
and inducing employees to repudiate the Union, and
imposing more onerous work practices because of
the Union.
"(c) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(AFL-CIO) or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, or to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all such activities, except to the extent that
such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act."
2. Delete the first paragraph in the Appendix
("Notice to All Employees") and substitute the
following:
WE WILL NOT discharge, layoff, suspend,
eliminate overtime, deny wage increases, fail to
transfer or otherwise discriminate against our
employees in regard to hire, tenure of
employment or any term and condition of
employment in order to discourage membership in
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO) or any other
labor organization, except as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
180 NLRB No. 1
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our
employees concerning their union membership or
activities, threaten reprisals or promise benefits in
order to dissuade them from union and concerted
activities, invoke or enforce an unduly restrictive
prohibition on our employees' union solicitation,
assist and induce our employees to repudiate their
union affiliation, or impose more onerous work
practices because of the Union.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Louis S. PENFIELD, Trial Examiner This proceeding,
with all parties represented, was heard before me in Vista,
California, on September 17, 18, 19, and 23, and October
I and 2, 1968, upon a complaint of the General Counsel
and answer of The Deutsch Company, Electronic
Components Division, herein called Respondent.' The
issues litigated were whether the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, herein called the Act Upon the entire
record, including consideration of the briefs filed by the
parties, and upon my observation of the witnesses, I
hereby make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a California corporation with a plant
located in Oceanside, California, where it is engaged in
the manufacture and sale of electrical connectors used by
the aerospace industry In the normal course and conduct
of its business at the Oceanside plant, Respondent
annually sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points located outside the State of California
In the course and conduct of the same business at the
Oceanside plant, Respondent annually purchases materials
and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped
to it directly from points located outside the State of
California. On the basis of the foregoing, I find that
Respondent at all times material has been an employer
engaged in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act and that in accordance
with existing Board standards assertion of jurisdiction
over its business is appropriate.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (AFL-CIO), herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act
The original complaint issued on June 7, 1968, and is based on a charge
and amended charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board , on March 13 and 28, and on April 5 and May 29,
1968, respectively An amendment to complaint issued on June 26, 1968,
and an amended complaint issued on August 26, 1968 Copies of the
complaint , amendment to complaint , amended complaint , charges and
amended charges have been duly served upon Respondent
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
9
The General Counsel contends that in response to the
announcement of an organizational drive by the Union,
Respondent engaged in various unlawful acts violative of
Section 8(a)(1) which interfered with, restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights
The General Counsel further alleges that Respondent
discriminatorily laid off 96 employees, that it
discriminatorily selected and thereafter refused to reinstate
four employees included in such layoff, that it
discriminatorily reduced overtime for employees in certain
departments, that it made discriminatory assignments to
two employees, that it discriminatorily issued a warning to
an employee for violation of an invalid no-solicitation rule
and thereafter failed to grant such employee an increase in
pay and discriminatorily imposed a 3-day suspension upon
him, and that it discriminatorily discharged another
employee. It is contended that each discriminatory act
came about as a show of Respondent's opposition to the
efforts of the employees to pursue organizational activities
on behalf of the Union and was thus violative of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act Respondent denies that it engaged in
any conduct interfering with the Section 7 rights of its
employees or that any of the acts attributed to it were
unlawfully motivated within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3).
A The Setting
The Deutsch Company maintains its corporate
headquarters in Los Angeles, California. The chairman of
the Board, Alex Deutsch, and the president, Carl Deutsch,
have offices there The Electronic Components Division
consists of two plants - one located in Banning,
California, and the other at Oceanside, California. This
proceeding is concerned solely with the Union's effort to
organize the Oceanside plant.'
Leonard Brooks is a vice president of Respondent and
general manager in charge of operations of Respondent's
Oceanside plant. Brooks is assisted by Dudley Kebow,
production control manager, Phil Flory, factory manager,
Fran Gallagher, quality control manager, and John
Wolcott, personnel manager. The employees are directly
supervised by a group of general foremen in charge of
different operations, and by shift foremen who work under
the general foremen. It is conceded, or otherwise
established, that at all times material to this proceeding
the following persons were supervisors within the meaning
of the Act- Joe Brent , Everett Clayton, Bob Erickson,
Ken Hall, Dale Hatter, Don McClellan, George Mathews,
Hank Pihl, Bernie Pratschner, Kenton Quick, Pat Reilly,
Willie Roemhild, Paul Rule, Paul Saupstad, Chris
Williams, Jack Jones, and Ray Schum.3
'In 1966 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, conducted an
organizational drive at Respondent ' s Banning plant In an unfair labor
practice proceeding involving the Banning plant, the Board found that
Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by maintaining and
enforcing an unlawful no-solicitation and no-distribution rule, and by
unlawfully assisting employees to withdraw their union support The Board
also found that Respondent had engaged in unlawful discriminatory
conduct by imposing disciplinary suspensions on two employees for
breaching an invalid no-solicitation rule See The Deutsch Company,
Electronic Components Division , 165 NLRB No 5.
'Respondent initially did not concede that Jones and Schum, both of
whom work in the personnel department , were supervisors The record
establishes , however , that both play a direct role in the hiring of
employees, and that each exercises a degree of authority which would
10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All references to the term Respondent, unless otherwise
noted, should be construed to refer to the Oceanside plant.
Respondent initially commenced operations at Oceanside
in 1965 in a rented building which it occupied until
construction on new facilities had been completed in
November 1966. In March 1966 there were 110 employees
engaged in production work. In November 1966 there
were 300, and by late 1967 there were approximately 570
persons so engaged . At all times Respondent' s business
has been to manufacture electrical connectors of varying
sizes and complexity for use by the aerospace industry.
Initially the least skilled aspects of the work, such as
assembly and shipping, were performed at Oceanside on
parts obtained either from other plants of Respondent or
purchased from other manufacturers. Subsequently the
more skilled operations including machining , molding, and
the production of machine tools were added and carried
on at Oceanside. By the end of 1967, the Oceanside plant
was a substantially integrated operation with most of the
components of the connectors and the tools needed to
produce them manufactured there. In some instances,
however, it is still necessary, or advantageous, to obtain
certain parts from other sources.
Employees coming to work for Respondent are given a
booklet entitled "Welcome" which undertakes to describe
the Company's product and to set forth the benefits and
work rules which are to apply to employees generally.
Early in March several of Respondent's employees
approached union representatives to discuss the possibility
of organizing the employees. The Union' s organizing
campaign was launched by a letter from a representative
of District Lodge 50 which purported to advise
Respondent that its employees had requested that an
organizing campaign be undertaken, and that the Union
was in the process of initiating it. The letter stated that
five named employees would be engaged in lawful
organizing activities during their free time, and expressed
the hope that "they would be extended the courtesy
normal under these conditions."' This letter was dated
March 7, 1968, and it is conceded that it was received by
Respondent on Monday, March 11, 1968. The March 7
letter was followed by two others dated March 8 and 12,
respectively, in which the Company named five additional
employees who would likewise be engaged in organizing
activity.'
On April 5, 1968, the Union filed a representation
petition with the Board in a proceeding known as
2l-RC-10821. Following a hearing, a Board election was
conducted among Respondent's employees on June 28,
1968. Of approximately 462 eligible voters, 163 voted for
the Union, 275 for no union, with 8 challenged ballots.
Thereafter, the Regional Director certified the results of
such election.
B. Respondent's Response to the Union's Organizing
Campaign
Although Respondent did not reply in writing to the
letters of the Union regarding its organizing campaign, its
reaction was immediate and direct, and it is the character
constitute him a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, and I so find.
'The following employees were named: William K. Baer , Walter R.
Einertson, Scott H. Mowery , Tony W. Thomas, and Jack Clinton Ford,
Jr.
'These included David E. Hodge, Herbert Dostler , Mario B Silva,
Carlos Diz, and Frances S . Stratton . It was pointed out that there might
be other names added from time to time and that persons engaged in
organizing would be wearing a committeeman 's badge.
of such response as evidenced by written communications
to employees, the invocation or enforcement of work
rules, unlawful interrogations, threats by supervisors, and
various alleged discriminatory action taken against
employees that constitute the subject matter of this
proceeding.
1. The alleged unlawful no - solicitation rule
In the booklet entitled "Welcome" noted above, we
find the following rule regarding solicitation:
COLLECTION AND GIFTS:
The solicitation of funds for any purpose , the sale of
tickets for all purposes , the operation of lotteries and
raffles , and the solicitation of membership in
organizations during working hours on Company
property are absolutely prohibited . [Emphasis supplied.]
It is the General Counsel ' s contention that this rule is
invalid on its face inasmuch as it prohibits solicitation on
company property at all times . The existence of this rule
is not denied , and various aspects relating to its
enforcement following the commencement of the union
organizational drive will be set forth below.,
2. The letters to the employees
On March 13, 1968, two days after first receiving
notification regarding the Union's organizational drive,
Respondent sent a letter to each of its employees. This
letter, among other things, advised the employees that
Respondent had been notified that organizing was
underway. The letter noted the names of employees
designated by the Union as committeemen characterizing
them as "paid professional union organizers." Respondent
represented that two of these committeemen "had already
changed their minds and had tried to turn in their union
badges." The latter were not named. The letter went on to
say:
Some of you will be approached and asked to sign an
authorization card. Don't do it! The card states that
signing will not obligate you financially. Do you know
of any union that does not collect dues? The card also
states that all cards are kept confidential by the union
and the government. This is not necessarily true. It
wasn't true for the 10 people listed above. The card also
asks for your address and phone number. Do you really
want these people to have such information?
The card does not state that you could be forced to
join a union against your wishes. The card does not tell
about union strikes such as the 8-month old copper
strike. It doesn't tell about the loss of jobs and income,
about the violence that has happened during the Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner strike. The card asks a lot of
you and gives you nothing in return.
The Deutsch Company does not believe that you
need a union, and believes that a majority of you feels
the same way.
On March 15, Respondent sent another letter to each
of its employees which I quote in its entirety: (The
underscoring is as it appears in the letter.)
March 15, 1968
'The same rule was in effect at Respondent's Banning plant , and its
legality was challenged there . In The Deutsch Company, Electronic
Components Division . supra , the Board found the rule to be "unlawfully
broad.
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY it
To All Employees
Many of you have been approached to sign a "union
authorization" card You are told that you are under
no obligation if you sign their card - this is a lie! By
signing a union card you are letting the union be your
sole representative in dealing with the company As
your representative, you could be forced to pay dues,
initiation fees, fines, and assessments or lose your lob
without any election A union has the right to call a
strike, whether you want to strike or not.
Strikes can last for months or years Strikes lead to
violence You may not be safe in your own home.
Striking employees, in many cases, lose their job by
striking. All striking employees lose wages that they
can never regain.
These union organizers will tell you that if you do
not like the union that you can easily change your
minds and go non-union again This is a lie It is
practically impossible to remove a union as a
representative
One thing that unions will tell you is that they will
get you job security if you will pay them dues This is a
lie' Some of our present employees have worked in
union plants and have lost their job because of strikes,
plant shutdowns, and lay-offs
The union will tell you that you will be represented
by a committee of fellow employees who work here at
Deutsch. Read the union authorization card again It
states that the union will represent you. If you sign it,
you are asking the government to recognize the union
as your agent No election, no committees, no nothing.
Employees have been coerced into signing union
authorization cards and have complained to the
company The company will not stand to have its
employees intimidated, coerced, or threatened
The company has filed charges with the government
against the union and its organizers and intend to bring
them to justice and have them restrained
However, even if the authorization cards were signed
under duress, they can still be used by the union to lock
you into their union
If you have changed your mind, been misinformed,
coerced, threatened, or intimidated into signing an
authorization card, or if you think someone else might
have sent in a card with your name on it, you can
revoke that card by mailing the enclosed post card. The
card will be kept in confidence by the National Labor
Relations Board
The company can protect you at the plant from
threats, coercing, and intimidations if you report it to
your supervisors.
