The American National Red Cross, Great Lakes Blood Services Region and Mid-Michigan Chapter

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 5, 2011

07-CA-052033 (N.L.R.B. May. 5, 2011)

JD–27–11
Lansing, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS,
GREAT LAKES BLOOD SERVICES REGION
and MID-MICHIGAN CHAPTER
Cases 7-CA-52033
and 7-CA-52288
7-CA-52544
LOCAL 459, OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL 7-CA-52811
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO 7-CA-53018
and Cases 7-CA-52282
7-CA-52308
LOCAL 580, INTERNATIONAL 7-CA-52487
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Dynn Nick, Esq., and Robert A. Drzyzga, Esq.,
for the General Counsel
Michael J. Westcott, Esq. (Axley Brynelson, LLP), and
Fred W. Batten, Esq. (Clark Hill, PLC),
for the Respondents
Tinamarie Pappas, Esq. (Law Offices of Tinamarie Pappas),
for Charging Party OPEIU Local 459
Wayne A. Rudell, Esq. (Rudell & O’Neill, PC),
for Charging Party Teamsters Local 580
DECISION
Statement of the Case
JEFFREY D. WEDEKIND, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint in this
consolidated proceeding alleges that the Great Lakes Blood Services Region and the Mid-
Michigan Chapter of the American National Red Cross have violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and/or
(5) of the Act in numerous respects since November 2008, shortly before their most recent labor
agreements with OPEIU Local 459 and/or Teamsters Local 580 expired in early 2009.1
Allegations against the Region and/or the Chapter include failing to timely provide requested
information, unilaterally changing various benefits and past practices, failing to bargain in good
faith with respect to certain subjects, discriminatorily disciplining a union steward, and
unilaterally and discriminatorily denying accrued benefits to employees who had engaged in a
strike.2

1 The allegations are based on charges and amended charges filed and served on various
dates from April 23, 2009 through September 8, 2010, and are set forth in a Fourth
Consolidated Amended Complaint (fourth complaint) issued on September 10, 2010 (GC Exh.
1(dddd)), as further amended during the hearing (Tr. 9–14, 140–141, 350–351, 1978–1979; see
also Tr. 773–777).
2 The Respondents’ answers to the fourth complaint (GC Exhs. 1(nnnn) and 1(oooo)) assert
that the Regional Director’s consolidation of the cases against them was improper. However,
the chief administrative law judge previously denied the Respondents’ motions to sever the
Continued
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Following a prehearing conference, the cases were tried before me on 11 days over a 2-
month period from September 27 through December 2, 2010, in Lansing, Michigan. Thereafter,
on March 8, 2011, the General Counsel, the Charging Party Unions, and the Respondents filed
posthearing briefs.3
After considering the briefs and the entire record,4 for the reasons set forth below I find
that a preponderance of the record evidence supports most, but not all, of the General
Counsel’s allegations.
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent Region collects, processes, and distributes blood and related services.
The Respondent Chapter provides relief to victims of disasters and helps people prevent,
prepare for, and respond to emergencies. Both have offices in Lansing and facilities throughout
Michigan. The complaint alleges, the Respondents admit, and I find that the Respondents each
annually derive over $250,000 in revenue and sell and ship from their Lansing offices and
facilities goods valued over $50,000 directly outside Michigan, and that they are employers
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. See, e.g.,
Dane County Chapter, American National Red Cross, 224 NLRB 323 (1976). They also admit,
and I find, that Charging Parties OPEIU Local 459 and Teamsters Local 580 (hereinafter OPEIU
and Teamsters) are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Background
The American National Red Cross (ANRC) is a congressionally chartered organization
with a headquarters in Washington, D.C. and approximately 36 regions and 700 chapters
around the country. As indicated above, the regions provide blood services, and the chapters
_________________________
cases on March 30, 2010 (GC Exh. 1(sss)), after issuance of the second complaint, and the
Respondents did not seek special permission to appeal that ruling with the Board. Nor did they
renew their motions to sever after issuance of the fourth complaint (which differs significantly
from the second), at the hearing (during which the complaint was further amended), or in their
posthearing briefs. Thus, I can only speculate what the Respondents’ arguments might now be.
In any event, I find that the Respondents have failed to show that consolidation was an arbitrary
abuse of the Regional Director’s discretion, or that they suffered any prejudice as a result of the
consolidation. See generally Service Employees Local 87 (Cresleigh Mgt.), 324 NLRB 774,
774–776 (1997).
3 The Respondents’ counsel filed separate briefs, divided by allegation/issue. The brief filed
by attorney Westcott is cited as “West. Br.”, and the brief filed by attorney Batten as “Bat. Br.”
4 Where the record revealed substantial differences between witnesses as to significant
matters, I have specifically addressed them. As for other, less important differences or matters,
it may accurately be inferred that I credited the testimony cited, to the extent it supports my
factual findings, and discredited any contrary testimony. In making my credibility findings, I
considered, as appropriate, not only the demeanor of the witnesses, but their apparent interests,
if any, in the proceeding, and whether their testimony is corroborated or consistent with the
documentary evidence and/or the established or admitted facts. I have also considered
“inherent probabilities, ‘and reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the record as a
whole.’” Daikichi Corp., 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(unpub.), quoting Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996).
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provide disaster relief and emergency services. (Tr. 1299–1300; GC Exh. 1(lll) (attachments);
CPO Exh. 10.)
The Respondents in this case are a region and a chapter located in Michigan. Both
have their own IRS Employer Identification Numbers (Tr. 1761–1762), and are the alleged and
admitted employers in this proceeding.
The Charging Parties are two labor unions that represent certain of the Respondents’
employees in five separate units. The OPEIU represents the Region’s collections employees
and laboratory/clerical/distribution (LCD) employees, and the Chapter’s clerical/warehouse
employees. The Teamsters represents the Region’s apheresis employees and mobile unit
assistants (MUAs).
The most recent collective-bargaining agreements between the Respondents and the
Unions covering the five units expired in early 2009. The OPEIU agreements with the Region
and the Chapter were effective by their terms through March 30 and 31, 2008, but rolled over for
another year in the absence of a reopener (GC Exhs. 2–4, 23–24; Tr. 261, 393, 668–669, 687,
743). The Teamsters agreements with the Region were effective through April 30, 2009 (GC
Exhs. 5, 6).
The Region and the OPEIU began negotiations for successor contracts in late February
2009, about a month before the old contracts expired. The separate negotiations between the
Region and the Teamsters began a few months later, in late April 2009. The first Chapter
bargaining session with the OPEIU was in May 2009.
The chief negotiator/spokesperson for the Region and the Chapter with respect to all five
contracts was Sabin Peterson, the director of labor relations for the ANRC. The chief
negotiators for the Unions regarding their respective contracts were Lance Rhines, the service
representative for the OPEIU, and Lynn Meade, the business representative for the Teamsters.
Over the next 2 years, the parties held numerous bargaining sessions, either directly or
with the assistance of Federal and/or state mediators.5 Unfortunately, the negotiations were
unsuccessful; no new agreement had been reached in any of the five units as of the date of the
hearing in this proceeding.
III. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
As indicated above, the complaint alleges numerous 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) violations by
the Region and/or Chapter with respect to one or more of the units beginning shortly before and
continuing throughout the negotiations. Each of these allegations is addressed below, starting
with the 8(a)(5) allegations in early 2009.

5 See GC Exh. 39. There were relatively few bargaining sessions for the OPEIU chapter
unit. It is a very small unit, with only about 6 or 7 employees (compared to 70–75 in the LCD
unit and about 165 in the collections unit), and usually follows what the OPEIU region units do.
See GC Exh. 54; Tr. 259, 561–562, 734–735, 1757. There are approximately 12 employees in
the Teamsters apheresis unit, and 40 in the Teamsters MUA unit (Tr. 749).
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A. The 8(a)(5) Allegations
1. Region’s failure to timely provide requested information
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Region either refused to provide, or
unreasonably delayed providing, certain information requested by the OPEIU and Teamsters
during the contract negotiations.
a. Refusal to provide OPEIU with information requested on March 17 and 25, 2009,
regarding reduced demand for blood
The first of these allegations is that the Region unlawfully failed and refused to provide
the OPEIU with information it requested on March 17 and 25, 2009, regarding the reduced
demand for blood. For the reasons set forth below, I find that a preponderance of the evidence
supports this allegation.
At the very first negotiating session between the Region and the OPIEU for both units on
February 24, 2009, Peterson advised that there were going to be no improvements in the
contracts as everybody was “worth less this year than last due to the economy” (Tr. 338, 364–
366). He continued with this message at the next session on March 5 for the collections unit.
Indeed, he advised that the Red Cross would “need some significant concessions” from the
employees. In support, he cited certain “pressures” on the Red Cross. Specifically, he cited the
poor economy and resulting lower demand for blood (which he said occurred because people
were losing insurance and putting off having medical procedures performed). He also indicated
that competitors were charging less than the Red Cross for blood and were going after the Red
Cross’ donors and hospitals. (CPO Exh. 7; Tr. 366–369, 381–383, 549–550.)
In response to these statements, on March 17 Rhines sent a letter to Peterson
requesting information, on behalf of the collections unit, regarding the amount of blood products
purchased from, and exported by, the Region over the last 2 years; the projected amount of
blood products to be purchased from, and exported by, the Region over the next 2 years; and
the current price for blood products purchased from the Region (GC Exh. 42). On March 25,
Rhines sent an identical letter to Peterson on behalf of the LCD unit (GC Exh. 43), as Peterson
had made clear that concessions would be sought in that unit as well (Tr. 371.)
On March 27, the Region submitted a written response to the Union (Tr. 1546–1547).
The response denied that Peterson had ever linked the reduction in demand for Red Cross
products to the concessions sought by the Region, i.e. that he had ever stated that a major
reason for seeking concessions was that the economy had caused a reduction in the demand
for blood. The response further stated that:
To the extent you have misunderstood our position, we will be explicit. The
concessions we are seeking are unrelated to the current economic recession or
to demand for our products. Rather, we are seeking concessions because we
are unwilling to continue making payments for what we see as nonproductive or
nonvalue added activities.
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The response advised that the requested information was therefore “not relevant to bargaining.”
It also asserted that the information was “confidential, proprietary data.” Accordingly, it denied
the Union’s request for both reasons. (GC Exh. 44.)6
In agreement with the General Counsel, I find that the Region unlawfully refused to
provide the requested information. Contrary to the Region’s contention, the information was
clearly relevant to bargaining; it became so when Peterson specifically cited the reduced
demand for blood and price competition as support for the Region’s need for significant
concessions. See generally Kraft Foods North America, 355 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 3 fn. 6
(2010), and cases cited there. See also General Electric v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177, 1184 (6th
Cir. 1972).7 The Region’s subsequent denial that Peterson had done so―after receiving the
Union’s information requests―is contrary to a preponderance of the credible evidence,
including the Region’s own, detailed bargaining notes and the Red Cross’ direct
communications to employees during the same time period. See CPO Exh. 7 (Region’s
bargaining notes of March 5 session); and GC Exhs. 7 and 58 (October 2008 and April 2009
memos from ANRC CEO Gail McGovern notifying employees that certain “cost-cutting” changes
in the existing medical and retirement plans were “essential” due to the economic downturn and
expected decline in fundraising revenue and “softening in the demand for blood”).
The Region’s “explicit” statement in its March 27 response that the concessions it was
seeking had no relationship to the economy or demand for blood, but were sought solely to
increase productivity and value, is therefore equally incredible and unworthy of belief.
Accordingly, it was insufficient and ineffective to shed the Region’s duty to substantiate its
original claims on request. See Chemical Workers v. NLRB, 467 F.3d 742, 752–754 (9th Cir.
2006); and C-B Buick, 206 NLRB 6, 7 (1973), enfd. in relevant part 506 F.2d 1086 (3rd. Cir.
1974).
The Region has also failed to show that it has a legitimate and substantial confidentiality
interest in the information. Although it summarily asserted that the information was
“confidential/proprietary data” in its March 27 response, it presented no evidence or argument in
this proceeding to support that claim. See Southern New England Telephone Co., 356 NLRB
No. 62, slip op. at 12 (2010), and cases cited there (blanket claims of confidentiality are not
sufficient; the party asserting confidentiality must show that such interests are legitimate and
substantial). Further, as noted by the General Counsel, it is uncontroverted that the Region’s
CEO had voluntarily disclosed specific pricing information to Rhines in the past (Tr. 375).
Moreover, it is also uncontroverted that the Region never made any effort to seek an
accommodation with the Union to protect its asserted confidential/proprietary interests (Tr. 381).
Contrary to the Region’s unsupported contention in its posthearing brief, the Region, not the
Union, had the duty to seek an accommodation. See id.

6 The response on its face indicates that it was responding to the March 25, 2009
information request on behalf of the LCD unit. Peterson testified that he had prepared a similar
response to the identical March 17 request on behalf of the collections unit, but he inadvertently
forgot to send it, and the Union never questioned him further about it (Tr. 1546–1547).
7 The General Counsel does not contend that the subject information was presumptively
relevant.
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b. Delay providing Teamsters with information requested on May 11, June 10, and
July 31, 2009 regarding employee health insurance
The General Counsel also alleges that the Region unlawfully delayed providing the
Teamsters with information it requested on May 11, June 10, and July 31, 2009, regarding
employee health insurance. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the Region violated the
Act in this regard as well.
Each year, all Red Cross employees, both union and nonunion, are offered a choice of
medical insurance plans. This occurs every October/November, during a so-called “open
enrollment” period, when each employee is provided a list of available options for the upcoming
calendar/benefit year (Jan. 1–Dec. 31) and allowed to select the particular options he/she
desires. Planning for the annual open enrollment typically begins in the spring, i.e. in February
or March. The ANRC’s benefits staff reviews the most recent claims data and trends to
establish rates for the self-insured plans. It also collects plan design changes and rates from
the fully insured plans. In addition, the staff attempts to negotiate more favorable rates with the
plan administrators. The target date to have all changes set is July. August is then devoted to
“unit selection,” during which each region and chapter identifies the options it will provide to its
employees. The “open enrollment” materials are then prepared in September and early October
for distribution to the employees.
Starting with the 2008 benefit year, the open-enrollment offering was referred to as
“BenefitsAdvantage.” It included three national Blue Cross Blue Shield self-insured options: an
EPO (exclusive provider organization) and a standard and a premium PPO (preferred provider
organization). It also included additional plans limited to certain geographical areas and other
fully insured options pursuant to local collective-bargaining agreements. Thus, pursuant to the
provisions of the Region’s 2005-2009 collective-bargaining agreements with the Teamsters
covering the MUA and apheresis units, employees in those units were offered several options in
addition to the three national EPO and PPO options. (Tr. 204–206, 221–226, 239–246, 908–
910, 1401–1406, 1411–1413, 1720–1721, 1800–1810, 1839–1840; GC Exhs. 5, 6, 182.)
However, at the first negotiating sessions for the MUA and apheresis units in late April
2009, Peterson advised the Union that it was very cumbersome for the Red Cross to have
hundreds of healthcare contracts all over the country; that the Red Cross wanted to have just
one national plan or group of plans that all employees participated in. He therefore proposed
replacing the insurance provisions in the expiring contracts with so-called “me too” language
providing that the unit employees would be “eligible to participate in the same group insurance
plans, under the same terms and conditions, as offered to the Region’s non-bargaining unit
employees” (GC Exhs. 92, 97; Tr. 794–795, 999).
Thereafter, on May 11, 2009, Meade sent a letter to Peterson, on behalf of both units,
requesting certain information relating to health insurance. Specifically, the letter requested
“summary plan documents and costs for each of the health care plans offered to any
management and nonmanagement personnel employed by the American Red Cross.” (GC
Exh. 101.)
Peterson responded on June 10 (GC Exh. 108). He stated that the Union’s request for
information regarding nonunit employees was not presumptively relevant; however, the request
would be reconsidered if the Union explained how such information was relevant. As for the
other requested information, he noted that the Red Cross had already provided the Union with
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the 2009 benefit-plan information applicable to Region employees in March, before bargaining
began (R. Exh. 40).8 He also noted that the Union had been provided with a disk containing all
the updated group insurance summary plan descriptions (SPDs) on May 21 (GC Exh. 102).
Finally, he advised that future rates and costs for the 2010 plans would be provided when the
information became available after July 1.
Meade replied later that day with another information request (the second request at
issue here). She again requested “costs for each healthcare plans offered to all American Red
Cross employees,” including the “total cost of the plans that is charged to the American Red
Cross.” She explained that “information of cost(s) for union and non-union employees and
management is relevant to these bargaining negotiations to be able to determine total cost(s)
per employee in [sic] able to justify standardization of costs and to be able to compare what is
currently being offered with any potential cost savings plans.” (GC Exh. 109; Tr. 824–828.)
Peterson responded later the same day. He reiterated that the Red Cross would have
no additional information to provide the Union until after July 1. (GC Exh. 110.)
Thereafter, on July 24 (by email) and 29 (by hand-delivery), Peterson did, in fact, provide
Meade with information on the national EPO and PPO plans that the Region intended to offer its
employees during the upcoming open enrollment for the 2010 benefit year. The information
included both the plan designs and a “cost sharing strategy document” setting forth the
employer’s percentage share of the premium costs. Peterson advised Meade that she could
calculate the employer and employee shares of the premiums herself based on this information.
(R. Exhs. 25–26, 28–29).9
Peterson’s response, however, did not include information on other regional or local
plans that would be offered to other Red Cross employees around the country for 2010.
Accordingly, a week later, at the next bargaining session on July 31, Meade submitted another
information request (the third request at issue here). The request specifically asked for “any
and all of the health insurance plans that will be offered to any American Red Cross employee
starting January 1, 2010 regardless of region or locality,” including “what each and every plan is
and the cost to the American Red Cross and what the cost-sharing fee structure [is] for each
and every employee.”

