Textile Processors Local 311 (Mission Uniform)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 15, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 1352 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1352
Textile Processors, Service Trades, Healthcare, Pro-
fessional & Technical Employees, Local 311
(Mission Industries, d/b/a Mission Uniform &
Linen Services) and Suzanne J. Pollack. Cases
28–CB–3832 and 28–CB–3855
December 15, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On April 26, 1996, Administrative Law Judge Burton
Litvack issued the attached decision. The Respondent
Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief.1
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.
This case presents the issue of whether the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing and re-
fusing to accept Charging Party Suzanne Pollack’s tender
of membership dues, thereby removing Pollack from
union membership status and causing her to be ineligible
to run for union office. The judge concluded that the
Respondent’s conduct violated the Act based in part on
his finding that the Respondent refused Pollack’s dues
tender because of her internal union activities. For the
reasons set forth in Sandia National Laboratories3 and
briefly reiterated below, we find merit in the Respon-
dent’s exceptions to the judge’s finding.
Facts
The Respondent Union has approximately 700 mem-
bers and represents employees who are engaged in the
clothing, uniform, and linen cleaning and laundry busi-
ness in Las Vegas, Nevada. Charging Party Pollack, who
became a member of the Respondent Union in 1986, has
been a long-time dissident concerning the Respondent’s
internal operations. In April 1988, Pollack was termi-
nated from her job with Tiffany Cleaners, a union signa-
tory employer. After Pollack filed unfair labor practice
charges against both Tiffany Cleaners and the Respon-
dent, both entities entered into an informal settlement
agreement in November 1988.4 In June 1988, Pollack
took a job with Sierra Cleaners, a nonunion employer,
and continued to work there until June 1989. During her
employment with Sierra Cleaners, Pollack tendered dues
to the Respondent every month, and the Respondent ac-
cepted those dues.

1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
3 Office Employees Local 251 (Sandia Laboratories), 331 NLRB No.
193 (2000).
Also during 1988, Pollack wrote letters, dated May 25
and July 13, to the Respondent’s International President,
Frank Scalish, in which she complained that Robert
Camacho, the Local’s president, was failing to perform
his job duties and was “using his office for personal
gain.” The letters also protested the manner in which the
Respondent was conducting its executive board meet-
ings.
Pollack then ran for president of the Respondent
against Camacho. The election was held on September
12, 1988, and Pollack lost, receiving only 25 percent of
the vote.5 Thereafter, Pollack wrote to the Respondent’s
secretary/treasurer, Mary Caldwell, protesting the elec-
tion and listing six supporting reasons. After Caldwell
responded that Pollack’s accusations were totally un-
founded, Pollack wrote to the Department of Labor
(DOL) in January 1989, challenging the Respondent’s
election procedure and its conduct of the November 1988
election. On April 4, 1989, the DOL concluded that the
matter raised by Pollack did not warrant legal action. On
June 5, 1989, Pollack wrote another letter to Caldwell,
this time protesting salary increases that Camacho and
Caldwell had given themselves and proposing an
amendment to the Respondent’s bylaws regarding the
method of setting salaries for Local officials. The Re-
spondent’s executive board denied Pollack’s proposed
amendment.
In June 1989, Caldwell referred Pollack to a job with
Mission Linen with whom the Respondent has a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Also, in July 1990, Camacho
appointed Pollack to serve as shop steward at Mission
Linen. Then, in March 1991, Camacho resigned when
Scalish, president of the International, placed the Re-
spondent into trusteeship because the Local was almost
bankrupt. Scalish appointed Anthony Griese as the Re-
spondent’s special trustee and chief operating officer.
On assuming office, Griese rescinded the Respondent’s
constitution and bylaws and established the Interna-
tional’s constitution and bylaws as the Respondent’s
governing documents. Griese also eliminated the Re-

4 While Pollack was between jobs in 1988, the Respondent offered
her a withdrawal card, but she declined to accept it.
5 During the campaign, Camacho wrote to Scalish and questioned
Pollack’s eligibility to run against him while she was working for a
nonsignatory employer.
332 NLRB No. 143
TEXTILE PROCESSORS LOCAL 311 (MISSION UNIFORM) 1353
spondent’s hiring hall procedures, ceased the Respon-
dent’s practice of accepting members’ dues payments at
the Respondent’s office, and implemented a practice of
immediately offering a withdrawal to any member who
lost his or her job with a signatory employer. In August
1991, Griese appointed Pollack to serve on the Respon-
dent’s negotiating committee for contract negotiations
with Mission Linen.
During the summer of 1992, Pollack received two
warning notices from Mission Linen and filed grievances
and unfair labor practice charges against her employer.
The Region deferred the charges to the contractual griev-
ance and arbitration procedure. The Respondent then
processed both grievances through arbitration, which
resulted in an adverse decision.
Pollack was off work due to a back injury in the fall of
1992. She paid her monthly dues directly to the Respon-
dent and, contrary to Griese’s stated policy, the Respon-
dent accepted her dues payments. Pollack at that time
also complained to Scalish, whose office is in Cleveland,
Ohio, about Griese’s purchase of an automobile and the
money he had spent in remodeling the union hall. Dur-
ing a union meeting on October 7, 1992, Pollack showed
three other members the LM-2 form that the Respondent
had filed with the DOL the previous year and, with
Griese standing no more than 3 feet away, voiced her
concerns about the Respondent’s financial status. The
next day, October 8, Pollack wrote to the DOL and re-
quested an investigation of the Respondent’s trusteeship,
in particular the activities of trustee Griese. The DOL
began an investigation of her complaints. On October
15, Pollack wrote a letter to Griese, requesting the oppor-
tunity to examine all of the Respondent’s financial re-
cords relating to office remodeling and the purchase of
an automobile. The Respondent made these records
available for Pollack’s inspection at its attorney’s office
on November 24, 1992.
On approximately December 7, 1992, prior to a gen-
eral membership meeting, Scalish told Pollack that the
Respondent’s trusteeship would end in 1993, and a DOL
representative informed Pollack that an election for
president would be held at that time. At the same meet-
ing, Pollack spoke to Luz Hall, the Respondent’s recep-
tionist and interpreter, and asked if Hall would be inter-
ested in running for office on the same slate as Pollack in
1993. Hall declined Pollack’s offer.
In December 1993, Pollack was removed as shop
steward for the Mission Linen bargaining unit, because
the employees there needed a Spanish-speaking steward
and Pollack did not speak Spanish. Approximately 1
week later, on December 31, Mission Linen discharged
Pollack. On January 4, 1994, Pollack filed unfair labor
practice charges against both Mission Linen and the Re-
spondent. Pollack later withdrew these charges and then
refiled them on April 4, 1994.6
On February 1, 1993, the day before she withdrew her
initial unfair labor practice charges, Pollack telephoned
Mary Caldwell at the Respondent’s office and asked her
to inform Griese about her withdrawals of the unfair la-
bor practice charges. Later that afternoon, Pollack went
to the Respondent’s office and “tried” to pay her Febru-
ary membership dues. Caldwell refused to accept Pol-
lack’s dues tender because Pollack was not working for a
union signatory employer. Caldwell did not offer Pol-
lack a withdrawal card. That same night, Pollack went to
a union meeting and attempted to pay her dues directly to
Griese, who said that he could not accept her dues pay-
ment unless she was working in a “signatory establish-
ment.” Pollack then mailed her dues check to the Re-
spondent’s office, but the Respondent’s attorney returned
the check.
The Judge’s Decision
The judge found, as relevant here, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to ac-
cept Pollack’s dues tender in February of 1993, after she
no longer worked for a signatory employer. The judge
concluded that the Respondent’s rationale for rejecting
Pollack’s dues tender was a sham in retaliation for her
internal union activities. The judge concluded that, even
assuming that there was a valid rule that could have justi-
fied the Respondent’s action, the Respondent nonetheless
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act under Teamsters
Local 579 (Janesville Auto Transport),7 which held that
internal union discipline in retaliation for a member’s
dissident activities violates Section 8(b)(1)(A).
DISCUSSION
In Sandia National Laboratories,8 the Board
concluded that Section 8(b)(1)(A) does not proscribe
. . . wholly intraunion conduct and discipline . . . .
Instead . . . Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s proper scope, in un-
ion discipline cases, is to proscribe union conduct
against union members that impacts on the employ-
ment relationship, impairs access to the Board’s
processes, pertains to unacceptable methods of union
coercion, such as physical violence in organizational