The company can not protect you at your home from
such threats, coercion and intimidations. If such occurs,
call the local police for protection.
THE DEUTSCH MANAGEMENT
Attached to this letter was a stamped postcard
addressed to the Board's Regional Office in Los Angeles
which contained the following legend:'
Re: Deutsch Electronic Components Division
'At the Banning plant, Respondent sent an identical letter to the
employees during an organizational campaign there . The Board found it
unlawful for "an employer to attempt to assist lthe employees ] in revoking
their cards by furnishing to them without a demonstrated need or request
therefor, addressed stamped postcards which required no more than their
signature to notify the Board of the revocation of their authorization
cards."
Gentlemen
Recently I signed a union representation card of the
International Association of Machinists because of
misinformation or duress.
I hereby revoke my authorization for all purposes
SIGNATURE DATE
3 The alleged unlawful conduct of the supervisors
The General Counsel contends that Respondent, as part
of its attack designed to undermine union support,
permitted its supervisors to engage in widespread and
varied unlawful activity calculated to interfere with the
employees in the exercise of their statutory rights This
conduct is alleged to have commenced on March 11,
concurrently with Respondent's first knowledge of the
Union's organizational drive, and to have been
particularly intense during the week of March I1 to 15.
The record discloses the following.
(a) Employee Monica Felton testified that on March 15
Supervisor Everett Clayton called her into his office and
in the course of a conversation with her asked her "if
[she] had heard anything about the Union," and then said
"if anyone was to approach [her] on the Union to let him
know." Employee Wilma Sampson states that on the
same day, Clayton called her into his office and, among
other things, asked her "if anyone had approached [her]
about the Union " Sampson states that Clayton followed
this by asking her what she thought about the Union, and
that she had replied that she would not join even if
approached., Clayton was not called as a witness by
Respondent
(b) Frances Montgomery testified that on or about
March 14 Supervisor Ken Hall came to her place of work,
asked if she had heard about the Union, told her that if
the Union came in there would be a strike, and asked who
would then pay the bills. Montgomery states that Hall
then remarked that "if the Union came in . we won't
have any profit sharing."
Walter Einertson, who wore a union committeeman's
badge to work for the first time on March II, testified
that on that day Hall approached him stating, "What the
hell are you doing getting involved in this?" Hall went on
to say that he regarded the Union as "no good and
rotten," and then said "you were in line for a good job,
but you dust screwed yourself up when you put that badge
on"
Hall does not specifically deny the conversation with
Montgomery. He does no more than state in general and
conclusionary terms that he made no threats to anyone to
discontinue benefits if the plant became organized. Hall
does not deny the statements which Einertson attributes to
him. Under the circumstances, I credit the testimony of
both Montgomery and Einertson, and find that Hall spoke
to them in substantially the manner which they relate.
(c) Consuelo Miller commenced wearing a union
committeeman's badge on March 25 On March 26,
Supervisor Mathews came to her place of work and,
observing the badge, stated "Oh, I see you decided to go
against us." When Miller denied that this was the case,
Mathews stated, "Well, you decided to become our
enemy " When Miller signified that she didn't wish to
'in its brief Respondent asserts that Sampson did not properly identify
Clayton I disagree Although Sampson , in her testimony , did refer to the
person in question as "Everett," it is abundantly clear from her testimony
as a whole that she was referring to Supervisor Everett Clayton
12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pursue further discussion along these lines, Mathews
remarked that she should remember "the rules and
regulations when you were hired here and one was no
soliciting ." Mathews went on to tell Miller that she
"could not solicit for the Union at any time on company
property be it [her] breaks , lunch , before or after work."
When Miller replied that she should be able to express her
opinion , Mathews repeated " I'm telling you, you cannot
solicit for the Union or talk about it on company
ro ertp
Miller testified that in the fall of 1967 she had been
approached by Supervisor Don McClellan who had asked
her to sign a card authorizing Respondent to deduct
monies for the United Crusade. At that time, Miller states
she had also observed McClellan soliciting other
mployees for a similar purpose . She told this to Mathews
when he warned her about union solicitation in March
and, according to Miller , Mathews replied that "the
company could do what it wanted " The undenied
testimony of employees Einertson and Hodge corroborates
Miller to the effect that they too were solicited in
November or December 1967 by Respondent ' s supervisors
for the United Crusade , and that such solicitation took
place during their working time and in their working
areas. Mathews was not called as a witness.
(d) Mario Silva wore a union committeeman ' s badge to
work for the first time on March 11. Silva states that on
that same day Supervisor Pat Reilly called him into his
office , " informed [him] of the rules of the company
against solicitation on company property" and told him
that this meant he "could not solicit or hand any cards or
letters or anything , even talk with anybody about the
Union" Silva asked what he might do if approached by
somebody and asked about the Union , and Reilly replied
"Well you can't answer them , you can ' t talk to anybody
about the Union ." Silva then asked what would result if
he violated the rule and Reilly replied "there would be a
written warning first and second step would be a 3-day
suspension ," and with further violations "termination
from the company ." Silva testified that during the course
of this same conversation Reilly also told him that from
then on he would not be permitted to leave the area where
his machine was located , and that he was not to talk to
anybody or approach anyone working in his department.
It stands undenied that prior to March 11 it had been
Silva' s normal practice to leave his department on
occasion to help other employees who might be having
trouble with their machines . Silva states that prior to
March 1l neither Reilly nor any other supervisor had
signified such practice to be inappropriate.
Silva testified that on an occasion occurring some time
in April 1968 Reilly had told him that "because you put
that badge on you ruined your chances to get anywhere
with the company ." Silva states that on a variety of
occasions Reilly had remarked to him that the Union was
composed of crooks , that the employees would get nothing
from the Union , and that should there be a union "the
company was going to take the benefits off, like profit
sharing , stuff like that , they were going to take it off and
we were not going to get that much more." Reilly was not
called as a witness by Respondent.
(e) Employee William Frankenberg testified that on or
about March 14 Supervisor Wilfred Roemhild approached
him at his machine and started talking about the Union,
stating that people who belonged to unions had to pay
dues and assessments and that there were frequent layoffs
in union companies . Frankenberg testified that he then
showed Roemhild the March 13 letter Respondent had
sent to the employees , and asked Roemhild if it would be
permissible to show it to the other employees. When
Roemhild replied in the affirmative , Frankenberg then
asked him if he giight also show a union letter to the
employees , to whiph Roemhild stated "no, that would be
soliciting ," and "1 you solicited on company property,
you were subject to being dismissed ." Roemhild does not
deny these statements which Frankenberg attributes to
him.
Frankenberg testified that on another occasion, also
during the week of March 11, Roemhild had told him that
"if the Union came in you would not be allowed to leave
your machine ." This also is not denied by Roemhild.
Frankenberg states that prior to the start of the
Union ' s organizational campaign he and two other
grinders , Herb Dostler and Bill Fincher , had been
permitted to either stand or sit at their machines
depending on the work requirements of the particular job
in which they might be engaged . Dostler was a union
plant committeeman who wore a badge. Frankenberg
states that some time between March 13 and 15 Roemhild
had told him and the other grinders that they would no
longer be allowed to sit down at work at any time
explaining that "management frowned on that." Roemhild
insists that it had always been the rule that grinders were
not to sit at their machines inasmuch as they could work
more effectively while standing and that to sit down might
be dangerous . Roemhild conceded , however , that there
might be conditions and particular types of jobs at which
it would be appropriate for grinders to sit . Roemhild fails
to explain why he invoked a stricter rule at this time than
he had theretofore been applying.
According to the undenied testimony of employees
Edwin Ray and Sebastiano Randone, Roemhild
questioned each of them during the week of March 11
about the Union , asking Ray "how did [he] feel about the
Union ," and Randone what he "was thinking about the
Union and this union business ." Roemhild did not
accompany such questioning with any explanation of his
purpose or by giving any assurance against retaliation.
(f) David Hodge testified that he wore his union
committeeman's badge to work for the first time on
March 11 . Hodge states that on that day Supervisor Paul
Rule called him into his office and questioned him as to
"why [he] wanted to support the Union." Hodge told
Rule that he felt it to be against company policy to
discuss union matters on company time. Rule thereupon
told Hodge that he could not talk about the Union at any
time on company property . Later that same day, Hodge
states that Rule told him he "was instructed to watch
[Hodge] while [he] was at the plant to make sure that [he]
did not solicit anybody at any time on their property for
the Union ." Rule does not specifically deny mentioning
the no-solicitation rule to Hodge although he does deny
that he told Hodge that he had been assigned to watch
him.
Hodge testified that on or about March 13 Rule had
called him to his office, told him that unions were no
good , cited examples of several current strikes, stated that
these did not get people anything , and that if employees
were to go on strike they would be replaced. According to
Hodge , during the course of this conversation Rule used a
vulgar expression, commenting that he had enough on
Hodge to cause him considerable trouble. At this point,
Hodge states that he asked Rule what might result should
he change his mind about the Union. Rule replied "that
the company would expect [him] to talk to other people
and change their minds also." While Rule does not
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY 13
specifically deny each of these statements, and even
acknowledges talking with Hodge about his
committeeman's badge and the Union, his version of what
appears to have been the same event is somewhat
different. Rule claims that Hodge came to his office and
expressed the view that "he had lost a lot of face" as a
result of putting on the badge, and that he "wanted to
know what possible chance it would be to make some
kind of restitution to get himself back in good standing
with his job in the company " Rule states that he told
Hodge that this would be entirely up to him. Rule denies
that he ever used the vulgar expression which Hodge
attributes to him. I do not regard Rule's testimony as
altogether inconsistent with that of Hodge Both agree
that Hodge sought Rule's advice as to how to regain good
standing with Respondent after appearing with a union
badge. This suggests that in some way Rule or some other
management representative had impressed Hodge that
wearing such a badge might have an adverse effect on his
future Hodge impressed me favorably as a witness The
general character of Rule's testimony, considered in
conjunction with undenred statements of a similar nature
attributed to other supervisors, makes it likely that the
version offered by Hodge is the more accurate, and I so
find.
Hodge further testified that while conversing with Rule
on March 11, Rule told him that thereafter he would be
restricted to his working area, and that if he had need for
any equipment in his work another employee would get it
for him Prior to this, it has been the practice of Hodge,
and others, to leave their work areas to go to the tool
crib, the gauge laboratory, or the grinding room Hodge
states that he had never been told that such activity was
restricted Walter Einertson , also a union committeeri,an,
testified that he, too, was notified by Rule that in the
future he was to be similarly restricted to his work area.
Einertson states that Rule told him "as long as [he] was
wearing that badge [he] would be confined to [his] work
area, and that if [he ] needed tooling , he would take care
of it If [he] needed gauges that the coordinator or lead
man would take care of it." The testimony of Einertson
stands undenied . Rule does not deny that at about this
time one employee was designated to supply others with
such materials as they might require. Rule does not,
however, explain why such work restrictions were imposed
concurrently with the start of the Union's organizational
drive, and the appearance of union committeemen badges
on some of the employees
(g) Alice Peneku testified that during the first week of
March Supervisor Chris Williams asked her if she had
seen a union card and if she had signed one. She states
that at the same time Williams had commented that she
had been doing a good job During the week of March 18,
Frances Montgomery testified that Williams approached
her at her work station asking "What do you think about
the Union?" In neither case did Williams explain the
purpose of his questioning or give assurances against
reprisals Williams was not called to testify.
