The Copps Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 26, 1970

181 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Copps Corporation and Retail Clerks Union
Local No. 640 , affiliated with the Retail Clerks
International Association , AFL-CIO. Cases
30-CA-998 and 30-CA-1064
February 26, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND BROWN
On October 31, 1969, Trial Examiner George A.
Downing issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to
a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs,
and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, The Copps
Corporation, LaCrosse, Wisconsin, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order.
At the hearing , an offer of proof was made by the Respondent to show
that 19 of the Respondent 's employees would testify that the Respondent
Company had not done anything since March 1 , 1969, to affect the way
they would vote in an election . In its exceptions , the Respondent excepted
to the Trial Examiner's alleged failure to receive this evidence We find no
merit in this exception , since, even if such testimony were received, it
would not affect our disposition of this case See Hendrix Manufacturing
v N L R B. 321 F 2d 100 , 105 (C A 5); Monroe Auto Equipment
Company. 146 NLRB 1267, 1275, in 23
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
August 19 and 20, 1969.1 Separate complaints, later
consolidated for hearing, were issued â–ºn Cases 30-CA-998
and 30-CA-1064 on July 29 and August 11, respectively
on charges and amended charges dated March 27, May
16, 29, July 7, and 22. They alleged in brief that
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed
by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by various
specified acts of interference, restraint and coercion in
March, by discriminatorily limiting the hours worked by
certain part-time employees, by constructively discharging
Dennis Walker, Larry Czechowicz and Scott Byrne in
June and by refusing on and after March 27 to bargain
with the Union as the majority representative of its
employees in an appropriate unit. Respondent answered
denying the unfair labor practices
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS, THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find on undenied allegations of the complaint that
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act' and that the Charging
Party is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5)
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
Respondent operates at La Crosse one of a chain of
grocery stores located in the State of Wisconsin. The
Union began in early March a campaign to organize the
grocery department employees and on March 21 it made a
formal demand for recognition Respondent refused the
demand by letter of March 27 and simultaneously filed a
representation petition in Case 30-RM-165, which was
dismissed by the Regional Director on July 18 because of
the issuance of the complaint on unfair labor practice
charges in Case 30-CA-998.
The General Counsel offered cumulative testimony,
mainly undenied, by a large number of witnesses
concerning a course of interrogations from March 12
through late March, interspersed with solicitation of
surveillance, promises of benefits and threats to reduce
working hours and to lay off part-time employees.
Evidence was also offered in support of complaint
allegations that Respondent constructively discharged
Larry Czechowicz, Scott Byrne, and Dennis Walker to
discourage membership in the Union.' The refusal to
bargain issues include questions concerning the
appropriate unit and the Union's majority as well as
Respondent's alleged doubts concerning both.
For preliminary disposition is a subsidiary issue
concerning the alleged supervisory status of Glenn
Strittmater which has bearing both on the question of unit
composition and on some of the Section 8(a)(1)
allegations. There is no dispute under the testimony that
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE A. DOWNING, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
as amended was heard at La Crosse, Wisconsin, on
All events herein occurred in 1969 unless otherwise specified
'Respondent , a Wisconsin corporation , operates a chain of retail grocery
stores in Wisconsin , including the La Crosse store involved herein
Respondent's gross sales exceed $500,000 per annum and it purchases and
receives annually from extrastate points goods valued in excess of $50,000
'A similar allegation concerning Thomas Schnick was withdrawn
181 NLRB No. 52
THE COPPS CORPORATION 295
Strittmater , manager trainee, was, along with Store
Manager David L . Weaver , assistant manager Donald
Richmond and bakery manager Schamens , the only
salaried personnel at the store , that Strittmater was in
charge of the store at least 2 nights a week when
Richmond and Weaver were not present , and during some
of the lunch periods, that he directed the employee work
force when he was in charge of the store , and possessed
authority to discipline employees . I conclude and find that
Strittmater was a supervisor within the meaning of the
Act Cf. Allied Supermarkets Inc.. 167 NLRB No. 48,
where the Board excluded from a unit of grocery
department employees a manager trainee on the ground
that his community of interest lay more closely with
management than with the rank - and-file employees.
B Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
Some nine witnesses for the General Counsel (Joan
Hauser, Carol Kopski, Opal Greene, Kenneth Olson,
Stanley Curtis, Dennis Walker, Mary Dellenbach, Larry
Czechowicz and William Valentine) testified to various
instances of interrogation by Store Manager David
Weaver, district manager Curtis Kunkel, assistant
manager Donald Richmond and manager trainee Glenn
Strittmater during a period beginning around March 12
and continuing late into the month. The interrogations
included inquiries concerning attendance by the employees
at union meetings, how many other were in attendance or
"voted," who started the Union, what occurred and what
was said at the meetings, what the employees thought
about, or got out of, the meetings and whether they had
signed union cards. In addition to the foregoing
Strittmater admitted that he interrogated Fred Johnson
concerning attendance at a union meeting, and Richmond
admitted in testimony and by affidavit that he twice
interrogated Michael Pohle concerning what happened at
union meetings and also asked James Ablan, Sandra
Weissenberger and another employee if they had attended
the union meetings and asked Ablan what he got out of it
The interrogations were intermixed with additional
coercive statements Hauser and Kopski testified that
Weaver charged Kopski with being the ringleader in the
Union and stated he intended to find out who started it
and that he would be back to renew his inquiries. Hauser
testified also that during a group meeting with three
employees called by Weaver in the latter's office and
attended by Kunkel, Weaver stated he was telling them, as
he was going to tell everyone else, not to attend the union
meeting William Valentine testified that during the
interrogation Weaver solicited him to report on what
transpired at union meetings, though when Valentine
demurred Weaver assured him it did not matter. When
Weaver questioned Mary Dellenbach and Larry
Czechow.icz about signing union cards, neither answered at
once and Weaver repeated his inquiry When Czechowicz
finally replied that he did not know whether he signed,
Weaver stated, "What do you mean, you don't know. Did
you sign a card or didn't you9" Whereupon both
Dellenbach and Czechowicz admitted they had signed. -
There was further testimony by Stanley Curtis, Larry
Czechowicz, Thomas Schnick, Jack Schermerhorn and
William Valentine that Richmond made statements to the
effect that if the Union came in the Company would limit
the hours of part-time employees to 24 or 25 per week; by
Czechowicz, Valentine, Hansen, Kenneth Olson and
Dennis Walker that Richmond made statements to the
effect that if the Union came in the Company would
replace two part-time employees by one full-time
employee;4 and by Schermerhorn, Valentine, Curtis and
Hansen that Richmond made statements to the effect that
if the Union did not come in the Company would raise, or
would probably raise, wages to a level comparable to the
union scale.