8 Meade initially testified that she could not recall being provided with this information (Tr.
1045). However, the record shows that the Region’s human resources (HR) supervisor,
Timothy Smelser, advised her by email on March 9 that the insurance binder was complete and
available (R. Exh. 30). Further, although Meade refused to admit that she received Smelser’s
email, testifying only that she “might” have received it (Tr. 1046), on further examination she
admitted that she did go and pick up the insurance information (Tr. 1047). Accordingly, to the
extent there is any ambiguity or conflict in the record on this question, I credit Smelser and find
that Meade did, in fact, receive the information from him in March (Tr. 1939, 1981).
9 Meade denied or refused to admit that she received this information from Peterson or
anyone else in management, either by email or in person, claiming that she only got it because
Rhines forwarded his copy to her (Tr. 846–847, 1023–1024, 1051, 1113, 1031, 1036, 1042,
1140; GC Exh. 115). However, I discredit Meade’s testimony in this regard as it is contrary to
both the cited documentary evidence and inherent probabilities. Further, she has a history of
claiming that she did not receive emails from management, only to later admit that she did so.
Compare R. Exh. 36 with R. Exh. 37 and Tr. 1054–1055. See also fn. 8, above.
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Meade’s July 31 request also sought two additional types of information: 1) enrollment
information, i.e. the total number of American Red Cross employees enrolled in any local,
regional or national health insurance program”;10 and 2) demographic information on every
employee currently enrolled locally, regionally, and nationally, including the employee’s name,
social security number, age, sex, and race. It explained that the above information was
necessary “in order to do an accurate cost analysis of health insurance plans” and to “evaluate
the Employer’s proposal with regard to healthcare and to formulate counter-proposals.” (GC
Exh. 162; see also Meade’s follow-up email the same day, GC Exh. 127.)11
The Union received no response to this request until the parties’ next meeting on August
24. Peterson at that time advised Meade that it would be “very difficult” to obtain such
information (Tr. 881). Eventually, however, on October 23 (the Friday before open enrollment
for 2010 began), the Region’s human resources (HR) manager, William Smith, emailed Meade
the requested information regarding plan designs and rates and enrollment data. The
information revealed that, in fact, the ANRC would be still be offering several regional fully-
insured Kaiser plans in certain states or regions for 2010, in addition to the national EPO and
PPO plans. When Meade inquired about why the ANRC was doing this if it wanted all
employees to be in the same plan or group of plans, Peterson advised that the ANRC wanted to
continue offering the Kaiser plans where it was a good value. (GC Exhs. 137–150; Tr. 953–961,
998, 1531–1534, 1571).
Approximately a month later, on November 24 (after open season had ended), Peterson
emailed Meade the demographic information as well. It included a list of every Red Cross
employee (albeit by a code number rather than by name), and identified their gender, date of
birth, type of medical coverage, and state. Regarding the delay, Peterson explained that he did
not realize the Union was still requesting the data, but was advised by legal counsel that it
was.12 (GC Exhs. 8, 151, 151(a); Tr. 964–975, 1578–1581.)
Based on the foregoing facts, in agreement with the General Counsel, I find that the
Region unlawfully delayed providing the information regarding all Red Cross employees that the
Union requested in each of its three requests on May 11, June 10, and July 31. First, the
Region itself made the information regarding health insurance plans in other geographical areas
relevant by asserting, in support of its “me too” proposal at the first bargaining session, that the
ANRC wanted to eliminate all such local plans around the country and have all Red Cross
employees participate in the same national plan or plans. Both Peterson and Anna Shearer, the
ANRC’s vice president of HR enterprise services, acknowledged that one of the reasons the
Region wanted this was to cut costs and obtain greater value for the money (Tr. 1408, 1599).
In these circumstances, the relevance of the requested plan design, cost, enrollment, and
demographic information in other geographical areas should have been apparent to the Region

10 Meade’s original, May 11 request had asked for the enrollment data in plans offered to the
Region’s employees, and Peterson’s June 10 response provided that information. Thereafter,
on July 27, Meade also requested national enrollment information (GC Exh. 116), and the
Region’s HR manager, William Smith, emailed her the enrollment data for the national PPO and
EPO plans the following day (GC Exh. 118). However, Smith did not provide enrollment data for
other plans offered to Red Cross employees around the country (Tr. 845).
11 The same day, the Union filed the unfair labor practice charge in Case 7-CA-52282
alleging that the Region was unlawfully refusing to provide information regarding health benefits
(GC Exh. 1(g)).
12The Union had filed an amended unfair labor practice charge on October 30 regarding the
Region’s failure to timely provide information (GC Exh. 1(y)).
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without requiring any further explanation from the Union (especially since, as indicated above,
the ANRC was planning to offer several regional plans in 2010 in addition to the national EPO
and PPO plans). In any event, the Union’s explanations on June 10 and July 31 why it was
seeking such information were sufficient to demonstrate the relevance of its request. See
generally Castle Hill Health Care Center, 355 NLRB No. 196, slip op. at 39 (2010), and cases
cited there.
Second, the Region has failed to provide an adequate explanation for the long delays in
providing the information to the Union. As indicated above, the Region did not provide the
requested information about plan designs and costs for all Red Cross employees (for either
2009 or 2010) until October 23―over 5 months after Meade’s initial May 11 request, over 4
months after her second, June 10 request, approximately 3 months after the 2010 information
became available in July, 2 1/2 months after the Union filed the unfair labor practice charge on
July 31, and the last business day before open enrollment for 2010 began. It also did not
provide the enrollment data until October 23, 2 1/2 months after it was requested. And it did not
provide requested demographic data until November 24, 4 months after it was requested, a
month after the Union filed its amended unfair labor practice charge on October 30, and after
the open season had ended. The Region’s assertion on August 24 that the information was
very difficult to obtain has never been supported with any explanation or evidence. Further, it is
belied, at least in part, by Peterson’s admission in his November 24 email that he did not even
begin compiling the demographic information until the Region’s attorney reminded him (most
likely after the amended unfair labor practice charge was filed on October 30) that the Union
was still waiting for it.
Accordingly, I find that the Region violated the Act as alleged. See, e.g., Comar, Inc.,
349 NLRB 342, 353 (2007) (4-month delay); El Paso Electric Co., 355 NLRB No. 71, slip op. at
50–51 (2010) (3-month delay); Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB 671 (1989) (2 1/2 month delay); and
Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000) (7-week delay).13
c. Failure to include the employees’ names with the demographic information
provided to the Teamsters in November 2009
As discussed above, the Region not only delayed providing the requested health
insurance demographic information to the Teamsters, but it also failed to include with that
information the names of any of the Red Cross employees, unit or nonunit. Rather, each
employee was identified only by a coded number. The General Counsel alleges that the
Region’s failure to include the requested names was unlawful.14 For the reasons set forth
below, I find merit in this allegation as well.

13 The scope of the General Counsel’s allegations, i.e. whether the General Counsel is also
alleging that the Region unlawfully delayed providing information on plans offered to the
Region’s unit and nonunit employees, is somewhat unclear from the complaint and posthearing
brief. In any event, to the extent the General Counsel is alleging that the Region unlawfully
delayed providing such information, I find that the facts fail to support that allegation.
14 The demographic information provided by Peterson also did not include each employee’s
social security numbers or race. However, neither the complaint nor the General Counsel’s
posthearing brief alleges or asserts that the Region unlawfully failed to include this information.
Although the complaint does appear to allege that the Region unlawfully failed to include each
employee’s age and gender, this information was, in fact, included with the information Peterson
emailed Meade in November (GC Exhs. 151 and 151(a)), and the General Counsel’s
posthearing brief does not address those issues either.
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The Region makes essentially two arguments with respect to this allegation. First, it
argues that the employees’ names are not relevant to their stated purpose; i.e. that names are
“not demographic in nature―no insurance proposals are influenced by an individual’s name.”
(Bat. Br. 9.) However, Meade explained why the Union needed the information when she made
the request on July 31. She provided a similar explanation at the hearing. Specifically, she
testified that the names would help the Union identify exactly which employees of which region
or chapter were in which plans. Although the information provided by Peterson included each
employee’s state, there could be differences in plans offered within each state. Together with
the various other information requested, this information would then permit the Union to do a
comprehensive analysis of all the various plans and to propose its own regional and/or national
plan or plans. (Tr. 872–875; 963–966.) The Region has not offered any reason why this
explanation is insufficient. Accordingly, I find that the information is relevant.
Second, the Region argues that the employees’ names were properly omitted to
preserve privacy. However, the Region did not specifically express this concern to the Union at
the time. Nor has it provided any explanation in this proceeding why merely disclosing what
medical plan an employee has chosen raises legitimate and substantial privacy concerns.
Indeed, although the open enrollment documents themselves (GC Exhs. 182, 183) discuss
employee privacy rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA),15 the Region does not cite those documents, HIPAA, or any other evidence or legal
authority, in support of its position. Accordingly, I find that the Region has failed to carry its
burden. See Comar, 349 NLRB at 351, 355 (rejecting employer’s argument that disclosing
nonunit employees’ health benefit and insurance information by name would violate their
privacy, as there was “no reason to believe that disclosure of the names would somehow reveal
medical history or other sensitive information about the individuals”; the employer “did not show
that nonunit employees objected to having the information regarding their individual terms and
conditions of employment shared with the Union”; and there was no evidence showing that the
employer “generally made special efforts to keep such information secret” within its facility, “or
that nonunit employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to such
information”). See also Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB at 737; and River Oak Center for Children,
345 NLRB 1335, 1336 & fn. 12 (2005), enfd. 273 Fed. Appx. 677 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpub.).
d. Failure to provide OPEIU with information requested on May 19 and 21, 2010
regarding transfer of telerecruiter work
Finally, the complaint alleges that the Region unlawfully failed to provide certain
information requested by the OPEIU on May 19 and 21, 2010. The requested information
concerned the Region’s announced plans to transfer telerecruiting work from the LCD unit to
one or more other facilities; specifically, a copy of a power point presentation regarding the
transfer, and the current number, wages, and benefits of employees in the telerecruitment
departments in the three other facilities under consideration. The Region admitted this
allegation at the hearing (Tr. 1487, 1498). Accordingly, I find that the Region violated the Act
as alleged.

15 Under the heading “Your Privacy Rights,” an attachment to the enrollment materials
states that protected health information (PHI) “may” include the fact that an employee is enrolled
in or has participated in a plan.
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2. Unilateral changes in benefits and past practices
As indicated above, the complaint also alleges that the Region and/or the Chapter
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by making various unilateral changes to certain benefits and
past practices beginning in late 2008.
a. Unilateral implementation of no-fault attendance policy in November 2008 (Region)
The first allegation is that the Region unlawfully implemented a “no-fault” attendance
policy in the collections and LCD units on November 17, 2008. More specifically, the General
Counsel alleges that the Region began more strictly enforcing its existing attendance policy by
disciplining unit employees for only three or four previously unscheduled absences or tardies
regardless of the reason (for example, even if the absence was for medical reasons and the
employee had accrued sick leave) (Tr. 1961, 1966, 1975). The General Counsel alleges that
the Region was obligated to provide the OPEIU with advance notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the change and its effects, but failed to do so.16 For the reasons set forth below, I
find that this allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Board has repeatedly held that an employer’s more stringent or consistent
enforcement of attendance and other personnel rules that it previously enforced in only a lax or
sporadic manner constitutes a significant change in mandatory terms and conditions of
employment requiring bargaining. See, e.g. United Rentals, Inc., 350 NLRB 951, 952 (2007);
Vanguard Fire & Security Systems, 345 NLRB 1016, 1017 (2005), enfd. in relevant part 468
F.3d 952, 962 (6th Cir. 2006); Hyatt Regency Memphis, 296 NLRB 259, 263 (1989), enfd. in
relevant part 939 F.2d 361, 372–373 (6th Cir. 1991); and Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals, 264
NLRB 1013, 1016–1017 (1982), enfd. 722 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983). The Region does not take
issue with this legal principle; nor does it contend that it actually gave the Union advance notice
and an opportunity to bargain. Rather, it denies that it ever implemented a new, no-fault
attendance policy or changed how the attendance policy was enforced (Tr. 1967–1968; Bat. Br.
16.)
The record evidence, however, indicates to the contrary. Thus, Kimberly Heintz, the
Region’s collections manager in late 2008, specifically acknowledged to Rhines that
management had instituted a new policy of disciplining employees for every three or four
occurrences, and that there would be no excused absences under the policy. 17 The Region’s

16 The General Counsel’s posthearing brief (pp. 140–141) also appears to argue that the
change violated the sick-leave and family-leave provisions of the OPEIU collective-bargaining
agreements (which were still in effect at the time). However, the complaint does not allege that
the change violated the contract or could not be implemented without the OPEIU’s consent, i.e.
it does not contain an 8(d) allegation. Further, the General Counsel did not otherwise give
sufficient notice of this theory during the trial, and the issue was therefore not fully litigated.
Accordingly, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to address the issue. See Baptist Hospital
of East Tennessee, 351 NLRB 71, 72 fn. 5 (2007).
17 The Region argues that Rhines’ uncontroverted testimony about his conversation with
Heintz should be discredited because he said the conversation occurred in January 2009 (Tr.
302, 305, 603–605, 732), but Heintz had voluntarily terminated her employment with the Region
on October 29, 2008 (R. Exh. 2; Tr. 1956). However, given the independent, documentary
evidence supporting the allegation, I find it more likely that Rhines’ memory of dates was simply
imprecise due to the passage of time (approximately 2 years) since the event.
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HR supervisor, Timothy Smelser, subsequently acknowledged this to Rhines as well during a
meeting regarding the discipline of an employee for attendance problems.18
The Region also communicated directly with its employees about the new policy during
this period. Thus, on October 8, 2008, the Region sent a memo to all employees in the
Teamsters’ MUA unit specifically acknowledging that unscheduled leave was being used
“frequently” and that “management has not [exercised] their right to enforce the use of
unscheduled” leave under the attendance policy set forth in the employee handbook.19 The
memo stated that “management’s expectation is that the [leave] will be scheduled”; that if leave
is called in after the schedule is posted, it will “automatically” be considered as unscheduled
leave; and that “excessive unscheduled [leave] will be subjected to progressive discipline.” It
notified the employees that it would “start enforcing the above guidelines on November 10,
2008.” (CPO Exh. 6.)20
The Region sent a similar memo regarding “unscheduled leave” to the employees in the
OPEIU collections unit on December 9, 2008. Again, the memo acknowledged that there had
been “excessive unscheduled leave”; that management had not been “consistent in the
supervision of staff calling in for unscheduled leave”; and that “the need to make further process
improvements to stabilize the collections team concept has become evident.” It stated that “the
expectation of management is that requests for time off will be scheduled on a routine basis”;
that “scheduled leave requests need to be submitted to the scheduler on or before the Monday
of the preceding week before the next schedule is to be posted”; and that “in the event these
requests are not approved and/or the staff calls in after the schedule is posted, then these
occurrences would be considered as unscheduled leave.” It notified the employees that “we will
start enforcing the above guidelines for the schedule posted for 1/12/09, and therefore all leave
requests must be submitted for approval by 12/22/08.” (GC Exh. 34).21