6 During the hearing in this case, Mission Linen entered into an in-
formal settlement, approved by the judge, that fully remedied Pollack’s
charge against it. No exceptions were filed to the judge’s finding that
the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by causing Mis-
sion Linen to discharge Pollack.
7 310 NLRB 975 (1993), enf. denied 145 LRRM 1054 (7th Cir.
1993).
8 331 NLRB No. 193, slip op. at 3. See also: Local 254 Service
Employees (Brandeis University), 332 NLRB No. 103 (2000).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1354
or strike contexts, or otherwise impairs policies
imbedded in the Act.

Because Sandia concerned a purely intraunion quarrel be-
tween factional rivals concerning the propriety of intra-
union activity, the Board concluded that the case did not fall
within any of these categories of union conduct that may
constitute violations of the Act. The Board thus found no
merit to the complaint in Sandia. In so concluding, the
Board stressed that there is a forum for resolving such inter-
nal disputes under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, enacted by Congress in 1959.9 The Board
also overruled prior decisions in Carpenters Local 22
(Graziano Constr. Co.),10 Teamsters Local 579 (Janesville
Auto Transport),11 Laborers Local 324 (AGC of Califor-
nia),12 and Laborers, Local 652 (Southern California Con-
tractors’ Assn.),13 as inconsistent with Sandia, because the
unions’ discipline in those cases similarly had no meaning-
ful relationship to the employment context.
Applying Sandia to the present case, we find that the
Respondent’s refusal to accept Pollack’s dues tender falls
outside all the categories of conduct that appropriately
may invoke the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
Here, there is no evidence of any unacceptable methods
of union coercion. Also, there is no contention that the
Respondent in any way restricted Pollack’s access to
Board processes. Finally, Respondent’s action had no
clear nexus to the employment relationship under San-
dia; nor did it “impair policies imbedded in the Act.”14
Thus, Pollack’s inability to make dues payments during
periods in which she has not worked for a signatory em-
ployer does not affect her future employment opportuni-
ties, or otherwise adversely affect her conditions of em-
ployment. Pollack has lost her membership privileges
and cannot run for union office, but these are strictly
internal union matters.
The judge found that there was no legitimate rule un-
der which the Respondent refused to accept Pollack’s
dues payments. However, we find it unnecessary to de-
cide whether the Respondent acted pursuant to a duly
adopted rule because the Act does not contain any pro-
scription against Respondent’s refusal to accept dues on
account of Pollack’s purely internal activity. It is also
immaterial that, even assuming there was such a rule, the
Respondent may have discriminatorily enforced it
against Pollack in order to retaliate against her for engag-

9 Id. slip op at 10.
10 195 NLRB 1 (1972).
11 Supra at fn. 7.
12 318 NLRB 589 (1995), enf. granted in part and denied in part 123
F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1997).
13 319 NLRB 694 (1995).
14 Sandia, 331 NLRB No. 193, slip op. at 3.
ing in internal union activities. The judge’s reliance on
Janesville Auto Transport in reaching a contrary result is
no longer correct in light of our Sandia decision overrul-
ing that and similar cases. Simply put, we will not scru-
tinize a union’s internal discipline of its members, even
for allegedly discriminatory reasons, so long as the ac-
tion does not restrict access to the Board’s processes or
invoke any aspect of the employment relationship. There
may be another forum in which Pollack can raise her
complaints about the Respondent’s conduct, but Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act does not provide it. Accordingly,
we shall dismiss the instant complaint.15
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring.
For the reasons set forth in Sandia National Laborato-
ries, 331 NLRB No. 193 (2000), I agree with the major-
ity that the instant Section 8(b)(1)(A) complaint should
be dismissed. Thus, the Respondent’s refusal to accept
the dues tendered by employee Pollack arose out of an
entirely intraunion dispute, and it did not affect Pollack’s
employment status.
I recognize that a violation could be based on the
Scofield tests. That is, the Respondent’s conduct may be
contrary to LMRDA principles and it may not have been
pursuant to a union rule.1 However, for the reasons of
comity, efficiency, and economy, I would stay the
Board’s hand in favor of LMRDA resolution of the dis-
pute.2

Jerry Schmidt, Esq. and Scott Brian Feldman, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
Dennis A. Kist, Esq. and Mona L. Snape, Esq. (Dennis A. Kist
& Associates), Las Vegas, Nevada, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVAK, Administrative Law Judge. The origi-
nal and first amended unfair labor practice charges in Case 28–
CB–3832 were filed by Suzanne J. Pollack, an individual, on
January 4, 1993, and April 4, 1994, respectively, and based on
the unfair labor practice charges, on June 17, 1994, the Re-
gional Director of Region 28 of the National Labor Relations
15 In finding no violation of the Act, we place no reliance on the de-
cision, which the Respondent attached to its brief on exceptions, by the
United States District Court of Nevada in Robert B. Reich, Secretary of
Labor, Plaintiff v. Local 311 Textile Processors Service Trade, Case
CV-S-94-328-DWH (LRL), particularly since the operative events
there occurred subsequent to the time that the Respondent’s allegedly
unlawful conduct began.
1 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
2 As a matter of fairness, I would entertain a motion for reconsidera-
tion based on an assertion that the conduct here was not cognizable
under the LMRDA.
TEXTILE PROCESSORS LOCAL 311 (MISSION UNIFORM) 1355
Board, herein called the Board, issued a complaint,1 alleging
that Textile Processors, Service Trades, Healthcare, Profes-
sional & Technical Employees Union, Local 311, Respondent,
had engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. The
original and first amended unfair labor practice charges in Case
28–CB–3855 were filed by Pollack on February 9 and June 17,
1993, and, on June 22, 1993, the Regional Director of Region
28 issued a complaint, alleging that Respondent had engaged
in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Respondent timely filed
an answer to each complaint, essentially denying the commis-
sion of any of the alleged unfair labor practices and raising
certain affirmative defenses. The matters were consolidated for
trial, and, on July 10–13 and September 19, 1995, in Las Ve-
gas, Nevada, the matters were tried before me. At the trial, all
parties were afforded the opportunity to examine and
cross-examine all witnesses, to offer into the record any rele-
vant evidence, to argue their legal positions orally,2 and to file