(h) Employee David Hodge testified that on March l l
Supervisor Joe Brent approached him and queried him
about the Union When Hodge replied that he believed it
to be against company policy to discuss such matters
during working hours he states that Brent had remarked
that if he did not want to discuss it , it was up to him At
this point, however , Brent called Hodge's attention to the
no-solicitation rule, stating that Hodge "couldn ' t solicit on
company property at any time." Hodge was one of those
who had formerly been solicited by a supervisor regarding
the United Crusade
William Frankenberg testified that shortly before the
March 15 layoff Supervisor Brent had "come to [his]
machine and told [him] that there would be no soliciting
on company property, or before work or lunch time or
break time "
Carlos Diz testified that on or about March 13
Supervisor Brent had approached him and questioned him
concerning his interest in the Union asking why he wanted
the Union and thereafter engaging in a discussion with
him about union organization . Brent acknowledges having
had a conversation with Diz about union cards, but he
insists that Drz initiated this conversation, explaining that
his wife was unhappy because Diz had become a member
of the union committee Brent states that he explained to
Drz that if he wished to drop out of the Union he need do
no more than inform the Union that he no longer wished
to be a member of the committee
Brent was unable to recall having had a conversation
with Frankenberg about the Union. He recalls talking
with Hodge about the Union, and admits that he talked
with a great number of employees, including Hodge,
asking them "How was the organization of the plant
coming along as far as recruiting members"" Considering
Brent's admission that he talked with many about the
Union and the fact that his alleged remarks to Diz and
Hodge are not only mutually consistent but are also
consistent with undenied testimony of other supervisors on
the same subject, I credit the versions of Diz and Hodge
and find that Brent made the statements which they
attribute to him.
(i) Employee Consuelo Miller testified that Supervisor
Don McClellan approached her on or about March 18
and initiated a conversation concerning work in general
which led into an inquiry regarding union matters and
Miller's feeling about the Union Miller states that
McClellan commented that a union would do nothing for
them, and a lot of people would be disappointed because
they would not get what they wanted Shortly thereafter,
but on the same day, McClellan returned and stated to
Miller, "Connie whether you advocated or are
sympathetic toward the Union I want you to know that
you cannot solicit for the Union at any time on company
property. That includes your breaks, your lunch hour,
before and after work " Miller commented that surely she
had the right to express an opinion , whereupon McClellan
reaffirmed his position stating "You cannot solicit for the
Union or talk about the Union on company property."
On the same day, Miller states that McClellan, who had
formerly sat at a table in the cafeteria with other
supervisors , commenced sitting at a table where Miller sat
with other employees and appeared to be noting her
communications to other employees She states McClellan
continued this practice until he was transferred to another
department in April
According to the undenred testimony of Monica Felton,
when she returned to work in April after the March 15
layoff, Supervisor McClellan , after giving her some
instructions and pointing out certain rules and regulations,
told her that if they ran out of work she would be moved
into another department, adding that we are able to do
this because we do not have a union in here, "but if we
had a union , they would send you home."
Employee Miller further testified that almost daily
between March 18 and April I McClellan would approach
her at her work station and query her as to why she was
"against the company."
14 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employee Felton further testified that on or about
March 8 McClellan had approached her and asked her
"how she felt about the Union " and how she felt about
the stand the company was taking against the Union. On
or about May 13 , when Felton first appeared at work with
a union committeeman ' s badge , she states that McClellan
had asked if she attended a union meeting held on May
11. Felton acknowledged that she had , and at that point
McClellan asked her what had happened at the meeting,
asking "how many people do you think are for the
Union?"
Although McClellan was called as a witness , he does
not deny the foregoing statements which Miller and
Felton attribute to him , except that he claims he did not
seat himself in the cafeteria in such a manner that he
could observe Miller.
(j) Sandra Jones testified that she came to work on
March 18 wearing a union committeeman ' s badge. She
states that on the same day Supervisor Hank Pihl called
her into his office and asked "how come you 're wearing
that badge?" Pihl then went on to relate all the benefits
that the employees were then getting stating "that if the
Union got in we wouldn ' t be getting any more of these
because it would cost the Company too much money."
She states that Pihl then asked "what the Company has
done to me to make me go against it" and that at this
point she had started crying . On a later occasion, Jones
testified , Pihl had approached her at her work station and
had asked her "if [she ] was ready to take [her ] badge off
and he told [her] not to wait too long ." She states that
Pihl then commented about various benefits Respondent
had to offer and told her "we'd lose them ." Subsequent to
this Pihl again asked "if she had changed [her] mind yet."
And when she had inquired as to what would happen if
she took off the badge , Pihl said "nothing would happen;
that all I'd do is to sign a little piece of paper." She
inquired as to purpose of the piece of paper , and Pihl said
it would "prove that [she] had been misled into signing a
card ." Pihl's version of his encounter with Jones is that
she came to him to tell him that she had been misled into
signing a union card , and wanted to know what she could
now do to change the situation. Pihl testified that he told
her, in substance , that he could give her a card to sign
whereby she could repudiate the Union . Pihl does not
specifically deny any of the other statements that Jones
attributes to him, stating only that he neither harassed
Jones or any other employee, or represented to anyone
that if the plant were organized there would be a loss of
benefits . In view of the general conclusionary nature of
Pihl's denials , his admission that he offered to aid Jones
to repudiate the Union, and the consistency of the
testimony of Jones and that of other employees as to what
Pihl and other supervisors had told them, I credit the
version of Jones and find that Pihl made the statements
which Jones attributes to him.
Sidney O'Leary testified that Supervisor Pihl spoke to
him about the Union sometime in the latter part of
March . O'Leary states that he was called to Pihl's office
on this occasion , and at the time Pihl had asked him why
he thought it would be necessary to have a Union at the
plant.
Jack Ford , a union committeeman , testified that in the
latter part of May Pihl had called him into his office and
asked Ford "[Why] he had decided to work for the
Union, what [his] reasons were ." Employee Ford further
testified that on another occasion later in May PihI had
questioned him concerning his reasons for working for the
Union and had commented that "by injecting a third
party . . . that it could spoil the relationship between
employee and employer" and an employee "would be
assigned to certain jobs to do and that would be the only
job that [he] could do . [he] couldn't progress from
machine to machine ... he couldn ' t advance very far with
the Company." The testimony of both O'Leary and Ford
stands undenied.
According to the undenied testimony of employee
Einertson on March 11 , when he reported wearing a union
committeeman ' s badge , Pihl had spoken to him saying
that he "was not allowed to solicit on company property
at any time during the lunch hour, break, or for that
matter on company property, or [he] would be
disciplined."
(k) Scott Mowery, a union committeeman, wore his
committeeman ' s badge to work for the first time on
March 11 . When this was seen by Supervisor Kenton
Quick, Quick "told [him] that [he had] better forget about
that, that it would just lead to nothing but trouble." Later
on the same day Quick asked Mowery what he "hoped to
gain from the Union." Shortly after this, Quick called
Mowery into his office and told him that he should not
support the Union , that it was comprised of undesirable
people who engaged in violence and criminal activity, and
that if Mowery "pursued this that it would lead to nothing
but trouble." Later in the day, Quick again called
Mowery into his office and told him that he was giving
him official notice "that solicitation was against company
policy" and that Mowery "wasn't allowed to solicit at the
company at any time." Mowery asked Quick if he
regarded authorization cards as soliciting , and Quick told
him that he did. Mowery asked if Quick would so instruct
him in writing , but Quick declined to do so. Mowery then
asked Quick what would happen if he engaged in
solicitation , and Quick replied "that [he] would be gone."
During the course of one of Mowery ' s conversations with
Quick , Production Manager Flory was also present.
According to Mowery, Flory asked him what his problems
were, and why he had not talked to Flory about them
instead of seeking the Union. Mowery told Flory that he
felt the employees needed some help in regard to
improving working conditions, whereupon Flory told him
that unions have caused people to lose work, have
imposed fines and assessments on them , and have even
caused people to be fired.
On another occasion between March 11 and 14,
Mowery states Quick approached him and asked to see an
authorization card . Mowery said he could not give him
one during working hours , and Quick asked where
Mowery kept them. Mowery explained that they were in
his toolbox. Quick went to the toolbox and took a card
and examined it. After examining it, Quick stated "You
realize this thing is nothing but troubles for you. . . .
you'd better give it up. You're going to be going."
Mowery states that the last conversation he recalls with
Quick took place on March 14, at which time Quick
asked him why he continued "to press the issue with the
Union ," commenting that the Union was comprised of
"nothing but gangsters , crooks , communism , and they
kept people on strikes, and they would just lead to nothing
but trouble. . ." After Mowery had responded that he
felt that the Union could be of assistance to the
employees , Quick stated " I'm not even going to talk to
you no more about it . I can 't change your mind."
Employee Joan Peeden first wore a committeeman's
badge on March 18. She testified that on March 13 Quick
had called her into his office and told her that should he
see her talking to Scott Mowery, he would consider it
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY
"detrimental to the company and take action." Peeden
testified that just prior to this she had passed Mowery's
machine either on the way to the restroom or to a coffee
break, and that she had spoken to Mowery in passing as
she had done frequently before without reprimand. Later
in the day, according to Peeden, Quick told her, "He'd
gotten onto [her] that morning because of the mess that
was going on." The next morning at the start of her shift,
Quick called Peeden to his office and told her that she
was receiving a raise in pay. At the same time, Quick told
her that the employees did not need a union, made some
comments about the copper strike, and stated that "we
did not need a middle man there." Peeden was not
expecting a raise at this time.
On or about March 13, employee Jack Ford, who had
commenced wearing his union committeeman's badge on
March 12, was called into Quick's office and told by
Quick "that solicitation was against the company policy."
Ford asked if this applied to union authorization cards,
and what would result if he passed them out. Quick
responded that in such a case he "could be terminated."
On March 13 or 14, Quick came over to Ford' s machine
and after some discussion as to the job upon which Ford
was working told him "that it was too bad [he had]
decided to work for the Union, because [he] could have
gone somewhere with the Company."
Neither Quick nor Flory were called as witnesses by
Respondent.
(I) On March 26, Ray Schum, supervisor in the
personnel department, took pictures of employees
distributing union handbills on an access road leading to
the Oceanside plant. He was observed pointing his camera
at both employees handing out handbills and those
receiving them . Schum admits engaging in such
photographing. He states that Personnel Manager Wolcott
instructed him to do so because Respondent had received
complaints that the handbilling created a traffic hazard
and it sought evidence to support an injunction. There is
no evidence that such complaints had been received prior
to March 26.
C. The Conduct Alleged as Discriminatory Within
the Meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
1. The warning to, the failure to grant pay increases
to, and the suspension of Mario Silva
Mario Silva commenced working for Respondent in
1967 as an automatic screw machine operator. He came
to work on March ll, 1968, wearing a plant
committeeman's badge. As set forth above, he was warned
at this time by his supervisor, Pat Reilly, against soliciting
on company property, and forbidden by Reilly to leave his
work area, talk to other employees in his department, or
sit down while he was working. In addition, it stands
undenied that at some time during the month of April
Reilly informed Silva that by putting on the union badge
he had ruined his chances of advancement . It is also
undenied that between March 1l and April 30 Reilly
engaged Silva in conversations almost daily, during the
course of which Reilly characterized the Union in a
derogatory manner.