18 Again, it appears Rhines may have been mistaken regarding when this conversation
occurred. He testified that it occurred during a March 2009 grievance meeting over a
counseling that had been issued to an employee in the LCD unit (Villareal) in November 2008
for “three sick occurrences” and one tardy over the previous 3 months (Tr. 300–301, 306, 314–
317, 601, 732; GC Exhs. 29, 30, 32.) However, a series of emails submittted into evidence by
the General Counsel (GC Exh. 32) indicate that the conversation more likely occurred during a
similar meeting on January 5, 2009 regarding a different employee (Owens), and that Rhines
subsequently asked Smelser at the March 2009 Villareal meeting to verify whether there was, in
fact, a no-fault attendance policy. In any event, I find that the conversation occurred sometime
in early 2009. Indeed, Smelser never specifically denied that the conversation occurred
(although he had previously denied that the Region implemented a “no-fault” attendance policy
when he denied the Villareal grievance at the third step on April 10, 2009 (GC Exh. 36; Tr.
322)).
19 The policy, which was quoted in the memo, states: “The following offenses are not
acceptable while performing Red Cross business: - Excessive absenteeism, tardiness, or abuse
of sick leave . . .” (GC Exh. 37).
20 The complaint does not allege stricter enforcement of the attendance policy in the
Teamsters MUA unit. However, the memo generally supports Rhines’ testimony and the
General Counsel’s contention that the Region had been lax in enforcing the attendance policy
set forth in its employee handbook, and decided in late 2008 to change this practice.
21 Smelser had emailed Rhines a copy of this memo earlier the same day for “review.”
Rhines responded that he had a “concern” about “the Employee Handbook vs. the Contract,”
but “you certainly have the right to address proven abuses, either way,” and the Union would
“take them as they come.” (R. Exh. 4.) However, the memo did not specifically state that only
Continued
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The record indicates that, a few weeks later, on December 17, Smith, the Region’s HR
manager, also sent an internal management email to a collections supervisor (Vasuki Johnson)
discussing how to interpret and apply the attendance policy set forth in the handbook. Smith
advised her that “a general guideline on the definition of excessive absenteeism is that any
combination of three or more occurrences (unexcused absences and/or tardies) in a rolling 12-
month cycle is considered cause for disciplinary action,” and that “an unexcused absence is any
absence that was not scheduled and approved prior to the schedule going up unless the
supervisor otherwise approves a change and/or switch.” (GC Exh. 88.)
At the hearing, Smith attempted to minimize the significance of this internal memo,
stating that he was just explaining to Johnson, who had recently returned to the Region after
several years, what the Region’s “consistent” policy was (Tr. 2054–2055). However, he
admitted that the Region had been seeking to implement such a no-fault attendance policy for
some time; indeed, the Region had previously proposed it to the Union in 2006 or 2007 and the
Union rejected it (Tr. 2057). Further, as indicated above, the Region’s own memos to
employees in late 2008 indicate that the Region’s past interpretation and/or enforcement of its
attendance policy had not been “consistent.”22 Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find
that the Region’s unilateral decision, in late 2008, to begin consistently and automatically
disciplining employees for only three or four instances of unscheduled leave, regardless of the
reason, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act as alleged. 23
b. April 2009 unilateral change in past practice regarding union meetings (Region)
The complaint also alleges that, on April 9, 2009, the Region unilaterally changed its
past practice of allowing the OPEIU to hold union meetings on the premises. I find that this
allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence as well.
_________________________
three or four instances of unscheduled absences or tardies would warrant discipline regardless
of the reason, and there is no contention that this exchange constituted advance notice to, or
bargaining with, the Union over the decision to implement such a new policy.
22 The record indicates that the Region had also issued LCD-unit employee Villareal a
counseling approximately 6 months earlier, on May 1, 2008, because she had a total of four
tardies and sick absences during the previous month alone (R. Exh. 3). However, the record
does not reveal whether the counseling was successfully grieved or sustained. In any event,
the fact that Villareal was counseled in May 2008 in arguably similar circumstances is not
particularly significant under the above-cited legal precedent given that the Region’s
communications to both its employees and the Union in late 2008 acknowledged that the
Region had not been consistently disciplining employees in such circumstances, and that it was
going to “start” doing so.
23 The Region’s answer to the complaint (GC Exh. 1(oooo)) also asserts that this allegation
is barred by the Section 10(b) 6-months limitations period. However, the Region has not
pressed this affirmative defense in the Respondents’ posthearing briefs. In any event, it is
without merit. The OPEIU filed the charge alleging the violation on April 21, 2009 (GC Exh.
1(a)), within a few months of the Region’s December 9, 2008 memo to the collections unit
employees and Rhines’ subsequent conversation with Smelser, and only a few weeks after the
Region denied Villareal’s step-three grievance challenging her November 2008 counseling (see
fn. 18, above). Further, the Region has not met its burden of showing that the Union had “clear
and unequivocal notice” of the violation outside the 10(b) period. Broadway Volkswagen, 342
NLRB 1244, 1246 (2004), enfd. sub nom. East Bay Automotive Council v. NLRB, 483 F.3d 628
(9th Cir. 2007); Leach Corp., 312 NLRB 990, 991 (1993), enfd. 54 F.3d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
and Taylor Warehouse v. NLRB, 98 F.3d 892, 899 (6th Cir. 1996).
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As indicated above, It is well established that an employer may not make material and
substantial unilateral changes in past practices involving mandatory subjects of bargaining―and
this includes a past practice of allowing union meetings on the employer’s premises. See Dow
Jones & Co., 318 NLRB 574, 576 (1995), affd. 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (table). See also
New York Telephone, 304 NLRB 183 (1991). Here, there is no dispute that the Region
summarily denied the OPEIU’s request to hold an upcoming union membership meeting on its
premises in April 2009. Rather, the Region argues that there was no past practice of allowing
the OPEIU to do so.
Again, however, the record indicates otherwise. Elizabeth McGwin, a 28-year member
of the Union and a steward or alternate steward in the LCD unit since 2005, testified that the
Union holds at least one or two membership meetings every year (whenever a vote needs to be
taken); that the Union has always held membership meetings on the premises; and that the
Region had never before denied permission to hold them on the premises (Tr. 209). Rhines
essentially confirmed this, testifying that virtually all union meetings, except for an occasional
picnic or meeting at a restaurant, are held on the premises; and that, although the Region had
sometimes asked the Union to change the date or time, it had never actually denied the Union’s
request to hold a membership meeting on the premises (Tr. 286–287). Further, several union
notices from Rhines’ computer archive files were introduced into evidence indicating that
membership meetings were, in fact, held on the premises in April, September, and November
2007, and February 2009 (GC Exhs. 25–27; CPO Exh. 5; Tr. 286).
Finally, HR Manager Smith admitted that he could only remember one time that he had
denied a request: “a few years ago” when Rhines had wanted to use a room to hold a
“fundraising meeting for a state senator candidate” (clearly not a typical union membership
meeting to vote on internal union matters). (Tr. 2032.). Smith also admitted that there were no
exigent circumstances preventing the Union from holding a membership meeting on the
premises in April 2009. Indeed, he admitted that he denied the request only
because we were in negotiations, and we had heard all kinds of conversation
about past practices, and we didn’t want to establish a past practice at that point
in granting favors and using our facility with, at any point, any time . . . no choice
on our end (Tr. 2032).
Perhaps recognizing the evidentiary problems with its primary argument, the Region
alternatively argues that the Union waived its rights by failing to request bargaining after the
request was denied. However, this argument is also without merit. The Region did not notify
the Union that it intended to change its past practice; it summarily denied the request and
thereby effectively advised the Union that the practice had already changed (Tr. 212, 214; see
also GC Exhs. 19–21). In short, as indicated by the General Counsel, the Region’s response
was a fait accompli. Thus, the Union was not required to request bargaining to preserve its
rights under the Act. Dow Jones, 318 NLRB at 577.
Accordingly, in agreement with the General Counsel, I find that that the Region had a
“regular and longstanding” practice of allowing union membership meetings on the premises,
and that the employees “could reasonably expect the ‘practice’ to continue or reoccur on a
regular and consistent basis.” Sunoco, Inc., 349 NLRB 240, 244 (2007). I further find that the
Region unlawfully failed to provide the OPEIU with advance notice and an opportunity to
bargain before significantly changing this past practice by summarily denying, without any
substantial business justification, its request to hold a union membership meeting on the
premises in April 2009.
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c. January 2009 unilateral change in retiree medical program (Region and Chapter)
The complaint also alleges that, on January 1, 2009, both the Region and the Chapter
unilaterally discontinued the retiree medical program for current employees in the three
respective OPEIU units who were not yet eligible for retirement, as well as for those employees
hired thereafter. The complaint alleges that the Respondents were required to give the Union
prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the decision and the effects, and therefore
violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to do so.
The Respondents do not dispute that they made the alleged unilateral change effective
January 1, 2009. Nor have they argued that the change did not materially and substantially
modify a mandatory subject of bargaining.24 However, they assert that the Union waived its
rights because it had notice of the “proposed” change in late October 2008, approximately 2
months before it became effective, but admittedly failed to request bargaining. In support, the
Respondents cite KGTV, 355 NLRB No. 213 (2010); Bell Atlantic Corp., 336 NLRB 1076 (2001);
and Haddon Craftsmen, 300 NLRB 789 (1990), review denied sub nom. Graphic
Communications Union, Local 97B v. NLRB, 937 F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1991) (table). (West. Br.
51–53.) For the reasons set forth below, I reject the Respondents’ defense.
It is uncontroverted that neither the ANRC nor the Respondents directly notified the
Union of the change; the Union only learned of the change from a union steward, shortly after
the ANRC’s president and CEO, Gail McGovern, sent an October 28, 2008 memo to all
employees announcing both the January 1 change and a second change to occur on July 1,
2009 (discussed below). (Tr. 453, 665, 1816.) Further, the announcement to employees
indicated that the final decision to modify the program had already been made by the ANRC.
Thus, the subject line stated that the program had been “changed” and the announcement
explained in some detail why the ANRC Board of Governors had decided that the changes were
“necessary” (GC Exh. 58). In sum, the changes to the retiree medical program were announced
to the employees, not the Union, and as a fait accompli, not as “proposed” changes.
The cases cited by the Respondents are therefore clearly distinguishable. Thus, in all
three cases, the employer directly notified the union, and did so before (Haddon) or at
approximately the same time (KGTV and Bell Atlantic) that it notified the employees. See Roll
and Hold Warehouse and Distribution Corp., 325 NLRB 41, 42 (1997) (expressly distinguishing
Haddon on the ground that “notice was given to union officials either in a meeting or in a letter
before general notice was given to employees”), enfd. in relevant part 162 F.3d 513, 519–520
(7th Cir. 1998). Accord: Defiance Hospital, 330 NLRB 492 (2000). See also Gratiot Community
Hospital v. NLRB, 51 F.3d 1255, 1259–1260 (6th Cir. 1995). Further, in KGTV, the
simultaneous notices were consistent with the provisions of the parties’ contract. Similarly, in
Bell Atlantic, there were other, independent circumstances to support giving the employees
virtually simultaneous notice; moreover, the employer otherwise made clear in its
communications to the union that it was willing to explore alternatives. Thus, unlike here, there
was insufficient objective evidence in those cases that the employer had no intention of
bargaining with the union or changing its mind.

24 As indicated by the General Counsel, it is well established that an employer is obligated to
bargain over future retirement benefits of current unit employees. See Chemical Workers Local
1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See also Southern Nuclear Operating Co.,
348 NLRB 1344, 1350 (2006), enfd. in part and vacated in part 524 F.3d 1350, 1356 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
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In any event, in agreement with the General Counsel, I find that the Respondents have
failed to establish that the Union had sufficient notice prior to implementation that the changes
would actually apply to the unit employees. See Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB 373, 374
(1991), enfd. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (table); and Gratiot Community Hospital, 51 F.3d at
1260 (union has no duty to request bargaining over a proposed change until it receives “clear
and unequivocal” notice). The uncontroverted evidence shows that Rhines reasonably believed
at the time of the announced changes that the January 2009 change would not apply to the unit
employees. Thus, all three of the OPEIU contracts contained specific provisions stating that the
Region and Chapter “shall” pay a percentage of the Medicare supplement or regular premium
(or the equivalent) for retirees, and all three of the contracts were effective until the end of
March 2009 (GC Exhs. 2–4, art. 31, sec. 3). In addition, the ANRC had a history of sending
announcements to all Red Cross employees even when they did not apply to employees
covered by collective-bargaining agreements (Tr. 587–588.) Further, ANRC Vice President
Shearer testified that the changes to the retiree medical plan were not, in fact, applicable where
there were specific provisions in collective-bargaining agreements (Tr. 1773).
Moreover, when Rhines formally requested Region HR Supervisor Smelser for
clarification in early February 2009 (GC Exh. 59)―because another steward had recently been
mailed something about the announced changes―Smelser orally responded either that he did
not believe the changes would apply, or that he did not know whether they would apply. And
when Rhines formally asked for clarification again on April 17, Smelser’s April 23 written
response did not include the announced changes to the retiree medical program among the
changes that impacted unit employees. (GC Exhs. 61, 62; Tr. 462–469, 690, 740–741.)
Thereafter, in mid-August, Rhines made another written inquiry to Smelser (GC Exh.
63)―again prompted by information received by a unit employee―and the two met about 2
weeks later, on August 25, to review the personnel files of several recent retirees. After
reviewing the files, Smelser again advised Rhines that he did not believe the changes had been
implemented by the Region. (Tr. 464, 471–472). However, in December, a recent retiree
notified Rhines that his insurance costs had gone “way up” (Tr. 475). Accordingly, Rhines again
contacted Smelser (GC Exh. 65). In response, on February 16, 2010, Smelser informed Rhines
that the Region had, in fact, adopted the new national plan and was applying the change to the
unit employees effective January 1, 2009 (Tr. 477–479; GC Exh. 66).25
As for the Chapter, Rhines admittedly did not communicate directly with it regarding the
announced changes to the ANRC retiree medical program. However, he testified that he
typically deals with the Region regarding national issues because the Chapter does not have its
own human resources department and usually follows along with what the Region does on such
issues. (Tr. 690, 736–738.) Further, Cynthia Richmond, the Chapter’s COO (who serves as the
Chapter’s HR person and works in the same office building as the Region’s HR staff),
acknowledged that even she did not know whether the changes to the retiree medical program
applied to the unit employees until 6 months prior to the November 2010 hearing in this
proceeding (Tr. 1261–1262).

25 Smelser at that time also attached an 8-page fact sheet about the changes that Rhines
had previously requested, which was dated a year earlier, in March 2009. At the very end of the
last page, the fact sheet stated:
Employees who are in a collective bargaining unit are subject to the terms of their
collective bargaining agreement. Bargaining unit employees should consult with
their human resource representative or collective bargaining representative for
specific information on how these changes affect their individual situations.
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In sum, even if the January 2009 change to the ANRC program was only a “proposed”
change in late October 2008, it was plainly not a “proposed” change when the Union finally
received clear and unequivocal notice that the change would apply to the unit employees; by
that time the change had already been effective for over a year. Clearly, in these
circumstances, the Union did not waive its rights by not requesting the Respondents to bargain
over the change. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals, 264 NLRB at 1017–1018. 26
The Respondent Region also asserts various other affirmative defenses to this
allegation: that the January 2009 change was “covered by” and permitted under the terms of the
extant collective-bargaining agreements; that the Region had a sound arguable basis for
believing that it was contractually privileged to make the change; and that the Union
contractually waived the right to bargain over the change.27 However, the Region has not
argued these defenses in the Respondents’ posthearing briefs. In any event, I find that they are
without merit.
Under well-established Board precedent, a waiver of the statutory right to bargain must
be “clear and unmistakable”; the fact that a matter may be “covered by” the contract is
insufficient. Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007). Some courts,
however, have adopted the opposite view, i.e. they have rejected the Board’s “clear and
unmistakable waiver” standard in favor of the less-stringent “contract coverage” test. See Bath
Marine Draftsmen’s Assn. v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2007); Postal Service v. NLRB,
8 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1993); and Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 974 F.2d 933 (7th Cir.
1992). See also Automatic Sprinkler v. NLRB, 120 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 1997).
As indicated above, the Region’s answer appears to assert that the subject change was
lawful under both standards. However, the particular contractual language the Region relies on
is unclear. In his opening statement, the Respondents’ counsel stated only that “the contract
language” permitted the change (Tr. 123). And, as noted above, the issue is not even covered
by the Respondents’ posthearing briefs.
Nevertheless, the logical place to look is the language in article 31 (Retirement) of the
contracts (GC Exhs. 3, 4), the article where the contractual obligation to pay retiree medical
benefits is set forth.28 In relevant part, Section 1 of that article states as follows:
Employees covered under this contract will receive the same retirement benefits,
savings plan, including the American Red Cross Savings Plan (a 401-k plan) and
403(b) plan as other employees at the Great Lakes Region. The American Red
Cross has the right to amend the Retirement System, Savings Plan and 403(b)

26 The Respondents also assert that the allegation regarding the January 2009 change is
barred by the 10(b) limitations period, inasmuch as the underlying charge (GC Exh. 1 (qqq))
was not filed until March 22, 2010. However, for the same reasons discussed above, I find that
the Respondents have failed to show that the Union had clear and unequivocal notice of the
violation more than 6 months prior to the charge. See cases cited at fn. 23, supra. See also
Concourse Nursing Home, 328 NLRB 692, 694 (1999) (Section 10(b) will not bar a charge
where the employer has sent conflicting signals or engaged in ambiguous conduct).
27 Unlike the Region, the Chapter (which is represented by the same counsel) does not
assert any of these additional defenses in its answer.
28 Each of the five, now-expired OPEIU and Teamsters contracts contain a general
“management rights” provision; however, the Respondents do not rely on those provisions with
respect to any of the allegations in this case. See, e.g., Tr. 126.
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plans in its discretion. The provisions of these plans are fully set forth in separate
summary plan descriptions.
In addition, after setting forth the specific retiree medical benefits the Region “shall” pay, Section
3 states:
In the event that the [Region] begins participating in a retirement health plan
sponsored by the [ANRC], the [Region] may in its discretion choose to substitute
such plan for the coverages described above in this section.
The foregoing provisions fail to support the Region’s defense under either standard.
Although the phrase “retirement benefits” in the first sentence of section 1 appears broad
enough to include retiree medical insurance, as indicated above section 3 of the same article
contains specific provisions requiring the Region to pay certain retiree medical benefits for unit
employees, without apparent regard for whatever the Region pays for nonunit employees.
Further, the second sentence of section 1, which expressly addresses the Region’s “right to
amend,” only refers to the “retirement system.” Respondents’ own witnesses testified that the
“retirement system” means only the defined pension plan and does not include the retiree
medical program (Tr. 1266, 1329, 1777). Moreover, as noted, the Region has not specifically
cited section 1 in support of its defense.29 Finally, the above-quoted language in Section 3,
which follows the specific provisions of the retiree medical plan, only permits the Region to
“substitute” a different plan sponsored by the ANRC for the previously negotiated coverages; it
does not permit the Region to eliminate future retiree medical benefits altogether. In sum, the
contract language does not “clearly and unmistakably” waive the OPEIU’s right to bargain over
such changes, and to the extent it “covers” the matter, it indicates that the Region cannot make
such changes unilaterally.
Accordingly, I find that the Region and the Chapter violated the Act as alleged by failing
to provide the OPEIU with advance notice and an opportunity to bargain over the January 2009
change to the retiree medical program and its effects.
d. July 2009 unilateral change in retiree medical program (Region and Chapter)
The complaint also alleges that the Region and the Chapter unlawfully modified the
retiree medical program on July 1, 2009, after the contracts had expired, for those employees in
the OPEIU units who were currently eligible or nearing eligibility to retire. For the reasons set
forth below, I find that a preponderance of the evidence supports this allegation as well.
As indicated above, the July 2009 change to the ANRC retiree medical program was
announced to employees in the same October 28, 2008 notice that announced the January 1,
2009 change affecting ineligible employees. The change at that time was described generally
as follows:
Effective July 1, 2009, Medicare-eligible retirees will be provided coverage under
a plan design that better integrates with Medicare provisions. This plan will
generally provide a lower premium but will have some increased out-of-pocket

29 As discussed in the next section, the Respondents likewise do not specifically cite the
language in section 1 as justification for the July 2009 unilateral change in the retiree medical
program―even though they do specifically cite the language in section 3. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
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expenses for using healthcare services. Current retirement-eligible employees
and a specially defined group of employees close to meeting eligibility
requirements will have access to Red Cross-subsidized coverage when they
retire. Red Cross subsidies for retiree medical coverage are being restructured
and simplified, generally resulting in a reduction over time.
(GC Exh. 58.) A subsequent, March 2009 fact sheet described the change in more detail,
specifically advising employees that the Medicare Supplement plan would be “replaced” by a
“new” private fee-for-service (PFFS) plan and describing how it would affect future retirees’
premiums and costs (GC Exh. 60).
Again, the Respondents do not dispute that they applied this change to their unit
employees effective July 1, 2009, or that it constituted a material and substantial change.
However, they argue that the change did not involve a mandatory subject of bargaining. In
support, they cite ANRC Vice President Shearer’s testimony that it only impacted individuals
who were already retired and Medicare eligible (Tr. 1773). However, on its face, the July
change would likewise affect current employees when they retired; indeed, this is presumably
the reason that the ANRC discussed the change in the October 2008 memo and March 2009
fact sheet that it distributed to current employees. Thus, like the previous change in January, it
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. See fn. 24, supra.
The Respondents also assert several affirmative defenses to the allegation. As with the
January 2009 change, the Respondents assert that the OPEIU waived its rights because it
admittedly did not request bargaining after receiving notice of the July 2009 change in October
2008, when the ANRC announced it. However, for essentially the same reasons discussed
above, I find that this defense is without merit. Like the January 2009 change, the ANRC
announced the July 2009 changes to employees in October 2008 as a fait accompli. Further,
although this change to the ANRC program was not scheduled to become effective until July
2009, several months after contract expiration, Rhines’ inquiries to HR Supervisor Smelser in
early 2009, about whether the Region would apply the ANRC changes to the unit employees,
failed to yield a clear response. Moreover, as indicated above, on April 23 and August 25,
2009―both 5 weeks before and 7 weeks after the ANRC’s July 1 implementation date―
Smelser indicated to Rhines that the change would not be applied to the unit employees. It was
not until February 16, 2010, well after the change had been implemented by the ANRC, that
Smelser notified Rhines that, in fact, the Region had applied the change to the unit employees,
and provided him with the March 2009 fact sheet. Finally, Chapter COO Richmond admitted
that even she did not know that the change would be applied to unit employees until mid-
2010.30
Both of the Respondents’ answers also assert the same “contract coverage/sound
arguable basis/contractual waiver” defenses that the Region asserted with respect to the
January 2009 change to the retiree medical program. However, only the Region asserts this
defense in the Respondents’ posthearing briefs. The Region specifically cites the following
language from section 3 of article 31 of the Region’s contracts with the OPEIU previously
discussed above:

30 For the same reasons, I also reject the Respondents’ 10(b) defense to this allegation
(which, again, is not mentioned or discussed in their posthearing briefs).
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In the event that the [Region] begins participating in a retirement health plan
sponsored by the [ANRC], the [Region] may in its discretion choose to substitute
such plan for the coverages described above in this section. 31
The Region argues that, because “the changes . . . were made during the term of each of the
contracts (albeit effective postexpiration), the contract language applies and privileged
Respondent Region to act to substitute the Medicare supplement plan with the private-fee-for-
service plan” (West. Br. 54).
The problem with this argument is its premise. Although the record indicates that the
ANRC decided well before the end of March 2009 to make the future changes in its retiree
medical program, there is no contention or evidence that the Region was required by the ANRC
to participate in its retiree health plan or substitute the announced changes. Indeed, the
language of article 31, section 3 indicates to the contrary. See also R. Exh. 59 (the May 2005
American Red Cross Retirement Program News Bulletin), which states that employees are
eligible under the retiree medical plan if, among other things, their particular region or chapter
“participates in the Life & Health Benefits Plan.” Moreover, as discussed above, ANRC Vice
President Shearer admitted that the changes were not intended to apply where there were
specific, collectively-bargained retiree medical provisions.
Further, there is no evidence that the Region began participating in the new ANRC plan,
and/or chose to adopt or substitute the announced changes, during the terms of the contracts
pursuant to the reservation-of-discretion language in article 31, section 3. In fact, the objective
circumstances indicate the opposite. As discussed above, the Region did not advise Rhines
that it would apply the changes to unit employees until February 2010, after previously
indicating to the contrary in April and August 2009.
Finally, there is no evidence that the parties intended the reservation-of-discretion
language to survive expiration of the contract. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the
language constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to bargain over substitute
ANRC plans or changes of this kind (or “covered” the right to make such substitutions or
changes), the language was no longer operable at the relevant time for determining the parties’
rights and obligations under the Act. See E. I. Dupont de Nemours, Louisville Works, 355 NLRB
No. 176, slip op. at 2–4 (2010) (even a narrow contractual reservation of management
discretion does not survive contract expiration absent evidence that the parties intended it to
survive). 32

31 As noted above (fn. 29), the Region does not rely on the management-rights language in
section 1 of article 31.
32 The OPEIU’s posthearing brief (p. 53) concedes only that “the Union clearly and
unmistakably waived . . . the right to bargain over the substitution of the locally provided
Medicare subsidies with comparable subsidies under the National plan” (emphasis added). In
light of my findings above, it is unnecessary to address this issue. For the same reason, it is
also unnecessary to address whether, as suggested by the Respondents, article 31, section 3
waived the OPEIU’s right to bargain over prospective changes, i.e. changes adopted before, but
effective after, the contracts (including their reservation-of-discretion provisions) expired.
Compare Southern Nuclear Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
vacating in relevant part 348 NLRB 1344 (2006) (management rights provisions contained in or
incorporated into parties’ 1998–2001 contracts waived union’s right to bargain over future retiree
benefit changes announced in October 2000 but not effective until January 1, 2006), and
Mississippi Power Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.3d 605, 625 (5th Cir. 2002), denying enf. in part of 332
Continued
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As noted, the Chapter does not argue the foregoing defense in the Respondents’
posthearing briefs―even though its answer asserted the defense and its contract contains the
same language in article 3, section 3. In any event, I reject the defense for essentially the same
reasons above.33
The Respondents’ answers lastly assert that the July 2009 change was a continuation of
the status quo as defined by the provisions of the expired contracts and/or the Respondents’
past practice of unilateral changes. However, the Respondents have not cited any contractual
provisions or past changes, or offered any argument, in support of this defense. Indeed, the
defense was not even mentioned in either their opening arguments or their posthearing briefs
(even though, as discussed below, they did argue a similar defense with regard to other
unilateral change allegations). Accordingly, I find that they have failed to satisfy their burden of
proof. See Caterpillar, Inc., 355 NLRB No. 91, slip op. at 3 (2010) (the burden of proving that a
unilateral change was consistent with past practice is on the employer). See also Beverly
Health and Rehabilitation Services v. NLRB, 297 F.3d 468, 481 (6th Cir. 2002).
e. Unilateral changes in the 401(k) savings and pension plans
in May and July 2009 (Region and Chapter)
The complaint also alleges that the Region and the Chapter violated Section 8(a)(5) by
unilaterally suspending employer matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan on May 1,
2009, and closing the pension plan to new hires on July 1, 2009. The General Counsel alleges
that these changes were unlawfully implemented in all five of the units represented by the
OPEIU or Teamsters without providing the Unions prior notice or an opportunity to bargain. For
the reasons set forth below, I find that a preponderance of the evidence supports this allegation,
in whole or in part, in the three OPEIU units, but not the two Teamsters units.
The Respondents do not dispute that the changes were made in all five units, or that
they materially and substantially changed mandatory subjects of bargaining. However, they
assert several affirmative defenses. As with the changes to the retiree medical plan, the
Respondents first argue that the Unions waived their rights because they admittedly did not
request bargaining (West. Br. 19–27).34 For essentially the same reasons discussed above, I
reject this argument. Like the previously announced changes to the retiree medical plan, both
of these additional changes were announced to the employees in a memo from ANRC CEO
_________________________
NLRB 530 (2000) (reservation-of-rights clause “by its nature include[d] (or, at least fail[ed] to
exclude) prospective changes to medical insurance benefits of future retirees”), with Ryder/ATE,
331 NLRB 889 (2000), enfd. sub nom. First Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 22 Fed. Appx. 3 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (unpub.) (rejecting employer’s defense that change in attendance policy was permitted by
the contract’s management rights clause; although employer decided to implement, and
provided union with a copy of, the new policy during the contract term, the policy was not
implemented until after the contract and its management rights clause had expired).
33 As previously mentioned, Chapter COO Richmond admitted that even she did not know
that the change would be applied to unit employees until mid-2010.
34 Unlike with the retiree medical plan allegations, the Respondents did not actually assert
this waiver defense in their answers to the complaint or opening statements regarding these
allegations. However, both the General Counsel and the OPEIU anticipated and specifically
address the defense in their posthearing briefs (GC Br. 107–115; OPEIU Br. 38–39). In any
event, given my conclusion that the defense fails on the merits, it is unnecessary to decide
whether the defense is also untimely. See generally Trident Seafoods v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 111,
116–117 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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McGovern. The memo, dated April 2, 2009, advised the employees that the changes were
“essential” due to the economic downturn; that the ANRC had “no choice” but to make the
changes; and that the Board of Directors had already approved the changes after reviewing the
options (GC Exh. 7). Further, it is uncontroverted that neither the ANRC nor the Respondents
directly notified the Unions of the changes prior to notifying the employees.
Region HR Supervisor Smelser did eventually send a copy of the ANRC memo to
Rhines and Meade. However, he did not do so until almost 2 weeks later, on April 15. Further,
there is no evidence that he did so because the parties had begun, or were about to begin,
negotiating new contracts, or to otherwise provide the statutorily required advance notice and
opportunity to bargain. Indeed, his letter stated that he was simply responding to “questions”
that had been asked about the effect of the announcement on the Region’s existing collective-
bargaining agreements. And his response was that:
The American Red Cross intends to honor its existing agreements. Where the
agreements permit us to make the changes referred to by Ms. McGovern, we will
do so. (GC Exh. 61, and R. Exh. 107).
Moreover, it was not until April 23, a week before the change to the 401(k) plan was
scheduled to take effect (“the first paycheck of May”), that Smelser specifically informed Rhines
that the changes applied to the OPEIU unit employees. Again, he only did so at that time
because Rhines had formally asked him for clarification on April 17, after receiving the April 15
letter. And nothing in Smelser’s curt response indicated that the Region was prepared to
discuss alternatives before implementing the changes. (GC Exh. 62.) 35
In sum, a preponderance of the objective evidence indicates that, as with the changes to
the retiree medical program announced in October 2008, any request to bargain over the
changes to the pension and 401(k) plans would have been futile. It was therefore unnecessary,
under the Board and court precedent cited above, for the Unions to make a request.36
The Respondents’ answers also assert the same “contract coverage/sound arguable
basis/contractual waiver” defenses asserted in response to the allegations involving the retiree
medical plan. However, again, only the Region addresses these defenses in the Respondents’
posthearing briefs. Further, the only contractual provisions it cites in support are the

35 Meade testified that Smelser told her orally sometime prior to April 30 that he did not
know whether the changes applied to the Teamster units (Tr. 1106). Although Meade was an
evasive and less than fully credible witness overall (see, e.g., nn. 8 and 9, supra), I credit her
testimony in this regard. Her testimony was uncontroverted and Smelser’s initial
correspondence and delay in subsequently responding to Rhines indicates that he may very
well have been uncertain, at least until April 23, whether the changes could lawfully be applied
to the units.
36 The OPEIU alternatively argues that no request was necessary because a union is not
required to demand bargaining over individual proposed changes when the parties are engaged
in bargaining for an overall contract, citing, e.g., Pleasantview Nursing Home, 351 F.3d 747, 757
(6th Cir. 2003) (“In a negotiation, a party need not respond to every statement with a forceful
rejection and insistence on further bargaining; further bargaining is assumed and a waiver of the
issue will not be presumed unless it is clear and unmistakable.”). However, it is unnecessary to
address this alternative argument. It is undisputed that the changes here were not proposed at
the bargaining table prior to implementation. Indeed, as found above, there was no “proposal”
to make the changes at all; rather, they were announced as a fait accompli.
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“retirement” provisions in its contracts with the Teamsters covering the apheresis and MUA units
(West. Br. 27–33). Those provisions state as follows:
Section 1. The [Region] shall continue to participate in the retirement program of
the National Red Cross on the same basis as the present, or as it hereafter may
be amended by the National Red Cross.
. . . .
Section 3. The [Region] agrees that bargaining unit employees will participate in
any future 401(k) or 403(b) matching pension plan offered by the National Red
Cross on the same basis as other employees. (GC Exh. 5 (apheresis unit), art.
28; GC Exh. 6 (MUA unit), article 30).)
The Region argues that these contractual provisions “privileged, and indeed required” it
to make the changes to the 401(k) and pension plans (West. Br. 32). This does, in fact, appear
to be true; that is, although the ANRC does not require the regions and chapters to participate in
its national plans,37 the provisions of the parties’ contracts on their face require the Region to
participate in whatever 401(k) and pension plans the ANRC offers to employees. Thus, the
provisions state that the Region “shall” and “will” participate in the ANRC plans as offered or
amended by the ANRC. Unlike the contractual provisions relating to retiree medical benefits,
there is no discretion reserved to the Region in this respect. 38
However, the evidence shows (R. Exhs. 66, 82), and the Region acknowledges (Tr. 490;
West. Br. 20), that, while the changes to the national plans were adopted by the ANRC on or
before April 30 (the last effective date of the Teamsters contracts), the changes were not
effective, and the Region did not implement or apply them to the unit employees, until at least
May 1 and July 1, 2009, respectively. Thus, as the contract provisions were no longer in effect
on those dates, they did not require the Region to implement the changes―at least not as a
matter of contract law. See generally Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 206–
207 (1991).
As noted above, the Respondents do not cite any other contractual provisions in support
of these defenses (even though the OPEIU contract with the Chapter, contains the same
section-1 language, GC Exh. 2, art. 31, sec. 1). In any event, as indicated above, all of the
OPEIU contracts with the Region and Chapter expired even earlier, at the end of March 2009
(after rolling over for 1 year). Thus, for the same reason, I find that they did not privilege or
require the Region or Chapter to implement the changes.
Finally, the Respondents’ answers also again assert that the changes were lawful
because they continued the status quo as defined by the provisions of the expired contract
and/or the Respondents’ past practice of unilateral changes. For the reasons set forth below, I
find that this defense has merit, at least in part, with respect to some of the units but not others.

37 As with the ANRC retiree medical plan, individual regions and chapters are not required
by the ANRC to participate in the national 401(k) and pension plans. Although all the regions
have chosen to do so, approximately 200 chapters do not participate in the pension plan and
350 do not participate in the 401(k) plan. Further, some chapters have their own 401(k) plans.
(Tr. 1331, 1460, 1736, 1775–1779; R. Exh. 69).
38 For this reason, it is again unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments about whether
an employer may make prospective changes pursuant to a reservation-of-discretion or
management rights clause that will expire with the contract before the changes are effective.
See cases cited at fn. 32, above.
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It is well established that a unilateral change in employees’ terms and conditions does
not violate Section 8(a)(5) if it does not alter the status quo. The threshold inquiry, therefore, is
what the status quo was prior to the change. See Life Care Centers of America, 340 NLRB 397,
399 (2003); and Crown Elec. Contracting, 338 NLRB 336 (2002). The status quo may be
created by the provisions of the expired contract as well as by the parties’ past practice. Litton,
501 U.S. at 206; and NLRB v. Cauthorne, 691 F.2d 1023, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Moreover, it
may be dynamic (active) as well as static (fixed). See Post-Tribune, 337 NLRB 1279 (2002)
(unilateral increase in dollar amount of employees’ health insurance costs secondary to
premium increase imposed by insurance carrier was not unlawful because employer followed its
past practice in allocating the carrier’s premium increase to employees on an 80/20 and 60/40
percent basis); and Intermountain Rural Elec. Assn., 305 NLRB 783, 785 (1991), enfd. 984 F.2d
1562 (10th Cir. 1993) (status quo under the provisions of the parties’ expired contract required
the employer to pay 100 percent of the new medical and dental insurance rates set by insurers,
rather than just continue paying the premium rates which had been in effect under the previous
medical and dental plans).
Here, the record indicates that the status quo in the apheresis and MUA units was
established by the provisions of the expired Teamsters contracts, and that it was dynamic rather
than static. Thus, as indicated above, the provisions specifically stated that the Region “shall
continue to participate” in the ANRC retirement program “on the same basis as the present, or
as it hereafter may be amended by the [ANRC], and “will participate in any future 401(k) . . .
matching pension plan offered by the [ANRC] on the same basis as other employees.” These
provisions clearly contemplate that the status quo between the Region and the Teamsters unit
employees includes, not just the current ANRC retirement program, but any amendments to the
program or future 401(k) plans offered to other employees by the ANRC.39
Further, there is no evidence that the Region has any control over whether the ANRC
amends the national program or offers different national plans. As indicated above, the record
indicates that such decisions are made by the ANRC staff and board of directors in Washington,
D.C. See also Tr. 1348, 1394–1398, 1769–1771, 1842–1845. Nor is there any evidence that
the Region has not adopted or applied past changes in the pension and 401(k) plans made by
the ANRC. The record indicates that the ANRC made numerous changes to the pension and
401(k) plans over the years. Most were minor, technical, or housekeeping amendments
pursuant to legislative changes (R. Exhs. 64, 65, 70, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81; Tr. 1337–1338,
1354–1358, 1386, 1458, 1788–1799, 1870). And some were more significant. For example, in
July 2005, during the terms of the 2005–2009 Teamsters contracts, the ANRC substantially
modified the pension plan by lowering the percentage for calculating years of benefit service to
1 percent of average pay, increasing the age to receive unreduced benefits from 60 to 65, and
discontinuing the post-retirement 1 percent annual increase and voluntary after-tax contributions
by employees. The ANRC also modified the 401(k) plan at that time by requiring new
employees to wait 3 years before vesting in employer 401(k) contributions, while increasing the
employer match from 50 percent to 100 percent on the first 4 percent of employee contributions,
and increasing the maximum amount of employee contributions. (R. Exhs. 57, 58, 76; Tr.
1306–1310, 1314–1316, 1780, 1864–1866; see also R. Exh. 78 (adding catch-up feature to
allow participants over 50 to make additional 401(k) contributions).) There is no evidence that

39 This reading is consistent with a February 2003 arbitration decision submitted into
evidence by the General Counsel. See GC Exh. 160 (ruling that the Region was required to
count meal vouchers as taxable income under the terms of the retirement provisions in the
1999–2002 MUA contract―which were essentially identical to the 2005–2009 contract―and a
February 2000 amendment to the ANRC pension plan).
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these changes were not applied to the employees in the apheresis and MUA units in
accordance with the retirement provisions of the contracts. See Tr. 1102–1103.40
Finally, in agreement with the Region, I find that the changes to the pension and 401(k)
plans that were implemented in the Teamsters apheresis and MUA units in May and July 2009
were consistent with, and continued, the dynamic status quo. Accordingly, the changes as
applied to those units were not unlawful under extant precedent.
The same conclusion is warranted with respect to the May 2009 changes to the pension
plan as applied to the Chapter clerical/warehouse unit represented by the OPEIU. As noted
above, like the Teamsters contracts with the Region, article 31, section 1 the OPEIU contract
with the Chapter provided that the Chapter “shall continue to participate in the retirement
program of the [ANRC] on the same basis as the present or as it hereafter may be amended by
the [ANRC]” (GC Exh. 2). Thus, for the same reasons set forth above, I find that the Chapter
was simply continuing the status quo, and did not violate Section 8(a)(5), by implementing the
May 2009 changes to the pension plan in the OPEIU clerical/warehouse unit.
A different conclusion is warranted, however, with respect to the July 2009 change in the
401(k) plan as applied to the Chapter clerical/warehouse unit. Article 31, section 2 of the
OPEIU contract with the Chapter stated only that the Chapter “may choose to participate” in the
ANRC 401(k) plans “as presented or as it hereafter may be amended by the [ANRC].” Thus, as
the Respondent Chapter acknowledges (West. Br. 39), unlike the pension provisions, the 401(k)
provisions of the expired contract did not mandate the Chapter to participate in the current or
amended ANRC plan, but simply allowed to the Chapter to participate.
As discussed above, the Board in E. I. DuPont held that such reservation-of-discretion
provisions do not survive contract expiration in the absence of evidence that the parties
intended them to survive. Consistent with that holding, the Board also held that prior unilateral
changes implemented under the authority of such provisions during the contract term do not
establish a “past practice” permitting unilateral changes when no contract is in effect. 355
NLRB No. 176, slip op. at 2–4. Here, there is no evidence that the parties intended the
provision to survive contract expiration, or that any of the ANRC’s prior changes to the 401(k)
plan were implemented by the Chapter outside the term of the contract or by some other
contractual authority. Thus, the Respondents’ defense must fail in this respect.
For similar reasons, the Respondents’ defense also fails with respect to both the pension
and the 401(k) changes as applied to the Region collections and LCD units represented by the
OPEIU. The relevant language covering those units was contained in sections 1 and 4 of article
31 of both of the expired contracts. As previously discussed, section 1 stated as follows:
Employees covered under this contract will receive the same retirement benefits,
savings plan, including the American Red Cross Savings Plan (a 401-k plan) and
403(b) plan as other employees at the Great Lakes Region. The American Red
Cross has the right to amend the Retirement System, Savings Plan and 403(b)
plans in its discretion. The provisions of these plans are fully set forth in
separate summary plan descriptions.