Hansen testified that Richmond told him during one
conversation that if the Union came in and the employees
wanted time off for a vacation or for other purposes, he
would tell them, "Forget it, get it from your union
representative." Curtis testified that Richmond told a
group of employees that when the Union came in the
Company would not be as friendly and would be "much
harder as far as working is concerned."
Respondent's evidence contained no substantial denial
of the interrogations to which the General Counsel's
witnesses testified but it offered general denials by its
witnesses that they made any threats or promises and it
points to acknowledgment by some of the General
Counsel's witnesses that such was the case. Respondent
also points to similar acknowledgment by some of the
opposing witnesses that the conversations were friendly
discussions and that they made frank and truthful
answers, apparently free of coercion.
Then, proceeding to consider each conversation
separate and apart from all other conduct, Respondent
contends that the conversations were isolated and that
they reflected no organized or systematic attempt to
engage in interrogation Respondent argues that such
informal discussions or unionization, sometimes initiated
by the employee, reflected no attempt to persuade
employees to withdraw their support from the Union and
were all privileged as free speech under Section 8(c) of the
Act. Indeed, Respondent seeks to brush aside the
admitted solicitation of Valentine to report on happenings
at union meetings by arguing that the attempted
surveillance "came about in a friendly way and during a
friendly discussion."
The overwhelming weight of the evidence requires
rejection of Respondent's contentions Thus the record
revealed a widespread course of interrogations which was
directed at numerous employees by various members of
Respondent's supervisory hierarchy. Not only was no
legitimate purpose demonstrated, but Respondent made
no attempt to meet the Board's requirements in Struksnes
Construction Company, 165 NLRB No. 102, cited with
approval in N L R B v Gissel Packing Company, 395
U.S 575. Furthermore, the interrogations were only a
part of a course of coercive conduct which included
solicitation of surveillance, promises of wage increases if
the Union did not come in,5 and various threats
concerning the reduction of the hours of part-time
employees and their replacement with full-time employees
Such conduct was not rendered noncoercive by the fact
that the discussions were informal and friendly or by the
fact that some of the witnesses did not consider
themselves to be coerced Indeed, some degree of coercion
was manifest alone in the fact that Dellanbach and
Czechowicz failed to answer Weaver's first interrogation
and admitted that they signed cards only after he
'Hansen attributed to Weaver a statement to somewhat similar effect,
i e , that if the Company "could not handle it with the Union in, the
part-time help would be the first to go "
'Respondent 's argument that Richmond was not talking for the store but
merely expressing his personal belief concerning the wage increases was
disposed of by the undenied testimony of Stanley Curtis that Richmond
represented that the information concerning the increases came through a
telephone conversation with personnel of the Copps Company
296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
demand that they answer, CI NLRB v
Harbison-Fischer Mfg Co , 304 F 2d 738, 739 (C A 5);
NLRB v. W T Grant Co . 199 F.2d 711, 712; cert.
denied 344 U S 928 The effectiveness of Respondent's
coercive conduct was further demonstrated by the fact
that two employees, Pohle and Valentine sought to
procure return of their authorization cards after
Respondent's antiunion campaign began See Section D,
infra.
I therefore conclude and find on the entire evidence
that Respondent interfered with, restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by
interrogating its employees concerning their union
membership, activities, and sympathies and concerning
their attendance at, and the happenings at union meetings,
by warning employees not to attend union meetings; by
soliciting an employee to engage in surveillance of union
meetings and to report back to it; by promising wage
increases if the Union should not come in; and by
threatening employees with reduction in hours worked,
with layoffs and with more onerous working conditions if
the Union should come in
There was further evidence (relevant also on the issue
of the constructive discharges, section C, infra) that
Respondent actually sought to carry out its threat to limit
the hours of the part-time employees Mary Dellenbach
testified that in late March Richmond denied her request
to work more hours, stating that the Company proposed
instead to reduce hours while it decided what to do about
union matter Richmond made a similar statement in June
when Dellenbach renewed her request.
David Johnson was a part-time employee who averaged
between 20 and 22 hours a week during the school months
and approximately 41 hours a week during the summer.
In late April he asked Weaver about going on a 40 hour
week during the summer but Weaver informed him that
because the Union was coming in, he would probably be
restricted to 24 hours When Johnson was later shown a
work schedule to be effective June I which listed him for
only 24 hours a week, he informed the produce manager
he would have to find another job.