On March 26, Respondent issued a written warning to
Silva charging him with soliciting for the Union. Silva
testified that Reilly had explained to him that someone
had signed a statement to the effect that he had been
solicited by Silva to join the Union while in the cafeteria
having lunch. Silva denied that he engaged in conduct of
15
this nature and asked Reilly to name the person charging
him with this conduct. Reilly declined to identify such
person, or to show Silva an affidavit which this individual
allegedly had signed . Silva then pursued the grievance
procedures set forth in Respondent's "Welcome" manual
by lodging a written grievance asserting that he had not
engaged in the solicitation as charged, and requesting that
he be given an opportunity to confront his accuser. Silva's
grievance was considered by Production Manager Phil
Flory who issued a written decision reciting the basis for
the warning notice to have been a notarized statement
from an employee. Flory held that Silva was well aware of
the existence of a no-solicitation rule, and ruled that
"because of the need to protect the well-being of the
employees not interested in unionization , the identity of
the employee will not be revealed." Flory ruled Silva's
grievance to be without merit. Silva then took an appeal
to the next step in the grievance procedure. This resulted
in a written decision signed by Leonard Brooks,
Respondent's vice president and plant manager at
Oceanside. Brooks affirmed Flory in all particulars.
When Silva had commenced work for Respondent on
April 7, 1967, he had been told by Supervisor Reilly that
if he did a good job he would receive a raise every three
months. During the course of his employment, Silva
received three pay raises, the last one in the amount of 15
cents an hour on January 1, 1968. No raise was accorded
Silva on April 1, 1968, and Silva lodged a protest with
Reilly. Reilly's immediate response, according to Silva's
undenied testimony, was to state that "because [Silva] had
joined the Union and, you know, gone against Company
rules , that [Silva] was, you know, didn't deserve to get a
raise, and that's about it." Silva protested that his union
activity had not affected his work, and that it should not
affect his being granted a raise to which he was otherwise
entitled. An argument ensued between Silva and Reilly
during the course of which Reilly stated "because you put
that badge on, you ruined your chances to get anywhere in
the Company." Subsequent to this, Silva filed a written
grievance with respect to the raise issue. Plant Manager
Phil Flory responded in writing by reciting that on
October 26, 1967, Silva had received a verbal warning for
absenteeism, and on March 26, 1968, a written warning
for his solicitation. Flory also noted Silva to have been
absent on February 12 and March 22, 1968, and to have
left work early on March 27 of that same year. Flory then
ruled that increases were given on a merit basis, and that
Silva had forfeited his right to one "because of his
excessive absenteeism and disregard of Company rules."
[Emphasis supplied.] Silva appealed Flory's ruling, and on
May 13, 1968, Plant Manager Leonard Brooks signed a
decision citing that he had reviewed the circumstances
surrounding Silva's grievance, and noted that between
April 11, 1967, and April 1, 1968, Silva had been absent
eleven times, late once , and had left work early five times,
that this indicated such a poor attendance record and lack
of interest in his job, that Brooks was supporting Flory's
ruling denying the increase. It was not shown that at any
time during this entire period Silva had had an unexcusedi
absence , or had received warnings with regard to his
attendance.
On May 1, 1968, Silva was suspended from work for
three days. He received notice of such suspension in a
telegram from Ray Schum, of Respondent's personnel
department , which read as follows:
DO NOT REPORT FOR WORK TONIGHT. YOU
ARE HEREBY PLACED ON THREE (3) DAYS
DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSION FOR YOUR
16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONTINUED VIOLATION OF COMPANY
RULES. ON MARCH 11 AND APRIL 4, 1968, YOU
WERE GIVEN VERBAL WARNINGS AND A
WRITTEN WARNING WAS ISSUED ON MARCH
26, 1968. REPORT FOR WORK AT THE
BEGINNING OF YOUR REGULAR WORK SHIFT
MONDAY, MAY 6, 1968.
The incident which gave rise to this notice of suspension
occurred when Silva had been leaving work at the end of
his shift on April 30 . According to Silva, he had a union
leaflet in his possession and he was in the process of
putting it inside his jacket to serve as additional lining
against the wind while traveling home on his motorcycle.
An employee named Trexel , who was standing nearby,
observed Silva putting the leaflet inside his jacket,
grabbed it from Silva ' s hand and commenced reading it.
Supervisor Reilly observed this and came over
immediately and accused Silva of handing out pamphlets
for the Union . Silva told Reilly that he had not given the
pamphlet to Trexel , but that Trexel had taken it from him
without his permission . Trexel affirmed to Reilly that this
was the fact. Nevertheless , Reilly ignored Trexel, and
charged Silva with handing out papers for the Union on
company property , after having been earlier warned that
this was against the rules. Neither Reilly nor Trexel
testified , and Respondent offered no other explanation for
this suspension.
2. The alleged discriminatory work assignments to
Consuelo Miller and Frances Montgomery
Consuelo Miller came to work for the first time
wearing a union committeeman's badge on March 25. As
recited above, Supervisor McClellan spoke to her at this
time about it, and later kept watch on her conduct in the
cafeteria in the manner described above. We have also
seen that Supervisor Mathews had commented to Miller
on her badge and had warned Miller against soliciting or
talking about the Union on company property.
On March 26, 1968, Mathews called Miller and two
other employees, Ferguson and Pedroza, who like Miller
were also silk screeners, into his office and informed them
that all three were being assigned to work on molding
machines. Commencing on March 26 and continuing for a
period of three weeks thereafter, Miller operated a
molding machine. At the end of this time, she returned to
her job as a silk screener. Ferguson and Pedroza operated
molding machines for only two days, after which they
were transferred to jobs on the assembly line at which
they remained during the entire three-week period that
Miller worked on the molding machine. It stands
undisputed that during this same period three other
molding machine operators were transferred to assembly
jobs. None of the employees who were moved to the
assembly line wore union badges. The record establishes
that the work on a molding machine is more onerous than
either silk screening, assembly line work, or trimming,
and that the employees so regard it. Miller was qualified
to perform all three jobs. Supervisor McClellan states that
he kept Miller on the molding machine because she was
the senior silk screener , and he felt that during the lull she
might be needed to do silk screening in cases of
emergency, thus it would be desirable to keep her close at
hand. However, only once during the period was Miller
called upon to do silk screening, and then only for a
period of one hour. Moreover, Miller testified, without
dispute , that while operating the molding machine she had
observed two other molding machine operators, holding
an even higher labor grade classification than her own,
assigned to trimming work. This was a far less
burdensome job than work on a molding machine. Miller
complained about this treatment to McClellan but
received no satisfaction from him. She then took up the
matter with Personnel Manager Wolcott. According to
Miller's undenied testimony, Wolcott stated "Well, you
know when you came in with that badge you set yourself
apart from anybody else." Wolcott follows this by stating
"You understand what I'm trying to tell you."
Frances Montgomery had been employed by
Respondent since November 16, 1965. Since July of 1966,
Montgomery had been the only female tool crib attendant
on the day shift. As recited above, on March 18 she was
questioned by Supervisor Hall about the Union. On
March 21, she was called into the personnel office and
told by Ray Schum that "due to a reduction in force they
would no longer need a tool crib attendant, that [she]
could be transferred to a molding machine." Montgomery
told Schum and Foreman George Mathews that it was
impossible for her to work on a molding machine because
she was unable to stand for any prolonged period of time.
She specifically asked if there was any other work that
woulp not involve standing to which she might be
transferred. Schum replied in the negative. At this point
Montgomery agreed to a voluntary layoff. Montgomery
was not recalled by Respondent, and 60 days later, in
accordance with Respondent's rules, she received a payroll
termination notice setting forth she had been severed from
work because she had been "on layoff in excess of 60
days." Respondent has not replaced Montgomery as a
tool crib attendant. There is, however, no explanation in
the record as to how her work is now being done. It is
undenied that in July of 1967 Montgomery had refused
promotion to a job as Swiss automatic machine operator
because she had expressed to Schum that she was unable
to stand for any length of time. Schum made a note of
this as the reason for her refusal to take the job at this
time. It would appear from Miller's testimony that other
sitdown jobs were available at or about this time, and that
other nonunion employees were assigned to them.
Respondent advances no explanation with regard to this.
It may also be noted that when Ferguson, a nonunion
employee, complained that she could not stand at the
molding job she was transferred to assembly.
3. The alleged discriminatory discharge of Monica
Felton
Employee Monica Felton first began work for
Respondent on February 9, 1968. She was among the
group of 96 employees who were laid off on March 15,
1968, under circumstances which will be described below.
Early on the day of her layoff Felton had been called into
her supervisor's office and advised by Supervisor Everett
Clayton that he was satisfied with her work performance.
Although Felton had signed a union authorization card
before her layoff, there is no evidence that Respondent
was aware of this.
On April 18, Felton was recalled to work, and on April
19 she went back to work as an assembler. Her immediate
supervisor at this time was Don McClellan. On May 8,
Felton attended a Board representation hearing involving
employees at Respondent's plant. Personnel Manager
John Wolcott was also in attendance. After reporting to
her shift that same evening , Felton observed Wolcott
talking to Supervisor McClellan and looking in her
direction. After Wolcott's departure, McClellan came over
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY 17
to Felton's work station and asked her "How [she] felt
about the Union" and "the stand the company was taking
against the Union." Felton told McClellan that the Union
had the right to take the stand it was taking. On Friday,
May II, Felton attended a union meeting, and on
Monday, May 13, Felton reported for work for the first
time wearing a union committeeman's badge On the first
day she wore her badge, McClellan asked her if she had
attended the union meeting. She replied in the affirmative
and after some conversation about the Union, McClellan
instructed Felton that she could not solicit for the Union
On May 17, McClellan, in the presence of personnel
assistant Jack Jones, notified Felton that she was
discharged. McClellan told Felton that she had not
completed her probationary period and that he was
"dissatisfied with [her] attitude." She asked McClellan
what he meant about her attitude, but he refused to
explain further. Respondent defends its position by
asserting that it was dissatisfied with Felton's work
performance, and inasmuch as the probationary period
was based upon 90 days' actual work, it deemed it
appropriate to take the action it did Prior to the
discharge, Felton had not received any warning or
suggestion that her work performance was unsatisfactory
4 The alleged discriminatory layoff of March 15,
1968
On March 15, 1968, Respondent laid off 96 employees
With the exception of four, whom the General Counsel
alleges were selected for inclusion in the group for
discriminatory reasons, it is conceded that in making the
selections Respondent followed a seniority policy, using a
plantwide criterion for women employees, and a
departmental criterion for male employees. The General
Counsel's central contention is that this layoff was
discriminatorily motivated. Respondent defends its actions
by claiming that the layoff came about solely for
economic reasons To resolve the issue, we must first
consider such matters as the timing and manner of the
layoff, and then examine Respondent's alleged economic
justification.
The layoff took place on a Friday The preceding
Monday Respondent had received written notification that
the Union was launching an organizational drive. It was
during the course of this week that Respondent had sent
the letters noted above to all of its employees. During the
same period, a substantial number of the alleged acts of
the interference and discrimination, as related above, took
place
Other circumstances surrounding the layoff include the
following.
(a) During the months of February and March, and
continuing up to the date of the layoff, the Respondent
had been advertising extensively in newspapers circulating
in Oceanside and neighboring communities seeking to
attract new employees to jobs in classifications similar to
those held by the employees laid off on March 15.'
Concurrently with the layoff, further advertisements for
employees were temporarily curtailed. Prior to this,
however, the local Oceanside management had not been
informed that a layoff was even a remote possibility, nor
had it been suggested that a gradual easing in recruitment
efforts through use of newspaper advertising might be
advisable Brooks, however, testified that it was not
Respondent's policy to advertise unless it was really in
need of help.
Between January 1, 1968, and the March 15 layoff,
Respondent hired a total of 138 employees. Respondent
hired 60 employees during the month of February In the
first 14 days of March, it hired 25 additional employees,
including 12 who were hired in the first 4 days of the week
that the layoff occurred Employees were hired to fill jobs
in a wide variety of classifications, including some highly
skilled classifications such as die makers
According to the undisputed testimony of employee
Monica Felton, Personnel Supervisor Schum told her and
two other persons also hired on February 9 that they
"didn't have to worry about layoff because unlike the
other companies he says the war and other matters does
not affect the company and we wouldn't have the layoff.