40 As noted above (fn. 39), the parties in late 2000 disagreed over the proper interpretation
of certain ANRC plan provisions and amendments. However, such an isolated disagreement
does not warrant a conclusion that the Region has not applied the provisions or amendments to
the Teamsters employees when they were adopted by the ANRC.
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Section 4 stated as follows:
Bargaining unit members shall be eligible for the 401(k) program that provides for
a fifty cents ($.50) match for every dollar contributed by the employee up to the
first four percent (4%). In the event the [Region] improves this plan, the
members of the bargaining unit shall be eligible for said improvement upon
implementation. (GC Exhs. 3, 4.)
The Region argues that section 1 defines its postcontract obligations, i.e. the status quo,
and that the language mandates it to apply the same pension and 401(k) plan to the unit
employees as it applies to other employees of the Region. It further argues that plan
documents referred to in that section reserve the right to amend the plans at any time, and that
those reservation-of-rights provisions also define the status quo upon expiration just as other
terms and conditions of expired contracts. Finally, the Region argues that the parties’
bargaining history indicates that section 4 is merely a reference to the 401(k) plan rather than a
definition of the benefits available to the unit employees. (West. Br. 39–42.)
However, the Region does not argue, nor could it reasonably do so, that section 1
requires the Region to continue participating in the current ANRC pension and 401(k) plans or
any amended plans. That section simply requires the Region to apply the plans to the unit
employees if the Region chooses to apply those plans to its nonunit employees. Thus, as the
Region could choose not to apply the provisions to its nonunit employees, its discretion not to
likewise apply them to its unit employees is preserved.41
The Region’s remaining arguments are also without merit under extant law. As
discussed above, reservation-of-rights provisions do not survive contract expiration or define the
status quo during the hiatus between contracts absent a contrary intent. Again, there is no
evidence that the parties intended the reservation-of-rights provisions of section 1 and/or the
referenced plan documents to survive contract expiration. Nor is there any evidence that the
ANRC’s prior changes to the pension and 401(k) plans were implemented by the Region in the
collections and LCD units outside the terms of the contracts or by some other contractual
authority. Thus, neither the language of section 1 (including the plan documents, assuming
arguendo that they were effectively incorporated into section 1), nor the prior changes,
established a status quo permitting the postcontract unilateral changes in May and July 2009.
Finally, given that section 1 provides no support for the subject changes, it is irrelevant whether
section 4 places any limits on section 1.

41 This does not necessarily mean that the Region could make any employer-wide changes
to retirement benefits without providing the OPEIU notice and opportunity to bargain. See
Trojan Yacht, 319 NLRB 741, 742–743 (1995) (general language stating that the pension plan
would be “maintained in the same manner and to the same extent such plans are generally
made available and administered on a corporate basis” was not a clear and unmistakable
waiver), citing with approval Rockford Manor Care Facility, 279 NLRB 1170, 1172–1173 (1986)
(language stating that “participat[ion] in the Company's health and life insurance programs on
the same basis as other [i.e., nonunit] employee members of the group” was ambiguous and did
not waive the union’s right to participate in deliberations about which option was the more
appropriate for all employees). However, whether the contract permits the Region to make
employer-wide changes without bargaining is a different question than whether the contract
mandates the Region to apply any amended ANRC pension and 401(k) plans to the unit and
nonunit employees. (And only the latter question need be addressed here, given that the
changes occurred post-contract expiration.)
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f. Unilateral reduction of choices among local health plans in October 2009 (Region)
The complaint also alleges that the Region violated 8(a)(5) by unilaterally reducing the
choices among local health insurance options under the BenefitsAdvantage plan for unit
employees beginning October 26, 2009, during the open enrollment period for the 2010 benefit
year. Specifically, the General Counsel alleges that the employees had been offered three local
Blue Care Network (BCN) options under the plan in the past (East, West, and Mid-Michigan),
but were only offered one for the 2010 benefit year. For the reasons set forth below, I find that
the General Counsel has failed to prove this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.
First, it is not clear which units the General Counsel contends were unlawfully affected
by the alleged unilateral change. Although it is undisputed that the Region has offered all three
local options to all of the unit employees in the past (GC Exh. 12), at trial, counsel for the
General Counsel initially stated that the unilateral-change allegation applied only to the OPEIU
units (Tr. 774). However, counsel later stated that the allegation also applied to the Teamsters
units (Tr. 776) and introduced testimonial and documentary evidence showing that an employee
in the Teamsters MUA unit (Hemstreet) had been offered all three local BCN options for 2009
but only one (Mid-Michigan) for 2010 (Tr. 908–910; GC Exh.182, 183). However, the General
Counsel’s posthearing brief mentions this evidence only in a footnote (Br. 85, fn. 78), and
ultimately argues that the Region unlawfully reduced the number of local options only in the
LCD and collections units represented by the OPEIU (Br. 150).42
Second, only one of the 70–75 employees in the LCD unit (McGwin) was called to testify
in support of the allegation. McGwin testified that she was able to select any of the three local
BCN options in the past, and that she had previously selected the Mid-Michigan plan for 2008
before switching to the West-Michigan plan for 2009. (Tr. 202–227, 247–250.) However, no
documentary evidence was presented to substantiate this. The only documentary evidence
introduced was McGwin’s October 2009 open-enrollment worksheet showing that she was
offered only the West-Michigan local plan (and the national PPO and EPO plans) for 2010 (GC
Exh. 18). Moreover, McGwin admitted that she selected the Mid-Michigan plan for 2008
because that is where she worked at the time, and the West-Michigan plan for 2009 because
that is where she lives―thus suggesting, consistent with the Region’s position (and the names
of the plans themselves), that there is some connection between geographical location and
available local options, i.e. while the BenefitsAdvantage offering includes all three local BCN
plans, an employee may only select a local plan covering the geographical service area that
he/she works and/or lives. See also GC Exh. 163, pp. 11, 20 (discussing effect of changes in
address or zip code on plan eligibility).
Third, no evidence whatsoever was presented at trial regarding what local options were
offered to employees in the collections unit for 2010. None of the approximately 165 employees
in that unit were called to testify regarding this allegation. Nor was any documentary evidence
introduced to support the allegation with respect to that unit. Contrary to the OPEIU’s
contention, the lack of documentary evidence cannot be blamed on the Region’s failure to
produce the information in response to a General Counsel subpoena. HR Supervisor Smelser
testified that the Region does not maintain the subpoenaed records; that annual enrollment
materials are sent to and received from employees by Hewitt Associates, a third-party
administrator (Tr. 1989–1990). I credit Smelser’s testimony in this regard as it is consistent with

42 The General Counsel’s posthearing brief also at times discusses the allegation as if both
Respondents committed the violation (Br. 84–85). However, the complaint clearly alleges a
violation only by the Region.
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the record as a whole, including the testimony of ANRC Vice President Shearer (Tr. 1408–1413)
and LCD-unit employee McGwin (Tr. 221, 229–236, 249) regarding the annual enrollment
process, and the open-enrollment and BenefitsAdvantage materials themselves (GC Exhs. 18,
163, 182, 183). Accordingly, an adverse inference that the absent documentation would
support the complaint allegation is unwarranted. See Hansen Bros. Enterprises, 313 NLRB
599, 608 (1993), review denied 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (table), cert. denied 484 U.S.
845 (1987); and Champ Corp., 291 NLRB 803 (1988), enfd. 933 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied 502 U.S. 957 (1991).
Finally, the available record otherwise supports the Region’s contention that it did not
eliminate any of the three local BCN plans from the 2010 offering. Thus, although the Region
was admittedly seeking to eliminate the local plans, HR Manager Smith specifically advised
Rhines in writing on October 23, 2009 that all three local BCN plans would still be offered to unit
employees in 2010, given that no agreement or impasse had yet been reached in the
negotiations on that issue (GC Exh. 55; Tr. 575–576).43 Further, the General Counsel’s own
evidence confirms that at least two of the plans were included in the 2010 Benefits Advantage
offering. As indicated above, McGwin’s open enrollment packet included the West-Michigan
plan and Hemstreet’s included the Mid-Michigan plan (along with the national PPO and EPO
plans and her current Physicians Health Plan (PHP) plan).
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find that this allegation should be dismissed
in its entirety.
g. Unilateral implementation of new BenefitsAdvantage health insurance program
in January 2010 (Region and Chapter).
This is the last of the complaint unilateral-change allegations. It alleges that both the
Region and the Chapter unlawfully implemented a new BenefitsAdvantage health insurance
program effective January 1, 2010, without providing the Unions a meaningful opportunity to
bargain. The General Counsel alleges that the new 2010 BenefitsAdvantage program
significantly changed the unit employees’ benefits by (1) merging the standard and premier PPO
options and eliminating the premier option; (2) increasing out of pocket costs to employees
through increased deductibles, co-pays, and coinsurance; (3) increasing the coinsurance for
formulary drugs; (4) imposing a surcharge on employees with a spouse or partner who has
access to medical coverage for themselves through their own employment but elect coverage
under an ANRC option; (5) increasing employee contributions for the PPO dental option; and (6)
suspending the employer subsidy for vision coverage for full-time employees. I find that the
General Counsel has proven this alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Again, there is no dispute, and the record establishes, that the ANRC made the
foregoing changes to the national, self-insured EPO and PPO plans, and that the Respondents
implemented the changes in all five units, for the 2010 benefit year, i.e. the unit employees’
October 2009 open enrollment materials included the changes and the changes were

43 The expired contracts in the LCD and collections units required that the annual health
insurance offering include “the local current BCN policy, where offered” (GC Exhs. 3, 4, art. 30,
sec. 1). Although Smith advised Rhines on October 23 that the unit employees would be able
to select “any” of the local BCN options that had been available for the 2009 benefit year,
including the East, West, and Mid-Michigan plans, there is no evidence that the Region
determined or controlled the geographical service area covered by each local BCN plan.
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implemented and effective January 1, 2010 (GC Exhs. 9, 10, 12, 18; and Tr. 491, 1471, 1806).44
There is also no dispute that the changes materially and substantially changed a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
However, the Respondents deny that they failed to provide the Unions with a meaningful
opportunity to bargain over the changes. Indeed, they contend that the parties reached
impasse in negotiations over the 2010 national plan designs before the open enrollment period
began on October 26, 2009. Accordingly, because the changes were made pursuant to the Red
Cross’ annual health-benefits review process, the Respondents contend that they were entitled
to implement the changes without waiting for an overall impasse in the contract negotiations,45
citing Stone Container Corp., 313 NLRB 336, 337 (1993) (employer lawfully implemented wage
increase, despite absence of an overall impasse in ongoing contract negotiations, because
wage reviews and increases were discrete annually occurring events and the union was given
sufficient opportunity to bargain before implementation). (Bat. Br. 21–26.)46

44 Unlike with the other employee benefits discussed above, the record is somewhat unclear
whether the regions and chapters have discretion not to offer the national self-insured EPO and
PPO plans to their employees. ANRC Vice President Shearer testified that, since 2008, all
regions and chapters have been mandated to provide core benefits to full-time employees
through BenefitsAdvantage (Tr. 1402–1403, 1474, 1801). She also testified that there is a “rule”
(apparently unwritten) that chapters and regions are not to offer separate plans (Tr. 1474).
However, as discussed earlier in this decision (see part III.A.1.b), BenefitsAdvantage is an
umbrella program that includes more than just the self-insured EPO and PPO plans. Thus,
Shearer testified that it includes eight Kaiser plans that are made available to employees in
certain regions of the country (Tr. 1462). She also acknowledged (and this case illustrates) that
unionized regions and charters may negotiate additional local plans, which are likewise
administered under BenefitsAdvantage (Tr. 1475). Further, Peterson testified that the Region
had discretion whether to offer the self-insured EPO and PPO plans to its employees (Tr. 1589).
This is consistent with Smith’s letter to Rhines on October 23, 2009 (GC Exh. 55), and the
Region’s December 23, 2009 position statement (GC Exh. 12, p. 4), both of which specifically
stated that one of the Region’s options was to not offer those plans. In any event, counsel
made clear at the hearing, during discussion of a related evidentiary objection, that the
Respondents are not contending that the issue of the plan designs was not amenable to
bargaining (Tr. 1850–1851).
45 The Respondents acknowledge that the parties had not reached an overall impasse.
Indeed, as indicated above, they do not even contend that the parties were at impasse over the
local health insurance plans. Nor do they contend that the parties were at impasse over cost-
sharing under the EPO and PPO and local plans, which they also did not change. They
contend that the parties were only at impasse over the narrow issue of what the EPO and PPO
plan designs would be in the BenefitsAdvantage offering to the unit employees for the 2010
benefit year.
46 The Respondents did not specifically assert this Stone Container defense in their
answers. However, Respondents’ counsel generally alluded to it during opening statements (Tr.
119); the defense was anticipated and addressed by the OPEIU in its posthearing brief; and the
defense arguably relates to the Respondents’ tenth affirmative defense, which asserts that the
parties “were at impasse under the circumstances which met the exigency exception recognized
in Bottom Line Enterprises [302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991), enfd. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994)
(table)]” (GC Exhs. 1(nnnn) and (oooo)). The Respondents make no other arguments relating
to that affirmative defense; specifically, they do not argue that the interim changes were
compelled by an economic exigency within the meaning of Bottom Line or RBE Electronics, 320
NLRB 80 (1995). In any event, as with the Respondents’ waiver defense to the May and June
Continued
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The Respondents’ Stone Container defense fails to withstand scrutiny. The record
confirms that Peterson advised Rhines and Meade on July 24, 2009 that the above-described
changes had been made to the national plans for the 2010 benefit year. See GC Exh. 115, and
fn. 9, supra.47 The record likewise confirms that Rhines repeatedly objected to the changes and
offered several specific alternatives (CPO Exh. 2; GC Exhs. 53, 55, 57; Tr. 432, 571, 1558,
1713), and that Meade proposed alternatives as well (GC Exhs. 124, 125; Tr. 852–856).
However, the record also clearly establishes that the Respondents did not bargain over the
changes in a meaningful manner or with good faith. Thus, although Region HR Manager Smith
assured Rhines on July 31 that the Region was “willing and prepared to bargain over the
benefits information” that Peterson provided to Rhines on July 24, he did so only after the ANRC
had already advised the unit employees of the changes and Rhines inquired about it (CPO Exh.
2; GC Exh. 9; Tr. 571–572). Moreover, under cross-examination by counsel for the General
Counsel, Peterson acknowledged that neither he nor anyone else at the bargaining table even
had the authority to negotiate over the design of the 2010 EPO and PPO plans; that as far as he
knew the ANRC had decided to eliminate the 2009 national plans and they were therefore “no
longer available”; and that he never consulted with the ANRC about continuing the 2009 plans
as proposed by Rhines (Tr. 1587, 1615, 1725–1726, 1733). See also the Region’s October 23,
2009 correspondence to Rhines (GC Exh. 55) and December 23, 2009 position statement (GC
Exh. 12, p. 3) (admitting that the Region could not change the plan design).
In these circumstances, no valid bargaining impasse over the plan design changes could
have possibly occurred. See, e.g., NLRB v. Big Three Industries, 497 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.
1974) (a valid impasse presupposes good faith bargaining). Nor could the changes be
implemented without an overall impasse under the analysis in Stone Container. Cf. E.I. Dupont,
355 NLRB No. 176, slip op. at 4 (rejecting employer’s Stone Container defense where employer
refused to bargain over changes).48
The Respondents’ answers also assert that the changes were a continuation of the
status quo as defined by the expired contracts and the Respondents’ past practice of unilateral
changes. The Respondents, however, have not cited any provisions in the expired contracts or
past history of unilateral changes supporting these defenses.49 Indeed, they do not even
_________________________
2009 unilateral changes to the 401(k) and pension plans (see fn. 34, supra), it is unnecessary to
address whether the defense has been untimely raised given my conclusion that the defense is
without merit.
47 To the extent there is conflict in the record about whether the 2010 BenefitsAdvantage
national EPO and PPO plan design was actually “proposed” to the Unions as a contract
proposal, I find that a preponderance of the credible evidence indicates that it was not; rather,
the Respondents simply advised the Unions that the 2010 design was what they intended to
offer all unit and nonunit employees during the annual upcoming open enrollment period.
48 In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to address whether the Region’s unlawful failure to
timely provide health insurance information to Meade also prevented the Region from
implementing the changes to the EPO and PPO plans in the Teamsters units. See part III.A.1.b
and c, above.
49 Each of the expired contracts contains a provision (article 30 in the OPEIU contracts and
articles 28 or 31 in the Teamsters contracts) regarding employee health insurance (GC Exhs. 2–
6). However, as noted, the Respondents do not cite those provisions in support of this defense.
Nor do the provisions on their face appear to provide such support. Finally, there is no
contention or evidence that the parties had reached a side agreement in 2008 or 2009 (the first
benefit years that the BenefitsAdvantage umbrella program were offered to unit employees)
Continued
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mention the defenses in their posthearing briefs. I therefore find that they have failed to carry
their burden of proof.
3. Bad faith bargaining over mandatory subjects
As indicated above, the complaint also alleges that the Region and/or the Chapter
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to bargain in good faith over certain mandatory
subjects.
a. Failure to bargain in good faith over transfer of telerecruiter work
since May 2010 (Region)
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(5) by bypassing
the OPEIU and announcing to employees on May 18, 2010 that it intended to transfer
telerecruiter work from the LCD unit to other, out-of-state locations. It further alleges that, since
July 2010, the Region has bargained with a fixed mind and no intention of reaching an
agreement with respect to the transfer. As with the related refusal-to-provide information
allegation discussed earlier in this decision (part III.A.1.d), the Region admitted these
allegations at the hearing (Tr. 1487–1498). Accordingly, I find that the Region violated the Act
as alleged.
b. Bargaining with a fixed mind in contract negotiations over
health insurance, 401(k), and pension benefits (Region and Chapter).
The General Counsel also alleges that, since February 2009, both the Region and the
Chapter have bargained in bad faith during contract negotiations by bargaining with a fixed mind
and no intention of reaching an agreement in any of the units regarding health insurance,
401(k), and pension benefits. For the reasons set forth below, I find that this allegation is not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
The law is clear that an employer may take a firm stand on a position in bargaining, i.e.
an employer’s mere refusal to change its position does not constitute bad faith. See, e.g., St.
George Warehouse, 341 NLRB 904, 906 (2004); Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600, 1603
(1984); Pleasantview Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 757–759 (6th Cir. 2003); and
Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On the other
hand, the Board and courts have also held that an employer may not engage in the mere
pretense of negotiating by bargaining with a completely closed mind. See, e.g., Mid-Continent
Concrete, 336 NLRB 258, 260–261 (2001), enfd. sub nom NLRB v. Hardesty Co., 308 F.3d 859
(8th Cir. 2002); Clear Pine Mouldings v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 729 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied
451 U.S. 984 (1981); and NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg., 344 F.2d 210, 215 (8th Cir. 1965). See
also Pleasantview, 351 F.3d at 758. In distinguishing between the two―whether an employer
has engaged in lawful hard bargaining or unlawful surface bargaining―the totality of the
employer’s conduct is examined, including its conduct both at and away from the bargaining
table and the proposals themselves. See, e.g., Regency Service Carts, 345 NLRB 671 (2005);
and Liquor Industry Bargaining Group 333 NLRB 1219, 1220-1222 (2001), enfd. 50 Fed. Appx.
444 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (unpub.).
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providing that any subsequent changes to the EPO and PPO options could be made by the
Respondents without notice or bargaining with the OPEIU. See Tr. 385–392.
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Here, it is clear that health insurance, 401(k), and pension benefits were important
issues for all parties (Tr. 402, 1504–1515, 1693, 2026, 2067; R. Exh. 100). Further, it is
undisputed that the Respondents proposed so-called “me too” language with respect to all three
benefits, and that this language reserved to the Respondents unlimited discretion to make
whatever changes they wanted whenever they wanted (provided only that they made the same
changes for nonunit employees). Indeed, the “me too” health insurance proposal even
contained language expressly removing the subject from the grievance/arbitration procedure. 50
See Regency Service, and Liquor Industry, above (broad management-rights proposals
accompanied by no-grievance/arbitration and no-strike proposals evidenced bad faith). 51 It is
also undisputed that the Respondents never wavered from their “me too” proposals,
notwithstanding that the OPEIU or the Teamsters made several counter-proposals, including
dropping the local health insurance plans. Moreover, as found above, the Region and/or the
Chapter contemporaneously engaged in unlawful conduct by making unilateral changes in the
very same benefits and failing to timely provide requested information. The Region also
admittedly engaged in unlawful, fixed-mind bargaining with the OPEIU in the summer of 2010
regarding the transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD unit.
However, as discussed above, such “me too” language was nothing new; the retirement
provisions of the expired contracts contained similar language. Although the “me too” health
insurance proposal contained additional language removing the subject from the grievance/
arbitration procedure, such language was not included in the “me too” 401(k) and pension
proposal. And there is no evidence whether the parties ever specifically discussed deleting the
offensive grievance/arbitration language from the “me too” health insurance proposal, i.e. there
is no evidence that the Respondents insisted on including the language in the “me too” proposal
over the Unions’ objection.