Dennis Walker, another part-time employee who
averaged around 30 hours in the summer of 1968, asked
Richmond for more hours around May 21 Richmond
replied he could not give Walker more than 24, and when
Walker inquired the reason, Richmond replied, "Well,
maybe you guys wanted a union . . Copps Company says
I can't give you over 24 hours."' Though Walker pointed
out that some of the employees were working more than
24 hours, Richmond stated that it would not be so for
long because as soon as the Company got more
employees, all part-time employees would be under 24
hours. Stanley Curtis testified similarly that Richmond
told him that in order to effect the 24-hour limitation, the
Company would "have to hire more kids "
James Ablan and Larry Czechowicz also testified to
separate requests which they made to Richmond in mid
and late May to work more summer hours. Richmond
informed them the new store policy was to limit part-time
employees to 24 hours a week. Both of them had averaged
more than 24 hours in prior summers
As the foregoing summary discloses, Respondent
informed its employees during the organizational
'The General Counsel has filed a motion, opposed by Respondent to
correct the first clause of Richmond 's statement to, "Well, baby, you guys
wanted a union " As the Examiner 's recollection accords with the
transcript , the motion is denied
campaign that it was instituting a new policy of limiting
the hours worked by part-time employees, and in two
cases it told the employees (Dellenbach and Walker) that
its decision was due to the union activities Not only was
the policy initiated at a time when it would have the
maximum effect on part-time employees (i e., the end of
the school term), but it was plainly calculated to restrain
and coerce them as regarded their continued adherence to
the Union. I therefore conclude and find under the
foregoing circumstances that Respondent engaged in
interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) by informing their employees of the
institution of the new policy.'
C The Constructive Discharges
Respondent's enforcement of its policy to limit the
hours of part-time employees led to the quitting of their
jobs by Larry Czechowicz, Scott Byrne and Dennis
Walker, whom the complaints alleged were constructively
discharged to discourage union membership 8
Respondent's knowledge of union activities generally was
conclusively established by the evidence summarized in
section B, supra Respondent also learned directly of
Czechowicz' membership for Czechowicz admitted he
signed a card after persistent interrogation by Weaver.
Walker was the most active participant in union activities
among the employees and it may reasonably be assumed
that Respondent learned of that fact as a result of the
widespread interrogations and the repeated attempts to
learn who was leading the organizational activities and
what was happening at union meetings Furthermore,
Richmond's explanation to Walker of the reason for
limiting his hours contained explicit recognition that
Respondent knew or suspected what Walker's union
sentiments were. There was no evidence, however, that
Respondent had knowledge that Byrne (who joined on
June 1 1) was a union member
Pertinent to consideration of each of the individual
cases are the findings made in section B, supra,
particularly as they concern Respondent's announced
intention to limit hours of the part-time employees and
Richmond's explanation to Dellenbach, Johnson and
Walker that union activities were the reason
We begin with Czechowicz who testified that when
Richmond rejected his request to work more hours, he
told Richmond he would have to find another job because
he had to have more hours. Richmond replied that he was
sorry to see Czechowicz go and wished he could do
something about it Answering Czechowicz' inquiry
Richmond stated he did not believe that Czechowicz could
be hired back in the fall and agreed that in any case
Czechowicz would have to start at the bottom as a
'Respondent 's explanations of its new policy and of its subsequent failure
to adhere to it relate more directly to the issues surrounding the
constructive discharges , to be considered in the next Section
'By brief the General Counsel advanced for the first time a claim that
David Johnson was also constructively discharged because of the Urion
activities. Though Johnson was the first of the group to quit (see section B,
supra) . his name was not included in any of the charges or in either
complaint Furthermore, though the General Counsel moved to make
certain amendments during the hearing, he did not seek to include Johnson
in the complaint Thus, if the General Counsel were litigating or
attempting to litigate Johnson's discharge, his brief is the first notice of
that fact either to the Trial Examiner or to Respondent, whose brief,
understandably contains no treatment of the question I shall therefore
make no finding whether Johnson's quitting constituted an unfair labor
practice
THE COPPS CORPORATION 297
courtesy boy and would lose his seniority
A tabulation of Czechowicz' hours introduced by
Respondent showed that during the period from the week
of May 29 through the week of July 31, 1968, Czechowicz
worked an average of approximately 33 hours a week,
whereas in the final 3 weeks of his employment (week of
May 28 through the week of June 11, 1969), he worked an
average of only 17 hours
Certain facets of the evidence apply commonly to the
quittings of Byrne and Walker. Byrne worked full-time for
Copps from September 1968 to January 1969 and
part-time until April 2 when he quit A tabulation of his
hours beginning with the week of March 5, 1969, showed
that he worked 13 25 hours in that week, 8 25 in the week
of March 12 and 5 hours in the week of April 2 He
returned as a part-time employee on June 11, worked 5
hours in the week ending June 11, 31 5 in the week of
June 18, 30 in the week of June 25, and 8 hours before he
quit on June 26
On June 21 Byrne took another part-time job at
National Food Stores in order to earn more money. He
told Richmond about it on June 23 and asked that his
schedule at Copps be changed so as not to conflict with
the other schedule Richmond promised to see what he
could do, and said nothing about any policy against
working at another grocery store
Weaver called Byrne later on the telephone and,
referring to his jobs at two different grocery stores, stated
it was "unkosher" for Byrne to work at two different
grocery stores because Byrne might give away trade
secrets. The conversation was resumed the next day with
Weaver telling Byrne it was against Company policy for
employees to work at two different grocery stores Byrne
told Weaver he could not survive on 22 hours a week at
$1 60 and pay for a college tuition and that he had
decided to work for National. Weaver commented that
"It's a funny world sometimes," and that "I knew we
could talk with you, but we have to be a little more
careful with Dennis He doesn't know it yet, but he won't
be working here much longer either."
In 1968 Walker averaged working approximately 30
hours a week from the week of May 29 through the week
of July 31. After Richmond denied Walker's request for
more hours on May 21, 1969, Walker averaged only 20 5
hours a week until he quit on June 28, against an overall
average from May 21 through July 23 of 24 hours by
part-time employees. On June 20 Walker informed
Richmond he had obtained another part-time job because
he could not work enough hours at Copps to get the
tuition money he needed Walker asked to get off on
Saturday night and to be put on "set" hours, to match
with his schedule on the other job. Richmond agreed to
see what he could do.