1 The document is actually a consolidated complaint, consolidating
Case 28–CB–3832 for trial with an unfair labor practice charge against
Mission Industries, d/b/a Mission Uniform & Linen, Mission Linen, in
Case 28–CA–11801. However, during the trial, the parties, in the latter
matter, entered into an informal settlement agreement, which fully
remedied the alleged unfair labor practices and which the undersigned
approved, and the maker was severed from the instant matters and
remanded to the Regional Director of Region 28 for purposes of com-
pliance.
2 Prior to the start of the hearing and renewed at the hearing, Re-
spondent moved that the complaint in Case 28–CB–3832 be dismissed
on grounds that the General Counsel had pled an improper standard for
the tolling of the Sec. 10(b) of the Act statute of limitations period and
that, therefore, the General Counsel lacked subject matter jurisdiction
in that case. Notwithstanding my denial of his motion to amend the
said complaint to plead the proper standard for toiling the Act’s
6-month statute of limitations time period, a ruling which I affirm,
counsel for the General Counsel argued that it was never the General
Counsel’s burden of proof to plead any standard for the tolling of the
statute of limitations time period and that, therefore, pleading an im-
proper standard was an inconsequential act and one not requiring dis-
missal of the complaint. I took Respondent’s motion to dismiss under
advisement, with the understanding that I would rule on it in my deci-
sion, and, having considered the legal arguments of the parties during
the hearing and in their posthearing briefs, notwithstanding whatever
skepticism I expressed at the trial, I now believe counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel’s legal position is a correct statement of the law and have
decided to deny Respondent’s motion.
In this regard, at the outset, rather than “newly discovered, previ-
ously unavailable evidence” the proper standard for reinstating previ-
ously withdrawn charges and, thereby, equitably tolling the Act’s stat-
ute of limitations time period is “fraudulent concealment” of material
facts by a respondent. Weiner Motors, Inc., 265 NLRB 1457 (1982).
However, contrary to the assertion of counsel for Respondent that no
case law exists on the subject, the Board has long held that Sec. 10(b)
of the Act “is a statute of limitations and is not jurisdictional in nature.”
Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 278 NLRB 18, 23 (1986); Federal Man-
agement Co., 264 NLRB 107 (1982). That this is so is clear, as plead-
ing the Sec. 10(b) of the Act statute of limitations period is an affirma-
tive defense, which is deemed waived by a respondent if not timely
raised. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 395 fn. 11 (1982);
posthearing briefs. The documents were filed by counsel for
the General Counsel and by counsel for Respondent and have
been carefully considered. Accordingly, based on the entire
record, including briefs and my analysis of the testimonial de-
meanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT3
I. THE ISSUES
The complaint in Case 28–CB–3832 alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act by, on or about December 30, 1992, requesting that
Mission Linen discharge its employee Pollack in retaliation for
Pollack’s having engaged, and expressed intent to engage in,
internal union activity perceived as inimical to the interests of
the then current administration of Respondent. The complaint
in Case 28–CA–3855 alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act on or about February 1, 1993, by refusing
to accept Pollack’s tender of dues and by removing her from
membership in good standing in order to cause her to be ineli-
gible to hold office in Respondent. Respondent denied engag-
ing in the alleged unfair labor practices. Further, in the former
case, Respondent contends that the entire matter is time-barred
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, and, in the latter matter,
Respondent contends that the matter is governed by the proviso
to Section 8(b)(1)(A) and specifically that it was merely enforc-
ing a membership rule in refusing to accept Pollack’s tender of
dues. In response, counsel for the General Counsel argues that
the Act’s statute of limitations was tolled in Case 28–CB–3832
inasmuch as Respondent engaged in fraudulent concealment of

DTR Industries, 311 NLRB 833 fn. 1 (1993); Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB
1115, 1119 (1988) (Chairman Stephens, dissenting in part); Federal
Management Co., supra. Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the
General Counsel that it simply was never the General Counsel’s burden
of proof to plead anything regarding the toning of the Act’s 6-month
statute of limitations. Moreover, while, in deciding to announce, in
advance, its rationale for arguing that the statute of limitations had been
tolled in the case, the General Counsel obviously was inexcusably
negligent in failing to plead the proper standard for such, counsel for
Respondent did, in fact, have notice that the General Counsel would
argue fraudulent concealment here and, therefore, it is difficult to per-
ceive how Respondent was prejudiced by the General Counsel’s erro-
neous pleading. Thus, not only did a field examiner of the Board notify
counsel for Respondent, by letter dated January 24, 1994, that the
Board was investigating whether or not fraudulent concealment had
occurred but also, in responses to counsel for Respondent’s motions for
a bill of particulars and to dismiss, counsel for the General Counsel
correctly argued that the standard for equitably tolling the Act’s statute
of limitations was fraudulent concealment and that such would be the
General Counsel’s argument here. Finally, despite the erroneous com-
plaint pleading, the purposes and policies of the Act are best served by
not having the Board place the “consequences” of its own negligence
upon potentially “wronged” employees to the benefit of potentially
“wrongdoing employers.” NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S.
258, 264–265 (1969).
3 In its answers, Respondent admitted the jurisdictional paragraphs
of both complaints, in particular that Mission Linen is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act. Respondent also admitted, in its answers to both complaints,
that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the
Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1356
material facts and that the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act does not apply in Case 28–CB–3855 inasmuch as the issue
is whether Respondent was motivated by the Charging Party’s
opposition to its leaders and not the validity of its membership
rules.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Respondent, which, at all times material, has had approxi-
mately 700 members and whose International president is
Frank Scalish, represents employees of, and engages in collec-
tive bargaining with, employers, who are engaged in the cloth-
ing, uniform, and linen cleaning and laundry business in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The Charging Party Pollack has been a mem-
ber of Respondent since 1986, and there is no dispute that she
has been a long-time dissident, regarding Respondent’s internal
operations. Thus, in 1988, Pollack, who was terminated from
her job with Tiffany Cleaners, a union-signatory employer, in
April of that year4 and who, as a result of unfair labor practice
charges filed against Respondent and Tiffany Cleaners and
subsequent informal settlement agreements with both entities,
received $4,184.80 in backpay from Respondent in November,
wrote letters, dated May 25 and July 13, to Scalish, regarding
Respondent’s President, Camacho,5 who, she asserted, was
failing to perform his job duties and was “using his office for
personal gain,” and regarding the manner in which executive
board meetings were conducted. Also, in 1988, Pollack, who,
after being discharged by Tiffany Cleaners, was able to find
employment with Sierra Dry Cleaners, a nonunion company,
was nominated and ran for president of Respondent against
Camacho.6 The election was held on September 12, and Pol-
lack, who received only 25 percent of the vote, was defeated by
Camacho. Seventeen days later, Camacho wrote to Respon-
dent’s secretary/treasurer, Mary Caldwell, protesting the elec-
tion and listing six supporting reasons, and, on December 6,
less than a month after the settlement of the above unfair labor
practice allegations, Caldwell wrote to Pollack, stating that
Respondent “found no valid reason whatsoever for a recount of
the votes, because your accusations were totally unfounded and
invalid.” In January 1989, Pollack wrote to the Department of
Labor (DOL), challenging Respondent’s election procedure and
specifically its conduct of the presidential election between
Camacho and herself; however, after an investigation, on April
4 of that year, the area administrator of the DOL determined
that legal action was not warranted in the matter. On June 5,
1989, Pollack wrote a letter to Caldwell, protesting that
Camacho and Caldwell had given themselves salary increases,
during 1986, 1987, and 1988, totaling over $15,000 and propos-