We would have steady jobs there " Employee Eufemia^,
Sainz, who was hired on March 12, testified that on that
day personnel assistant Jack Jones had told her that "this,
plant had come to Oceanside to stay and he says that
never has a layoff been before, and I don't have to worry
about layoffs and he told me this is a steady job " James
Fetty, a machinist who quit Respondent's employ on
March 13, testified without contradiction that Ray Schum
had remarked on the day he quit that "right now we have
openings for 40 more machinists, for trained men in the
shop "
Prior to March 15, during the course of its three years'
operation at Oceanside, Respondent had not had occasion
to lay off any employees
(b) A variety of evidence indicates that Respondent at
the time of the layoff had more work scheduled that its
work force could produce during the course of a normal
40-hour week Male employees in Departments 451 and
461 had been working at least one day overtime since the
first week in February. Overtime for such employees had
been scheduled through March 15, the very day of the
layoff, and the employees scheduled to work on that day
who were not laid off put in an hour's overtime. After the
layoff, such regular overtime ceased
The undenied testimony of employee O'Leary indicates
that when leaving work at the end of the day shift on
March 14 he had been asked by Supervisor Rule if he
"would like to work about 6 or 7 hours overtime."
Employee Sainz testified that on March 15, the morning
of the layoff, she and other employees in her department
had been told that they were working on a rush order
which had to be finished by that evening. Employee
Kenny testified that on the day of the layoff there were so
many orders in the front room that the employees were
unable to fill them as fast as they were coming in
The Oceanside plant is a relatively new one. It has been
Respondent's aim from the outset to develop the
Oceanside plant into a completely integrated operation
which can produce all the component parts and tools
needed to manufacture connectors This objective had not
been fully achieved by early 1968 Up to that time it has
been the regular practice for Respondent to order from
other manufacturers needed parts which for some reason
or other it was unable to produce at Oceanside. The
policy was to place these orders at other plants owned by
Respondent whenever possible, but when this could not be
done to order from outside manufacturers Such orders
were not placed, however, if Respondent had the
personnel and tools needed to do the job at Oceanside. In
'These advertisements suggesting that applicants "prepare to stay"
indicated that at Oceanside there were openings , among others, for
"machine builders , precision grinders , tool and die makers, mold makers,
Acme-Gridley and Swiss operators."
18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the early months of 1968, Respondent was not producing
enough "shells" at Oceanside to meet its production
needs Accordingly, "shells" were being obtained from
other sources Some came from Respondent's Los Angeles
plant. On March 6, 1968, Respondent placed an order for
"shells" with Allesandro Automatic, Inc , a manufacturer
outside the corporate family. General Manager Brooks
testified that the Allesandro order, as well as the orders to
Respondent's Los Angeles plant, was needed because
Oceanside employees were unable to meet Respondent's
requirements Brooks states that at Oceanside Respondent
"never had enough machines or the skilled people to set
these machines up " The "shells," however, were a
product Oceanside could produce in Department 451
within limits using employees operating so-called
"Acme-Gridley" machines. An operator in this section,
however, was among those laid off Remaining
Acme-Gridley operators had their hours reduced from
nine to eight commencing on the first working weekday
following the layoff This need for "shells" continued to
be sufficiently great following the layoff that Respondent
found it necessary to increase substantially its orders to its
Los Angeles plant for such products. The undenied
testimony of employee Newbury indicates that between
March 15 and May I Respondent placed nearly twice as
many orders for "shells" with the Los Angeles plant than
it had had occasion to place during the preceding 5 1/2
months Other employees testified that following the
layoff they had experienced difficulties in meeting
production schedules for so-called "hermetic parts " They
attributed such difficulties to the unavailability of
sufficient personnel to work on such parts.
(c) On March 15, the 96 employees were told to stop
work in the middle of their work shifts They were
informed that because of inventory adjustments and
changes in manufacturing methods a layoff had become
necessary The following week each received a written
payroll termination notice specifying the reason for his
termination as "reduction in force " It was made clear,
however, that this was a temporary layoff with all 96
employees subject to recall within 60 days if work needs
would permit it
Commencing on or about April 11, Respondent started
to recall laid off employees. At the date of the hearing, all
but 16 of those laid off on March 15 had either been
recalled and put to work or had been offered employment
and had declined it No evidence was adduced to show if
the recall at this time was made possible because of
inventory changes and new orders, or because of attrition
The General Counsel concedes that except for the four
specific cases to be considered below the layoffs and the
recall were made on a seniority basis.10
Alex and Carl Deutsch, chairman of the Board and
president of Respondent, respectively, made the decision
to effectuate the layoff Their decision was brought to the
attention, and implemented by, the Oceanside
management as follows. The Deutsches flew to the
Oceanside plant from Respondent's Los Angeles
headquarters in a company plane on the morning of
March Il . They met with Plant Manager Brooks and
advised him that they had "decided that we should lower
"The "Welcome " manual states that layoffs are to be made by seniority
on a departmental basis . The March 15 layoff used departmental seniority
for the men and plantwide seniority for the women Wolcott explained that
the women employees were unskilled and that because of this could be
interchanged among the departments The plantwide method was used for
the women because it was possible to make transfers to adjust any
inbalance that a plantwide seniority reduction in force would create
our work forces by approximately 100 people." Brooks
testified that Carl Deutsch explained this directive by
stating "that's how much expense we have to cut out to be
within the budget set up for running the Oceanside plant "
Pursuant to this direction, Brooks took immediate steps to
determine which departments could absorb the reduction
with minimum interference with overall operation. On the
afternoon of March 11, after the Deutsches had departed,
Brooks asked Plant Superintendent Flory "to find out
how we could cut down about 100 people." Brooks did
not at this time explain to Flory that his inquiry related to
an immediate layoff On March 12 or 13, Flory and
Brooks went over a list of employees by individual
departments considering such factors as work
complement, inventory, and orders "to find out how long
it would take, based on the orders we had, to produce the
complete orders we had " According to Brooks, their point
efforts resulted in a decision as to the exact number in
each department that could be laid off. The total came to
96. Up to this point, neither Brooks nor Flory had
consulted with Dudley Kebow, production control
manager, Fran Gallagher, quality control manager, John
Wolcott, personnel manager, or any of the departmental
supervisors. Wolcott was first notified on the afternoon of
March 14 that there was to be a layoff. Wolcott in turn
then notified the other supervisors of the impending
layoff, and worked with them on its implementation. It
was their task to translate the number to be terminated
into names in accordance with the controlling seniority
policy Seniority lists, as well as payroll records and
paychecks, for the Oceanside employees are prepared by
computers located at Respondent's Banning plant. After
receiving notification of the layoff, Wolcott immediately
telephoned Banning and directed the preparation of an
up-to-date seniority list. This was flown to Oceanside by a
special flight of a company plane on the afternoon of
March 14. Wolcott immediately set to work with the
departmental supervisors to make a selection of the
persons to be terminated The remainder of the afternoon
of March 14 and part of that same evening were used by
Wolcott and the supervisors to work out the mechanics of
this process, including the computations of the wages due.
On the morning of March 15, the data as to hours and
wages was sent by company plane to Banning The checks
were prepared there and flown back to Oceanside First
notice of the layoff, together with the final checks was
given to employees at midshift on March 15, at which
point the 96 left the plant It is Respondent's practice to
issue payroll termination slips to all employees cut from
its payroll. There was insufficient time to complete this
task by midshift on March 15. Personnel department
employees were required to work overtime on Saturday,
March 16, to complete preparation of such lists. These
were thereafter mailed to the laid off employees early the
following week.
Brooks was Respondent's principal witness with respect
to the layoff. Neither Alex nor Carl Deutsch, although
they made the layoff decision, were called as witnesses
Brooks testified that beginning in the fall of 1967, the
Deutsches had complained to him that the Oceanside
plant was exceeding its budget, and had expressed the
view that Oceanside was carrying too many persons on its
payroll Respondent submitted no budget figures to
suggest the dimensions of the budget excess, or to show
the relationship of any excess in early 1968, as compared
to others in the past. Nor was it shown what, if any,
consideration was given to means of meeting the
budgetary problem, other than by a massive layoff.
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY 19
According to Brooks, when the budget issue was first
brought up in late 1967, he convinced the Deutsches that
immediate layoffs would adversely affect the Oceanside
plant's ability to fill existing orders Brooks represented,
however, that increased efficiency would ultimately make
possible a layoff with its consequent reduction in expenses
Brooks states that the Deutsches continued to press for a
reduction in force Brooks last heard from them on this
subject approximately two weeks prior to their March 11
directive At this time Brooks testified he advised the
Deutsches that it was possible that the force might be cut
"if we watch the incoming orders . then if those figures
indicate the company was not in serious condition, we
would be in a position to lower our work force " Brooks
acknowledges that during the ensuing two-week period he
had no further conversations with the Deutsches relating
to any aspect of a cutback. Nor is it shown that Brooks
submitted any information to the Deutsches during the
interim relating to "incoming orders," which might signify
that the conditions he had specified had been met The
only figures which Respondent produced at the hearing to
support its asserted economic defense were dollar figures
purporting to show orders due to customers, orders
actually shipped, and orders shipped ahead of schedule
during the months of December 1967 and January and
February of 1968. Brooks testified that such figures
showed that during these three months shipments to
customers exceeded orders due to customers It is claimed
that this had the inevitable effect of reducing inventory.
Brooks testified further that even with such reduction in
inventory, "the necessity to replace that inventory, based
on our history, wouldn't warrant our replacing as much
inventory since we did not have future requirements to use
it." Despite Respondent's reliance upon the state of the
inventory and its relationship to existing orders as
supplying economic justification for the layoff,
Respondent did not undertake to produce records
purporting to show exact figures as to inventory or orders.
Brooks testified, however, that Respondent kept inventory
records which would daily show items in stock as well as
records as to existing orders." As an added justification
for the layoff, Brooks testified that "Certain departments
were becoming more efficient " However, all the evidence
in the record on this subject is of a most generalized
nature The testimony of Brooks signified that there had
been continuing efforts by the Oceanside management to
use improved methods and to get more skilled personnel.
The testimony of Brooks, however, fails to specify
precisely how these improvements considered in
conjunction with the inventory and orders had reached
such a point by March 15 that they became a significant
supportive reason justifying a layoff at this time.
D. Discussion of the Issues and Conclusions
The entire case centers upon the lawful or unlawful
,nature of Respondent's conduct upon learning that the
Union was launching an organizational drive among its
employees at the Oceanside plant. Formal confirmation
that such a drive was underway was first received by
Respondent on the morning of March 11, 1968, in a letter
from the Union The foregoing recital shows Respondent's
response to have been immediate and widespread In
many instances the conduct charged is not even denied
Some of this alleged unlawful conduct is directed against
employees generally, and is said to be in violation of their
Section 7 rights Other acts are alleged as discriminatory
with respect to specific individuals or toward groups of
individuals.
I The alleged acts of interference
Some 12 of Respondent's supervisors are charged with
engaging in various unlawful acts including interrogation,
threats of reprisals and promises of benefits, imposition of
work restrictions, and particularly with widespread efforts
to enforce an invalid no-solicitation rule Six of these
twelve supervisors were not called as witnesses With
respect to the others I have credited the versions of the
General Counsel's witnesses where a conflict existed for
reasons set forth above
Respondent's formal opposition to the Union's drive
was given forceful expression in letters to employees dated
March 13 and 15, 1968, respectively Although with two
exceptions the General Counsel does not contend that
Respondent's letters exceeded permissible bounds of free
speech, the letters do express Respondent's opposition to
the Union in the strongest possible terms, and need not be
disregarded as a factor in evaluating the character and
significance of other concurrent acts charged as unlawful.