Weaver spoke with Walker the same evening,
expressing objection to letting Walker off on Saturday
and inquiring about his other job. When Walker told him
it was at National Foods (a competing store), Weaver
laughed and said he did not care for Walker to work at
both places, that it was "unethical" and that he did not
want any trade secrets getting out Agreeing that he was
asking Walker to choose between the two jobs, Weaver
continued that he knew the manager at National and that
Walker might make more money there. Walker asked for
time to discuss the matter with his parents, and after
doing so informed Weaver he would prefer to stay at both
places because he needed the money so badly because of
going to college in the fall Weaver stated that he would
be unable to give Walker set hours as requested, but
Walker explained that he was only asking that Weaver
schedule his hours around the other work, pointing out
that it was customary for Weaver to do such scheduling
around other activities during the school year, including
even social activities. Walker concluded by stating that he
would prefer to let things to the way they were, and
Weaver nodded in apparent agreement.
There was no particular conflict in the hours on the two
jobs during that week On June 26 Walker's hours were
posted at National Foods for the week of June 30 through
July 5. On June 27 Respondent posted its schedule for the
same week, reflecting a direct conflict with Walker's hours
at National Opal Greene testified that after Walker
checked his schedule for the week in question and had left
the room, the meat Manager Paul Magnusen commented
with a laugh that Walker's schedule was exactly the same
as his schedule at National.
Recognizing that it would be impossible for him to
continue working at both jobs, Walker informed
Richmond on June 28 that he was quitting and that
Richmond had finally got to him On the following day
Walker told Weaver he was quitting under protest and
was forced to quit
Respondent's defenses rested on the testimony of
Personnel Director Bernard Landerman and Store
Manager Weaver and on tabulations compiled from its
records of hours worked by part-time employees.
Landerman testified that the organizing campaign gave
rise to a problem concerning the hours of the part-time
employees, who by his definition worked 24 hours a week
or less; that with the summer season approaching,
Respondent anticipated requests from some employees to
work additional hours; and that it feared that unless it
divided the hours as fairly as possible it would run the
danger of unfair labor practice charges For that reason,
Landerman explained, the Company changed its rules
while the Union campaign was going on
Weaver testified similarly that Landerman informed
him around the first of June that part-time employees
should be limited to 24 hours or less and that he should
try to be fair to everyone. He testified however, that in
actual operation he was unable to comply because he was
too busy and that he accordingly worked employees more
hours without telling them that they were free to work
beyond the prescribed limitation.
Landerman also testified that for some 12 years
Respondent's policy had been one of opposition to its
employees working simultaneously in a competitor's store
because it felt the employees should have some sense of
loyalty to it and should not have divided allegiance.
Furthermore, Respondent desired to guard against the
possibility that its employees might obtain confidential
information about its operations such as the anticipated
pricing of future sale items and that such a danger might
exist even in the case of courtesy boys. Though both
Weaver and Richmond were aware of the Company
policy, there was no occasion to apply it at La Crosse
prior to the spring of 1969, when Weaver informed
Landerman there were two employees who had obtained
employment at another store. Landerman testified,
however, that because the Company was in the midst of
an organizing campaign, it was his understanding that,
"we were not able to enforce any of those rules."9
'There was obvious inconsistency between that explanation and
Respondent 's admitted changing of its rules during the union campaign
concerning the hours worked by part-time employees
298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's tabulations included comparisons of the
overall averages of hours worked by part-time employees
during the months of June and July, 1968 and 1969, as
well as by individual employees named in the complaint,
including Czechowicz, Byrne and Walker as previously
noted. The overall averages showed that in 1968 during
the 2 months in question an average of 27 part-time
employees worked an average of 26 hours a week and that
in 1969 an average of 31 employees worked an average of
24 hours a week. Thus the total work hours in 1969
exceeded those in 1968 by some 42, or approximately 7
percent.
Concluding Findings
As found in section B, supra. Respondent threatened to
limit the hours worked by part-time employees if the
Union should come in and later informed the employees
that the new policy was actually being put into effect
because of the Union. Respondent could reasonably have
expected that such action would cause a substantial
number of quits by employees who customarily worked
longer hours in previous summers and who found
themselves without sufficient earnings to meet their needs
under the limited schedules. Indeed, in late April David
Johnson informed the produce manager he would have to
find another job. Later Czechowicz, who was known to
Weaver to be a union member, found himself unable to
continue under weekly hours averaging 17 as against the
33 hours he worked in the summer of 1968
I therefore conclude and find Czechowicz was forced to
quit because of Respondent's unlawful conduct and that
Respondent thereby constructively discharged him because
of his union membership and activities and to discourage
union membership generally.
The Walker-Byrne cases differ from Czechowicz'
mainly in the circumstance that they undertook the
necessary supplementation of their earnings by obtaining
other part-time work. Here Respondent came forward
with an alleged long-standing policy, not previously
communicated to the employees, that Respondent did not
permit other employment in a competitor's store. We
consider first how Respondent sought to apply that rule in
Walker's case.
Though expressing disapproval, Weaver did not insist
that Walker give up the other job nor did he inform
Walker that Walker was free to work additional hours at
Copps because the 24 hour rule was not being adhered to
Instead, Weaver permitted Walker to work out the week
under a schedule which involved no substantial conflict,
but he then posted a new weekly schedule which it was
impossible for Walker to meet because it was in direct
conflict with the one National had posted a day earlier
The evidence showed that such action was deliberate
and not the result of pure coincidence. Weaver informed
Walker earlier that he knew the manager at National and
recommended that Walker choose employment there in
preference to Copps. Meat Manager Magnusen
commented that Walker's newly scheduled hours were
identical with those set by National. Furthermore, Weaver
told Byrne some 2 days before that though Walker did not
know it, he would not be working for Copps much longer.
