The American Laundry Machinery Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 30, 194876 N.L.R.B. 981 (N.L.R.B. 1948) Copy Citation In the Matter of THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 1 and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS of AMERICA, A. F. of L. Case No. 9-C-2349.-Decided March 30, 1948 Mr. Allen Sinsheimer, Jr., for the Board. Messrs. Peck, Shaffer & Williams, by Mr. John Weld Peck and Mr. John C. Taylor, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the respondent. Mr. Morris Weintraub, of Newport, Ky., and Mr. Peter G. Noll, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Union. Mr. Philip J. Kennedy, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Intervenors. DECISION AND ORDER On March 13, 1947, 'T'rial Examiner John H. Eadie issued his Inter-, mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto.2 Thereafter, the Board's attorney, the Intervenors, and the respondent filed exceptions to the Inter- mediate Report. Oral argument was granted but later rescinded by the Board with leave to the parties to file supplemental briefs. The respondent subsequently filed a supplemental brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-man panel consisting of the undersigned Board Members. ' In the Intermediate Report the respondent is referred to as "The American Laundiy Machine Company" whereas the record indicates that the respondent ' s name is as above designated. 2Those provisions of Section 8 (1) and ( 5) of the National Labor Relations Act, which the Trial Examiner found were violated herein , are continued in Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 ( a) (5) of the Act , as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. 'Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Reynolds 76 N. L R. B., No. 141 981 982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's ruling's made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.'; The rul- ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the parties' exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner, with the modifications hereinafter set forth. 1. We find, as the Trial Examiner did, that the respondent unlaw- fully refused to bargain with the Union in June 1946 and thereafter,` by refusing to meet with the Union in June 1946, unless and until the Union withdrew certain charges it had filed with the Board on June 3; ' by refusing to recognize and deal with Eckert as the Union's spokesman at all meetings between the parties after May 24, 1946; 6 by IIn its briefs filed with the Board after issuance of the Intermediate Report, the respondent objects to certain of the Trial Examiner 's fact findings on the ground, inter aba, that United States Conciliation Commissioner Bentley, who had attended a serves of bar- gaining conferences between the respondent and the Union, was not a witness at the hearing. Without stating the specific facts to which the conciliator might have testified, and without specifying what relief it now seeks in this connection , the respondent complains in its briefs of the alleged refusal of the Board's Regional Attorney, Allen Sinsheimer , to join with its counsel in requesting the Secretary of Labor to permit Commissioner Bentley to testify We find the respondent ' s objection belated and wholly lacking in merit. Assuming that the conciliator ' s testimony might have been relevant to certain aspects of the case, the respondent did not, so far as the record shows, apply to the Trial Examiner for a subpoena iequiring his attendance as a witness Nor aid it otherwise seasonably attempt to secure it ruling from either the Trial Examiner or the Board as to whether the circumstances justified requesting the Secretary of Labor to make an exception to the Department of Labor's rule ( Regulations of the Department of Labor, Article III, Sec. 3 ) which pro- hibited officers or employees of the United States Conciliation Service from testifying as to matters coming to their knowledge in their official capacity. (See Matter of Tomlinson of 11mgla Point, Inc, 74 N. L It B 681 ) It cannot at this late date contend either that the hearing should be reopened , or that the Board should disregard competent evidence which is in the record, concerning transactions as to which the conciliator might have testified Moreover, the absence of the conciliator' s testimony does not prejudice the respondent, for even if we made no findings inconsistent with the respondent's testimony or its admis- sions as to transactions which Commissioner Bentley witnessed, it would not alter our conclusion that the respondent refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act 4 For reasons set forth below, we do not affirm the Trial Examiner's finding that the refusal to bargain first occurred on November 15, 1945. 5 This finding is based on the testimony of Peter Noll, a representative of the Union, as to telephone conversations with the respondent 's representatives, Taylor and Williams. The Trial Examiner in his Intermediate Report notes that Taylor argumentatively con- tradicted Noll , without mentioning that the same witness specifically denied this par- ticular telephone conversation , and that Williams argumentatively denied all conversations as to which he had no written record Nevertheless, we credit Noll's testimony in this respect, inasmuch as Trial Examiner in this and other instances found him to be a truthful witness We do not rely, as the Trial Examinee appears to hale clone, upon Noll's addi- tional hearsay testimony to the effect that Commissioner Bentley also advised him that the respondent would not meet with the Union until the Tune 3 charges were withdrawn we note, however, in this connection, that the Trial Examiner made no erroneous ruling in allowing that testimony ; the respondent made no objection or