The letters are replete with characterizations of the Union
as a dishonest enterprise willing to resort to any means
including fraud, violence, and intimidation to gain
bargaining rights Attainment of such objective is
represented as a disastrous consequence for the employees.
Granted that Respondent may have honestly held such
opinions, and had a right to express them, it presents
them to the employees in a manner calculated to invoke
an atmosphere of fear, confusion and apprehension which
tends to make concurrent overt unlawful acts fall on more
fertile ground.
In two particulars the General Counsel claims that
Respondent in the letter of March 15 did exceed lawful
limits The General Counsel contends that the following
statement should be construed as a warning to employees
that participating in an economic strike would result in
termination of their jobs
One thing that unions will tell you is that they will get
you job security if you will pay them dues This is a lief
Some of our employees have worked in union plants
and have lost their jobs because of strikes .
"Brooks' testimony in detailing the steps he took to implement the
March II directive of the Deutsches is particularly revealing Brooks states
that he and Production Manager Flory took departmental lists of
employees " We took each individual department, the tooling department,
the machine department of which we have two, the contact manufacturing
department , the assembly department , and compared - also the molding
department , compared each individual department with the amount of
inventory we had for the various things, orders we had on hand in each
department , and we compared our production records to find out how long
it would take , based on orders we had , to produce - complete orders we
had "
The construction urged by the General Counsel is indeed a
permissible one. Were this the only reasonable
construction I would agree that Respondent had exceeded
lawful free speech limits. I view the statement as
equivocal, however, and as one that can as readily be
construed to represent only that an economic strike may
result in the replacement of strikers and the consequent
loss of their jobs So construed it would be permissible.
Under the circumstances, contrary to the claim of the
20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Counsel, I do not find the foregoing statement in
the March 15 letter to be an unlawful interference with
employee rights
Respondent ' s efforts to induce employees to repudiate
the Union as expressed in the March 15 letter , and the
accompanying stamped and addressed postcard , fall into a
different category , however . As the General Counsel
correctly points out it is a recognized form of unlawful
interference for an employer to induce employees to sign
statements repudiating the Union 11
While minimal assistance may be in order if employees
have independently withdrawn their support, there is
nothing in this record to signify that any employee had
sought Respondent ' s assistance as to the proper procedure
to repudiate his authorization card On the contrary from
what appears the circumstances parallel in every particular
the format used by Respondent at its Banning plant
during the organizational drive of another union. Such
conduct at Banning had already been found by the Board
to be unlawful when the drive opened at Oceanside." In
the Banning case the Board upheld the following finding
of the Trial Examiner without comment.
It is the opinion of the Trial Examiner that, while it is
not unlawful for an employer to inform his employees
that they may withdraw their authorization cards if they
had changed their minds , or if they were coerced or
intimidated into signing, it is unlawful for an employer
to attempt to assist them in revoking their cards by
furnishing to them , without a demonstrated need or
request therefor , addressed , stamped postcards which
required no more than their signature to notify the
Board of the revocation of their authorization cards.
There is no showing that the employees required or
requested such assistance of the Respondent . Therefore,
it is concluded that Respondent , by distributing said
cards to its employees, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
Respondent in the instant case, without any showing of
additional justification , elected to follow the same course
of action it had in the Banning case even to the point of
identical language on the card This suggests a disregard
of its obligations under the law I find the efforts of
Respondent to induce employees to withdraw from the
Union in the March 15 letter , including the use of the
enclosed stamped postcard, to be an unlawful interference
with employee rights, and that thereby Respondent has
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
An employer may engage in interrogation of its
employees with regard to their union sentiments and
activities only in limited circumstances where it can be
shown that such interrogation serves a useful purpose, and
the interrogation is conducted with proper safeguards
assuring employees that their response will not subject
them to reprisals " It has been found above that
Supervisors Clayton , Mathews, Roemhild , Rule, Williams,
Brent , McClellan , Pihl, and Quick each interrogated
various employees concerning their interest in, and
support for, the Union In no instance does Respondent
advance a legitimate reason for such interrogation, and in
no instance were employees given assurances against
retaliation . On the contrary , as we shall see below, the
interrogations were frequently undertaken in a context of
general and specific threats of reprisal particularly in
"N L R B v Birmingham Publishing Company, 262 F 2d 2, 7 (C A 5)
"The Deutsch Company, Electronic Components Division, A
Corporation. supra
relation to enforcement of the no-solicitation rule. Under
the circumstances, I find the various acts of interrogation
recited above to constitute unlawful interference with
employee rights, and that Respondent thereby engaged in
conduct restraining and coercing employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act
Although some general threats of reprisal were made,
in most instances the threats and the imposition of work
restrictions related to Respondent's no-solicitation rule
and its enforcement as a means of limiting organizational
activity.
The no-solicitation rule as it appears in the "Welcome"
manual was initially promulgated in 1966 but it,
admittedly, remained in effect at all times thereafter.
Prior to the Union's organizational drive, its significance
at the Oceanside plant appears to have been minor
indeed the only evidence regarding it indicates that
Respondent itself chose to ignore the rule with respect to
solicitation for the United Crusade. Respondent, however,
concedes that not only was the rule in effect at the outset
of the organizational drive, but that it was invoked and
enforced at this time Respondent undertakes to justify
both the existence and enforcement of the rule because it
claims that circumstances dictated a need for it The rule
on its face purports to prohibit solicitation of
"membership in organizations during working hours on
Company property." Although Respondent argues, with
seemingly little conviction, that this signifies only a
prohibition against organizational activity during working
hours, the language of the rule itself belies such a
construction Moreover the record is replete with evidence,
much of it undenied, that numerous supervisors told
employees that the rule prohibited all solicitation on
company property The Board, with court approval, has
long adhered to the view that absent special circumstances
an employer may not prohibit solicitation for a union
during nonworking time and in nonworking areas 16
Moreover the Board's view as to this very rule was well
known to Respondent at the time it invoked it at
Oceanside In the proceeding -involving Respondent's
Banning plant the identical rule found in the same
"Welcome" manual was attacked by the General Counsel
It was found to be unlawful by a Trial Examiner in a
Decision issued on March 17, 1967, and the Trial
Examiner's ruling was subsequently affirmed without
comment by the Board in its Decision issued May 31,
1967.16
There remains for consideration Respondent's assertion
that special circumstances existing at Oceanside,
regardless of the situation at Banning, justify the broad
rule there Respondent argues that during the course of its
organizational effort "union adherents coerced, deceived
and intimidated employees into listening about the Union,
receiving union literature and joining the Union." It
further claims that the Union made implied threats of
violence to employees who indicated they did not wish to
support the Union. It is this conduct that Respondent
asserts makes the instant case an exception to the usual
rule. Assuming that situations exist in which the disruptive
character of a union's organizational efforts would justify
the imposition of an unusually restrictive rule, Respondent
"Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591
"Stoddard- Quirk Manufacturing Co. 138 NLRB 615, Gale Products,
142 NLRB 1246, Campbell Soup Company, 159 NLRB 74.
"The Deutsch Company, Electronic Components Division. A
Corporation, supra
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY 21
has failed to establish in this record evidence of either
substantial interference with work or undue intimidation
of employees at any time during the organizational drive
At the hearing and in its brief Respondent made sweeping
generalizations as to the gross misconduct of union agents
both at and away from the plant. It failed, however, to
adduce convincing supportive evidence Respondent called
seven employees and a substantial number of supervisors
as witnesses Their collective testimony discloses a union
campaign neither disruptive of plant work, nor indicative
of significant interference with those not interested in the
Union At the most, this evidence indicates differences of
opinion existing among employees which in some
instances were expressed in an abrasive manner Moreover
the rule was invoked and its enforcement threatened at the
very outset of the union campaign, and before even minor
disruptions had had a chance to develop While there is no
question that Respondent had every right to insist that
employees work during worktime, the rule itself is phrased
in terms of plant property regardless of working time and
it stands undenied that the supervisors sought to enforce it
against solicitation in the cafeteria during coffee or lunch
breaks, and in the locker rooms before and after work
hours. I find Respondent's claim that the rule was needed
as a "temporary expedient, needed to maintain peace
among the employees" to be without support in the
record. On the contrary from the record as a whole and
Respondent's attitude toward the Union as expressed by
its letters and supervisors, I am convinced, and find, that
the rule and its enforcement was aimed at inhibiting all
lawful organizational efforts that employees might attempt
on company premises Accordingly, I find that
Respondent from the outset of the campaign invoked an
unlawfully broad no-solicitation rule, that it has not
established the existence of special circumstances to justify
such rule, and that thereby it has interfered with the rights
of its employees and engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As set forth above, we find its supervisors engaging in
an extensive and widespread conduct not only to enforce
the invalid rule, but also in various other ways
undertaking to interfere with and intimidate employees
from engaging in legitimate union activities. Not only did
supervisors warn employees that penalties would result if
they engaged in solicitation on company property, but in
many cases they imposed, without explanation, more
restrictive work conditions than had theretofore been in
existence Thus we note Supervisor Hall questioning
employee Emertson as to his involvement with the Union,
and telling him that this would ruin his chances for a good
job We find Supervisor Mathews warning employee
Miller about the no-solicitation rule, and when she
reminded him that management had engaged in
solicitation for the United Fund, countering by saying that
management could do as it pleased. Supervisor Reilly not
only warned employee Silva about soliciting on company
property, but restricted his work activities after he put on
the badge, and told him that the badge ruined his chances
for advancement. Supervisor Roemhild warned employee
Frankenburg about the no-solicitation rule and also
imposed restrictions upon Frankenburg and others relating
to the manner in which they carried on their work.
Supervisor Rule warned employee Hodge concerning the
no-solicitation rule, made derogatory comments
concerning the Union and restricted Hodge and others,
including employee Einertson, in the manner in which they
carried on their work Supervisor Brent warned both
employees Hodge and Frankenburg concerning solicitation
on company property Supervisor McClellan warned
employee Miller against solicitation, and engaged in
surveillance during her lunch hour to see that his
admonitions were observed. Supervisor Quick warned
employee Mowery concerning soliciting on company
property and threatened him with discipline if this should
take place Quick also warned employee Peeden against
talking with Mowery." Quick also threatened employee
Ford with discharge if he should engage in solicitation,
and commented that if he violated such instructions he
would not get a promotion or might be terminated
Supervisor Pihl queried employee Jones concerning the
Union, warned her that a union might result in loss of
benefits, and solicited her to repudiate the Union Pihl
also queried employees O'Leary and Ford concerning the
Union, and warned Ford that because of the Union he
had hurt his chances for advancement. Pihl also
threatened employee Einertson with discipline should be
engage in solicitation on company property
In substantial measure, these warnings, interrogations
and work restrictions were directed at badge wearing
union committeemen. It seems clear that the central thrust
of Respondent's conduct was not aimed at work
efficiency, but was directed at curtailing lawful
organizational activity Accordingly, I find that the
totality of Respondent's approach as set forth in detail
above stands out as a broad gauge infringement on
employee rights, both designed and calculated to hinder
and obstruct the organizational campaign which the
Union had launched I find that by such conduct
Respondent has engaged in interference with employee
rights thereby violating Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
Respondent's alleged discriminatory treatment of
individuals and groups must be evaluated against this
demonstrated, broadly based unlawful interference with its
employees in the exercise of their rights
2 The discriminatory treatment allegedly directed at
individuals
Mario Silva, Consuelo Miller, Frances Montgomery,
and Monica Felton are each alleged to have been
subjected to discriminatory treatment by Respondent.