4 Upon her termination, according to Pollack, she was offered a
withdrawal card by Robert Camacho, Respondent’s president “so I
wouldn’t have to pay my union dues” while unemployed. Camacho
testified but failed to deny Pollack’s testimony.
5 Apparently, the office of president of Respondent is a paid, full-
time position.
6 During the campaign, Camacho wrote to Scalish, questioning Pol-
lack’s eligibility to run against him as she was working for a nonunion
shop at the time, and Pollack wrote to the Department of Labor, ex-
pressing concerns about Respondent’s election process.
ing an amendment to Respondent’s bylaws regarding the
method of setting the president’s and the secretary/treasurer’s
annual salaries, and, on July 31, the members of Respondent’s
executive board jointly wrote to Pollack, denying her proposed
bylaws amendment. In June 1989, Pollack was hired by Mis-
sion Linen, which has a collective-bargaining relationship with
Respondent; and, during cross-examination, she admitted that,
notwithstanding her dissident activities, Caldwell referred her
to this job. Further, in July 1990, Camacho appointed Pollack
to be Respondent’s shop steward at Mission Linen.
In March 1991, inasmuch as Camacho resigned as president
of Respondent and as it was, according to Pollack, “almost
bankrupt,” Respondent was placed into trusteeship by Scalish,
and he appointed Anthony Griese to the position of special
trustee and Respondent’s chief operating officer. On assuming
office, according to Mary Caldwell and Robert Camacho,
Griese rescinded Respondent’s constitution and bylaws and
established the International’s constitution and bylaws as Re-
spondent’s governing document. Further, according to the two
witnesses, Griese instituted several internal changes, including
eliminating Respondent’s hiring hall procedures. Also, he
ceased Respondent’s practice of accepting members’ dues
payments at Respondent’s office and implemented a practice of
immediately offering a withdrawal card to any member, who
has been terminated or laid off from or who has voluntarily quit
his job with an employer, which has a collective-bargaining
relationship with Respondent.7 Four months after assuming
office, in August 1991, Griese appointed Pollack to serve on
Respondent’s negotiating committee during negotiations with
Mission Linen,8 and, a year later during the summer of 1992,
after Pollack received two warning notices from Mission Linen
and, as a result, filed grievances and unfair labor practice
charges against it as “I felt like I was being reprimanded be-
cause I was union steward” and after the Regional Director of
Region 28 decided to defer to Respondent’s and Mission
Linen’s contractual grievance and arbitration procedure, Re-
7 The record establishes that the benefits to the cardholder of the
withdrawal card are that he is not obligated to pay his membership dues
and that, upon resuming to work in laundry and clothes cleaning indus-
try and reapplying for membership in Respondent, he will not be re-
quired to pay an initiation fee. However, by accepting a withdrawal
card, the cardholder loses his status as a member and the attendant
rights to attend membership meetings, vote, and run for office.
The record establishes that Respondent distributes withdrawal cards
to members, who are about to be laid off or who are laid off. Thus,
according to Teresa Foote, the Dunes Hotel closed in early 1993, and,
in or about November or December 1992, prior to the layoff of its
employees, including those, such as Foote, who were members of Re-
spondent, Griese visited the hotel and advised members to obtain with-
drawal cards from Respondent so that they would not have to pay an
initiation fee if they return to work in the “industry.”
8 During redirect examination, Pollack asserted that her appointment
was “automatic” given her status as a steward; however, during further
cross-examination, she conceded that nothing in the International’s
constitution or bylaws mandated her appointment and that it was just
her “assumption” she was automatically a member of the contract nego-
tiating committee.
TEXTILE PROCESSORS LOCAL 311 (MISSION UNIFORM) 1357
spondent processed both grievances through an expensive arbi-
tration.9
Thereafter, during the fall of 1992, while she was off work
due to a back injury,10 Pollack resumed her dissident activities
against Respondent’s leadership. Thus, Pollack testified that,
after reviewing Respondent’s 1991 LM-2 form, which had been
filed with the DOL, on September 30, she telephoned Frank
Scalish, whose office is in Cleveland, Ohio, and “I complained
to him about the purchase of an automobile and . . . about the
large expenditure on remodeling the Union Hall.”11 Then, ac-
cording to the Charging Party, on October 7,12 during a regu-
larly scheduled membership meeting at Respondent’s hall, with
Griese standing no more than 3 feet away, she spoke to three
other members, showing them the LM-2 form, and voicing her
concerns about Respondent’s spending and its financial
status.13 The next day, October 8, Pollack wrote to the DOL,
requesting an investigation of Respondent’s trusteeship and, in
particular, the activities of special trustee Griese, and, as a re-
sult, without divulging the name of the individual whose com-
plaint prompted the action, the DOL commenced an investiga-
tion of her complaints. A week later, on October 15, Pollack
wrote a letter to Griese, requesting an opportunity to examine
all of Respondent’s financial records relating to the office re-
modeling and the purchase of the automobile, and Respondent
made the records available for Pollack’s inspection on Novem-
ber 24 at its attorney’s office. Pollack added that, 2 weeks after
inspecting Respondent’s financial records, on or about Decem-
ber 7, she attended a general membership meeting at Respon-
dent’s hall; that, prior to the meeting, Scalish had informed her
that Respondent’s trusteeship would end in 1993 and a DOL
representative told her that an election for president would be
held at the same time; that, accordingly, her intent was to “ac-
quire a slate to run for office”; and that, at the meeting, she
spoke to Luz Hall, a receptionist and interpreter for Respon-
dent14 and asked “if she’d be interested in running for office on