motion to strike. " We attach no significance to the action of Taylor in angrily leaving a meeting on May 24 because of Eckert' s remarks which lie found offensive IIo«ever, there is nothing to indicate that Eckert furnished any fresh provocation 6 weeks later when the respondent's THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 983 its refusal to meet with the Union in September unless the strike was called off; and its refusal to meet in October unless the Union's charge filed in the present proceeding, and its demands on the recognition clause and for a closed shop were withdrawn. The respondent justifies its conduct on the ground that it met fre- quently with the Union, between late December 1945 and August 2, 1946, and in those meetings reached agreement concerning all the items in a proposed contract except the issues concerning the recognition clause 7 and closed shop. It is true that the respondent met and bar- gained with the Union in a series of meetings, that an impasse was reached concerning these two issues, and that the strike called by the Union on August 2 was caused by this impasse. However, these facts do not justify the respondent's subsequent refusal to bargain during the strike,' or its conduct in refusing to meet with the Union in October, after the strike was called off, unless the Union would agree in advance, not only to withdraw its demands as to the recognition clause and the closed shop, but to withdraw its charges in this proceeding.' Cer- tainly "the failure of negotiations before the strike did not preclude the possibility of agreement" 116 weeks and more thereafter. Neither does the respondent's action in meeting and negotiating with the Union during the period before the strike alter the fact that it required the Union during that period to submit to unlawful conditions when it insisted upon withdrawal of the earlier charge in June and silenced Eckert as the Union's negotiator. 2. We do not adopt the Trial Examiner's finding that the initial delays caused by illness were an indication of bad faith.- We also disagree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the respondent's pro- negotiators refused to continue a meeting after another international representative became ill and withdrew , leaving Eckert alone to speak for the Union Neither that action nor the respondent 's conduct in ignoring Eckert at all subsequent meetings which lie attended can be justified or excused as an impulsive reaction to insulting language . An employer cannot restrict a union ' s choice of negotiators on the basis of mere personality or manner See Matter of The Oltiver Corporation, 74 N L R B 483, and Matter of The Kentucly Utilities Company, 76 N I. it B 845 7 As we find below, the form of recognition clause proposed by the respondent was not, in the circumstances , objectionable 8 See Matter of Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp , 73 N L R B 329 , and Jeffei y-Dewitt, In- salatorCo. i N L R B, 91 F (2c1) 134 (C C A 4) ° See Hartsell Mills Company v N L R B., 111 F (2d) 291 (C C. A 4). 1° Matter of Craddock-Tei ry Shoe Corp, supra 11 The record does not show that the illnesses were not genuine but, on the contrary, tends to show that they were and that the delays were not unreasonable. See Matter of Easton Publishing Company, 19 N L R B 389 , wherein the Board in dealing with a delay of "several weeks" said , "while the respondent could not postpone bargaining indefinitely on account of the disability of one of its officers, we do not view its suggestions that further negotiations be withheld pending Snyder's recovery as a refusal to bargain " Cf Matter oj 6argie 1'inegas Company, 71 N L It B 829 wherein the Board. in treating with the plea of illness in connection with a delay of more than 5 months after the Union ' s initial request stated, The Act. which was designed to equalize bargaining power between em- ployees and employers , does not permit the employer to secure , even unintentionally, a dominant position at the bargaining table by means of unreasonable delay " 984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD posal as to the recognition clause to be incorporated in the contract was violative of the Act.12 Neither do we concur in the Trial Examiner's reasoning as to the respondent's failure to check the signatures on the revocation cards submitted by employees on November 22, 1946. The Union's apparent loss of majority in November 1946, indicated by the revocation cards as well as by the intervention of a group of employees who asserted that they did not want the Union,13 is "not determinative of the remedy to be ordered," 14 but, in and of itself, the respondent's failure to check the signatures on the cards proves nothing. 3. The Board certified the Union on November 15, 1945, as the bar- gaining representative of the respondent's employees upon a stipula- tion for certification upon a consent election. No issue with respect to the appropriateness of the unit has been raised in this proceeding. However, we note that the unit includes watchmen and guards. We shall amend it by eliminating from the unit these employees in accord- ance with the provisions of Section 9 (b) (3) of the Act.15 % Te find that all production and maintenance employees of the respondent, including employees of the development department, jani- tors and sweepers, electrical testers, firemen, lead men, and dispatchers, but excluding watchmen and guards, full-time inspectors, timekeepers, truck drivers, factory clerks, engineering department employees, super- intendents, assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant foremen, chief inspector, office and clerical employees, and all supervisors, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 4. As recommended by the Trial Examiner we shall order the re- spolldent to bargain with the Union. Only in this way can the effect of the respondent's unfair labor practices be expunged and the policies of the Act effectuated.'' ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act; as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, The American "As we view its action in this respect, the respondent wished to include the language of the proviso of Section 9 (a) of the Statute in the contract, without prejudice to the right of either party to assert its interpretation of the language in the event any issue should arise. 10 A motion to intervene made through counsel by 4 employees, allegedly on behalf of 279 others similarly situated, was granted by the Trial Examiner to the extent of protecting the interests of those employees in the proceedings. 11 See Franks Bros Company v N L R B., 321 U. S. 702, and Semi -Steel Casting Co. Y. N. L R. B, 160 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 8). 15 Matter of C V Hill & Company, Inc., 76 N L R B 158 io International Association of Machinists v N. L R. B . 311 U S 72 , see also Matter of Tishomingo County Electric Power Association , 74 N L . R. B 864; Matter of Karp Metal Products Co , Inc, 51 N. L. R. B. 621 ; and N. L. R. B. v. Swtift and Company, 162 F. (2cl) 575 (C C A. 3). THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 985 Laundry Machinery Company, Norwood, Ohio, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the unit hereinabove found to be appropriate; (b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., to bar- gain collectively with it, as the exclusive representative of its em- ploy ees in the appropriate unit described above. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement; (b) Post at its plant at Norwood, Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A." 17 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTO-TIIomLE WORKERS OF AMERICA, A . F. OF L., 31 In the event that this order is enforced by decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals, there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words : "A Decision and Order" the words • "A Decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals Enforcing." 986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bar- gaining unit, and WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named union to bargain with us. The bargaining unit is : All our production and maintenance employees including em- ployees of the development department, janitors and sweepers, electrical testers, firemen, lead men, dispatchers, but excluding full-time inspectors, watchmen and guards, timekeepers, truck drivers, factory clerks, engineering department employees, super- intendents, assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant foremen, chief inspector, office and clerical employees and all supervisors. THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY, Employeq. By -------------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) Dated --------------------------- This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date hereof and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. Allen Sinsheimer, Jr., for the Board. Messrs. Peck, Shaffer & Williams, by Mr John Weld Peek and tllr John C. Taylor, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the respondent Mr. Morris Weintraub, of Newport, Ky., and Mr. Peter 0 Noll, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Union. Mr. Philip J. Kennedy, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Intervenors STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed by International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Ninth Region (Cincinnati, Ohio), issued its complaint dated December 30, 1946, against The American Laundry Machine Company, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section S (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of hearing were duly served on the respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that the respondent on or about December 1, 1945,' and at all times thereafter, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, although the Union was the representative of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit The respondent filed an answer and an amended answer in which it admitted the I The complaint originally alleged May 24, 1946. At the heating a motion to amend a as granted without objection THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 987 jurisdictional allegations of the complaint but denied the commission of any alleged unfair labor practices Pursuant to notice, a healing was held at Cincinnati, Ohio, on January 21 and 22, 1947, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner . At the opening of the hearing, Henry Kohnnescher, et alai, herein collectively called the Intervenors, appeared through their attor- ney and moved for permission to intervene. The motion was granted to the extent of the interest of the Intervenors over the objection of counsel for the Board. The Board, the respondent, the Union and the Intervenors were each represented by Counsel, and all participated in the hearing Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. At the conclusion of the case counsel for the Board moved to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof as to non-Substantive matters. The motion was granted without objection. The Board, the respondent and the Intervenors have submitted briefs to the undersigned. Although offered an opportunity to do so, none of the parties presented oral argument before the undersigned at the hearing Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THY. RESPONDENT The respondent is an Ohio corporation with its principal office and plant located at Norwood , Ohio , where it is engaged in the manufacture of laundry and dry cleaning machinery and