As set forth above, on March 26, Respondent issued a
warning to employee Mario Silva for allegedly soliciting
an employee in the cafeteria at lunch time. I've already
found the no-solicitation rule to be invalid It follows that
attempts to enforce it by warnings or other means would
also be unlawful and would interfere with the statutory
rights of employees, and, if resulting in disciplinary action
or reprisals, would constitute discrimination. Respondent's
use of the no-solicitation rule is well illustrated by the
virtually undisputed facts relating to Silva. Respondent
not only warned Silva for having violated the rule, but
would not even give credence to his denial by affording
him an opportunity to confront his accuser. Respondent
followed this by denying Silva a wage increase which it
appears otherwise would have been routinely granted.
When Silva protested and filed a grievance, Plant
Manager Flory ruled that the wage increase had been
denied in part because of Silva's "disregard of rules."
"The General Counsel claims that the wage increase accorded Peeden a
few days after Quick had warned Peeden about talking with Mowery is
also conduct violative of 8(a)(I) I disagree Such increase unexpected and
otherwise unexplained raises some suspicions that its motivation may have
been unlawful , but I am not convinced that such suspicions are of sufficient
import to support an inference that the purpose was unlawful
22 'DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Clearly this had reference to the no-solicitation rule about
which he had already been warned. Flory and General
Manager Brooks then undertook to inject an issue of
excessive absenteeism as justification for the denial, but
this appears to be an afterthought. Theretofore Silva had
never been warned about absenteeism, and previously he
had received raises at regular intervals. The absenteeism
issue thus appears as a pretext. While standing alone this
might suffice to sustain a finding of unlawful motivation,
we have in addition the undenied testimony of Silva that
Supervisor Reilly expressly told him that the wage
increase had been denied because he had joined the Union
and gone against company rules. Moreover, we see
Respondent following the denial of the wage increase with
a still further reprisal by suspending Silva on May I for a
further violation of the invalid no-solicitation rule. Not
only this but Respondent was not even prepared to
consider an apparently valid defense that Silva proffered
to Supervisor Reilly. Under the circumstances, I find that
Respondent unlawfully warned Silva regarding violation of
an invalid no-solicitation rule, thereafter denied Silva a
wage increase because of his disregard of such rule, and
finally unlawfully suspended him for three days because of
a further alleged violation of such rule. I find each such
act to constitute discrimination against Silva because of
his activities, or Respondent's belief that he had engaged
in activities, in support of the Union, and that by such
acts Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The discriminatory motivation behind Respondent's
failure to transfer employee Consuelo Miller from a
molding machine to a less onerous job is not so obvious,
but I am of the opinion that it existed. Miller, like Silva,
was a plant committeeman. She was interrogated, warned
against solicitation on company property, and kept under
surveillance to assure that the warning was heeded. It may
be assumed that the transfer of the three silk screeners to
the molding department was legitimate, but very shortly
thereafter the other two nonunion employees received
preferred treatment by way of transfers to less
burdensome jobs. In addition, it is undisputed that other
molding department employees were transferred to
assembly-line and trimming jobs while Miller remained in
the molding department. Miller was, of course, well
qualified for either assembly or trimming jobs. Miller's
protests went unheeded. Respondent's explanation that it
wished to keep Miller as the senior screener available for
such silk screening jobs as might arise is not convincing.
Only once for a very short period did the need arise, and
it has not been shown that the relative proximity of any
other available job would have rendered Miller
inaccessible should the demand have been greater. In view
of Respondent's generally expressed opposition toward
union organization and Miller's known union support, it is
a fair inference that Respondent was influenced by this in
according her less consideration than it had granted others
who had not demonstrated their union support. The
validity of such a conlcusion is convincingly reinforced by
the undenied response of Personnel Manager Wolcott
when Miller carried her protest to him. As noted above,
Wolcott told Miller that when she put on the badge she
set herself apart from the others. Under the
circumstances, I am satisfied, and find, that the
Respondent's failure to transfer Miller from the molding
department to a less onerous job came about because of
her openly expressed support for the Union, and that
thereby Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The termination of Frances Montgomery on March 21,
1968, is also alleged as discriminatory. Since July 1966,
Montgomery had been the only female tool crib attendant.
This was a sitdown job. Montgomery had earlier made it
clear that she was not physically able to work at a
standup job. She made it equally clear that she could not
take the transfer to the molding department when it was
offered on March 21 because of this physical incapacity.
Montgomery was not a plant committeeman, but she had
been interrogated earlier by both Supervisors Hall and
Williams concerning her interest in the Union. She was an
employee of long standing and known to be capable of
performing other jobs which did not require standing, such
as trimming and assembly work. Respondent represents
that on March 21 there were no sitdown jobs of any
nature available. This seems questionable in view of
Miller's undenied testimony that only a few days later
Respondent had transferred persons from the molding
department to trimming and assembly jobs. It does not
appear that as of the date of the hearing the Respondent
had resumed using female tool crib attendants.
Respondent, however, does not undertake to explain why
in March it abolished these jobs, or how it had thereafter
carried on the work formerly done by female tool crib
attendants. Under the circumstances, including
Respondent's widespread expressed hostility to union
organization, its failure to explain the elimination of tool
crib jobs in the first place, and the unconvincing nature of
its claim that no other jobs were available, I deem it
reasonable to infer that Respondent's insistence that
Montgomery accept molding machine work was motivated
by its knowledge of her interest in the Union and that
thereby Respondent sought to present a choice calculated
to cause her to quit. Accordingly, I find that by such
conduct Respondent engaged in discrimination against
Frances Montgomery in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
I am further convinced that the discharge of Monica
Felton on May 17 was discriminatorily motivated. Felton,
although a new employee, was laid off on March 15, and
had been called back to work early in May. Prior to her
layoff, Felton had been told that she was a satisfactory
worker. It is Respondent's claim that following her return
her work performance did not measure up to its
standards, and that thus it elected to discharge her within
the probationary period. Such claim will not withstand
scrutiny.18 According to Felton on the day of her
discharge, Supervisor McClellan had said to her that
inasmuch as her probationary period was not yet up he
was discharging her because he was dissatisfied with her
"attitude." I credit Felton's testimony in this respect.
Prior to this Felton had received no complaint or warning
whatsoever from McClellan or any other supervisor
signifying that she was not satisfactorily performing her
work Although Felton had not been a known union
supporter at the time of the layoff, she had been observed
by Respondent attending a Board representation hearing
on May 8, and shortly after this had been interrogated by
McClellan as to her feelings about the Union. On
Saturday, May 11, she had attended a union meeting, and
on the following Monday, May 13, had worn a union
"The Respondent has a probationary period of 90 days for new
employees. More than 90 days had elapsed since Felton's initial hire by the
time of her discharge . However, while Felton had retained employment
status during the period of her layoff, Respondent asserts that in
computing the probationary period for any employee it counts only days of
actual employment, and not days in which such employee is in layoff
status
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY 23
committeeman's badge to work. During this week
McClellan queried her about her attendance at the union
meeting. On May 17, he discharged her because of her
"attitude." The timing of these events suggests strongly
that the "attitude" which concerned McClellan is to be
found in her newly shown interest in the Union, and I so
find. Accordingly, I find that Respondent discharged
Monica Felton on May 17, 1968, for unlawful reasons,
thereby engaging in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
3. The alleged discriminatory layoff of March 15,
1968
The General Counsel, in effect, contends that the layoff
of the 96 employees on March 15, 1968, was one facet of
Respondent's response to the Union's organizational
drive, and that the layoff was intended as a show of force
designed to disrupt the Union's organizational drive at its
outset. Various considerations tend to support such a
claim.
I am convinced that the timing and execution of the
layoff was undertaken in a manner unlikely to have
occurred had Respondent been acting solely from
economic considerations . I deem it impossible to isolate
the layoff from other aspects of Respondent's widespread
unlawful response to the Union's organizational drive, and
I am not satisfied that its asserted economic justification
will withstand scrutiny.
As we have seen, with news of the drive supervisors
immediately commenced unlawful interrogations , and gave
voice to threats of reprisals of one sort or another. The
no-solicitation rule, theretofore observed in the breach,
was promptly invoked. The importance of obeying this
rule was brought home to many, particularly those
identified as union plant committeemen . Restrictions in
work conduct, not previously in effect, were imposed on
employees, and it was represented that breaches of the
no-solicitation rule would both result in discipline and
jeopardize future advancement . Respondent ' s ostensible
justification for invoking the no-solicitation rule has been
found to have no substance.
Respondent's attitude toward organization is fully
explicated in the letters to the employees of March 13 and
15. Even assuming the letters to be lawful within the
limits of Section 8(c), we note them to be couched in
terms likely to impress employees with the intensity of
Respondent's opposition to organization. Moreover, the
letter of March 15 goes even further, and has been found
to encompass an unlawful effort by Respondent to induce
employees to abandon the Union.
The letters, the acts of interference, and the acts of
discrimination , heretofore found , whether occurring during
the week of March 11 or thereafter, when considered in
their totality, constitute a background which suggests an
employer not only prepared to voice opposition to the
organization of its employees , but also one prepared to
exceed lawful limits if necessary to insure the success of
its opposition . Such factors give support to an inference
that the mass layoff may have been designed as a
dramatic expression of this hostility to organization.
Various factors lend substance to such a conclusion. Thus,
we note the layoff to have been brought about without
advance warning either to the employees or to lower
echelon local management . The layoff came about at a
time when some departments were steadily working
overtime. For some two months prior thereto,
Respondent ' s personnel department had been conducting
an extensive advertising campaign to obtain new
employees in all classifications. New employees coming to
work had been told that no layoffs were in the offing.
There had been a substantial number of new hires since
the first part of the year, and hiring continued even into
the final week of the layoff. The layoff decision was made
on the very day Respondent learned that the Union's
organizational drive was underway. Departmental
supervisors not only were not consulted as to the viability
of their respective departmental operations should a layoff
ensue , but they did not even learn that it was to take place
until the afternoon of the day preceding its occurrence.
The same supervisors were then required to act with an
urgency that demanded special flights to and from
Banning to obtain lists and termination checks. Night
work was required to complete the mechanics of the layoff
so that it might be effectuated by midshift of the following
day. Personnel department employees were required to
work on the Saturday following to mail out the
termination slips which normally would have been handed
to the employees with their termination checks. No
explanation was offered to show the necessity for
completing the entire layoff operation with such urgency.
The precipitant character of the layoff procedure,
especially when it is considered against the background of
Respondent's widespread, and in many aspects unlawful,
opposition to organization as detailed in earlier sections,
suggests in a compelling manner that a layoff at this time
may have been meant as a massive show of force designed
to nip in the bud the Union's organizational drive.
The foregoing inference, however, while permissible,
would not necessarily have controlling significance should
Respondent make an effective showing of economic
circumstances indicating that sound business practice
demanded a layoff at this time, and that its proximity to
the Union' s organizational drive, and its precipitant
character, were purely coincidental. Respondent's
showing , however, is not convincing.
While Respondent points out that commencing in the
fall of 1967, corporate management had been pressing the
Oceanside management for changes in operation aimed at
bringing the Oceanside plant within its overextended
budget, Respondent did not produce records as to the
Oceanside budget which would either show the nature of
this alleged budgetary discrepancy, or would indicate
possible alternative approaches. Nor did it call the top
corporate officials who were voicing these complaints.