Finally when Walker informed Weaver he was quitting
under protest because it was impossible to work on both
jobs, Weaver again failed to inform Walker that the
limited hours policy was not being adhered to and that
Walker could stay on at Copps and work more than 24
hours a week In view of Weaver's admitted difficulties in
obtaining necessary additional help,' ° it is inconceivable,
absent a discriminatory motivation, that Weaver would
not seek to retain Walker ' s services , concerning which
there was no evidence of dissatisfaction on Respondent's
part
The foregoing circumstances are also to be viewed, of
course, against the immediate background of
Respondent's unlawful conduct as found in section B,
supra, including particularly Richmond ' s explanation that
Walker's hours were being limited because of prounion
sentiments So viewing them , I conclude and find on the
entire record that by limiting Walker's hours and by
deliberately scheduling his hours for times it knew he
could not work , Respondent constructively discharged
Walker because of his union membership and activities
and in order to discourage membership in the Union
Byrne's discharge is to be viewed against the
background of Walker's case, with which it was linked
When Byrnes informed Richmond of his other job,
Richmond promised , as with Walker , to see what he could
do about giving Byrne set hours, and he said nothing
about a company policy against working elsewhere. Also
as in Walker ' s case neither Richmond or Weaver
informed Byrne that it was not adhering to its policy of
limited hours and that he might work longer at Copps if
he desired Indeed, as noted in Walker's case, it is
impossible to understand why in view of the difficulties
they were experiencing in obtaining the necessary help,
they failed to inform Byrne he could work as many hours
as he desired . Instead Weaver not only permitted Byrne to
quit but made the revealing comment predicting Walker's
termination some 2 days before he posted a new work
schedule which forced Walker to quit.
Where Byrne's case differed from Walker's was in the
fact that it was not shown that Respondent knew he was a
union adherent , but that fact is not controlling under the
circumstances here because Byrne was only an innocent
victim of Respondent ' s determination to eliminate
Walker. Byrne could plainly not be permitted to work
under conditions which were denied to Walker for that
would manifestly disclose Respondent ' s hand But by
imposing the same conditions on Byrne as it did on
Walker, it may reasonably be assumed that Respondent
thereby expected to "lend an air of legitimacy" to
Walker ' s termination . Gainesville Publishing Companv.
150 NLRB 602, 630-631, cases there cited at fn. 77
Because Section 8 ( a)(3) proscribes in broad terms
discouragement of membership in a labor organization,
The Great A & P Companv , 154 NLRB 361, 367, it is
immaterial that some of the victims of discrimination may
not be union members or that the employer had no
knowledge of their union membership or activities
Arnoldware. Inc.. 129 NLRB 228 Lamar Creamery
Company, 148 NLRB 323, N L R B v. Piezo Mfg. Co,
290 F .2d 455, 456 (C.A. 2).
I therefore conclude and find that by limiting Byrne's
hours of work , thereby forcing Byrne to quit, Respondent
constructively discharged Byrne to discourage membership
in the Union within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
"Extra hours were obviously available in view of the 7 percent increase
over 1968 Though there were more part -time employees on the payroll,
that was plainly in implementation of Richmond 's threat , testified to by
Curtis, that if the Union came in the hours limitation would be
accomplished by "hiring more kids " Landerman's explanations for
changing rules during the union campaign were not only refuted by that
testimony but were inconsistent as well with his stated understanding
elsewhere that Respondent could not enforce rules during the campaign
D The Refusal to Bargain
1 The appropriate unit
THE COPPS CORPORATION. 299
The unit alleged in the complaint to be an appropriate
one conforms to that in which the Union sought
recognition, i.e., all employees including regular full-time
and regular part-time employees of Respondent at its La
Crosse store, but excluding all bakery department
employees, all meat department employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Respondent's position consists mainly in professing doubt
as to certain features of that unit while refraining from
stating any view of its own as to an appropriate unit and
while contending that it was the duty of the Board to
make the determination in representation proceedings
under Section 9(b).
The questions which Respondent raises are without
substance under Board and court decisions. The Board's
policy concerning units in the retail chain field is to
consider single store units presumptively appropriate. The
presumption is not, however, a conclusive one and may be
rebutted where there are factors present which would
counter the appropriateness of a single store unit. Haag
Drug Company Incorporated. 169 NLRB No. 111, and
cases there cited; Star Market Company, 172 NLRB No.
130; and see Vol. 68, LRR Analysis, No. 29, where those
and other related cases are reviewed and analyzed
In Haag the Board took specific note that the Courts of
Appeals for the Seventh and First Circuits had denied
enforcement of its decisions in single store units, i.e.,
Frishch's Big Boy, Inc, 147 NLRB 551, 151 NLRB 454,
enforcement denied 356 F.2d 895 (C A. 7), Purity Food
Stores Inc . 160 NLRB No. 53, enforcement denied 376
F.2d 497 (C A 1), cert. denied 389 U.S. 959. Pointing to
contrary results reached by other courts (see cases cited in
footnote 8 thereof), the Board stated it would continue to
adhere to the policy of finding single store units
presumptively appropriate.
The present record contains no evidence of
"countervailing factors," and when the Trial Examiner
called attention to that fact at the end of the hearing,
Respondent's counsel requested that the record be closed
without more. As I therefore conclude and find that a
single store unit confined to the store at La Crosse
constitutes an appropriate unit, I turn to the question
whether the exclusion of the bakery and meat department
employees would render that unit inappropriate.
The evidence establishes that the meat and bakery
department employees worked different hours and are
under separate immediate supervision from the grocery
department employees whose "break" times also differ.
The work engaged in is also significantly different. The
grocery employees are responsible for the stocking and
sale of groceries, while the meat department employees
deal exclusively in the preparation of meat for sale and
the bakery employees are responsible for the actual
baking of the products and are located in a separate area
from the grocery employees Furthermore, there is no
evidence of any interchange of meat and bakery
employees with the grocery employees, and the former are
often present at the store during times when the store is
not open for business The latter fact lends emphasis to
the essential differences in the functions involved, the one
being on the side of production whereas the other is
confined chiefly to sales. The evidence shows further that
the work schedules of meat and bakery employees are
prepared by the managers of the respective departments
and posted in their departments while Assistant Manager
Donald Richmond prepares the schedules of the grocery
employees. Indeed, Richmond professed to have no
knowledge of the wage rates of the meat and bakery
employees
I find this case to be controlled by Mock Road Super
Duper. Inc . 156 NLRB 983, 984-986, enfd 393 F.2d 432
(C.A. 6), where the Board observed in part, "In fact, it
appears that separate grocery units have become the
general bargaining pattern in the retail food store
industry In addition, recent cases have made it clear that
under the Act, a unit of less than all the employees in a
retail store may be appropriate." See also Allied
Supermarkets Inc, 167 NLRB No. 48.