special equipment for allied industries. Dui in,, the year 1946 its purchases of raw materials were valued at $2,000,000, of which 75 percent was received from outside the State of Ohio. During the same period of time the respondent shipped from its plant finished products having a value in excess of $5,000 ,000, of which amount in excess of 75 percent was sold and shipped to points outside the State of Ohio At the hearing the respondent admitted that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., is a labor organization which admits to membership employees of the respondent. III THE UNIAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The refusals to bargain 1. The appropriate unit and representation of a majority therein The complaint alleges that all production and maintenance employees of the respondent , including employees of the Development Department , janitors and sweepers , electrical testers, firemen, lead men, dispatchers , watchmen and guards, but excluding full-time inspectors , timekeepers, truck drivers , factory clerks, Engineering Department employees , superintendents , assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant foremen, chief inspector , office and clerical employees , and all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge , discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees , or effectively recommend 988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD such action, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar- gaining. In its answer the respondent admits the appropriateness of the unit as alleged in the complaint Accordingly, the undersigned finds that all production and maintenance em- ployees of the respondent, including employees of the Development Department, janitors and sweepers, electrical testers, firemen, lead men, dispatchers, watch- men and guards, but excluding full-time inspectors, timekeepers, truck drivers, factory clerks, Engineering Department employees, superintendents, assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant foremen, chief inspector, office and clerical employees , and all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, dis- charge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, have at all times material herein constituted and do now constitute an appropriate unit within the meaning of the Act: he finds that said unit will insure to the employees of the respondent the full benefit of their rights to self-organization and collective bargaining and other- wise effectuate the purposes of the Act. In its Decision dated November 15, 1945,' the Board certified the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the afore-mentioned appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. At the hearing the respondent submitted uncontradicted evidence showing that as of November 22, 1946, ap- proximately 276 employees had signed cards revoking any authority of the Union as their bargaining agent. The respondent employed approximately 835 persons at that time. The undersigned finds that the defections from the Union were caused by the unfair labor practices of the respondent, hereinafter found, and therefore would be immaterial in determining the question of representation of the respondent's employees. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that on and at all times after November 15, 1945, the Union was the duly designated bargaining representative of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and that, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union was on November 15, 1945, and at all times thereafter has been and is now the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. 2. The negotiations Immediately after November 15, 1945, the Union requested the respondent for a meeting in order to negotiate a contract. The respondent refused to meet with the Union, however, until December 27, claiming that it was impossible to meet before that time due to the illness of one of its officers on the negotiating committee. On that date representatives of the respondent, including John Taylor, the respondent's attorney, met with the "bargaining committee" of the Union, composed of employees, and Everett Eckert, an International Repre- sentative of the Union. At this meeting the Union submitted a proposed contract. Other meetings were held on January 2, 8 and 11, 1946, and at these four meet- ings the Union's proposed contract, which the respondent indicated it approved in part, was discussed. Although numerous requests were shade by the Union 2 The Board 's decision was rendered after a consent election. In the election 419 valid votes were cast ; of this number 257 were for the Union and 150 were for United Laundry Machine workers, an unaffiliated union. THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 989 for meetings during January, February and March, the respondent again advised the Union that it was impossible to hold meetings due to illness of members of its negotiating committee. Two meetings, however, were held on March 5 and 19, respectively.' It appears that very little was accomplished at the above- mentioned meetings and that no agreements, tentative or otherwise, were reached.4 Due to the delays in the negotiations, the Union at about the end of March petitioned the Board to conduct a strike vote. Thereafter, a Conciliator of the United States Department of Labor was present at all meetings which he arranged and which were held in his office. The first of these meetings was held on April 9; other such meetings were held on April 15, 17, 18, 23, 26, and 30, May 10, 14, 21, and 24, June 25, July 1, 8, 12, 15, 23, 25, and 30, and August 1. At the above meetings all matters at issue were agreed upon with the exception of recognition and union security 3 At the meeting on May 24 Eckert made a statement of a personal nature which Taylor resented. Taylor angrily left the meeting and the respondent's repre- sentatives thereafter refused to meet further with the Union on that day. On July 8, the next meeting which Eckert attended, the respondent again refused to meet with the Union with Eckert as its spokesman. At subsequent meetings which Eckert attended he was ignored by representatives of the respondent.