Initially, we see the Oceanside management able to
forestall action ostensibly because it convinced these
corporate officials that curtailment of the work force
would not permit the plant to fulfill its existing orders. It
is contended that the situation changed in the early
months of 1968 so that by March 15 a layoff was called
for. The nature of this change, however, is not
satisfactorily developed. Limited records produced indicate
no more than that Respondent in these months was
making progress in filling orders and thus was depleting
its inventory. There is only generalized testimony from
General Manager Brooks signifying his belief that in some
way improved efficiency and the state of the inventory and
orders made March 15 the right time for a massive layoff
to meet a budgetary overextension the dimensions of
which were never fully defined. Respondent's failure to
produce the very records supposed to support its
contentions makes evaluation of its conclusions
impossible . No reason is advanced for not producing such
records, and the inference is inescapable that possibly they
do not provide the needed support.
24 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We cannot overlook the significance of the conceded
fact that the layoff decision was made by Alex and Carl
Deutsch. Previously we find the Deutsches to have
withheld action of this nature when convinced that the
operation might suffer should it be undertaken. Two
weeks before March 15 Brooks had done no more than
represent to the Deutsches that if incoming orders were
watched a cutback in personnel might become appropriate
in the near future. The precise meaning of Brooks'
representation to the Deutsches at this time is not
altogether clear, but it scarcely suggests the likelihood
that within two weeks a layoff of one-fifth of the
personnel would be called for. On the contrary, Brooks
seems to have been telling the Deutsches only that in the
near future after a thoughtful evaluation of orders and
inventory a curtailment of the work force of an unknown
dimension might be proper. Significantly, it does not
appear that in the interim the impact of a cutback of any
size was again discussed between Brooks and the
Deutsches. Without further consultation, or apparent
reference to orders or inventory, the Deutsches directed
Brooks on March 11, 1968, to layoff 100 persons.
I seriously question that Brooks himself contemplated
such a substantial immediate layoff and deem it likely
that the directive came as a surprise to him.
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of testimony
from the Deutsches which might bear on the various
considerations leading to their decision. It is not, however,
claimed that they were unavailable. Absent their
testimony supplemented by documentary evidence relating
to budgets, orders and inventory, I find it difficult to
believe that it was sheer coincidence that the layoff
directive came concurrently with Respondent's first
notification of the Union's organizational drive.
Respondent has not produced sufficient evidence of
compelling economic considerations to overcome a
well-grounded inference that an underlying motivation for
a mass layoff at this time may have centered in
Respondent's opposition to the Union. On the contrary, I
deem it to be the more reasonable inference that the
layoff was an integral part of Respondent's openly
expressed effort to thwart the success of the Union's
organizational drive. The significance of a mass layoff
coming early in an organizational campaign and taking
place in a setting of unlawful acts of interference,
discrimination and openly expressed opposition to the
Union need not be underestimated. I am convinced, and
find, that Respondent recognized this, and undertook this
course of action as a likely means of forestalling the
ultimate success of the Union's efforts to organize its
employees. Accordingly, I find that by the layoff of 96
persons on March 15, 1968, Respondent was undertaking
a dramatic show of its opposition to union organization,
thereby discriminating against the laid-off employees with
an object of discouraging membership in the Union. I find
that by such conduct Respondent engaged in a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Inasmuch as I have found that Respondent has
discriminatorily laid off 96 employees, there is no need to
reach the General Counsel's alternative contention with
respect to four employees included in this group. The
General Counsel claims that Scott Mowery, Carlos Diz,
Sebastiano Randone , and Edwin Ray were
discriminatorily selected and thereafter discriminatorily
refused reinstatement. I will recommend that Respondent
offer reinstatement and make whole all persons laid off on
March 15, which would include these four as well as the
others. Accordingly, no useful purpose will be served at
this point in considering their cases separately, although it
may be noted that the issues were fully litigated during the
course of the hearing.
As noted above the overtime that men employees in
Departments 451 and 461 had been regularly getting was
eliminated commencing March 18, the first workday
following the layoff. These employees were engaged in the
production of "shells," a product that Respondent could
not produce at Oceanside in sufficient quantity to meet its
needs. We have seen that it placed an order for "shells"
with an outside manufacturer on March 6, less than two
weeks prior to the layoff. It was also ordering "shells"
from its Los Angeles plant and these orders increased
after the layoff. Admittedly it is Respondent's policy to
produce all component parts possible at Oceanside, and
only to order outside when a supplement is needed
Apparently it was fulfilling this policy in part by
according the workers producing these "shells" an hour
overtime on a more or less regular basis prior to the
layoff The March 6 order did not result in a change in
this, but the layoff did, and at the same time it brought
about an increase in orders from the Los Angeles plant.
Respondent does not convincuigly explain why continuing
to follow its stated policy would not have resulted in
continued overtime even after the layoff. It suggests no
more than that the same economic reasons that prompted
the layoff called for an additional cut in expenses thereby
bringing about elimination of overtime. Having found the
justification for the layoff to be without merit, and the
layoff itself to have been discriminatorily motivated, it is a
reasonable assumption that overtime elimination is part of
the same pretext, and that it was undertaken as part of
the same effort to make the whole cutback appear
economically legitimate Under the circumstances, I
regard it as no more than another aspect of the show of
force, and motivated for the same unlawful reasons as the
layoff, and I so find. Accordingly, I find that by
eliminating the overtime for men employees in
Departments 451 and 461 Respondent was discriminating
against such employees as part of its efforts to discourage
membership in the Union, and to defeat its organizational
efforts. I further find such conduct to be violative of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent as set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent discussed in section I, above, have a close,
intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic and
commerce among the several states and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom,
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully terminated
the employment of Frances Montgomery and Monica
Felton," I will recommend that Respondent be ordered to
offer each immediate and full reinstatement to her former
"Consuelo Miller was apparently restored to her former position so no
affirmative order regarding her reinstatement is required.
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY
or substantially equivalent position. Having found that
Respondent unlawfully denied Mario Silva a wage
increase on April 1, 1968, thereafter unlawfully suspended
him, I will recommend that Silva be reimbursed for all
losses incurred as a result of a denial of the wage increase,
and that he be made whole for loss of earnings during the
period of his suspension. Having further found that
Respondent discriminatorily eliminated overtime for the
men employed in Departments 451 and 461 by reducing
hours of work commencing on March 18, 1968, 1 will
recommend that each person in such departments so
affected be made whole for the losses incurred thereby
after March 18 until such point, if any there be, that
Respondent can establish that such regular overtime
would have been eliminated on a nondiscriminatory basis
Having also found that Respondent discriminatorily laid
off 96 employees on March 15, 1968, 1 shall further
recommend that Respondent offer immediate and full
reinstatement to each such employee to his former or
substantially equivalent job unless it can be established
that such reinstatement has already taken place or been
offered and refused 20 1 shall further recommend that
Respondent make whole those employees whose
employment was unlawfully terminated, or who were
discriminatorily laid off, denied overtime, transferred, or
suspended, for losses, if any, that each may have incurred
as a result of the unlawful discriminatory action, by
payment to each of a sum of money equal to the wages
each would have earned from the date of such
discriminatory action to the date each is either reinstated
or offered reinstatement, or in the event no reinstatement
is involved covering the period that the discriminatory
action continued, less the net earnings of each together
with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum,
and that loss of pay and interest be computed in
accordance with the formula prescribed by the Board in F
W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716, to which the
parties hereto are expressly referred
The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent
strike at the heart of the rights guaranteed to employees
by Section 7 of the Act.21 The inference is warranted that
Respondent maintains an attitude of opposition to the
purposes of the Act with respect to the protection of
employees in general. It will accordingly be recommended
that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any
manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.22
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the
following conclusions of law-
1 The Deutsch Company, Electronic Components
Division, is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act, engaged in a business which affects
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
The record indicates that at the time of the hearing all but 13 of those
persons laid off on March 15, 1968, had been either offered and accepted
reinstatement , or had been offered and refused reinstatement It is
assumed , although the matter was not developed in the record, that each
was offered employment to his former or a substantially equivalent
position Should this not be the fact with respect to any individual the
scope of the recommended order would include any needed adjustment
Q1 N L R B v. Entwistle Mfg Co , 120 F 2d 532 (C A 4)
May Department Stores v N L R B, 326 U S 376, Bethlehem Steel
Co v N L R B, 120 F 2d 641 (C A D C )
25
the Act
2 The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
3. By the warning issued to Mario Silva on March 26,
by the failure to grant Silva a wage increase on April I,
and by Silva's suspension on April 30, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4 By its discriminatory failure to assign Consuelo
Miller to a less arduous job shortly after her transfer on
or about March 26, and by its discriminatory failure to
transfer Frances Montgomery to a job that she was
physically able to perform, thereby bringing about
termination of her employment, Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
5 By its discriminatory discharge of Monica Felton on
May 17, 1968, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
6 By the discriminatory layoff of 96 employees on
March 15, 1968, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
7 By the elimination of overtime commencing on
March 18, 1968, for men employed in Departments 451
and 461 Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
8 By interfering with, restraining and coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act, as found above, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this
proceeding I recommend that Respondent, The Deutsch
Company, Electronic Components Division, its agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
I Cease and desist from.
(a) Discouraging membership of any of its employees in
the Union, or any other labor organization of its
employees, by unlawful interrogations, by invoking or
enforcing an unlawful no-solicitation rule, by unlawfully
promising benefits or threatening reprisals, or by
discharging, laying off, or in any other manner
discriminating against individuals with regard to their hire
or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment, except as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining
and coercing employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist the Union or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
26 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Offer to Frances Montgomery and Monica Felton
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make
them whole for any losses each may have suffered as a
result of her termination in the manner described above in
the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Make whole the men in Departments 451 and 461
for losses incurred as a result of the elimination of
overtime on March 18, by payment to each of sums of
money equal to the amounts each would have received had
such overtime not been discriminatorily eliminated.
(c) Make whole Consuelo Miller for losses incurred, if
any, as a result of its failure to transfer her to less
arduous work
(d) Make Mario Silva whole for any losses he may
have incurred as a result of the discriminatory failure to
grant him the wage increase on April 1, 1968, and make
him whole for the loss of wages resulting from his
discriminatory suspension on April 30, 1968
(e) Offer to each of the 96 employees laid off on March
15, 1968, who has not heretofore either been reinstated or
offered and refused reinstatement, immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or equivalent position without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and
make each whole for any losses he may have suffered as a
result of his layoff in the manner described above in the
section entitled "The Remedy."
(f) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, for examination and copying all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and other
records necessary to analyze the backpay due
(g) Notify any individual entitled to reinstatement if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of his right to reinstatement upon application in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces
(h) Post in conspicuous places at its usual place of
business, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted, copies of the' attached notice
marked "Appendix "" Copies of said notice on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 21 of the
National Labor Relations Board, shall, after being signed
by Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter in such conspicuous places Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material
(i) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision what steps Respondent has taken to comply
therewith."'
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board,
the words " a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the event that
the Board ' s Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals,
Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board,
paragraph 2(i) shall be modified to read "Notify the said Regional
Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps
Respondent has taken to comply therewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities
on behalf of any of our employees in International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(AFL-CIO) or any other labor organization, by
unlawful interrogations, by making or enforcing an
unlawful no-solicitation rule, by unlawfully promising
benefits or threatening reprisals for engaging in union
activities, or by discharging, laying off, or in any other
manner discriminating against such employees with
regard to their hire or tenure of employment except as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to
Frances Montgomery and Monica Felton and to each
employee laid off on March 15, 1968, who has not
heretofore been reinstated or offered and refused
reinstatement, to his former or substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges
WE WILL make whole each employee discriminated
against, including those discriminatorily terminated,
laid off, transferred, denied overtime, denied a wage
increase, or suspended for any loss of earnings each
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
above-named or any other labor organization
THE DEUTSCH COMPANY,
ELECTRONIC
COMPONENTS DIVISION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Note- We will notify any employee entitled to
reinstatement if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern
Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles,
California 90014, Telephone 688-5229