I conclude and find on the present record that a
separate community of interests exists between the grocery
employees on the one hand and the meat and bakery
department employees on the other. As the record shows
further that there is no labor organization which seeks to
represent a storewide unit, a unit of grocery employees in
an appropriate one under Section 9 (a) of the Act.
Respondent cites no authority for its contention that a
refusal to bargain cannot be found herein because the
Board made no determination of ;in appropriate unit
pursuant to Section 9(b) That novel contention, plainly
without merit, ignores a long line of unfair labor practice
cases where unit determinations were made in Section
10(b) proceedings in the absence of prior representation
proceedings. Were Respondent's theory sound, no refusal
to bargain charge could be proceeded upon unless unit
issues were first decided in a representation proceeding.
2. The constituency of the unit; the Union's majority
Respondent stipulated to the names of the employees
who were within the unit contended for by General
Counsel and Union but reserved contentions of its own
which remain for consideration.
The status of Glenn Strittmater had already been
resolved in section A, supra. Thomas Schnick is claimed
to be excludable as a meat department employee, but I
find him to be within the unit under his undenied
testimony that he was one of the "courtesy boys" in the
grocery department for a few weeks before he signed his
card on March 18, and that he continued on that job until'
he quit in June.
Respondent also apparently questions the inclusion of
the part-time employees, some 30 in number, pointing out
that they were mostly high school students and that some
14 of them left its employ at some time between March
21 and the date of the hearing There is no merit to those
contentions under the circumstances here Regular
part-time employees are customarily included in
bargaining units, and there was no suggestion here that
any of the part-time employees, including the students,
were not regularly employed. Terminations and
resignations which followed the requests to bargain do not
affect the constituency of the unit, for it is the time of the
requests which is controlling Furthermore, under the
findings made in section B and C, supra. Respondent's
unlawful conduct was directly calculated to cause the
quitting of part-time employees through the threats of
replacing them by full-time employees and by the threats
to limit their hours of work.
I therefore conclude and find that the appropriate unit
as found above included 44 employees as of March 21 and
43 as of April 1. See Appendix A, hereto attached
300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel offered a total of 31 cards signed
by employees within the unit, all of which were received in
evidence except the card of John Laufenberg which was
rejected for lack of proper authentication." All except
three of the cards were procured prior to March 21 and
the remaining three were procured on March 23. Thus on
March 21 the Union was in possession of 27 cards in a
unit of 44 employees and on April 1 it held 30 cards in a
unit of 43 employees.
Respondent's attacks on the validity of some of the
authorizations were without substance. The cards
themselves were phrased in language which was clear and
unambiguous . They bore the caption in bold capitalized
type "AUTHORIZATION FOR
REPRESENTATION", and after expressing the
signatory's desire to enjoy the rights and benefits of
collective bargaining, they continued with an authorization
to the Union "to negotiate my rates of pay, hours of work
and other working conditions in collective bargaining with
my employer." The Union was further authorized " to use
this card as proof that I want it to represent me in
negotiations for a labor agreement for any lawful purpose,
and in particular, as the basis for it to obtain recognition
by my employer as bargaining agent, without there first
being an NLRB election among the employees.
Testimony by Union representatives, Kenneth Geroux
and Marvin Schael, who authenticated some 21 of the
cards plainly established the validity of those
authorizations under principles now definitively established
by N.L R.B v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575 "
Testimony by employees Thomas Schnick, Kathy
Nasseth, James Sauer, Joan Hauser, Michael Pohle, and
Dennis Walker similarly authenticated the remaining 9
authorizations.
Respondent attacks specifically cards which were signed
by Bruce Secor, Raymond H. W 'I, and Ralph Garavalia
at a union meeting on Marc 23 and which were
authenticated by Geroux Ward, lied by Respondent,
testified that he asked the question ether the signing of
the card was a vote for or against the Union and was
informed that it was just to authorize the Union to call a
vote. Ward, a high school graduate, admitted that he read
the card before he signed it and, after reading it again on
the stand, admitted he had no trouble understanding it.
He admitted further that some statement was made in the
meeting to the effect that the cards would be sent to some
one like a priest or minister, but he was uncertain as to
the purpose of doing that.
Bruce Secor, called on rebuttal, testified that he was
told in part the purpose of the card was to get the Union
in the store and that he understood he was authorizing the
Union to represent him Secor was told further that it
would save him union dues if he signed and that the
Union had enough signatures without his On
cross-examination Secor admitted that some language was
"A separate signature by Laufenberg , identified by James Ablan, was
received for the purpose of comparison with the signature on the rejected
card , but examination of the two proved inconclusive to the Trial
Examiner , who professes no qualifications as a handwriting expert
"The court approved the rule set forth in Cumberland Shoe
Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, and reaffirmed in Levi Strauss and
Company, 172 NLRB No. 57, stating in part that, "Employees should be
bound by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is
deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words
calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above
his signature There is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card
that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him and then telling
him that the card would probably be used first to get an election."
used about an election , and though he did not remember
the exact language, he "guessed," or "it sounded to him,"
that it was to the effect that the only purpose was that
there would be an election.
Geroux's testimony was that he told the employees at
the March 23 meeting that they were to sign the cards if
they wanted Local 640 to represent them for the purpose
of collective bargaining and that the Union needed 51
percent of the employees to sign in order to request a card
check which would be made by some impartial party
comparing the signature on the card against those on the
payroll.