` In connection with the above incidents, however, the respondent, while still refusing to deal with Eckert, offered to withdraw Taylor as a negotiator if the _ Union so desired. As noted above only one meeting was held in June, namely on June 25. No International Representative of the Union was present at this meeting. It appears that the Union on June 3 filed with the Board an unfair labor practice charge against the respondent? This charge was apparently filed due to a misunderstanding on the part of the Union as to scheduled meeting dates after the May 24 meeting.' About 1 week after June 3, Peter Noll, an attorney and Regional Director of the Union, had separate telephone conversations with Taylor and Floyd Williams, a partner in the legal firm representing the respond- ent. Both Taylor and Williams told Noll that the respondent would not meet 3 In relating the bargaining negotiations , the undersigned has omitted reference to meet- ings between representatives of the respondent and the "bargaining committee" or officers of the local of the Union , since it conclusively appears that these meetings were not formal meetings called for the purpose of negotiating a contract. At one such meeting on March 2 the respondent presented its counterproposal. 4 Eckert testified to the effect that it was his understanding that the respondent had agreed tentatively to a number of the issues involved, including recognition ; that discus- sion on certain issues, such as union security, was "tabled" or postponed at the respond- ent's request ; and that at subsequent meetings the respondent denied that any tentative agreements had been reached . The undersigned believes and finds that the respondent had merely indicated its approval of some of the clauses in the Union 's proposed contract, but that no agreements were reached in this respect. 6 Some of the agreements were tentative . In such cases the understandings were reduced to writing and initialed by the parties . Agreements on wages and vacations , however, were drawn in contract form and formally signed by the parties. 6 At these meetings either other International Representatives of the Union or its attorney acted as its spokesman . It does not appear, however, that the Union at any time agreed to any substitution for Eckert. ° The charge was withdrawn by the Union on June 14. 3 The Union claimed that the respondent failed to appear at meetings scheduled for May 28 and 31. It conclusively appears that the Conciliator did not set these dates for meetings. 990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with the Union until it withdrew the unfair labor practice charge. Conciliator Bentley advised Noll to the same effect.° The meetings of July 30 and August 1 were devoted almost exclusively to dis- cussions concerning recognition and union security clauses. An impasse was leached on both questions The respondent refused to grant any form of union security clause and with respect to the recognition clause insisted either that the exact wordage of the proviso of Section 9 (a) of the Act be added or that it be stated that the clause was subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act. The Union stated that it would not accept such a recognition clause unless a further proviso be added to the effect that the Union be notified of the presenta- tion of grievances and that the Union should have the right'to be present at all stages of discussion and settlement of such grievances should it so desire This was refused by the respondent In this connection, the respondent insisted on the right of individual employees to present "personal" grievances without notifi- cation to, or the presence of, the Union and stated, in effect, that it so interpreted Section 9 (a) of the Act, notwithstanding the decision in the Hughes Toot Case10 The respondent further stated that it regarded an employee's wage rate and iierit rating to be matters within the scope covered by "personal" grievances. On August 2 the Union called a strike which lasted until about October 1. About September 23, Noll, while representing the Union in another matter in- volving the respondent, met Williams. During the ensuing conversation Noll re- quested that negotiations be resumed. Williams replied that the respondent would not meet with the Union as long as it was on strike." Within a day or two after the termination of the strike, Noll telephoned Wil- liams. As to this conversation Noll testified without contradiction and the undersigned finds that Williams stated that the respondent would not meet with the Union unless the unfair labor practice charges were withdrawn and unless the Union withdrew from its previous stand on the recognition and Union secur- ity clauses 1^- Within a few days Noll had other telephone conversations with both Williams and Taylor in which they reiterated the above conditions to a meeting with the Union. 