50 The Region’s “me too” 401(k) and pension proposal for the OPEIU collections unit stated:
Employees covered under this contract will receive the same retirement benefits
and savings plan, including the 401(k) plan as other employees of the ARC. The
American National Red Cross has the right to amend the Retirement System, the
Savings Plan and the 401(k) plan from time to time in its discretion.
The Region’s “me too” health insurance proposal for the same unit stated:
Regular full-time bargaining unit employees are eligible to participate in the same
group insurance plans, under the same terms and conditions, as offered to the
Region’s non-bargaining unit employees. Any changes or amendments to the
plans automatically apply to the bargaining unit employees to the same extent
that such changes or amendments apply to the non-bargaining unit employees.
The parties further agree that the cost of coverage under the plans is shared
between the bargaining unit employees and the Red Cross on the same basis as
such costs are shared between the Red Cross and other non-bargaining unit
employees. The Region, the Union and the employees are bound by the terms of
the plans, and issues regarding the plans shall not be subject to the grievance or
arbitration provisions.
See GC Exh. 41. The “me too” proposals for the other four units were virtually or exactly
the same. See GC Exh. 46 (LCD unit), 92 (MUA unit), 97 (apheresis unit), and CPO
Exh. 1 (Chapter clerical/warehouse unit). See also Tr. 439–441, 561–563.
51 The Respondents’ proposals also retained the no-strike provisions in the prior contracts.
However, neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Parties have cited or relied on this as
support for the allegations.
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Further, Peterson provided a reasonable explanation to the Unions why the ANRC and
the Respondents wanted the “me too” language: to achieve greater commonality and
consistency of administration and experience and lower costs (Tr. 422, 432, 994, 1128, 1509–
1510, 1599–1602, 1613, 1723–1724; CPO Exh. 7). The evidence fails to establish that this was
not the true reason for seeking the provisions. Although the ANRC continued to offer several
regional fully-insured Kaiser health plans for the 2010 plan year (see part III.A.1.b, and fn. 44,
above), there is no real dispute that the ANRC wanted to eliminate the numerous additional
local health plans around the country to increase the number of “lives” in the national plans.
Further, while Rhines offered to drop the local plans for the region and chapter units, he did not
offer to accept the same 2010 national EPO and PPO plan provisions being offered to nonunit
employees. See GC Exhs. 40, 50, 53, 56, 57; and Tr. 432–441.
Moreover, the record indicates that several other regions and chapters had successfully
negotiated similar “me too” health-insurance and retirement provisions with other local unions
around the country (Tr. 1511, 1636–1638, 1719; see also R. Exh. 100). Indeed, Rhines and
Meade themselves actually agreed at some point during their separate contract negotiations
with Peterson to accept “me too” language with respect to the 401(k) plan (Tr. 660, 986; GC
Exh. 159). Thus, it was certainly reasonable for the Respondents to believe that it was “fair and
proper” to stand firm on their position, and/or that they had “sufficient bargaining strength to
force” the Unions to agree. Atlanta Hilton, 271 NLRB at 1603. Cf. Mid-Continent, 336 NLRB at
260 (citing employer’s failure to offer a legitimate explanation for its proposal or provide any
evidence that it had considered or implemented similar provisions at other facilities as evidence
of bad faith).52
The similar or related unfair labor practices found in this proceeding are also insufficient
to establish that the Respondents―which had executed several contracts with the Unions in the
past―were attempting to avoid reaching any new agreements. The Region’s admission that it
recently engaged in fixed-mind bargaining over the transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD
unit does not establish that the Respondents had approached contract negotiations in all five
units in the same manner since February 2009. As for the related information and unilateral-
change violations, the Respondents did timely provide the Unions with a substantial amount of
information; their asserted defenses to the unilateral-change allegations were not entirely
frivolous (indeed, I have found merit to some of them); and the parties have continued to meet
and negotiate since the unfair labor practice charges were filed. Further, it is doubtful that the
fundamental differences between the parties, especially over the “me too” health-insurance
proposal, would have been any less fundamental in the absence of the 8(a)(5) violations.
Finally, the cases cited by the General Counsel in support of this allegation are
distinguishable. Thus, in Overnite Transportation Co., 296 NLRB 669, 671 (1989), enfd. 938
F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991), there was abundant evidence that the employer was “making good on
[its preelection] promise never to cooperate with the [u]nion,” rather than “honestly and in good
faith attempting to preserve uniformity among its [union and nonunion] terminals.” 938 F.2d at
818. Similarly, in Cleveland Sales Co., 292 NLRB 1151 (1989), enfd. by unpub. per curiam
opinion 1990 WL 142349 (6th Cir. 1990), the Board relied heavily on evidence that the employer

52 To the extent Liquor Industry, 333 NLRB at 1219 fn. 1, could be read to suggest that
evidence of similar agreements is irrelevant or insufficiently probative, I find that it is
distinguishable. In that case, the contract purportedly containing the similar provision was
executed by the parties after the respondents’ alleged unlawful refusal to bargain in good faith
had occurred and was litigated. Thus, it could not have had any bearing on the respondents’
alleged unlawful behavior.
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“did not want to bargain with the union,” and “wished and planned to get rid of the union,” in
finding that the employer unlawfully insisted on a contract of less than 1-year duration without
good reason. 292 NLRB at 1156.
Regency Service and Liquor Industry, discussed above, are also distinguishable. In
Regency Service, the proposed management-rights clause was “extremely broad,”
encompassing numerous subjects, and the employer made various statements indicating that it
did not want to reach an agreement with the newly certified union. 345 NLRB at 672, 675. And
in Liquor Industry, the employer’s proposal would have granted broad discretionary authority
over the “critical subject” of wages, “the most important issue in negotiations,” and the employer
refused to provide any explanation for its proposal. 333 NLRB at 1221.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find that this allegation should be dismissed
in its entirety. See St. George Warehouse, 341 NLRB at 906–908; and Atlanta Hilton & Tower,
271 NLRB at 1603.53
B. The 8(a)(1) and (3) Allegations
The General Counsel also alleges that the Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(3)
and/or (1) of the Act by the way it responded to two incidents in March 2010 involving
Lashawnda Spears, a phlebotomist and union steward in the collections unit. The first incident
occurred on March 22. Late that afternoon, Spears received a message from Rhines that
Smelser, the Region’s HR supervisor, wanted her to contact him immediately, no later than 4
p.m., to provide certain information he needed to complete the payroll. Specifically, Smelser
needed information from Spears regarding the amount the Region owed to a probationary
employee for meal vouchers under the terms of the expired collective-bargaining agreement. At
the time, Spears was working on a mobile truck unit at an offsite blood drive. She had just
hooked up a donor to an apheresis machine to begin a 30-minute double-red cell procedure.
However, the machine appeared to be functioning properly, the donor had no complaints, it was
already near 4 p.m., and there was a mobile truck phone near the donor bed. So she went
ahead and called Smelser on the mobile phone to give him the requested payroll/voucher
information while she was monitoring the donor. (Tr. 152–155, 159, 263–266, 1224, 1228,
1241.)
Unfortunately for Spears, this caught the eye and ear of Sherrie Bristol, the team
supervisor on the mobile blood drive. Bristol saw Spears using the mobile phone by the donor
bed and overheard her talking about employee meal vouchers. Later, when Spears was on

53 The General Counsel also argues (Br. 115–119) that the Respondents were prohibited
from unilaterally implementing their “me too” proposals under the principles of McClatchy
Newspapers, 321 NLRB 1386 (1996), enfd. 131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524
U.S. 937 (1998); and KSM Industries, 336 NLRB 133 (2001), reconsideration granted in part
337 NLRB 987 (2002). See also OPEIU Br. 49, and Teamsters Br. 8. However, the complaint
does not allege that the Respondents unlawfully implemented the “me too” proposals. Nor have
the Respondents ever asserted in this proceeding that the parties were at impasse over the “me
too” proposals, that they were entitled to implement their “me too” proposals, or that the alleged
unlawful unilateral changes were implemented pursuant to those proposals. Accordingly, I find
that it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to decide the issue. See generally Allied
Mechanical Services, 346 NLRB 326, 329 (2006); NLRB v. Quality C.A.T.V., 824 F.2d 542, 547
(7th Cir. 1987); and Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied
467 U.S. 1241 (1984).
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break, Bristol told Spears that she should not make phone calls while taking care of donors,
even when the call is about business rather than personal matters. Spears responded that she
was not going to use her breaktime for business matters. Bristol, however, repeated that
Spears should not use the phone in front of donors, to which Spears replied, “I got it Sherrie”―
in a tone that made Bristol feel that she was being mocked. (Tr. 156–158, 182, 1226–1231,
1243; R. Exh. 5.)
Bristol subsequently called and reported the incident to the collections manager, Sareta
Miller, who supervises both her and Spears. The following day, March 23, Miller put a memo in
Spears’ office mailbox notifying her that a “discipline investigation” had been initiated regarding
Spears “using [a] cell phone during work time.” The memo advised Spears that a meeting
would be scheduled to discuss the matter, and that she should “feel free to contact” Miller if she
had any questions. (Tr. 1165–1167, 1190–1192; GC Exh. 13.)
The second incident occurred the following morning, March 24, when Spears went to
see Miller about the memo. Spears was particularly upset that the memo incorrectly suggested
that she had been using her personal cell phone at work. She told Miller that Bristol had “lied”
by reporting this. Miller responded that Bristol had not reported that Spears was using her
personal cell phone, and if the memo (which she did not have in front of her at the moment) said
that, it was her (Miller’s) mistake. Spears asked Miller why, then, she was being disciplined,
since the call was to Smelser to give him the voucher information he had requested. Miller
replied that she could not talk anymore about the matter at that time; that it would have to wait
until the meeting.
Spears at that point left Miller’s office and the conversation ended. However, after a
moment, Miller decided to follow Spears out. Miller was concerned that Spears would start
talking about the situation with the staff, who were beginning to arrive for an onsite blood drive.
She eventually caught up with Spears about 20 or 30 feet down the hallway, at the doorway to
where the donor room, staging area, and breakroom were located, and told her to “not talk to
anyone about this.” This apparently enraged Spears, who began yelling that she had not talked
to anyone, and that she was being treated like a child. In response, Miller, who was normally
very soft-spoken, also began speaking in a loud, but controlled, voice, telling Spears that she
would have to settle down or go home. Eventually, however, after about 3–5 minutes, Miller
and Spears walked away from each other and the situation deescalated.54