As is seen both Ward and Secor read the card and were
fully capable of understanding it. Indeed, Secor admitted
he understood that it was to get the Union in the store
and that he was authorizing the union to represent him
and Ward admitted he was told the cards would be sent to
some impartial person. I therefore find their testimony
was not of sufficient weight as to require the discrediting
of Geroux's, nor do I find it sufficient under the language
of Gissel, supra, to establish that the authorizations were
invalid. Furthermore, it may be noted that rejection of
those cards would in no way affect the Union's majority.
Respondent also cites testimony by Michael Polite and
William Valentine that their requests for return of their
cards were refused or ignored. The record showed,
however, that they were among the employees who were
interrogated concerning union cards and union meetings,
that Valentine was solicited by Weaver to report on union
meetings , and that Valentine was also one of the
employees who were told by Richmond that if the Union
came in the part-time employees' hours would be limited
to 24 hours a week or the part-time employees would be
replaced by full-time employees.
Under the foregoing circumstances the requests which
Valentine and Polite made can be directly attributed to
Respondent's campaign of unlawful conduct, Quality
Markets, Inc , 160 NLRB 44, 45-46, enfd 387 F 2d 20, 24
(C.A. 3). The Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that
the attempted revocation was a part of the Company's
Section 8(a)(l) violations and would not therefore support
a finding of good-faith doubt since such doubt was based
on the Company's knowledge that his illegal tactic had
been at least partially successful.
I therefore conclude and find on the entire evidence
that on March 21 the Union represented 27 employees in
a unit which included 44 and that on April 1 it
represented 30 employees in a unit of 43.
3. The requests and the refusal , the issue of a
bargaining order
The Union made its initial request to bargain by letter
of March 21 and stated it was prepared to prove its
"substantial majority" by submitting the authorization
cards to a mutually satisfactory impartial party for
checking against Respondent's records. Respondent
rejected the request by letter of March 27, representing
that it had "some serious doubt" about the majority and
raising certain questions (resolved in section 1, supra)
concerning the appropriate unit. Stating further a desire to
have the Board resolve both the unit and the majority
questions, Respondent informed the Union it was filing a
representation petition with the Regional Director.
The Union renewed its request to bargain by letter of
March 31 and included photocopies of 30 signed
authorization cards to resolve any doubt of majority It
pointed out further that the unit it was seeking was a
THE COPPS CORPORATION 301
typical one for Respondent's type of operation, but stated
that even were minor changes made in that unit, it would
still represent a majority Respondent 'effected that request
on April 2.
There remain questions whether that action was
unlawful under Section 8(a)(5) and, if so, whether an
order to bargain should be issued to remedy the violations
herein found. The question of alleged good-faith doubt of
majority need not detain us, for that became irrelevant
under the findings made in section B and C, supra." See
the discussion, infra , of N L R B v Gissel Packing
Company, Inc , 395 U.S. 575.
Respondent's unit contentions have been disposed of in
sections 1 and 2, supra. but even assuming they were
advanced in good faith that fact would furnish no defense
to a refusal to bargain finding since the requested unit was
an appropriate one N L.R B v. Primrose Supermarkets,
353 F.2d 675, 676 (C.A. 1), cert. denied 382 U.S. 830;
Florence Printing Co v. N L.R B , 333 F.2d 289, 291
(C.A. 4); United Aircraft Corp v. N.L R B. 333 F 2d
819, 822 (C A 2), cert. denied 380 U S. 910; N L R.B v.
Quality Markets, Inc , 387 F 2d 20, at fn 3 (C A. 3),
l^ L.R.B v. Keystone Floors, Inc , 306 F.2d 560, 563-564
(C.A. 3).
We thus reach the question whether the issuance of a
bargaining order is warranted under the circumstances in
this case.
The controlling principles for cases like the present
were definitively established by the Supreme Court in
N L R B v. Gissel Packing Company, Inc, 395 U.S. 575
The question of good-faith doubt is largely irrelevant An
employer can insist that a union go to an election,
regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not
guilty of misconduct and he need give no affirmative
reasons for rejecting a recognition request He may either
request the Union to file an election petition or file one
himself, as Respondent did here. But the Court held that:
If, however, the employer commits independent and
substantial unfair labor practices disruptive of election
conditions, the Board may withhold the election or set
it aside and issue instead a bargaining order as a
remedy for various violations.
Respondent argues that even assuming unfair labor
practices were to be found, its conduct falls within the
category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices,
mentioned by the Court, "which, because of their minimal
impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a
bargaining order." Id.
But here as in General Stencils, Inc , 178 NLRB No
18, Respondent engaged in widespread unfair labor
practices during the Union's organizing drive and both
before and after receiving the Union's demand for
recognition As in that case Respondent's serious and
extensive unfair labor practices, despite its attempted
invocation of the election machinery, tended to destroy the
employees' free choice and to frighten them into
withdrawing their allegiance from the Union. Such
conduct was plainly of such a nature as to have a
lingering effect and to make a fair and coercion-free
election quite dubious if not impossible. See also
Production Industries, Inc., 178 NLRB No. 112;
N L.R B v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, Inc, 72 LRRM
2391, 2396 (C.A. 2), decided October 1, 1969, enfg 170
"It may be noted, however, that Landerman 's testimony established no
reasonable basis for his claimed doubt and that Respondent apparently
concedes the fact of an actual majority by arguing in its brief that no
"overwhelming majority" was shown to be in favor of the Union
NLRB No 99
I therefore conclude and find under the foregoing
circumstances that on balance the rights of the employees
and the purposes of the Act would be better effectuated by
reliance on the employee sentiments expressed in the
authorization cards rather than on the results of an
election. As the Union had secured authorization cards
from a majority of employees when it made its requests to
bargain, I find that by refusing the Union's requests and
engaging in the aforesaid unfair labor practices,
Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(5), and that an order requiring it to recognize and
bargain with the Union is appropriate to remedy its
violations of Section 8(a)(5), (1), and (3) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of the fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
Conclusions of Law
1. By interfering with, restraining and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
as proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By constructively discharging Larry Czechowicz,
Scott Byrne and Dennis Walker to discourage
membership in the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices as proscribed in Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
3. All employees, including regular full-time and
regular part-time employees of Respondent at its La
Crosse, Wisconsin, store, but excluding all bakery
department employees, all meat department employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
4. At all times on and after March 21, 1969, the Union
has been the exclusive representative of all employees in
said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and
other terms and conditions of employment.
5. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after
March 27, 1969, Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
as outlined below which I find to be necessary to remedy
and remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
For the reasons which are stated in Section D, (3),
supra, I find that imposition of a bargaining order is
essential to remedy the unfair labor practices and to
protect the statutory rights and interest of the employees.
Because of the scope and the extent of the unfair labor
practices found herein, I shall recommend a broad cease
and desist order
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Copps Corporation, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their union
membership, activities and sentiments , concerning the
identity of the leaders in the organizational activities and
concerning attendance at and the happenings at union
meetings.
(b) Warning employees not to attend union meetings.
(c) Soliciting employees to engage in surveillance of
union meetings and to report on the happenings.
(d) Promising wage increases to employees if the Union
should not come in.
(e) Threatening employees with reduction of or with
limiting their hours of work, with layoffs, and with more
onerous working conditions if the Union should come in.
(f) Informing employees that the limiting of their hours
of work is due to the organizing activities.
(g) Discouraging membership in the Union or in any
other labor organization by constructively discharging
them because of their union memberships and activities or
in any other manner discriminating against them in regard
to hire or tenure of employement or any term or condition
of employement.
(h) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of its employees in the unit
herein found to be appropriate
(i) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist the Union or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargain or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Upon request bargain with the Union as the
exclusive representative of all its employees in the unit
herein found to be appropriate with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Offer to Larry Czechowicz, Scott Byrne, and
Dennis Walker reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make
each of them whole for any loss of earnings he may have
suffered by payment to him a sum of money equal to that
which he would have earned from the date of his
constructive discharge to the date of the offer of
reinstatement, less his earnings during that period
(Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 240), said backpay
to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner
established by the Board in F W Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate
of 6 percent per annum. Isis Plumbing & Heating
Company, 130 NLRB 716.
(c) Notify Larry Czechowicz, Scott Byrne and Dennis
Walker, if they are presently serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective Service
Act and Universal Military Training and Service Act of
1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
(d) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, `social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due
under these recommendations.
(e) Post in its offices and store at La Crosse,
Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix B."' 4 Copies of said notice on forms to be
provided by the Regional Director for the 30th Region,
shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in
writing within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith 11
"In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read . "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A'
Opal Greene [C]
Jane Loeffler [C]
Kathy Nasseth [C]
Marge Caspersen
Joan Maule [C]
Joe Kuhn
Joan Hauser [C]
Roger Zager
Jack Schermerhorn [C]
Merry McLees
Mary Dellenbach [C]
Larry Czechowicz [C]
George Ann Phillips [C]
Patti Golba [C]
Ron Philpot [C]
Ken Melbye [C]
John Laufenberg [C]
(Rejected)
Ray Ward [C]
Ralph Garavalia [C]
Rose Osley [C]
Mike Adams
Mike Moen
Mike Pohle [C]
Gary Best
Jane Ritter [C]
John Robertson
Jerry Rothstein
William Valentine [C]
Carol Kopski [C]
Bruce Secor [C]
Tom Schnick [C]
Carlyn Snodgrass [C]
Dave Johnson [C]
Pete Hansen [C]
Michael Renehan
Austin Phillips [C]
Stanley Curtis [C]
James Sauer [C]
Kenneth Olson [C]
Dennis Walker [C]
Tom Bruley
Sandra Weissenberger
James Ablan [C]
Fred Johnson
'Stipulated unit employees as of March 21, with card signers being
designated by [C]. As of April I , the list was reduced by eliminating Jerry
Rothstein , who was no longer an employee Eliminated from the card
signers was Scott T Byrne, who was not within the unit either on March
21 or April I , and who did not sign a card until June I I
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
THE COPPS,CORPORATION 303
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board an Agency of the United States Government '
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning
their union membership, activities and sympathies,
concerning the identity of the leaders in the
organizational activity or concerning their attendance at
and the happenings at the union meetings.
WE WILL NOT warn our employees not to attend
union meetings.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to engage in
surveillance of union meetings and to report back on
the happenings
WE WILL NOT promise wage increases if the Union
should not come in
WE WILL NOT threaten to reduce or limit the hours
worked by employees nor threaten them with layoffs or
with more onerous working conditions if the Union
should come in.
WE WILL NOT inform our employees that the limiting
of their hours of work is due to the organizing
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or constructively discharge
employees because of their union membership or
activities to discourage membership in the Union nor
will we discriminate in any other manner against them
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the unit found to be appropriate.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with , restrain
or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist Retail Clerks' Union Local No. 640, affiliated
with the Retail Clerks' International Association,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing or to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection or to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act
WE WILL offer to Larry Czechowicz, Scott Byrne,
and Dennis Walker immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered as a result of our
discrimination against them in the manner provided in
the Trial Examiner's Decision
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with said
Local No. 640 as the exclusive representative of our
employees in the bargaining unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
and other conditions of employment and if an
agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed contract The bargaining unit is:
All employees including regular full time and regular
part time employees at our LaCrosse, Wisconsin,
store, but excluding all bakery department employees,
all meat department employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act
Dated By
THE COPPS
CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material
Any questions concerning this Notice or compliance
with its provisions, may be directed to the Board 's Office,
2nd Floor Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-272-3861.