9 Pollack testified that these were the only grievances, which the Un-
ion had processed through arbitration since 1986. She added that, in
August, after a 2-day arbitration hearing, the arbitrator ruled against
her, upholding Mission Linen’s position on each grievance.
10 Pollack was off work on worker’s compensation leave from July
29 through October 16, 1992.
11 According to Pollack, inasmuch as the contractual dues-check off
procedure could not be utilized while she was on a medical leave of
absence and notwithstanding Griese’s stated policy against such pay-
ments, in September and October, she tendered her monthly member-
ship dues directly to Respondent and such were accepted. Mary Cald-
well conceded that Pollack’s dues tenders had been accepted by Re-
spondent “because she was still working at the time. She was just off
on leave.”
12 During direct examination, Pollack stated that this membership
meeting occurred on December 7; during cross-examination, she said
she desired to correct her testimony and placed the meeting in Octo-
ber—presumably on the same date.
13 Pollack stated that she did not confront Griese at the meeting with
regard to Respondent’s expenditures as “I had decided I wanted to see
all of the paperwork on K first before making a judgment.”
14 Pollack denied being friends with Hall and, indeed, asserted that
she harbored animosity toward her as she perceived that Hall’s activi-
ties at the Mission Linen plant during December 1992 were a usurpa-
tion of her own duties as shop steward.
that slate in 1993 and she told me she would not be inter-
ested.”15 Finally, Pollack stated that Griese was not in the room
when she spoke to Hall.
Luz Hall, who was an obviously nervous witness and who is
bilingual in Spanish and English, was employed by Respondent
as a receptionist in its office from June 3, 1991, until being laid
off in approximately January 1992. Thereafter, Hall continued
to work for Respondent but on a sporadic “on call” basis,
whereby Respondent utilized her as an interpreter at its mem-
bership meetings and during visits to plants by its officers and
agents. At some point, in late December 1992 or early January
1993, Hall testified she was rehired by Respondent on a full-
time basis, as a “special projects coordinator” and, in the posi-
tion, was responsible for interpreting, visiting plants at which
Respondent was the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees for the purpose of recruiting members.16 During
cross-examination, averring that she was “very stressed out,”
Hall said she could not recall exactly when she was rehired by
Respondent but stated “it was a little before Christmas.”17
However, she was then impeached by various documents, in-
cluding an unemployment compensation form and a charge,
alleging sexual harassment, filed against Respondent with the
State of Nevada Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion, signed under penalty of perjury, in which she set forth her
rehire date by Respondent as January 1 and 3, 1993. During
redirect examination, Hall attempted to explain away any dis-
crepancy as to her hire date, stating that such resulted from a
pre-Christmas agreement, between Griese and herself, pursuant
to which Griese would permit her to work under an assumed
name at a salary less than what she would earn as special pro-
jects coordinator in order to permit her to fraudulently receive
welfare payments during December. Her date of hire as special
projects coordinator assumed significance here as Hall ex-
plained that, as a condition to being hired in the position,
probably “one week before [Pollack] got fired” by Mission
Linen, Griese spoke to her about the Charging Party18 and said
“he wanted me to start something with the employees at Mis-
sion Linen to get Suzanne removed for being a steward.” Dur-
15 Hall initially testified that her conversation with Pollack about
running for office occurred prior to latter’s discharge by Mission Linen,
she was impeached by a prior sworn deposition in which she stated that
the conversation occurred after Pollack had been terminated.
16 The State of Nevada is a right-to-work state.
17 At another point, Hall dated her hire for the work of special pro-
jects coordinator as early December.
18 According to Hall, she was well aware of who Suzanne Pollack
was. Thus, she testified that “I knew . . . the first day I went into the
Union” that Pollack had aspirations for union office and that “Mary
Caldwell warned me about Suzanne and she told me that she got the
union into trouble before, to very careful if she comes into the local, to
check everywhere she goes because she tried many times to run for
president of the union.” Caldwell, who admittedly had “concerns”
about Pollack’s “dishonesty and the way she turned things around
backwards” but denied that such resulted from Pollack’s candidacy for
union office and demand to see Respondent’s financial records, con-
ceded that she told Hall she had concerns about Pollack and “just to
watch Suzanne because anything you say she turns it around.” Finally,
on these points, Hall testified that she heard Griese refer to Pollack as
“that bitch” whenever he received writings from her.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1358
ing cross-examination, after being informed that Pollack had
been discharged on or about December 31, Hall placed this
conversation “around Christmas, around New Year.” Hall
elaborated on this during cross-examination, testifying that
Griese “wanted the union members to be the ones who got rid
of [Pollack]—So, I was supposed to go to Mission Linen and
start something with the employees.” Thereafter, Hall boasted,
in her capacity as special projects coordinator (notwithstanding
being for the position, “they still gave me the title so I could go
into the plants,” she went to the Mission Linen plant in Las
Vegas and successfully organized an employee petition based
on Pollack’s inability to speak Spanish and, thus, to socialize
with the mostly Spanish-speaking employees. However, she
later contradicted herself on this point, admitting that, during
her visits to the Mission Linen plant, while meeting with groups
of Spanish-speaking employees, her only question to them was
“how everything was;” that an employee, who said the employ-
ees needed a Spanish-speaking steward, initiated the discussion
as to removing Pollack as shop steward;19 and that she advised
that such a request be in writing. However she lost her status as
shop steward, there is no dispute that, a week after being re-
lieved of her duties as shop steward, on January 1, 1993, Pol-
lack was fired by Mission Linen.
Hall testified that she was aware, at the time it occurred, that
Pollack had been discharged by Mission Linen and that, either,
“the same day [Pollack] was fired or one day before,” she
(Hall) overheard20 comments by Griese, regarding Pollack,
while speaking on the telephone to Ronald Robertson, Mission
Linen’s service manager at its Las Vegas facility. After ini-
tially saying that she could not recall whether Robertson tele-
phoned Griese or Griese telephoned Robertson and after being
asked how she knew it was Robertson to whom Griese was
speaking, Hall replied that, “I answered the phone when [he]
called” and that she recognized Robertson’s voice. Hall further
testified that she transferred the call to Griese, and “I remember
his words, that he said he wanted to get rid of Suzanne because
she was giving them too much trouble.” Asked to restate what
she recalled Griese saying, Hall embellished her testimony,
quoting Griese as saying, “Ron I want you to get rid of the
bitch, she’s giving me a lot of problems.” Continuing, Hall
stated that either that same day or the following day, she again
answered the phone, and Robertson asked to speak to Griese.
She transferred the call to Griese’s desk and, upon ending the
conversation, the latter “was very happy, very excited and he

19 With regard to the removal of Pollack as union steward, the record
establishes that, based on an employee petition, on December 21, Re-
spondent’s attorney wrote to Pollack that she was being removed as the
Mission Linen shop steward because “you lack the ability to effectively
represent the bargaining unit employees at [Mission Linen].” Two days
later, a notice, informing the employees of Pollack’s removal as shop
steward, was posted at Mission Linen.
20 Hall initially testified that Griese was at his desk and she was at
her desk during the conversation. Then, she clarified this, saying that
her desk was located in a “temporary office,” which previously had
been used as a closet, that her desk was behind and to the right of
Griese’s desk, and that she could see Griese through the door frame
(the door had been removed). In any event, Hall “could hear him, he
was very loud and I could see him at all times.”
was very loud, loud enough that Caldwell entered the room—
Griese saw her, and said, “Done deal, she’s out.” and “she was
escorted out by [Robertson].” Griese did not testify and, thus,
failed to deny Hall’s testimony, and Caldwell, who did testify,
failed to controvert Hall’s account.
With regard to Griese’s alleged comments during the first
telephone conversation and after the second, Hall’s credibility
is, of course, of paramount concern. Thus, during
cross-examination, after being informed that Pollack had been
discharged on December 31, 1992, Hall stated that she heard
Griese’s comments to Robertson around Christmas or New
Years; however, after admitting that her memory had been
better during the taking of a pretrial affidavit by a Board agent
on November 30, 1993, she was impeached as to the timing of
the alleged conversations, having stated, in the affidavit, that
the conversation occurred on February 1, 1993. Cognizant of
this discrepancy, Hall volunteered that the date was “around”
Christmas. Under further cross-examination, Hall reiterated
that both telephone conversations occurred when Robertson
telephoned Griese and that she initially answered the phone on
both occasions. However, she was then confronted with her
sworn testimony at a deposition taken on February 4, 1995,
wherein she stated that Griese made the initial telephone call to
Robertson. After listening to what she had earlier stated, Hall
said such was incorrect. Finally, and of the utmost significance
to Hall’s credibility, she apparently told Pollack a completely
different version of the Griese-Robertson conversation than
related in her testimony. Thus, according to the Charging Party
during cross-examination, in May 1995, she had a chance en-
counter with Hall at a restaurant in the Gold Coast Casino. She
was there to celebrate a friend’s birthday and met Hall while
waiting in line to enter the restaurant. Pollack was certain that,
during their ensuing conversation, her discharge from Mission
Linen was discussed. Thus, according to Pollack, Hall apolo-
gized for not having come forward at the time Pollack had been
terminated from Mission Linen and said that “not until the
same thing happened to her did she realize how much she had
hurt me.” Turning to what allegedly occurred in December
1992, “I think she said . . . that she and Mr. Griese went to Mis-
sion Linen” and “that Mr. Griese asked Mr. Robertson if he
could have me terminated from Mission Linen.” Hall added
that Robertson left the room, came back a while later, and said,
“it’s a done deal” and that Hall told her the conversation oc-
curred “the day after the union meeting, that would have been
Tuesday, December the 8th.” Then, asked by counsel for Re-
spondent, whether what Hall told her that Griese asked Robert-
son if he removed Pollack as shop steward, would Mission
Linen then terminate her, Pollack answered, “yes.”21 While
denying that there was any discussion of Pollack’s termination
from Mission Linen, Hall confirmed her meeting with the
Charging Party at the Gold Coast in 1994 but remembered as
being little more than “Hi, bye, how are you, where are you
working.”
Two other matters bear upon Halls credibility. Initially, I
note that Hall was laid off by Respondent in May 1993, and
21 Pollack recalled that the conversation could have lasted from 5 to
15 minutes.
TEXTILE PROCESSORS LOCAL 311 (MISSION UNIFORM) 1359
after being hired by Mission Linen, was discharged by it the
following December. Thereupon, Hall filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against Respondent and Mission Linen and while
providing a Board agent with supporting evidence, divulged
what assertedly happened to Pollack in December 1992. As to
this, while admitting attempting to strengthen her own position,
Hall disavowed any knowledge of Pollack’s unfair labor prac-
tice allegations at that time; stated that what she said, regarding
Pollack, was just a coincidence; and maintained that she volun-
teered the information “without knowing that [the Board agent
assigned to her case] was the [same Board agent] that Pollack
previously had.” Finally, prior to the commencement of the
hearing, Hall’s above-mentioned sexual harassment suit against
Respondent had been dismissed, and the presiding judge had
assessed court costs, including lawyer’s fees, against her. At
the time of the hearing, Respondent was engaged in on-going
efforts to collect the court costs, to which it was entitled.
Shortly after her discharge from Mission Linen, on January
4, 1993, Pollack filed the original unfair labor practice charge
in Case 28–CB–3832 and a companion unfair labor practice
charge against Mission Linen; however, after the Board com-
pleted its investigation of both unfair labor practice charges,22
with the approval of the Regional Director of Region 28, she
withdrew both charges.23 On the day before she did so, Febru-
ary 1, Pollack telephoned Mary Caldwell at Respondent’s of-
fice and asked her to inform Griese that “I was withdrawing the
charges that I had filed against Mission Linen and against the
Union.” Later that afternoon, according to Pollack, she went to
the Union’s office and “tried” to pay her February membership
dues to Caldwell. Pollack tendered a check to Caldwell, who
asked Pollack if she was then working in a “signatory” shop;
Pollack responded that she was “unemployed” at the time.
Caldwell replied, “unless I am working in a signatory shop, she
cannot accept my Union dues. She said she would not accept
my Union dues.”24 Caldwell corroborated Pollack with regard