54 The foregoing factual summary of the exchange between Spears and Miller is based on
both their testimony and the testimony given by Rhines (who was able to hear much of the
exchange because Spears called him on her cell phone so that he could do so), and Michelle
Nimmo, a supervisor in the Region’s donor recruitment division (who was unpacking her
computer at her open cubicle next to the door and saw and/or heard the entire exchange). See
Tr. 159–161, 183, 189, 266–268, 1167–1171, 1181–1183, 1202, 1206, and 1211–1216. To the
extent there are inconsistencies between witnesses, I have given the greatest weight to Nimmo,
as she was physically present throughout, she impressed me as having the clearest memory of
the events, she was the least interested of any of the witnesses (although a member of
management, she works in a different division and is not supervised by Miller), her testimony
was consistent with the known or undisputed facts and inherent probabilities, and her demeanor
betrayed no reason to discredit her testimony. For example, based in part on Nimmo’s
testimony, I discredit Miller’s testimony that she had intended to add “during working time” when
she initially told Spears not to talk about the matter with staff, but that Spears “interrupted” and
“cut off” her statement (Tr. 1201). According to Nimmo, Spears had her back turned to Miller at
that time, and did not respond until after she turned around to face Miller (1211–1212). Further,
Continued
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A disciplinary meeting was held about a month later, on April 30. Rhines attended with
Spears, and Smelser attended with Miller. After the meeting, Smelser decided that Miller should
not discipline Spears for using the mobile phone while monitoring a donor, because Miller had
not made the Region’s policy on phone usage clear enough to the staff. Nevertheless, Miller
issued a written “verbal” warning to Spears (the first step in the progressive disciplinary system)
for the two subsequent verbal exchanges with Bristol and Miller on March 22 and 24,
respectively, that occurred in connection with that conduct. (Tr. 1175–1177, 1205).
Specifically, the verbal warning (GC Exh. 14) cited Spears for the following conduct:
March 22 & 24, 2010
Lashawnda was loud, rude, and unprofessional to supervisor and Site manager.
Acting in a manner that is contrary to the best interest of the American Red
Cross.
The General Counsel alleges two violations based on the above facts: first, that Miller’s
broad and unqualified statement to Spears on March 24 not to talk to the staff violated Section
8(a)(1); and second, that Miller’s April 30 verbal warning to Spears for her conduct on March 22
and 24 violated Section 8(a)(3). I find that both allegations are well supported.
1. The 8(a)(1) statement
The Region asserts that Miller simply “ask[ed]” Spears “not to discuss the phone issue
so as not to disrupt the blood drive set up,” and that it was “an isolated remark,” with “no follow
up of any kind.” (Bat. Br. 4). However, Miller admitted that she never qualified her statement in
this or any similar manner. Although she testified that she intended to do so―because Spears
had a history of talking to staff about union matters during work―and was interrupted by
Spears, I have discredited this testimony. See fn. 54, supra. Further, Miller acknowledged that
at least one other employee (in addition to Supervisor Nimmo) was present when she made the
statement to Spears (Tr. 1169–1170). Moreover, the statement is apparently what prompted
the heated exchange that was subsequently cited in support of issuing Spears a verbal warning.
Accordingly, I find that Miller’s statement violated the Act as alleged and warrants a
remedial order. See Desert Palace, 336 NLRB 271 (2001) (absent an overriding substantial
and legitimate business justification, an employer cannot prohibit employees from discussing an
ongoing disciplinary investigation with fellow employees); and Intermet Stevensville, 350 NLRB
1349, 1355 (2007) (employer’s directive to employee not to discuss her discipline with other
employees while working violated Section 8(a)(1) where employer failed to prove that employee
had previously impeded production or been warned or disciplined about impeding production or
that other employees were restricted from talking during work).
_________________________
Miller made no mention of being cut off when she reported the incident to HR (Tr. 1202). I
likewise discredit Miller to the extent she suggested that Spears had a history of improperly
talking to other employees about disciplinary or other union matters during work. See Tr. 1181–
1182 (testifying that she thought Spears would talk to the staff during work based on her “past
experiences with [Spears]”). Miller’s testimony was not corroborated by any other witness, she
offered no examples, and she admitted that Spears had never been disciplined for such conduct
(Tr. 1182–1184). Finally, I also discredit Miller’s testimony that Spears said she did not have to
listen to Miller and that Miller could not tell her anything (Tr. 1167–1170). Again, this was not
corroborated by Nimmo or any other witness and, as discussed infra, the verbal warning that
Spears eventually received made no mention of any insubordinate statements or conduct by
Spears.
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2. The 8(a)(3) verbal warning
The Region argues that the verbal warning did not violate the Act because Spears was
not acting in a representative capacity when she mocked Bristol and yelled at Miller, and the
warning Miller gave her for that conduct was therefore unrelated to union activity. In short, the
Region argues that “there is . . . nothing to connect the verbal warning to any protected
activity.” (Bat. Br. 3–4.) However, as indicated by the General Counsel, it is undisputed that
the exchanges with both Bristol and Miller arose from Spears’ conduct in her representative
capacity as a union steward (telephonically reporting voucher/ payroll information to HR
Supervisor Smelser at his request), and that Spears’ cited behavior on both March 22 and 24
occurred while defending that conduct (in response to being accused of violating the Region’s
rule against using the mobile phone in front of donors while exercising her steward duties).
Thus, Spears did not “just happen[] to be a steward” who was being investigated by her
employer for conduct that occurred in her individual capacity as an employee. Tampa Tribune,
346 NLRB 369, 370 (2006) (finding that employer lawfully disciplined employee for his outburst
while being “coached” by foreman for shutting down the pressline without a backup line running,
even though employee was the union steward). Rather, her conduct as union steward was at
the heart of the disciplinary investigation and related discussions that occurred on March 22 and
24. See American Red Cross Blood Services Div., 316 NLRB 783, 786–787 (1995), and cases
cited therein. See also Roadmaster Corp. v. NLRB, 874 F.2d 448, 453–454 (7th Cir. 1989).
In agreement with the General Counsel, I also find that Spears’ cited “loud, rude, and
unprofessional behavior” on March 22 and 24 was not so opprobrious or egregious that she lost
the protection of the Act under the relevant factors set forth in Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 814
(1979). As discussed below, I find that those factors―the place of the discussion, the subject
matter of the discussion, the nature of the employee’s conduct, and whether the conduct was
provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices―clearly weigh in favor of finding that Spears
remained protected.
Place of discussion.
As indicted above, the March 22 exchange with Bristol occurred while Spears was on
break. Further, there is no evidence that any other employees or donors overheard Spears’
remark. As for the March 24 exchange with Miller, the record indicates that the exchange
occurred in or near a work area, and that other employees walked in or out of the area and
would have overheard it. However, Miller is the one who followed Spears there and initiated the
exchange in that area (Tr. 1169–1170). See Kiewit Power Constructors, 355 NLRB No. 150
(2010) (finding that the place of discussion was at least a neutral factor where respondent chose
to distribute the warnings in a group-employee setting in a work area during working time, and
should have reasonably expected that employees would react and protest on the spot).
Subject matter of discussion
As discussed above, the underlying subject matter of both discussions concerned
Section 7 activity. The March 22 exchange concerned Spears’ conduct, in her representative
capacity as union steward, of using the mobile phone in front of a donor to provide
payroll/voucher information to HR Supervisor Smelser at his request. The March 24 exchange
revolved around the same subject, and also specifically concerned Spears’ right to discuss the
disciplinary investigation of her alleged March 22 improper phone use with her fellow
employees. Thus, this factor clearly favors protection.
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Nature of conduct
While Spears’ comments on March 22 and/or 24 were apparently considered
inappropriately loud, rude, and/or unprofessional, they were not considered insubordinate. Nor
is there any contention that Spears used profane, obscene, or personally denigrating terms or
made any threatening comments or gestures. Further, the record indicates that her comments
in both instances were spontaneous and that she voluntarily disengaged from the more volatile,
March 24 discussion after only a few minutes. See Goya Foods, 356 NLRB No. 73 (2011); and
Plaza Auto Center, 355 NLRB No. 85 (2010) (finding that such circumstances weigh in favor of
protection).
Provocation by employer’s unfair labor practices
As indicated above, the more heated discussion on March 24 with Miller was clearly
provoked, at least in part, by Miller’s unlawful directive not to talk about the disciplinary
investigation with other employees. Thus, this factor also favors protection.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find that Miller’s statement and warning to
Spears both violated the Act as alleged.
C. The 8(a)(3) and (5) Allegations
The General Counsel lastly alleges that the Region unlawfully denied 6 collections and
LCD-unit employees preapproved paid leave, and 89 collections-unit employees guaranteed
hours or pay, during the week commencing Monday, June 7, 2010, immediately following a 3-
day unfair labor practice strike.55 The General Counsel alleges that these actions violated both
Section 8(a)(3) and (5) because they were discriminatory, in retaliation against the employees
for engaging in the strike, and because they were unilateral, without providing the OPEIU notice
or an opportunity to bargain over the decision or effects.
As with most of the allegations in this proceeding, the Region admits the underlying
facts; that its, there is no dispute, and the evidence is uncontroverted, that the named
employees participated in an unfair labor practice strike beginning June 2 (GC Exh. 71; and Tr.
196–197, 493–495, 698–699); that the strike ended effective Saturday, June 5 (GC Exh. 74; Tr.
491, 500–501); and that during the following week beginning Monday, June 7, the Region
unilaterally denied all of the named unit employees preapproved paid leave and/or guaranteed
hours (GC Exhs. 1(nnnn), 1(oooo), 22(c); Tr. 346–347).
However, the Region asserts that it did so because the previously scheduled blood
drives for that week had been cancelled by the Region or the sponsors due to uncertainty about
when the strike would end or the lack of signed-up donors. The Region asserts that,
consequently, there was no work available for the named collections and LCD employees and
they had not yet been returned to “active status” at that time. The Region contends that, in

55 The complaint lists 90 named employees who were denied guaranteed hours. However,
the parties stipulated during the hearing that there were actually 89 such employees. See GC
Exh. 22(c); and Tr. 346. Employee Ranum, who was listed twice in the complaint, is omitted
altogether from the stipulation. Three other employees who were named in the complaint―
Rhein, Starin, and Whitehill―are also omitted from the stipulation. On the other hand, the
stipulation includes three other employees―Flannery, Fountaine, and Tracy― who were not
named in the complaint.
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these circumstances, it should be relieved of any obligation to provide paid annual leave or
guaranteed hours during that period, citing Drug Package Co., 228 NLRB 108, 113–114 (1977),
enfd. in part and denied in part, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1978) (reaffirming Board’s longstanding
remedial policy that backpay for former strikers who were unlawfully denied reinstatement shall
not begin until 5 days after their unconditional offer to return, in “recognition of the practical
difficulties [the employer] may face in reinstating employees, when [the employer] is not in a
position to know exactly when they may seek to return”) (Bat. Br. 5–7.)
The record evidence supports the Region’s explanation for why blood drives during the
week of June 7 were cancelled (Tr. 693–700, 1888–1930). Although the Union issued a “press
advisory” on June 1 stating that the strike would be limited to 3 days (GC Exh. 71), the Union
had not included this statement in the advance notice of the June 2 strike it gave the Region as
a “courtesy” on May 21 (GC Exh. 72). The evidence also supports the Region’s assertion that
the named collections and LCD employees were not immediately recalled beginning June 7
because of the cancellation of blood drives and lack of work (Tr. 1891; GC Exhs. 22(d), 75, 77;
CPO Exh. 11). Indeed, it is undisputed that the Region immediately recalled other former
strikers who worked as telerecruiters in the LCD unit, as their work is not tied to scheduled
blood drives (Tr. 694–697, 1891).
Moreover, the General Counsel’s posthearing brief (p. 158) specifically states that “[t]he
recall of employees subsequent to OPEIU’s unconditional offer to return to work is not an issue
in the instant case.” Thus, the General Counsel appears to concede, and I therefore presume,
for purposes of this proceeding, that the Region lawfully delayed recalling the named employees
due to lack of work. See Zimmerman Plumbing & Heating Co., 334 NLRB 586, 588 (2001) and
cases cited there (employer may delay reinstating former strikers where there is a bona fide
absence of available work).
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow―either from the Board’s policy that
reinstatement may be delayed due to lack of work, or from the Board’s policy that such practical
problems warrant delaying backpay for 5 days―that the Region’s actions here with respect to
the unrecalled former strikers were lawful. As indicated in Drug Package and Zimmerman
Plumbing, both policies are grounded in the Board’s interpretation of the language and purpose
of the statute. In contrast, the Region’s obligations to pay employees for preapproved annual
leave and guaranteed hours arise from the provisions of the parties’ expired collective-
bargaining agreements (which, as discussed above, continue to define the status quo post-
expiration).
In these circumstances, in agreement with the General Counsel and the OPEIU, I find
that the proper analysis is set forth in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967). The
issue in that case, similar to the issue here, was whether the employer violated Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act by refusing to pay striking employees vacation benefits pursuant to the provisions of
the parties’ expired contract. The Board held that it did, and the Court upheld the Board’s
finding. The Court held that once it has been shown that an employer engaged in discriminatory
conduct that could have adversely affected employee rights, the burden is on the employer to
establish that it was motivated by legitimate objectives. Applying this analysis, the Court held
that the Board properly found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(3) inasmuch as the
vacation benefits had accrued to the strikers prior to the strike, the only reason the strikers were
denied the accrued benefits was because they participated in the strike, and the employer failed
to submit any evidence of a legitimate motive for its discriminatory conduct.
The Board has applied the same analysis in subsequent cases under similar
circumstances. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc., 285 NLRB 241, 246 (1987) (employer unlawfully
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denied accident and sick benefits and pension credits to disabled employees during strike
where the benefits were accrued, the benefits were denied based on protected strike activity,
and the employer had failed to show that the union had expressly waived the right to receive
such benefits during a strike or that there was a reasonable and arguably correct
nondiscriminatory contract basis for denying the benefits); Lourdes Health Systems, 316 NLRB
284 (1995) (employer unlawfully denied termination benefits, including vacation and sick leave
pay, to unrecalled former strikers who wished to resign, as the benefits had accrued and the
employer had given such benefits to other employees who were not on active work status when
their employment terminated); and Swift Adhesives, 320 NLRB 215 (1995), enfd. 110 F.3d 632,
634 (8th Cir. 1997) (employer unlawfully denied to permanently replaced strikers vacation pay
that had accrued under the terms of the parties’ expired contract, where employer would have
deemed the employees eligible to receive the benefits but for their participation in the strike, and
the employer failed to show a legitimate and substantial business justification for denying the
benefits); and Dayton Newspapers, 339 NLRB 650, 656 (2003), affd. in relevant part 402 F.3d
651, 666 (6th Cir. 2005) (employer unlawfully denied laid off former strikers accrued “stay to the
end” bonuses where bonuses were withheld on the apparent basis of the strike and employer
failed to show a legitimate and substantial business justification for denying the bonuses). See
also Pride Care Ambulance, 356 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 4–5 and 18–19 (2011) (employer
unlawfully denied vested health insurance coverage to strikers after they returned to work by
requiring them to re-enroll and wait 90 days to requalify for health insurance eligibility), and
cases cited therein.
For the reasons set forth below, applying the same analysis here, I find that the Region’s
denial of preapproved paid annual leave and guaranteed hours to the former strikers violated
the Act as alleged.56
1. Denial of preapproved paid annual leave
The provisions of the expired LCD and collections contracts provide that full-time
employees shall earn a certain number of hours of paid annual leave each week depending on
their length of service. They further require that employees submit their specific annual leave
requests for approval well in advance, either in December of the prior year (collections contract),
or between January 1 – 15 for the upcoming 15 months (LCD contract).57 Finally, they provide
that the Region may not cancel or reschedule vacations unless “emergency or disaster
conditions so require.” (GC Exh. 3, art. 22; GC Exh. 4, art. 20.)58
There is no dispute that, pursuant to the foregoing provisions, all six of the named former
strikers had accrued annual leave and had previously requested and were approved to take
such leave during the week of June 7. Thus, for example, the record indicates that Michael

56 The Supreme Court in Great Dane indicated that an employer’s discriminatory actions
might also be found unlawful, regardless of whether the employer established a legitimate
business justification, if the actions were “inherently destructive of employee interests.” 388
U.S. at 34. However, the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue in that case given
that the employer had failed to establish a business justification. For the same reason, there is
likewise no need to address the issue here.
57 The LCD contract contains separate provisions for requesting summer leave (Memorial
Day–Labor Day). Although the date for making the request is not specified, the description of
the procedure indicates that it is also done well in advance.
58 The expired collections contract further provides that the Region may not do so without
“reasonable cause and notice of at least 4 weeks.”
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Turner, a former striker in the collections unit, had requested to take the leave in December
2009, and the Region approved the request in January 2010 (GC Exh. 16; Tr. 195).
Nevertheless, on June 10, while he was on his previously scheduled and approved vacation,
Turner was informed that the Region would not be paying him for the leave time. And, in fact,
he was not paid for the time in his next paycheck. (Tr. 197–199; GC Exh. 17.)
As indicated above, the Region admits that it unilaterally denied Turner and the other
five unit employees paid annual leave because of the strike and resulting cancellation of blood
drives. Further, it does not contend that these circumstances constituted “emergency or
disaster conditions” requiring cancellation of the leave. This contractual language was
obviously intended to address situations when there is an unexpected increase in the number of
blood drives, not when, as here, there is a decrease. Finally, the Region has cited no provisions
in the contracts, or any other evidence of a past practice, that would even arguably require
employees to be in “active status” during or immediately prior to taking their previously approved
leave. Compare Advertiser’s Mfg. Co., 294 NLRB 740 (1989) (employer did not violate Section
8(a)(3) by denying holiday pay to strikers because the relevant handbook provisions expressly
included an active on-duty work requirement the day before and after July 4 and for 3 months
before Memorial Day, and there was no evidence of a contrary past practice), with Glover
Bottled Gas Corp., 292 NLRB 873 (1989) (employer violated Section 8(a)(3) by denying
bereavement and vacation benefits to returning strikers where employer’s contention that most
recently expired contract required employees to work continuously from April 1 to March 31 to
be eligible for vacation pay was unreasonable and not even arguably correct).
In agreement with the General Counsel, therefore, I find that the Region has failed to
establish any legitimate or substantial business justification for its action, and that it violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as alleged. As it is undisputed that the Union was not provided
advance notice or an opportunity to bargain, I find that the Region’s action also violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act See Pride Care, supra; and Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, 346
NLRB 1319, 1326 (2006).
2. Denial of guaranteed hours
The same conclusion is warranted with respect to the Region’s denial of guaranteed
hours to the 89 former strikers in the collections unit. Article 17, section 7 of the expired
collections contract (GC Exh. 3) provides that all full-time employees are “guaranteed” a certain
number of “work or hours each week” (40 hours for those hired before October 1, 1989, and
37 ½ hours for those hired thereafter). The only listed exception is for “periods covered by
annual and granted leaves of absence.” See also Tr. 510.
Again, it is clear that all of the named former strikers qualified for guaranteed hours
under these provisions. The only stated requirement is that they be employees, and it is well
established that strikers do not lose their employee status. Thus, like paid annual leave, the
hours guarantee was an accrued benefit. See Texaco, 285 NLRB at 245–246 (a benefit is
“accrued” when it is “due and payable” on the date the employer denied it “based on past
performance with no further work required for continuing receipt”). See also Circuit-Wise, 309
NLRB 905, 912 (1992) (longevity bonus had “accrued” to strikers where entitlement to bonus
was based solely on employee status without any requirement of further work).
There is also no dispute that the only reason the former strikers were denied guaranteed
hours during the week following the strike was because they had participated in the strike and
had not yet been called in due to lack of work. The Region’s counsel stipulated at the hearing
that this was the only reason and that the former strikers were not denied guaranteed hours
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because they had requested and been granted annual leave or other leave of absence (Tr.
546).59
Finally, there is no evidence of a past practice inconsistent with the expired contract
provisions that would arguably support denying guaranteed hours to employees who are not in
“active status” because of lack of work. On the contrary, HR Supervisor Smelser acknowledged
that employees are normally paid their guaranteed hours when drives are cancelled (Tr. 1991–
1992). (Indeed, as noted by Rhines, “that is the whole point of the guarantee” (Tr. 598–599).)
Accordingly, I find that the Region’s unilateral rescission of the 89 former strikers’ vested
right to guaranteed hours following the strike also violated Section 8(a)(3) and (5) of the Act.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by:
(a) failing and refusing to provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on
March 17 and 25, 2009 regarding the reduced demand for blood;
(b) unreasonably delaying providing Teamsters Local 580 with the information it
requested on May 11, June 10, and July 31, 2009 regarding employee health insurance;
(c) failing and refusing to include the names of employees with the health insurance
demographic information it eventually provided to Teamsters Local 580 in response to its July
31, 2009 request;
(d) failing and refusing to provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on
May 19 and 21, 2010 regarding the transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD unit to other, out-
of-state locations;
(e) unilaterally implementing a more stringent, no-fault attendance policy covering
employees in the collections and LCD units in November 2008, without providing OPEIU Local
459 notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects;

59 This factual stipulation appears inconsistent with the evidence the General Counsel
presented in support of the annual-leave allegation regarding Turner. Turner is one of the 89
stipulated collections-unit employees allegedly denied guaranteed hours the week of June 7.
However, as discussed above, the evidence shows that Turner was on annual leave that entire
week. Four of the other five named employees who were allegedly denied paid annual leave
one or more days the week of June 7 (Clark, Letts, Silver, and Wright) are also among the 89
stipulated collections-unit employees denied guaranteed hours the same week. Nevertheless,
in the absence of a timely or proper motion to withdraw from the stipulation, I find that the
stipulation is binding on the Region. See Arbors at New Castle, 347 NLRB 544, 545 (2006),
and cases cited there. See also Graham, 3 Handbook of Fed. Evid. Sec. 801:26 (6th Ed. 2010);
and Wright and Graham, 22 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. Sec. 5194 (1st ed. 2010). This, however,
does not prevent the parties from reaching a mutually agreeable settlement different from the
terms of the remedial order to correct this or any other errors or inconsistencies in the
stipulation. (It appears they might all have an incentive to do so. See fn. 55, supra.)
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(f) unilaterally refusing, contrary to past practice, to permit OPEIU Local 459 to hold
union meetings on its premises in April 2009, without providing the Union prior notice or an
opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects;
(g) eliminating the pension plan for new hires in the collections and LCD units in July
2009, without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the
change and its effects;
(h) bypassing OPEIU Local 459 and announcing to employees in May 2010 that it
intended to transfer telerecruiter work from the LCD unit; and
(i) bargaining with OPEIU Local 459 since July 2010 with a fixed mind and no intention
of reaching an agreement with respect to the transfer of the telerecruiter work from the LCD
unit.
2. Both the Respondent Region and the Respondent Chapter violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by:
(a) unilaterally changing the retiree medical program in January 2009 by discontinuing
the program for both current employees not yet eligible to retire and future hires in the
collections, LCD, and clerical/warehouse units, without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice
and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects;
(b) unilaterally changing the retiree medical program in July 2009 by replacing the
Medicare Supplemental Plan with a private fee-for-service plan for employees in the collections,
LCD, and clerical/warehouse units currently eligible or nearing eligibility to retire, without
providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its
effects;
(c) unilaterally suspending matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan for
employees in the collections, LCD, and clerical/warehouse units in May 2009, without providing
OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects; and
(d) unilaterally implementing a new BenefitsAdvantage health insurance program in
January 2010 for employees in the collections, LCD, clerical/warehouse, apheresis, and MUA
units, without providing OPEIU Local 459 and Teamsters Local 580 a meaningful opportunity to
bargain over the change and its effects.
3. The Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on March 24, 2010 by
directing Lashawnda Spears, an employee in the collections unit and the OPEIU Local 459
steward, not to talk to other employees about a pending disciplinary matter.
4. The Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing a
written “verbal” warning to Spears on April 30, 2010.
5. The Respondent Region violated Section 8(a)(3), (5), and (1) of the Act by:
(a) denying preapproved paid annual leave during the week of June 7, 2010 to six
employees in the collections and LCD units who had participated in a 3-day unfair labor practice
strike the previous week; and
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(b) denying guaranteed hours during the same week to 89 employees in the collections
unit who had participated in the strike.
6. The Respondents’ unfair labor practices affected commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. The Respondents did not otherwise violate the Act as alleged by the General
Counsel.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall order them to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Specifically, I shall order the Respondent Region and the Respondent Chapter to
rescind the unlawful unilateral changes one or both of them made to the unit employees’ terms
and conditions of employment, and to restore the status quo ante that existed prior to the
changes until such time as they bargain with Teamsters Local 580 and/or OPEIU Local 459 in
good faith to a contrary agreement or bona fide impasse.60 With respect to the Region’s
unlawful change in the attendance policy, this obligation shall include removing from its files any
discipline issued to employees in the collections and LCD units as a result of the change, and
notifying the employees that this has been done and that the prior discipline will not be used
against them in any way.
I shall also order the Respondents to make whole any unit employees affected by the
unlawful unilateral changes. This includes reimbursing the employees for any loss of earnings
or benefits resulting from the changes. Backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), plus interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). It also includes
making any benefit contributions on behalf of eligible unit employees that have not been made
since the date of the unlawful changes, plus any additional amounts due the funds in
accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979).61 It further
includes reimbursing the unit employees for any expenses ensuing from the Respondents’
failure to make the required contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB
891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981), such amounts to be computed in the
same manner as backpay described above.
Similarly, I shall order the Respondent Region to make whole the named employees in
the collections and LCD units who were unlawfully denied preapproved paid annual leave and

60 Respondents may litigate in compliance whether it would be unduly burdensome to
restore the status quo ante with respect to the unilateral changes in health insurance coverage
or other benefits. See Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 21, slip op. at 1, fn. 7 (2010). If the Unions
choose to retain one or more of the unilaterally implemented changes, then make-whole relief
for those changes is inapplicable. Ibid.
61 To the extent that an employee has made personal contributions to a benefit or other fund
that have been accepted by the fund in lieu of Respondents delinquent contributions during the
period of the delinquency, Respondents will reimburse the employee, but the amount of such
reimbursement will constitute a setoff to any amount that Respondents otherwise owe the fund.
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guaranteed hours following the strike. Such amounts shall be computed in the same manner
described above.
I shall also order the Respondent Region to provide the requested information it
unlawfully failed to provide OPEIU Local 459 or Teamsters Local 580; to bargain in good faith
with OPEIU Local 459 on request with respect to the transfer of telerecruiter work; and to
rescind the written “verbal” warning it issued to Spears, expunge any reference to the discipline
from its files, and advise Spears that this has been done and that the discipline will not be used
against her in any way.
Finally, I shall order the Respondents to each post a notice to their employees regarding
their respective violations in accordance with J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (2010).
Accordingly, consistent with the foregoing, and based on the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record, I issue the following recommended62
ORDER
A. The Respondent, American National Red Cross, Great Lakes Blood Services
Region, Lansing, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to timely provide relevant and necessary information requested
by OPEIU Local 459 or Teamsters Local 580.
(b) Unilaterally implementing more stringent attendance policies covering employees in
the collections and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 advance notice and an
opportunity to bargain over the changes and their effects on employees.
(c) Unilaterally changing its past practice of permitting OPEIU Local 459 to hold union
meetings on its premises without providing advance notice and an opportunity to bargain over
the change and its effects on unit employees.
(d) Bypassing OPEIU Local 459 and announcing to employees that it intends to transfer
telerecruiter work from the LCD unit.
(e) Bargaining with OPEIU Local 459 with a fixed mind and no intention of reaching an
agreement with respect to the transfer of the telerecruiter work from the LCD unit.
(f) Unilaterally changing the retiree medical program for employees in the collections
and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain
over the change and its effects.

62 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(g) Unilaterally suspending matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan for
employees in the collections and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and
an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
(h) Unilaterally eliminating the pension plan for new hires in the collections and LCD
units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the
change and its effects.
(i) Unilaterally implementing a new health insurance program for employees in the
collections, LCD, apheresis, and MUA units without providing OPEIU Local 459 and Teamsters
Local 580 a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
(j) Directing employees not to talk to their coworkers about pending disciplinary matters.
(k) Disciplining employees because they engaged in protected concerted activities and
to discourage employees from engaging in such activities.
(l) Discriminatorily and unilaterally denying preapproved paid annual leave to employees
in the collections and LCD units because they engaged in a strike or other protected concerted
activities and to discourage employees from engaging in such activities, and without providing
OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
(m) Discriminatorily and unilaterally denying guaranteed hours to employees in the
collections unit because they engaged in a strike or other protected concerted activities and to
discourage employees from engaging in such activities, and without providing OPEIU Local 459
prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
(n) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on March 17 and 25,
2009 regarding the reduced demand for blood.
(b) Provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on May 19 and 21, 2010
regarding the proposed transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD unit, and, on request,
bargain in good faith with OPEIU Local 459 with respect to the proposed transfer.
(c) Provide Teamsters Local 580 with the health insurance demographic information it
requested on July 31, 2009, with the employees’ names included.
(d) On request, rescind the unlawful unilateral changes it made in the collections and
LCD units in November 2008 and January, April, May, and July 2009, and in the collections,
LCD, apheresis, and MUA units in January 2010, and restore the status quo ante that existed
prior to the changes until such time as it has bargained with OPEIU Local 459 or Teamsters
Local 580 to an agreement or impasse.
(e) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any discipline issued to
employees in the collections and LCD units as a result of the November 2008 unlawful unilateral
change to the attendance policy and, within 3 days thereafter, notify the employees that this has
been done and that the prior discipline will not be used against them in any way.
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(f) Make whole, with interest, the employees in the collections, LCD, apheresis, and
MUA units for any loss of earnings and benefits they may have incurred as a result of its
unlawful unilateral changes, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(g) Make whole, with interest, in the same manner, the following six employees in the
collections or LCD units who were unlawfully denied preapproved paid annual leave following
the June 2010 unfair labor practice strike: Jennifer Clark, Jeannie Wright, Michael Turner, Judy
Letts, Ron Silver, and Stephanie Coats.
(h) Make whole, with interest, in the same manner, the following 89 employees in the
collections unit who were unlawfully denied guaranteed hours following the strike: Kristine
Adler; Cheryl Albert; Jacquelyn Barton; Lynn Blake; Ruth Blakeslee; Michelle Brennan; Megan
Brown; Kelly Brust; Carla Bunn; Karen Caramango; Robert Carpenter; Gail Case; Nichole
Cheza; Jennifer Clark; Heather Diepen; Tara Eberhard; Brianne Edmonds; Jennifer Ellis; Stacy
Emede; Kathleen Emig; Jereatha Flannery; Dechara Fountaine; Brenda Fundunburks; Mary
Gardner; Russell Hager; Reynett Henderson; Chad Hier; May Hill; Robin Hilliard; Carly
Hoffman; Freda Holley; Amber Holton; Amy Holysz; Jason Hruskach; Jaiml Johnson; Diana
Jones; Penny Jugovich; Patsy Kaiser; Garred Kasprzycki; Eric Kendziorski; Patti Ketelaar;
Heather Keyton; Angela Kinney; Sharron Kirkby; Michelle Lahti; Sandra Lalumandiere; Joshua
Lanning; Minette Lefkiades; Judy Letts; Constance Longcore; Heather Lytle; Elijah McIntosh;
Janet Michael; Kerri Michaud; Tonia Miles; Barbara Moore; Emily Nichols; Laurel Perkins;
Jennifer Pogue; Kathleen Poirot; Steven Prchlik; Sharon Proctor; Ashley Ramsey; Lisa Reeves;
Joan Rogers; Julianne Ruhstorfer; Sara Sackman; Rita Serva; Lisa Shute; Ronald Silver;
LaShawnda Spears; Holly Spring; Christine Stafford; Rebecca Starr, Sandra Steggerda; Karl
Sternberg; Christopher Summers; Robert Swicker; Lesley Thibault; Teresa Thomas, Rachel
Thrush; Nancy Topel; Kelly Tracy; Michael Turner; Brigitte Vandebroek; Carol West; Kelly
White; Jeannie Wright; and Dale Wyman.
(i) Within 14 days of the Board’s order, rescind the written “verbal” warning it issued to
Lashawnda Spears on April 30, 2010, expunge any reference to it from its files, and within 3
days thereafter, notify Spears that this has been done and that the warning will not be used
against her in any way.
(j) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the NLRB
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated
by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such
records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(k) Within 14 days after service by the NLRB Regional Office, post at its facility in
Lansing, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix I.”63 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Office, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such

63 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since November
17, 2008.
(l) Within 21 days after service by the NLRB Regional Office, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Regional Office
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
B. The Respondent, American National Red Cross, Mid-Michigan Chapter, Lansing,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally changing the retiree medical program for employees in the
clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the change and its effects.
(b) Unilaterally suspending matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan for
employees in the clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an
opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
(c) Unilaterally implementing a new health insurance program for employees in the
clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 a meaningful opportunity to bargain
over the change and its effects.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, rescind the unlawful unilateral changes it made in the clerical/warehouse
unit in January, May, and July 2009, and January 2010, and restore the status quo ante that
existed prior to the changes until such time as it has bargained with OPEIU Local 459 to an
agreement or impasse.
(b) Make whole, with interest, the employees in the clerical/warehouse unit for any loss
of earnings and benefits they may have incurred as a result of its unlawful unilateral changes, in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
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(d) Within 14 days after service by the NLRB Regional Office, post at its facility in
Lansing, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix II.”64 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Office, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 1,
2009.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the NLRB Regional Office, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Regional Office
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 5, 2011
__________________________________
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge

64 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–27–11
Lansing, MI
APPENDIX I
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT fail to timely provide relevant and necessary information requested by OPEIU
Local 459 or Teamsters Local 580.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement more stringent attendance policies covering our
employees in the collections and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 advance notice
and an opportunity to bargain over the changes and their effects on employees.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change our past practice of permitting OPEIU Local 459 to hold
union meetings on the premises without providing advance notice and an opportunity to bargain
over the change and its effects on unit employees.
WE WILL NOT bypass OPEIU Local 459 and announce to employees that we intend to transfer
telerecruiter work from the LCD unit.
WE WILL NOT bargain with OPEIU Local 459 with a fixed mind and no intention of reaching an
agreement with respect to the transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD unit.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the retiree medical program for employees in the collections
and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain
over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally suspend matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan for
employees in the collections and LCD units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and
an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally eliminate the pension plan for new hires in the collections and LCD
units without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the
change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement a new BenefitsAdvantage health insurance program for
employees in the collections, LCD, apheresis, and MUA units without providing OPEIU Local
459 and Teamsters Local 580 a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the change and its
effects.
JD–27–11
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WE WILL NOT direct employees not to talk to their coworkers about pending disciplinary
matters.
WE WILL NOT discipline employees because they engaged in protected concerted activities
and to discourage employees from engaging in such activities.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily and unilaterally deny employees preapproved paid annual leave
because they engaged in a strike or other protected concerted activities and to discourage
employees from engaging in such activities, and without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice
and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily and unilaterally deny guaranteed hours to employees because
they engaged in a strike or other protected concerted activities and to discourage employees
from engaging in such activities, and without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an
opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on March 17 and 25, 2009
regarding the reduced demand for blood.
WE WILL provide OPEIU Local 459 with the information it requested on May 19 and 21, 2010
regarding the proposed transfer of telerecruiter work from the LCD unit, and, on request,
bargain in good faith with OPEIU Local 459 with respect to the proposed transfer.
WE WILL provide Teamsters Local 580 with the health insurance demographic information it
requested on July 31, 2009, with the employees’ names included.
WE WILL, on request, rescind the unlawful unilateral changes we made in the collections and
LCD units in November 2008 and January, April, May, and July 2009, and in the collections,
LCD, apheresis, and MUA units in January 2010, and restore the status quo ante that existed
prior to the changes until such time as we have bargained with OPEIU Local 459 or Teamsters
Local 580 to an agreement or impasse.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any discipline issued to
employees in the collections and LCD units as a result of the November 2008 unlawful unilateral
change to the attendance policy and, within 3 days thereafter, notify the employees that this has
been done and that the prior discipline will not be used against them in any way.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, the employees in the collections, LCD, apheresis, and
MUA units for any loss of earnings and benefits they may have incurred as a result of our
unlawful unilateral changes.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, the following six employees who were unlawfully denied
preapproved paid annual leave following the June 2010 unfair labor practice strike: Jennifer
Clark, Jeannie Wright, Michael Turner, Judy Letts, Ron Silver, and Stephanie Coats.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, the following 89 employees who were unlawfully denied
guaranteed hours following the strike: Kristine Adler; Cheryl Albert; Jacquelyn Barton; Lynn
Blake; Ruth Blakeslee; Michelle Brennan; Megan Brown; Kelly Brust; Carla Bunn; Karen
Caramango; Robert Carpenter; Gail Case; Nichole Cheza; Jennifer Clark; Heather Diepen; Tara
JD–27–11
Lansing, MI
Eberhard; Brianne Edmonds; Jennifer Ellis; Stacy Emede; Kathleen Emig; Jereatha Flannery;
Dechara Fountaine; Brenda Fundunburks; Mary Gardner; Russell Hager; Reynett Henderson;
Chad Hier; May Hill; Robin Hilliard; Carly Hoffman; Freda Holley; Amber Holton; Amy Holysz;
Jason Hruskach; Jaiml Johnson; Diana Jones; Penny Jugovich; Patsy Kaiser; Garred
Kasprzycki; Eric Kendziorski; Patti Ketelaar; Heather Keyton; Angela Kinney; Sharron Kirkby;
Michelle Lahti; Sandra Lalumandiere; Joshua Lanning; Minette Lefkiades; Judy Letts;
Constance Longcore; Heather Lytle; Elijah McIntosh; Janet Michael; Kerri Michaud; Tonia Miles;
Barbara Moore; Emily Nichols; Laurel Perkins; Jennifer Pogue; Kathleen Poirot; Steven Prchlik;
Sharon Proctor; Ashley Ramsey; Lisa Reeves; Joan Rogers; Julianne Ruhstorfer; Sara
Sackman; Rita Serva; Lisa Shute; Ronald Silver; LaShawnda Spears; Holly Spring; Christine
Stafford; Rebecca Starr, Sandra Steggerda; Karl Sternberg; Christopher Summers; Robert
Swicker; Lesley Thibault; Teresa Thomas, Rachel Thrush; Nancy Topel; Kelly Tracy; Michael
Turner; Brigitte Vandebroek; Carol West; Kelly White; Jeannie Wright; and Dale Wyman.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s order, rescind the written “verbal” warning we issued to
Lashawnda Spears on April 30, 2010, expunge any reference to it from its files, and within 3
days thereafter, notify her that this has been done and that the warning will not be used against
her in any way.
THE AMERICAN RED CROSS,
GREAT LAKES BLOOD SERVICES REGION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Federal Building, Room 300
Detroit, Michigan 48226-2569
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
313-226-3200.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 313-226-3244.
JD–27–11
Lansing, MI
APPENDIX II
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the retiree medical program for employees in the
clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 prior notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally suspend matching contributions to the 401(k) savings plan for
employees in the clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 with prior notice
and an opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement a new BenefitsAdvantage health insurance program for
employees in the clerical/warehouse unit without providing OPEIU Local 459 a meaningful
opportunity to bargain over the change and its effects.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, rescind the unlawful unilateral changes we made in the clerical/
warehouse unit in January, May, and July 2009, and January 2010, and restore the status quo
ante that existed prior to the changes until such time as we have bargained with OPEIU Local
459 to an agreement or impasse.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, the employees in the clerical/warehouse unit for any loss
of earnings and benefits they may have incurred as a result of our unlawful unilateral changes.
AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS,
MID-MICHIGAN CHAPTER
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
JD–27–11
Lansing, MI
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Federal Building, Room 300
Detroit, Michigan 48226-2569
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
313-226-3200.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 313-226-3244.