The A. S. Abell Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 8, 1977

230 N.L.R.B. 17 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY
The A. S. Abell Company and Baltimore Typographi-
cal Union No. 12. Case 5-CA-7980
June 8, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER
On November 10, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent, the Charging
Party, and the General Counsel filed exceptions and
supporting briefs. Respondent filed reply briefs to
the exceptions filed by the Charging Party and the
General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, The A. S. Abell
Company, Baltimore, Maryland, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in said recommended Order.
t Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied because the
record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and
positions of the parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this case was held on September 22, 1976, at Baltimore,
Maryland, on complaint of the General Counsel against A.
S. Abell Company, here called the Respondent. The
complaint issued on July 26, 1976, on a charge filed on
May 28, 1976, by Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12.
The only question to be decided is whether by dealing
individually with its active employees and in consequence
paying them greater retirement benefits than its current
contract with the Union provided, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Briefs were filed by all parties.
I In pertinent part the early retirement plan set out in the contract reads
as follows:
... [A In early retirement plan for present situation holders shall be
230 NLRB No. 5
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGs OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Maryland corporation, is engaged in
the publication of daily newspapers in the City of
Baltimore, Maryland. During the preceding 12 months, a
representative period, its gross revenues exceeded
$200,000; it regularly carries in its papers advertisements of
products which are nationally advertised and sold in
interstate commerce. I find that the Respondent is an
employer within the meaning of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12 is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
m. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Insofar as the truly pertinent facts are concerned there is
no dispute in this case, no relevant question of credibility at
all, and no subordinate issue to be resolved. On the face of
the clear and uncontroverted evidence - spoken and
documentary - the Respondent violated the statute when
it bypassed the Union in its dealings with admittedly union
represented employees.
At the time of the events a collective-bargaining
agreement was in effect between the Company and the
Union; it was due to expire at the end of the year 1976.
Two substantive sections of that contract directly related to
and gave rise to the events leading to this proceeding. One
section provides for a jointly administered pension trust
fund, its assets to assure retirement benefits to all
employees covered by the contract. Details of how age and
years of service determine benefits later to be received
under what the contract calls the retirement plan are not
set out in the agreement, but that detail is irrelevant to the
question of this case. The contract does set out precisely
how much money the Company must contribute to the
pension fund. The agreement also contains a special clause
detailing "an early retirement plan"; this provides that
employees who have reached the age of 62, and have
worked 5 years, would be paid additional sums directly by
the Company if they retired.'
The second relevant provision, entitled "Job Security,"
establishes what are called "situations" for "members [of
the Union] who are presently employees." The clause then
says these individuals [later personally and individually
named in an appendix] "will be guaranteed life-time
employment under the latest collective-bargaining agree-
ment so long as the newspapers are published. . . subject
only to termination of named employees on the list
appended hereto by voluntary retirement, resignation,
death and dismissals for just and sufficient cause .... "
made available. The opportunity for early retirement shall be extended
on a voluntary basis to all employees of more than five (5) consecutive
years of full time service who have reached age sixty two (62).
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The related appendix to the contract, or "list appended
hereto," then sets out the 361 names of the printers at work,
all members of the Union. It is important to note that the
"early retirement plan" provided for in the contract itself
and identified by precisely those words, applies - again by
use of unmistakeable language - to "present situation
holders." This means, again, the 361 persons individually
named in the contract appendix.
Both the ultimate purpose of these clauses and the words
used at many places in the fuller language used in the
contract are unusual in employer-union contracts. But in
plain language, what they mean - and all parties at the
hearing agreed that this is so - is that at least up to the end
of 1976, when that agreement was to expire, the Respon-
dent bound itself not to remove from its payroll any one of
the persons named in the appendix - virtually all of the
regular, full-time employees in its composing room. They
could retire, as provided; they might die; they might just
quit. But unless they misbehaved and merited discharge for
"just and sufficient cause," they had to be paid for full-time
regardless of whether or not there was any work for them
to perform.