22 In a statement of position, dated January 21, Respondent’s attor-
ney, Kist, wrote, “As to the allegation that the Union somehow partici-
pated in, or caused [Pollack’s] termination, the Union had absolutely no
activity or input in the Employer’s decision to terminate Pollack.”
23 In January 1994, shortly after Luz Hall related her version of Re-
spondent’s successful effort to have Mission Linen discharge Pollack,
Region 28 gave Pollack the opportunity to amend her previously with-
drawn unfair labor practice charges against Respondent and Mission
Linen. Unaware of the nature of the evidence and the witness who
provided it, Pollack, of course, did so.
24 At the time, the governing document, for Respondent was its In-
ternational’s constitution and bylaws. Art. I, Sec. 3 of the document
states that the International has jurisdiction over all employees “em-
ployed in Laundries, Cleaning and Dyeing establishments, Towel,
Linen or industrial Laundry Supply companies.” Art. XV111, Sec. 1,
states, in order to be admitted to membership in Respondent, a candi-
date “must be actively employed in work coming within the jurisdiction
of . . . the International Union.” Further, Sec. 5 of the same article
states that “A member to be eligible to hold office in or attend meetings
of a Local Union or have a vote in International or Local Union affairs
must be actively employed in the work coming within the jurisdiction
of the International Union.” There is nonspecific language regarding
retention of membership.
In a statement of position dated February 19, 1993, counsel for Re-
spondent asserted that the International’s constitution, as interpreted by
to her tender of dues on that date; however, as to what was said,
Caldwell recalled that “[Pollack] came in that morning and she
wanted to pay her dues. And I told her I couldn’t accept her
dues and she could take a withdrawal card.” Caldwell specifi-
cally denied mentioning the necessity for employment by a
signatory contractor but testified that such was a requirement
for membership, and Pollack specifically denied having been
offered a withdrawal card by Caldwell.25 Pollack further testi-
fied that, not having been discouraged by the rejection of her
dues tender earlier in the day, she went to Respondent’s regu-
larly scheduled membership meeting that night and again ten-
dered her membership dues on this occasion to Griese. Accord-
ing to Pollack, prior to the start of the meeting, she approached
Griese and tendered her dues check to him. Griese responded
that, unless she was then working in a “signatory establish-
ment,” he would be unable to accept her dues payment but that
he would be happy to do so when she obtained work in a “un-
ion shop.” Griese did not appear as a witness and, thus, failed
to deny Pollack’s testimony. That night, Pollack mailed her
dues check to Respondent’s office; 3 days later, it was returned
by Respondent’s attorney, who wrote, “I am sorry that the Un-
ion cannot accept your check for union dues at this time since
you are not currently employed in a facility represented by the
Union.”
During cross-examinations, asked why Respondent would
not accept her tender to union dues in February 1993, Pollack
responded, “I was going to run against him for office.” Asked
when she told this to Griese, Pollack, who was uncontroverted
on this point, replied, “He always knew I wanted to run for
office.” The General Counsel alleges that the effect of Respon-
dent’s refusal to accept Pollack’s tender of her monthly mem-
bership dues was that she would thereafter be ineligible to hold
office in Respondent. Indeed, Article XVIII, Section 5, of the
International constitution provides that, in order to be eligible
to hold office, a member must be actively employed in work
within jurisdiction of the International and Article XVII, Sec-
tion 5, provides that no member shall be eligible to hold office
unless he or she has been a member in good standing for 24
consecutive months. However, Section H of the International
Union constitution’s trusteeship provision deems Article XVII,
Section 5, inapplicable to the election of officers in local un-
ions, which are emerging from trusteeship. Accordingly, as she