9 Noll testified credibly and without contradiction to the above conversations , excepting that Taylor testified that after April 9 lie did not have any telephone conversations with Noll concerning meetings , since such arrangements were made through Bentley Conciliator Bentley was not called as a witness at the hearing As stated above the Conciliator arranged all meetings after April 9 At the hearing the undersigned sustained all objec- tions as to any conversations with Bentley when either party was not present 10 In llughes Tool Company v N L It B , 147 P (2d) 69 (C C A. 5) 11 Noll testified credibly to the above conversation . Williams admitted that he may have had a conversation with Noll but denied the above statement attributed to him by Noll Williams testified in substance that his denial was based on the fact that he did not have any memorandum or notes of such conversation and that he habitually maintained notes on conversations involving the interests of his clients The undersigned believes that the facts in the case support Noll's version of this and other conversations with Williams. 1' The Union filed unfair labor practice charges in the instant proceeding with the Board on about August 6, 1946 Noll also testified credibly to a similar conversation with Taylor, which took place shortly after the above Taylor admitted that in a conversation with Noll reference was made to a prior conversation between Noll and Williams , but otherwise his testimony in this connection indicates a denial of the remarks attributed to hint by Noll Although W illiams did not specifically deny the above conversation , his testimony concerning a possible meeting with Noll on September 23 might be construed as a denial. Since the testimony of both Taylor and Williams was vague as to these conversations with Noll, the undersigned believes Noll to be the more credible witness in this respect THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 3. Conclusions 991 The undersigned believes that the respondent has bargained in bad faith with the Union, with a policy of delaying the negotiations until such time as the respondent thought that the Union had lost its majority. This policy is first indicated in the beginning of the negotiations and until a Conciliator en- tered the dispute, when the respondent claimed that it was impossible to meet with the Union because of the alleged illness of first one and then another of its officers or officials. The undersigned fails to see why the illness of one of its negotiators should have caused the delay, especially since Taylor, the respond- ent's attoi ney, acted as its spokesman at all meetings and since the respondent never had less than three on its negotiating committee. The respondent's re- fusal to meet with the Union on May 24 and July 8 because of the presence of Eckert as spokesman for the Union, during June unless the unfair labor practice charge was withdrawn by the Union, during September unless the Union dis- continued its strike, and after the termination of the strike in October unless the Union agreed to withdraw the unfair labor practice charges then pending and to re(ede from its position on the recognition and union security clauses, were in the undersigned's opinion not only pet se violative of Section 8 (5) of the Act but also reflect on the good faith of the respondent in the negotiations." The undersigned does not find that the respondent's insistence on the inclusion of the language of the proviso of Section 9 (a) of the Act in the recognition clause was in itself violative of the Act, but believes it to be further evidence of the respondent's bad faith in the contract negotiations, particularly in view of the fact that the respondent refused to grant any form of union security clause whatsoever. The proviso in said Section obviously is for the protection of employees and not employers. Nevertheless, the respondent insisted on the right of employees to present "personal" grievances without prior notification to, or the presence of, the Union, contrary to the prior interpretations of said Section by the Board and the court in the Hughes Tool case. If the Union had accepted such a recognition clause without obtaining some form of union security, it undoubtedly would have undermined the Union's strength, especially since the respondent claimed that such matters as an employee's wage rate and merit rating (could be the proper subject of "personal" grievances In addition to the above, there is further evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent On November 22, 1946, a committee of employees presented to the respondent approximately 276 cards, purportedly signed by employees and revoking the authority of the Union to represent them as collective bargaining agent These cards represented slightly over a majority of the respondent's eiii- ployees at that time. The respondent accepted the cards as evidence of loss of majority of the Union without any direct knowledge of the genuineness of signatures or the circumstances under which they were obtained. Nor does it appear that the respondent has ever made any effort to check the genuineness of the signatures Oil the basis of these cards the respondent in the latter part of December 1946, notified officers of the local of the Union that it would no longer recognize the Union as bargaining agent." The respondent took this 1' In the Matter of hlancock Brick d Tile Company, 44 N. L. R B. 920 ; N. L. R. B. V. Carlisle Lumber Company, 94 P. (2d ) 138 (C C A. 9 ) . Matter of Eili8-Klalseher d Co, 40 N L. R B. 1037, enforced, 142 F. (2d) 356, Matter of lVenona Textile Mills IS L R R M. 1154 , 68 N. L It. B. 702 14 In its answer the respondent states that it now refuses to bargain with the Union because of the mevocations of a ma j ority of employees. 