Offer, and Payment Over-and-Above Contract
Terms
By May 1976 there was not enough work for all the
people to do. No one disputed the words of the Respon-
dent's general manager to union agents in May that "We
are overstaffed in the composing room," "we . . . have
people just standing around in the Composing Room doing
nothing." It is clear that the regular pension benefits
provided for in the contract through the joint pension trust
fund, even with the additional early retirement that
employees under age 62 could choose, simply had not been
sufficiently attractive to employees to induce enough of
them to accept what had been agreed by contract and to
get off the payroll. In order to induce some of the
unneeded printers to leave and thereby to curtail the
unnecessary part of its payroll, the Company decided to
offer them more in monthly retirement payments than the
contract called for. It prepared a detailed written plan
entitled "Voluntary Employment Termination Incentive
Payment Options"; employees who could not retire at all
under the contract could now get some benefits if they
went away; others could get more than the contract
provided; under one provision some printers could choose
a quick check for about $15,000 in full payment in place of
periodic support. All of this, if only the situation holders
would "retire." It is not necessary to set out the details of
that plan here. All that matters is that, as the Respondent
conceded at the hearing, it substantially departed from the
contract provisions. The idea was to offer it individually to
each employee on a direct-dealing basis between him and
the Company.
The Company told its printers directly of its offer and,
during July and August, 54 of them applied for retirement
on this new preferred basis, and 38 in fact accepted the
money and have left the Company. In the face of its
current contract with the Union, the Respondent did this
by direct dealing with the employees - unilateral action
by the employer, as the cases say, if ever there was such
conduct. In fact, Mr. Becker, then general manager of the
Company, told the union officers - President Kees and
Chairman Poist - before going to the employees unilater-
ally, "that participating in that was up to the individual. If
he wanted to take the money. And he didn't feel that the
Union could tell the person when to quit." To the
employees the Respondent made its position even more
explicit, for its posted notice read: "We believe that the
right voluntarily to leave a position, to start afresh or just
plain take it easy, is a basic right of free citizens." The
notice then assured the employees the Company would
fight any unfair labor practice charge the Union might file.
Before any discussion about law, there is one further fact
that is absolutely clear on the record and that must be
stated without equivocation, because the briefs submitted
by the lawyers after the close of the hearing are above all
ambivalent and inconsistent. The Union was at all times
opposed to the Company's early retirement plan. In fact it
told management, before any step was taken to implement
the plan, that it would file National Labor Relations Board
charges if the Respondent dared to make the move. And, of
course, the Union did file the charge - on May 29, 1975 -
after telling the Company it would do so and before the
Company dealt with the employees at all.
Conclusion
Retirement and pension benefits later to be given
employees presently on the job are conditions of employ-
ment within the meaning of that phrase as used in the
statute and therefore mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America,
Local Union No. 1, v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical
Division, et al., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). This means the
employer may not as to this subject deal with its employees
individually, or unilaterally, in disregard of their bargain-
ing agent. And of course this also means that after the
employer has bargained with the union about such
pensions and retirement benefits, and signed a fixed-term
contract precisely detailing the agreed-upon conditions, it
may not thereafter deal with its employees individually, or
unilaterally, without the approval of their bargaining agent.
And that is all this case is about. The Respondent agreed
with the Union that 361 people would stay on the payroll
- work or no work, but would be given so much but no
more after leaving as later compensation for having worked
there. If this language seems almost childlike in its
simplicity, it is because the briefs of the parties argue
contentions and theories that in many respects seem totally
foreign to the facts of this case.
I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act by dealing directly with the employees on the subject
of how much they would receive in retirement benefits and
by in fact paying a number of them over and above the
amounts the current contract called for.
The General Counsel's position seems to ignore these
fundamental principles of law. The totality of his brief says
that because the Union told the Company the subject was a
bargainable matter, the Company did not bargain in good
faith, took "a fixed and unalterable" stance, a "take it or
leave it" attitude, and therefore violated the law because it
did not talk about its intentions long enough, or openly
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THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY
enough, or with a reasonably receptive attitude. The
General Counsel takes pains to rebut one of the defense
assertions (there are many), that the Company did bargain
to impasse. This means, if I read the brief correctly, that
had the Respondent discussed its innovative retirement
proposal in good faith, but in the end still insisted upon its
original proposal, it could implement it with impunity, and
never mind the fact the contract bargaining agent never
stopped saying it was opposed.
The General Counsel's factual assertion that there was
no bargaining to impasse is correct, because there never
was any bargaining at all. But his implied statement that a
party to a contract is ever free to change the terms during
the life of the agreement without the consent and approval
of the other party is false as a matter of law. See Equitable
Life Insurance Company, 133 NLRB 1675 (1961). But
clearer still is Section 8(d) of the statute:
[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining
contract covering employees . . . the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract
e * e
"[t]he duties so imposed [by the statute] shall not be
construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree
to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such
modification is to become effective before such terms
and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract.
What this statutory language says clearly enough is that
no matter what attempts at persuasion are made by the
employer, no matter how good his faith may be, and even
assuming persuasive economic justification, the union can
hold firm to a "no," and so long as it does so it is an unfair
labor practice for the employer to negotiate direct
arrangements with the employees which depart from the
conditions of employment set out in the contract. So long
as a party is not required to agree, in the words of the
statute, I cannot see how its attempt to explain to the other
party why it does not agree, or even its attempt to persuade
the employer to a different course, can deprive it of this
legal right. What is a contract for, if not to insure stability
in otherwise volatile industrial relations? If an employer is
free to change the terms at will - however well intentioned
and economically explainable its action may be - it would
make a mockery of the entire contract concept, which, after
all, is the ultimate salutary objective of the entire statute.
Both the General Counsel and the Respondent's briefs
belabor the details of what union and company agents said
at the two meetings when they talked of the Respondent's
new retirement plan. The General Counsel tries to show
that the Union bargained well, in good faith, while the
Respondent argues that testimony proves it was the
Employer who bargained in good faith and the Union,
which instead spoke arbitrarily and refused to make
reasonable counterproposals, was, in the words of compa-
ny counsel, "intransigent." It matters not what the parties
said to one another when they met; never did the union
negotiators agree the Company could do as it pleased
directly with the employees in defiance of the contract.
Informed about the plan for the first time on May 18, the
Union - speaking through Theodore Kees, Local 12
president, and Jack Poist, the union chairman, rejected it
off hand. With everybody courteous, Kees asked that the
Company first give him an opportunity to tell the
employees not to accept the new offer, before it invited
individual retirements. The Company did that. Kees talked
to his lawyer, and, as he entered the second meeting on the
21st, said the matter was negotiable and he would file
National Labor Relations Board charges if the Company
took any steps to offer the plan to the employees. From the
testimony of John Banach, then personnel director, Kees
opened the May 21 meeting with "if you put this offer into
effect, I'm going to file an unfair labor practice charge. I'm
going to fight you all the way on this thing."
On May 24 the Company posted a notice in the
composing room informing all employees of the offer. "An
offer of voluntary termination and voluntary retirement
incentive payments is available in the office of the
composing room superintendent." That same day the
Union also posted a notice in that room, telling its people
the plan was considered to be an unfair labor practice by
the Union. The next day the Company posted another
notice to the employees saying the plan involved "volun-
tary acceptance ... a basic right of free citizens," and that
it would resist any unfair labor practice charges filed
against it with the National Labor Relations Board.
None of the defenses urged by the Respondent have
merit. In 1975 it did the same thing - induced some
printers to retire by paying them more than the sum called
for in the written contract. The Union did not file charges
then. It was not therefore precluded from filing charges
with the Board for the unfair labor practices committed in
1976. Individual bargaining with employees over condi-
tions of employment in disregard of both the contract and
their bargaining agent is no less an unfair labor practice
merely because the company lawyer calls the extra gravy
given employees a form of "sweetening"! As to the
contention that this Union waived its statutory right to
represent the employees through the full gamut of statutory
prerogatives it simply has no relationship to this record.
See The Timken Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15
(1962), enfd. 325 F.2d 746 (C.A. 6, 1963).
Nor do out-of-context phrases enhance the defense. The
subject was not simply whether or not to retire. The essence
of the new plan was how much money was the Employer
going to pay its present employees for having worked there.
Carnation Company, 192 NLRB 237 (1971), is therefore
completely inapposite.
Running through the entire defense is the idea that the
Respondent had no other choice because it was throwing
money away - paying people who were not doing any
work. On this record there is no denying the assertion
seems true. But economic considerations appropriately
govern the thinking of both parties when the collective-
bargaining agreement is negotiated; once it is made, the
parties are stuck with its terms. If either could change it at
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
will, there would be no purpose in having any collective-
bargaining agreements.
IV. THE REMEDY
I think the real question in this case is what shall the
remedy be. Throughout the hearing the Union complained
that the Company bought the people out of their jobs,
subverted their self-interest with a pittance, gave $15,000
for jobs worth $200,000. Normal Board procedures have
long been to order a respondent to undo the effects of its
illegal conduct, put the people back where they were,
restore the status quo. But here again the General Counsel
is ambivalent in his position. He was asked at the hearing
by the hearing examiner to state precisely what, in his view,
remedial action should be, but his brief speaks more of
what remedies the General Counsel does not request than
what he seeks. He went out of his way to make it clear he
does not think the retired employees need be offered an
opportunity to return to their jobs. He also says the
General Counsel "takes no position whether" the retirees
need repay to the Company what extra money they have
received for going away if they should choose to return to
work. The only clear request of the General Counsel, if he
is to be taken literally, is that the Respondent must be
ordered to resume paying 355 people full pay (this is the
number of individuals still appearing on the contract
appendix at the time of the unfair labor practice) without
regard to the fact - clear on this record - that there is no
work in the composing room for a substantial number of
these 355 - in fact, the 38 who have left - to do. From the
General Counsel's brief: "The status quo, therefore, is a
bargaining unit having 355 composing room employees
with the guarantee of life time employment." "General
Counsel seeks only the restoration of the previolation
conditions in the Respondent's composing room; i.e., a
bargaining unit in which 355 employees have a contractual
guarantee of life-time employment."
At the hearing the Union seemed to be asking for this
also, i.e., that the Respondent call in as conceded sinecures
off the street people who may never have worked for it, or
been on its payroll. In its brief the Union seems to
withdraw from this extreme position. Now it says: "the
only proper means of returning the parties to a status quo
ante is through a restoration of situations to the bargaining
unit and payment by Respondent of those dues lost
through the absence of these situations." "Only through a
restoration of the unit's previolation size may both
charging party and the remaining situation holders be
made whole." What the Union is really saying here is that
while the Respondent need not put people on its payroll if
there is no work for them to do, it should be ordered to pay
directly to the Union whatever checkoff moneys, or other
payroll contributions employees who might work - but in
fact are not working - would make. And to make it all the
clearer, the Union adds that merely offering reinstatement
to the affected employees who have retired "would not cure
the problem of Charging Party's continuing lost revenues
2 Although not exactly in point, a phrase from the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in E.EO.C. v. Steam Fitters Local 638, 13 F.E.P.
There is no precedent in Board law for ordering an
employer-respondent to place people on its payroll -
persons who have never before been its employees and who
therefore have not themselves suffered a hurt at its hands
- and pay them while concededly there is no work for
them to do. And it has long been an established principle
that remedial orders under this statute are not to be
punitive in character, but only restorative of the status quo.
There is a certain literal logic in the contention that
absolute restructuring of the past in this case means
reestablishing the artificial arrangement of the unusual, to
say the least, contract in effect when the unfair labor
practices were committed. But it does not follow, merely
because the parties, for reasons sufficient to themselves,
saw fit to agree to force payment to employees who do not
work, that the Board of necessity ought to be party to such
methods. The General Counsel could as well argue that
where an unlawfully discharged employee elects not to
accept the normal offer of reinstatement following a Board
order, the employer must hire a stranger in his place, work
or no work.
Moreover, it is not true that the contract guaranteed
continued existence of a unit of "355 composing room
employees," as the General Counsel asserts. There is a
confusion of terms here; the words "job" and "situation"
are bandied about interchangeably, but as used in the
context of this case they have totally different meanings. In
my experience, a job refers to a condition where there is
certain work to be done and an employee performs it; the
man has a job, works at it, and therefore is a paid
employee. As used in this case - in the written contract
and by the union representatives at the hearing - a
"situation" is a job in which there may or there may not be
any work to be performed, where the man on the "job," or
in the "situation," works or does not work - depending
upon whether or not there is any work to be performed -
but is paid regardless of whether he works.
There is another reason for denying this request that the
Respondent be ordered to call people from who knows
where and pay them now for "standing around doing
nothing." The contract does not say the Employer agrees to
pay people even if it should have no work for them to do; it
says it shall pay "members who are presently employees
... named . . . on the list appended hereto . . . ." In
plain language this means Joe, Sam, and Harry - or all the
Joes, Sams, and Harrys individually identified by name in
the appendix to the contract - have a contractual right to
be paid even if there is no work for them. The contract does
not say that if any of these quit, die, retire (or refuse to
accept the Respondent's offer of reinstatement as provided
for here?), the Respondent is obligated; to call someone
from off the street - even if it has no work for him to do,
and pay him also.2
I also find no merit in the Union's suggestion that the
Respondent be ordered to pay to the Union whatever
moneys it would have forwarded had the 38 now retired
employees never left work. I suppose the moneys, not
detailed in the brief, include such things as dues checkoff,
pension contributions, and health and welfare payments. A
cases 705, is not totally inapposite: "we are not in the business of
redistributing the wealth .... "
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THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY
labor organization has no existence apart from its mem-
bers. And any assets payable to it by an employer must be
predicated upon work performed by employees - mem-
bers of or represented by the Union. Payments are not
made by an employer to a union on the basis of theoretical
abstractions.
The 38 employees who were unlawfully induced to leave
their jobs must be offered an opportunity to return to work
if they so desire. They are also free to remain in permanent
retirement. If they do return, they must be made whole,
and paid for what wages they lost on the job for having left.
As usual, any interim earnings they have had will be
deducted from their lost wages with the Respondent in the
event of their return. In this special case, the measure of
interim earnings will include what payments the Respon-
dent in fact gave them in the form of preferred benefits
under the plan, including, wherever it may have happened,
the $15,000 offered as single payment benefit.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set out in section IIl,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondent described in section 1, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. By dealing individually and unilaterally with its
employees concerning pension and retirement benefits and
by paying them pension and retirement benefits in excess
of the conditions set out in its current collective-bargaining
agreement with Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aXl) and
(5) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 3
The Respondent, The A. S. Abell Company, Baltimore,
Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Dealing individually and unilaterally with its employ-
ees concerning pension and retirement benefits while a
collective-bargaining agreement covering such conditions
of employment is in effect between the Respondent and
Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, or paying them
pension and retirement benefits in excess of the amounts
provided for retirement and pension benefits in its
contract, without approval of the contracting Union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist Baltimore
Typographical Union No. 12, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to each of the 38 employees who retired during
the year 1976 pursuant to the Respondent's innovative
early retirement plan immediate reinstatement to their
prior positions or, if such positions no longer exist, to
comparable positions, without prejudice to their seniority
and other rights and privileges.
(b) Make whole all the foregoing employees for any loss
of pay or benefits they may have suffered by reason of their
retirement, in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled the "Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Baltimore, Maryland, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 5, after being duly signed by its representatives,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Regior 5, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided b) Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
4 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT offer to our employees individually
benefits in terms and conditions of employment,
including particularly pension and retirement benefits,
in excess of the terms set out in our current contract
with Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT pay individually to our employees
pension and retirement benefits in excess of the terms
set out with respect to those conditions in our current
contract with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to join or assist
Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, or any other
labor organization, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities.
WE WILL offer reinstatement to each of the 38
employees who during 1976 retired pursuant to our
voluntary retirement plan and make them whole for
any loss of earnings they may have suffered in
consequence of their separation from employment.
THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY
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