the International’s president and general counsel, “requires a person to
be employed by a signatory employer in order to be eligible for mem-
berships.” However, other than the above-quoted provisions of the
constitution, there is no record evidence to substantiate counsel’s asser-
tion. Moreover, I note that, in 1988, despite the fact that, after her
layoff from Tiffany Cleaners, Pollack was hired by Sierra Dry Clean-
ers, a nonunion dry-cleaning establishment, Respondent accepted her
membership dues payments, that she was allowed to run for president
against Camacho and that, in challenging her right to run for office,
Camacho questioned only Pollack’s eligibility to run for office and not
her right to be a member. Finally, while Pollack testified that the Inter-
national Union’s new constitution and bylaws, which contains a provi-
sion requiring employment by a signatory employer in order to be
eligible for membership, became effective later in 1993, there is no
contention that such was in effect on or about February 1.
25 Pollack did state that had a withdrawal card been offered to her
she would not have taken it.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1360
recognized, in order to be eligible to run for office in 1993, it
was only necessary that Pollack find a job in the laundry and
dry-cleaning service industry in Las Vegas. Finally, asked
what she did to make Griese angry enough at her to risk back-
pay liability by requesting her termination by Mission Linen,
the Charging Party replied, “Paying me for backpay is nothing
compared to if he had to pay back that $50,000 . . . to the Union
if I had sued, claiming that he was irresponsible with union
funds.”
Besides Pollack and Hall, in support of its complaint allega-
tions in Case 28–CA–3855, the General Counsel offered the
testimony of Teresa Foote in order to establish disparate treat-
ment with regard to Pollack. Thus, according to Foote, she was
laid off as a result of the closing of the Dunes Hotel in early
1993, and was given a withdrawal card by Camacho or Cald-
well in February or March. Foote added that she has not paid
any membership dues since her layoff and conceded that there
is no obligation to make such payments while on withdrawal
status. Foote testified that in September 1993 she was given
General Counsel’s Exhibit 6, a document entitled, “Union
Status Verification, by the State of Nevada Employment Secu-
rity Department” and instructed to have it completed by an
official of Respondent. Thereupon, she visited Respondent’s
office, and Robert Camacho completed the document for her
and signed it. Analysis of it discloses that Camacho indicated
in the appropriate spaces that Foote was registered for work
with Respondent and that she was meeting all “reporting re-
quirements.” However, there is no dispute that, within hours,
Camacho telephoned Foote and requested that she return the
document to him inasmuch as he “wasn’t supposed to fill it
out” because Respondent “wasn’t a job finding place.” In this
regard, Camacho conceded that he was told to retrieve the
document from Foote inasmuch as Respondent was no longer
operating a hiring hall.
B. Legal Analysis
1. Case 28–CB–3832
The General Counsel contends that Respondent sought to
have Mission Linen discharge Suzanne Pollack because of her
dissident activities and because she desired to challenge the
incumbent leadership of Respondent in an internal presidential
election in 1993 in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act and
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. While denying the above-
described substantive allegations, Respondent affirmately ar-
gues that the instant complaint was procedurally defective as
the underlying amended charge was time-barred pursuant to
Section 10(b) of the Act—the 6-month statute of limitations.
Contrary to Respondent, the General Counsel argues that, as
Respondent engaged in fraudulent concealment of certain mate-
rial facts, the Act’s statute of limitations has been tolled here.
However, notwithstanding each party’s cogent arguments, I
need not engage in discussion and analysis of the applicability
of Section 10(b) to the instant fact matrix or of the General
Counsel’s fraudulent concealment contention, for assuming,
without deciding, that the Act’s statute of limitations has been
tolled by Respondent’s conduct, in contending the latter en-
gaged in the above-described alleged unfair labor practices and,
indeed, based upon its attorney’s above-quoted statement, in his
January 21, 1993 position statement to the Board, Respondent
engaged in fraudulent concealment of material facts herein,
counsel for the General Counsel relies on the testimony of one
witness, Luz Hall, and no corroborative evidence. Therefore,
as the parties recognized, her credibility is of critical import
herein. As to this, while recognizing that her testimony was
wholly uncontroverted by Anthony Griese, who did not testify,
I, nevertheless, believe that the General Counsel’s reliance on
the truth of her assertions is woefully misplaced.
Bluntly put, I found Hall’s testimonial demeanor to be that of
an inherently incredible witness, one who, I believe, exhibited
unmistakable bias against Respondent,26 who had previously
acted engaged in an employment scheme with Respondent in
order to fraudulently collect welfare payments during Decem-
ber 1992, and who, I also believe, compelled to testify by sub-
poena and fearful of a charge of perjury, perpetuated false tes-
timony to the Board.27 This latter factor, I believe, rather than
any other, accounted for her admitted and conspicuous nerv-
ousness while testifying. My conclusion as to Hall’s lack of
credibility is buttressed by her impeachment on key aspects of
her account of Griese’s alleged initial telephone conversation
with Ron Robertson (in a pretrial affidavit, she gave the date of
the conversation as February 1, and in an earlier sworn deposi-
tion, she said that Griese had telephoned Robertson) and most
significantly, by the contradictory account of Griese’s acts,
which she related to Pollack during their chance encounter at
the Gold Coast Casino in May 1994. Thus, Pollack, who, as
such was contrary to her own pecuniary interests, had no reason
to be untruthful regarding what Hall told her, admitted that Hall
told her that Griese’s conversation with Robertson occurred at
the Mission Linen facility in early December 1992 and that the
conversation related to removing Pollack as shop steward and,
in return, her discharge.28 In the foregoing circumstances, as I
find that Hall’s testimony was utterly untrustworthy and unreli-
able and as such was the only basis for the General Counsel’s
unfair labor practice and fraudulent concealment allegations, I
shall recommend dismissal of the complaint in Case 28–CB–
3832.

26 Not only had Hall filed unfair labor practice charges against Re-
spondent regarding her discharge from Mission Linen, but also she had
filed a complaint against Respondent alleging sexual harassment. The
latter had been dismissed by a judge, who had assessed litigation costs
against Hall, and, at the time of the hearing, Respondent was attempting
to collect what she owed.
27 I found Hall’s comment that it was just a “coincidence” she volun-
teered the information regarding Griese’s asserted effort to have Mis-
sion Linen terminate Pollack, and her professed lack of knowledge of
the latter’s prior unfair labor practice charges wholly unbelievable. To
the contrary, in her job as special projects coordinator and given her
office proximity to Griese, she was in a position to have known of
Pollack’s allegations. Moreover, she did not strike me as a naive indi-
vidual, and I think she believed that, by falsely implicating Griese in
Pollack’s discharge, her chances, that the Board would find merit to her
own unfair labor practice charges, would be enhanced.
28 Hall’s denial that she and Pollack discussed the former’s discharge
was, of course, a fabrication.
TEXTILE PROCESSORS LOCAL 311 (MISSION UNIFORM) 1361
2. Case 28–CB–3855
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act on February
1, 1993, by refusing to accept Suzanne Pollack’s tender of her
monthly membership dues, thereby removing her status as a
member in good standing, rendering her ineligible to run for
union office, and coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to run for union office. Respondent conceded that it re-
fused to accept Pollack’s tender of dues but contends that, in
doing so, it was merely enforcing a membership rule and, there-
fore, acting within the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A). Contrary
to Respondent, counsel for the General Counsel argues that,
rather than Respondent’s membership rule, what is at issue here
is its motivation for acting against Pollack. At the outset, in
this regard, while she was obnoxiously sarcastic, egotistical,
obstreperous, opinionated, and feisty, Pollack did not appear to
be an incredible witness. To the contrary, she impressed me as
being entirely candid, particularly when, obviously aware of the
consequences, she testified regarding what was said by Hall
during their encounter at the Gold Coast Casino. Further, not-
ing that her account of her conversation with Griese on Febru-
ary 1 was uncontroverted and that her testimony was corrobo-
rated by Respondent’s attorney’s letter, which accompanied her
rejected dues tender, I credit her account of her conversation
with Mary Caldwell on February 1 over that of the latter, who
was a far less impressive witness. Accordingly, I find that, on
that date Pollack was not working at any job in the Las Vegas,
Nevada, dry-cleaning and laundry industry and was unem-
ployed; that Caldwell, Griese, and Respondent’s attorney re-
jected Pollack’s tenders of her monthly membership dues be-
cause, at the time, she did not have a job with a union signatory
dry-cleaning or laundry employer, that, at no point during their
respective conversations with Pollack, did Griese or Caldwell
offer Pollack a withdrawal card; and that, in his letter to Pollack
rejecting her dues tender, Respondent’s attorney repeated Re-
spondent’s above-stated rationale for doing so. Moreover,
while I rely on Mary Caldwell’s admissions that she had con-
cerns about Pollack’s dishonesty and penchant for turning
“things around backward” and that she expressed these misgiv-
ings to Luz Hall, I found disingenuous her denial that her mis-
trust of Pollack resulted from the latter’s dissident activities and
believe that Pollack’s acts, in fact, form the basis for Caldwell’s
and, indeed, Griese’s attitude toward the Charging Party.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that Respondent re-
fused to accept Pollack’s tender of her membership dues in an
attempt to prevent her from holding union office due to her
intraunion political activity. In this regard, the record is uncon-
troverted, and I find, that, since 1988 and continuing through
the fall of 1992, Pollack had been an internal union dissident
against Respondent’s incumbent leadership with her acts, in
this regard, including running for president, challenging the
conduct of the election before the DOL, complaining to the
International regarding improprieties at the local union, peti-
tioning Respondent to amend its internal bylaws to prohibit
officers from increasing their salaries, investigating what she
considered to be improper expenditures by Griese, and seeking
a DOL investigation of the conduct of Respondent’s trustee-
ship. While there is record evidence that, notwithstanding her
dissident activities, Respondent appointed Pollack to the posi-
tion of shop steward at Mission Linen and to its bargaining
committee for the 1992 contract negotiations with her employer
and, in the summer of 1992, processed two of her grievances
through a costly arbitration hearing and while asserted evidence
of Respondent’s animus toward Pollack has been discredited by
me, I, nevertheless, believe that significant evidence of Re-
spondent’s animus toward Pollack, based on her dissident ac-
tivities, exists. Thus, Mary Caldwell conceded that she viewed
Pollack as a dishonest individual, one who had a penchant for
turning “things around backward,” and I believe the former
attitude was directly related to Pollack’s dissident activities.
Moreover, inasmuch as I believe that no such internal union
rule existed, I find that Respondent’s agents dissembled when
they rejected Pollack’s dues tender ostensibly because she was
no longer employed by a signatory employer. As to this, close
scrutiny of Article XVIII of the International’s constitution and
bylaws, which was Respondent’s governing document on Feb-
ruary 1, 1993, establishes that, while the article contains provi-
sions for admission to and qualifications for membership and
eligibility for holding office and voting, there exists no provi-
sion, setting forth qualifications or rules for retention of mem-
bership or defining the consequences of losing a job in the in-
dustry. Further, assuming that one is able to infer such a provi-
sion from the wording of Article XVIII, that language does not
permit the inference that an individual must remain working for
a union-signatory employer in order to retain his or her mem-
bership status. Thus, the only language on this point, which
language is reiterated throughout the article, is that an individ-
ual “must be actively employed in the work coming within the
jurisdiction of the International Union” in order to become a
member or to run for office or vote in internal union elections.
While counsel for Respondent asserted, during the investigation
of this matter and in its posthearing brief, that the language of
Article XVIII is interpreted as requiring employment by a sig-
natory contractor, there is no record evidence of such an inter-
pretation, and, as the record evidence is uncontroverted that, in
1988, Respondent accepted membership dues from Pollack and
permitted her to run for office notwithstanding her employment
by a nonunion dry-cleaning company, such evidence would be
of highly dubious value. In these circumstances, as Respon-
dent’s rationale for rejecting Pollack’s dues tender seems to
have been a sham, the inference may be drawn that Respondent
was motivated by Pollack’s dissident political activity and her
announced intention to run for president in a possible 1993
election. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466,
470 (9th Cir. 1966); Teamsters Local 287 (Emery Air), 304
NLRB 119, 123 (1991).29 Based on the foregoing, I find that
there is substantial record evidence to warrant a conclusion that
Respondent unlawfully refused to accept Pollack’s dues tender
because of her internal political activities. Teamsters Local
287, supra; Machinists District 91 (Pratt & Whitney), 278
NLRB 39 (1986).

29 In this regard, I credit Pollack that she had been informed of a
likely 1993 presidential election by the DOL and by International
President Scalish and that she had made her interest in running for the
position known to Griese.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1362
Respondent’s defense is two-fold. Counsel for Respondent
argues that there is no evidence of discriminatory treatment
herein and specifically states, “the Union has treated Pollack in
exactly the same fashion as it has all other members.” Contrary
to counsel, there is no record evidence that Respondent has, in
fact, enforced the identical condition for retaining membership
on any other individual and there is uncontroverted record evi-
dence that, in 1993, Respondent treated Pollack in a different
manner than it had in 1988 when it accepted Pollack’s union
dues while she was unemployed and after she became em-
ployed by a nonunion company. Furthermore, I have found
that Pollack was not offered a withdrawal card by Caldwell or
Griese and, while members who have been laid off by signatory
employers have been offered withdrawal cards by Respondent,
given the dearth of record evidence on the subject, such simply
may have been reflective of a desire to relieve the members
from the expense of membership dues while unemployed rather
than of a loss of membership status due to their layoffs. In this
regard, I rely on Pollack’s uncontroverted testimony that, in
1988, Camacho offered her a withdrawal card to relieve her of
her dues obligation and note that, as set forth above, there is no
retention of membership provision in the International constitu-
tion or any provision, mandating loss of membership while
unemployed.
As the other facet of its defense, Respondent contends that it
was merely enforcing a membership rule against Pollack. In
this regard, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act provides that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization “to restrain
or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.” The proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A)
states that the foregoing provision “shall not impair the right of
a labor organization to proscribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” Assuming
that Respondent was enforcing an extant membership rule, a
conclusion which I do not accept, the legality of its allegedly
unlawful conduct depends on whether refusing Pollack’s tender
of her monthly membership dues was privileged under the lan-
guage of the aforementioned proviso, and, ran analyzing the
interplay between Section 8(b)(1)(A) and its proviso,”30 it is
necessary to understand the dictates of Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969). Therein, in analyzing the same section of the
Act, the Supreme Court stated that, under its analytical ap-
proach which differentiates between internal and external en-
forcement of union rules, a labor organization is free to enforce
“a properly adopted rule,” one which is “not the arbitrary fiat of
a union officer” provided that the rule “reflects a legitimate
union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the
labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members
who are free to leave the union and escape the rule.” Id. at
428–430. At the outset, inasmuch as it has no basis in the In-
ternational constitution and bylaws and was contrary to Re-
spondent’s past practice, the policy, which was stated to Pol-
lack, by Mary Caldwell, Anthony Griese, and Respondent’s
attorney, seems to have been more akin to an “arbitrary fiat”
than to a duly adopted union rule. Moreover, I have found that

30 Teamsters Local 741 (A.B.F. Freight), 314 NLRB 1107, 1108
(1994).
Respondent acted against Pollack in retaliation for her dissident
activities, and, in Teamsters Local 579 (Janesville Auto Trans-
port), 310 NLRB 975 (1993), the Board noted that internal
union sanctions, such as removing an individual from member-
ship status:

[I]mposed in retaliation for a member’s exercise of the right to
engage in intraunion activities in opposition to the incumbent
leadership of the union, violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) because it
does not reflect a legitimate union interest and, instead, im-
pairs a policy which Congress has imbedded in the labor laws
. . . the right guaranteed by the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act . . . to participate fully and freely in inter-
nal union affairs.

Here, under the pretense of enforcing a membership rule,
Respondent sought to deprive Pollack of her right, under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, to engage
fully in the internal affairs of Respondent. Accordingly, assum-
ing the existence of the membership rule, which is asserted by
Respondent, such does not shield Respondent from a finding
that, by refusing to accept Pollack’s tender of membership dues
and, by removing her from membership, Respondent acted in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Teamsters Local
287, supra; Carpenters Local 22 (Graziano Const. Co.), 195
NLRB 1 (1972).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Mission Linen is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing and refusing to accept Suzanne
Pollack’s tender of membership dues on February 1, 1993,
thereby removing her from the status of a member of Respon-
dent and causing her to be ineligible to run for union office.
4. Respondent’s above described acts and conduct constitute
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Unless specified above, Respondent engaged in no other
unfair labor practices.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I shall recom-
mend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the purposes
and policies of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent be
ordered to accept Pollack’s payment of membership dues and
reinstate her to full membership status, retroactive to February
1, 1993.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]