992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD action in spite of the fact that a majority of its employees designated the Union in an election conducted by the Board, and thereby ignored the presump- tion of continuing majority. Under all the circumstances, the undersigned concludes and finds that from on or about November 15, 1945, and at all times thereafter the respondent has refused to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and thereby interfered with its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring In connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob- structing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Since it has been found that the respondent has failed and refused to bargain with the Union as the representative of all its employees in an appropriate unit, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that, upon request, the respondent bargain collectively with the Union with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. As there is no evidence that danger of the commission of unfair labor practices other than refusing to bargain collectively with the labor organization of its em- ployees' choice is to be anticipated from the respondent's conduct in the past, the undersigned will not recommend that the respondent cease and desist from the commission of any other unfair labor practices. Upon, the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record in the ease, the undersigned makes the following: CoNuLuslows OF LAW 1. International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F of L, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act 2 All production and maintenance employees of the respondent, including em- ployees of the Development Department, janitors and sweepers, electrical testers, firemen, lead men, dispatchers, watchmen and guards, but excluding full-time inspectors, timekeepers, truck drivers, factory clerks, Engineering Department employees, superintendents, assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant fore- men, chief inspector, office and clerical employees and all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L. was on November 15, 1945, and at all times thereafter has been the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the, Act. 4. By refusing to bargain collectively with International Union, United Auto- mobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., as exclusive bargaining representative THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINERY COMPANY 993 of employees in the appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in and is en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 5. By said acts the respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section S (1) of the Act. 6 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case , the undersigned recommends that the respond- ent, The American Laundry Machine Company , its officers , agents, successors, and assigns shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the unit hereinabove found to be appro- priate; (b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of International Union, United Automobile Workers of America. A F of L ., to bargain collectively with it 2 Take the following affirmative action winch the undersigned finds will effec- tuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request bargain collectively with International Union , United Auto- mobile Workers of America , A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit; (b) Post at its plant at Norwood , Ohio, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report herein marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent 's representative , be posted by the respondent imine- diately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty ( 60) consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region in writing within ten (10 ) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the re- spondent has taken to comply therewith. It is further recommended that unless on or before ten ( 10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies said Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the action aforesaid As provided in Section 203 39_ of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 4, effective September 11, 1946, any party or counsel for the Board may, within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board , pursuant to Section 203 3S of said Rules and Regulations , file with the Board , Rochambeau Building, Wash- ington 25 , D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or- to any other part of the record or proceeding ( including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he 994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD relies upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party or counsel for the Board may , within the same period, file an original and four copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Repot t. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. Proot of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required by Section 203 65 As further provided in said Section 203 39, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board , request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board JOHN H EADIE, Trial Exam i n er. Dated March 13, 1947. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, A. F OF L, as the exclusive repre- sentative of all the employees in the bargaining unit, and WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named union to bargain with us. The bargaining unit is All production and maintenance employees of the respondent, including employees of the Development Department, janitors and sweepers, electrical testers, firemen, lead men, dispatchers, watchmen and guards, but excluding full-tune inspectors, timekeepers, truck di fivers, factory clerks, Engineering Department employees, superintendents, assistant superintendents, foremen, assistant foremen, chief inspector, office and clerical employees and all super- visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action THE AMERICAN LAUNDRY MACHINE COMPANY, Einplopci. By ----------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) Dated ---------------------------- This notice must remain posted for 00 days from the date hereof and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation