Terremark North America LLCv.Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 6, 2016

09551365 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2016)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper No. 10
571.272.7822 Filed: January 6, 2016

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

TERREMARK NORTH AMERICA LLC, VERIZON BUSINESS
NETWORK SERVICES INC., VERIZON SERVICES CORP.,
TIME WARNER CABLE INC., ICONTROL NETWORKS, INC. and
COXCOM, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

JOAO CONTROL & MONITORING SYSTEMS, LLC,
Patent Owner.
_______________

Case IPR2015-01478
Patent 6,542,076 B1
_______________

Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, STACEY G. WHITE, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Denial of Institution of Inter Partes Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108

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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Terremark North America LLC (“Terremark”); Verizon
Communications, Inc.,1 Verizon Services Corp., Time Warner Cable Inc.
(“Time Warner”), iControl Networks, Inc., and CoxCom, LLC (collectively
“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) seeking to institute an inter
partes review of claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206, 216, and
217 of U.S. Patent No. 6,542,076 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’076 patent”) pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Joao Control & Monitoring Systems, LLC,
(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter
partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable

1 The Petition lists Verizon Communications, Inc. as a petitioning party (Pet.
2) and the caption of the Petition does not list Verizon Communications,
Inc.; instead it lists Verizon Business Network Services Inc. as a petitioning
party. Petitioner identifies “Verizon Communications Inc., Verizon
Corporate Resources Group LLC and Verizon Data Services LLC as a real
party-in-interest for the IPR requested by this Petition solely to the extent
that Patent Owner contends that these separate legal entities should be
named a real party-in-interest in the requested IPR.” Pet. 2. It is, however,
Petitioner’s obligation to identify all real parties-in-interest. 35 U.S.C. §
312(a). As such, we take Petitioner’s statement as an admission that these
entities are real parties-in-interest. Petitioner notes that Verizon
Communications Inc. has more than 500 affiliated entities and states that
“each of these entities agrees to be estopped under the provisions of 35
U.S.C. §§ 315 and/or 325 as a result of any final written decision in the
requested IPR to the same extent that the Petitioners are estopped.” Id. On
this record, we construe any mismatch between the named Verizon entities
to be a typographical error.
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likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
claims challenged in the petition.”
Petitioner contends the challenged claims are unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 on the following specific grounds (Pet. 20–53):

Reference(s) Basis Claim(s) Challenged
Busak2 § 1023
31, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185,
188, 206, 216, and 217
Busak and French4 § 103 40
For reasons discussed below, we do not institute inter partes review of
the ʼ076 patent.
B. Related Proceedings
Petitioner informs us that the ʼ076 patent is at issue in twenty-six
lawsuits pending in courts around the country. Pet. 3–4. In addition, ex

2 U.S. Patent No. 5,461,372, issued Oct. 24, 1995, filed Jan. 19, 1993
(“Busak”) (Ex. 1005).
3 Petitioner argues that the claims at issue are entitled to a priority date of no
earlier than July 18, 1996. Pet. 16–20. Petitioner then argues Busak would
be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and cites a February 4, 1992 issuance
date. Id. at 20–21. Busak, however, issued October 24, 1995 and thus, on
this record would be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) if we were to agree
with Petitioner’s arguments regarding the priority date of the challenged
claims. We, however, decline to decide that issue because, on the current
record, it appears that Busak’s January 19, 1993 filing date makes it
available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). The other asserted prior art
reference, French, qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) under
either date.
4 U.S. Patent No. 5,061,916, issued Oct. 29, 1991 (“French”) (Ex. 1006).
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parte reexamination No. 90/013,302 was filed with respect to the ’076 patent
and is pending. Id. at 3.
C. Statutory Bar
Patent Owner asserts that the Petition must be denied as untimely.
Prelim. Resp. 11–19. A statutory time bar regarding the institution of an
inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which provides as
follows:
PATENT OWNER’S ACTION.—An inter partes review
may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is
filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner,
real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time
limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a
request for joinder under subsection (c).
On June 23, 2014, two of the petitioning parties, Verizon
Communications and Time Warner, were served with complaints alleging
infringement of the ’076 patent. Prelim. Resp. 12; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 2, 4. By
stipulation of the parties, Terremark, another of the petitioning parties, was
substituted in place of Verizon Communications. Ex. 2001 ¶ 3, Ex. 2004.
Thus, under the statute, Petitioner must have filed its Petition by June 23,
2015. The filing date accorded to the Petition is June 23, 2015. Notice of
Filing Date Accorded (Paper 3).
Patent Owner alleges that this filing date is improper because
Petitioner did not effect service until June 24, 2015. Prelim. Resp. 13. In
support of this assertion, Patent Owner provides a printout of tracking
information that shows acceptance of the package containing the service
copy of the Petition by Federal Express on June 24, 2015. Ex. 2007. In
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addition, Patent Owner argues that that Petitioner’s electronic transmission
of the Petition and supporting documents did not constitute proper service.
Prelim. Resp. 16–18. According to Patent Owner, Petitioner “[sent an
email] to Patent Owner’s litigation counsel at 11:55 pm on June 23, 2015”
and this email contained links to an electronic file share site which had links
to the Petition and supporting evidence. Id. at 16; Ex. 2009. Patent Owner
argues that there is no evidence that the Petition and supporting evidence
actually were available June 23, 2015. Prelim. Resp. 16–17. Patent Owner
also asserts that its litigation counsel was not representing Patent Owner in
any matters before the USPTO and that it had not consented to email
service. Id.
Patent Owner cites 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) that states “[a] petition filed
under section 311 may be considered only if— . . . (5) the petitioner
provides copies of any of the documents required under paragraphs (2), (3),
and (4) to the patent owner or, if applicable, the designated representative of
the patent owner.” See Prelim. Resp. 15. The statute, however, does not
require that the documents be served on the Patent Owner, nor does it
specify when the Patent Owner must receive these documents. The statute,
instead, requires that the Petitioner “provide[]” copies to the Patent Owner.
Patent Owner was provided with, and did receive, copies of the documents
in question. We, therefore, decline to deny this Petition for failure to meet
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312.
In addition, the facts of this case are similar to Micron Tech., Inc. v.
e.Digital Corp., Case IPR2015-00519 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2015) (Paper 14), in
which the Board addressed a Motion to Deny a Petition a Filing Date based
on Improper Service. The petitioner in Micron filed timely the petition, and
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paid timely the filing fee. In addition, in Micron, the petitioner served a
copy of the petition and supporting documents on the patent owner’s
litigation counsel via email before expiration of the statutory bar date. The
petitioner in Micron failed to timely serve the patent owner at the
correspondence address of record. The Board, however, denied the patent
owner’s motion because the patent owner, through its litigation counsel,
received the petition prior to the one year statutory bar date. Micron, slip op.
at 4–6.
Patent Owner also relies on 37 C.F.R. § 42.106, which states “[a]
petition to institute inter partes review will not be accorded a filing date
until the petition satisfies [the requirement of] . . . (2) [e]ffect[ing] service of
the petition on the correspondence address of record as provided in
§ 42.105(a).” We agree that mailing via FedEx the day after filing the
Petition failed to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.105(a). In addition, the
purported email service, on this record, also does not appear to have been
proper. The error appears harmless, however, because Patent Owner
received the Petition no later than the morning of June 25, 2015 when the
FedEx package was delivered. In addition, Patent Owner does not assert
that it was unable to access the documents submitted via email. Patent
Owner timely responded to the Petition and thus, we see no prejudice to
Patent Owner from Petitioner’s service miscues. In this instance, we,
therefore, decline to change the filing date accorded. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.5(b). Petitioner, however, must follow the rules on service, such as 37
C.F.R. § 42.6(e), going forward. Thus, we decline to deny the Petition for
failure to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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D. The ʼ076 Patent
The ’076 patent discusses a control, monitoring, and/or security
apparatus and method for vehicles or premises. Ex. 1001, 1:25–32. The
apparatus described in the ’076 patent allows an owner, occupant, or other
authorized individual to control or to perform various monitoring and
security tasks in regards to a premises from a remote location and at any
time. Id. at 3:5–11.
An embodiment of the apparatus of the ’076 patent includes a
transmitter system which is “a remote system, which may or may not be
physically connected to the remainder of the apparatus. Further, the
transmitter system is not located in the [vehicle or premises] . . . , but rather,
is located external from, and/or separate and apart from, the vehicle.” Id. at
3:50–56. The apparatus also includes a CPU that is connected electrically
and/or linked to one or more vehicle equipment systems (e.g., vehicle
ignition or anti-theft systems), which are located externally from the
apparatus. Id. at 4:35–37; 4:61–5:14. The vehicle equipment systems may
be activated, de-activated, reset, or controlled by the apparatus. Id. at 5:15–
18. This activation or control may be achieved by a user entering a code on
the transceiver of the transmitter system. Id. at 6:30–36. The code is
transmitted to the CPU and then the CPU communicates with the appropriate
vehicle equipment system. Id. at 7:16–21.

E. Illustrative Claim
As noted above, Petitioner challenges claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177,
183, 185, 188, 206, 216, and 217 of the ʼ076 patent, of which claims 31,
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143, and 206 are independent. Claim 31 is illustrative of the challenged
claims and is reproduced below:
31. A control apparatus, comprising:
a first control device, wherein the first control device at least
one of generates a first signal and transmits a first signal for
at least one of activating, de-activating, disabling, and re-
enabling, at least one of a premises system, a premises
equipment system, a premises component, a premises
device, a premises equipment, and a premises appliance, of a
premises, wherein the first control device is located at the
premises,
wherein the first control device at least one of generates the first
signal and transmits the first signal in response to a second
signal, wherein the second signal is at least one of generated
by a second control device and transmitted from a second
control device, wherein the second control device is located
at a location which is remote from the premises, wherein the
second signal is transmitted from the second control device
to the first control device, wherein the second signal is
automatically received by the first control device, and
further wherein the second control device at least one of
generates the second signal and transmits the second signal
in response to a third signal, wherein the third signal is at
least one of generated by a third control device and
transmitted from a third control device,
wherein the third control device is located at a location which is
remote from the premises and remote from the second
control device, wherein the third signal is transmitted from
the third control device to the second control device, and
further wherein the third signal is automatically received by
the second control device.
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
As acknowledged by the parties, the ’076 patent has expired. See Pet.
12; Prelim. Resp. 6. We construe expired patent claims according to the
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standard applied by the district courts. See In re Rambus, 694 F.3d 42, 46
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Specifically, we apply the principles set forth in Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “In determining the
meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic
evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written
description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc.
v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). A patentee may act as a
lexicographer by giving a term a particular meaning in the specification with
“reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Petitioner asserts that “[t]he terms of the challenged claims have a
well-understood meaning” and such, Petitioner does not seek an explicit
construction for any term. Pet. 12. Petitioner does present arguments
regarding the construction of several terms in an effort to preempt Patent
Owner’s potential arguments regarding these terms. Id. at 12–16. Patent
Owner provides argument for several of these terms; however, we are not
persuaded that express construction of these terms is necessary in order to
resolve the disputes currently before us. See Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Thus, we
discern no need to provide express constructions for these terms at this time.
Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and
only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).
Patent Owner, however, also argues that the terms “premises,”
“remote,” and “located at” are defined expressly in the prosecution history
of at least two related applications. Prelim. Resp. 23–24. Petitioner does not
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provide explicit arguments regarding these terms. Patent Owner seeks to
rely upon statements made in the Preliminary Remarks filed by Applicant on
November 26, 2006, during prosecution of the patent application that issued
as U.S. Patent No. 7,277,010 (“the ’010 patent”) (Ex. 2011) and in the First
Remarks filed on November 23, 2007, during prosecution of the patent
application that issued as U.S. Patent No. 7,397,363 (“the ’363 patent”) (Ex.
2012). Prelim. Resp. 23. These statements were made several years after
the issuance of the ’076 patent. See Ex. 1001 at (45) (April 1, 2003 issuance
date). The ’076 patent and the ’010 and ’363 patents all descend from U.S.
Patent Application Nos. 08/587,628, 08/622,749, 08/489,238, and
08/073,755. See Ex. 1001 at (63)5; Prelim. Resp. 23.
As the Federal Circuit has noted, “[a] statement made during
prosecution of related patents may be properly considered in construing a
term common to those patents, regardless of whether the statement pre- or
post-dates the issuance of the particular patent at issue.” Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Microsoft
Corp. v. Multi–Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Explicit definitions for these terms were provided in the related applications.
See Ex. 2011, 3–5; Ex. 2012, 8, 10. We have reviewed the definitions stated
in those related applications and we find them to be reasonable and
instructive to understanding the proper scope of these claims terms. See In
re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Thus, we adopt the
following constructions for the purposes of this decision.

5 We note that this portion of the ’076 patent has been modified by a
Certificate of Correction, which may be found on page 95 of the Exhibit.
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Term Citations Construction
Remote Ex. 2011, 3
Ex. 2012, 10
“‘Remote’ means ‘separate and apart from, or
external from, or at a distance from or distant
from, or not located in.’”
Premises Ex. 2011, 4
Ex. 2012, 8–9
“‘Premises’ means ‘a building or a structure
and the grounds or parcel of land associated
with the building or the structure, or a
building or structure or a portion, room, or
office, of or in the building or structure, or a
home, mobile home, mobile building, mobile
structure, residence, residential building,
office, commercial building, commercial
office, structure, equipment, facility, machine,
rig, assembly line, or edifice.’”
Located at Ex. 2011, 5
Ex. 2012, 8
“‘Located at’ means ‘situated at, or situated
in, or situated on.’”

III. ANALYSIS
We turn to Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability to
determine whether Petitioner has met the threshold of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
A. Asserted Anticipation over Busak (Ex. 1005)
1. Overview of Busak
Busak is a U.S. Patent titled “System and Method for Modifying
Security in a Security System.” Ex. 1005 at [54]. Busak describes a security
system that can be accessed by a user from within the space to be controlled,
or remotely through the use of a telecommunications interface. Id. at 1:18–
20. An embodiment of Busak is depicted in Figure 1, which is reproduced
below.
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Figure 1, reproduced above, depicts an embodiment of Busak’s automation
system. Id. at 2:54–59. As described in Busak’s specification, “automation
system 10 would be particularly suitable for automatically controlling a
building, such as a small commercial building, a home, or a similar
building.” Id. at 3:19–21. Automation system 10 includes principal control
system 12, which is security system 16. Id. at 3:21–26. The principal
control system is “electrically connected to a plurality of control systems 14,
including lighting system 18.” Id. at 3:26–27. Lighting system 18 is a
commercially available system that may be used to control lights or other
electrical devices and it may be connected to the security system. Id. at
5:29–40. The automation system also includes telecommunications device
34, which may be a touch tone telephone. Id. at 5:52–53.
.
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2. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Anticipation by Busak
Petitioner asserts that claims 31, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206,
216, and 217 of the ’076 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
anticipated by Busak. Pet. 20–46. Petitioner relies on claim charts showing
how this reference allegedly discloses the claimed subject matter. Id.
Petitioner further relies on a declaration from Richard Bennett. Ex. 1002.
Each of the challenged independent claims (31, 143, and 206) recites
a first, second, and third control device. In claims 31 and 143, the “first
control device is located at the premises.” Id. at 114:1–2; 132:45–46.
Similarly, in claim 206, the “third control device is located at the premises.”
Id. at 141:60–61. All three independent claims recite that “the second
control device is located at a location which is remote from the premises.”
Id. at 114:7–9; 132:51–53; 141:62–63. In addition, claims 31 and 143 recite
that “the third control device is located at a location which is remote from
the premises and remote from the second control device.” Id. at 114:18–20;
132:61–64. Similarly, claim 206 recites that the “first control device is
located at a location remote from the second control device and remote from
a premises.” Id. at 141:48–50. Thus, all of the independent claims require
three control devices, one of which is located on the premises and two other
control devices that are located at two other places that are remote from the
premises.
Petitioner argues that Busak discloses these control devices6 through
its discussion and depiction of lighting system 18 with a control system 14

6 Petitioner argues that the first control device of claim 206 correlates to the
third control device of claim 31; that the second control device of claim 206
correlates to the second control device of claim 31; and that the third control

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therein and control points 84 (first control devices), principal control system
16 (second control device), and telecommunications device 34 (third control
device). Pet. 24. Petitioner asserts that Busak discloses that the “second
control device is located remote from the premises” (id. at 26) because
Busak’s specification states that “control system 14 could be remote from
security system 16. . . ” and that control points 84 are on the premises and
may be connected to security system 16 via hardwire 88 or RF connections
86. Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:35–39, Fig. 2, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–31).
We are not persuaded that these disclosures are sufficient to anticipate
the challenged claims. “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four
corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of
the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim,
it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus,
cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. VeriSign,
Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Busak describes a preferred
embodiment in which a control system 14 could be at a location remote from
that of security system/principal control system 16. Ex. 1005, 3:35–37.

device of claim 206 correlates to the first control device of claim 31. Pet. 40
n.7. Petitioner relies on the same disclosures in Busak for each of the
corresponding devices in claims 31 and 206. Compare Pet. 22–23 and Pet.
40–42. This is also true for Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim 143,
which recites a first, second, and third control device in language similar to
that used in claim 31. See id. at 32–34 (providing citations to Busak nearly
identical to those cited in support of its arguments regarding claim 31).
Thus, our analysis of Busak’s disclosures applies to each of the independent
claims. For convenience, unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the terms
first, second, and third control device to refer to the control devices as
described in claim 31.
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Busak, however, also discloses that there may be “[a] plurality of control
systems 14” and that these systems “as well as any number of other systems
. . . might be located in or near the building, and including systems which
could be remote from the building.” Id. at 3:26–35. We are not persuaded
that Busak’s principal control system is “separate and apart from, or external
from, or at a distance from or distant from, or not located in” (i.e., remote
from) (see § II (claim construction)) the premises because the cited portions
of the reference do not describe the principal control system as being apart
from the premises. Also, we are not persuaded that the ability to connect
control systems 14 and principal control system 16 via an RF connection
discloses that principal control system 16 is remote from the premises
because an RF connection could be used to connect devices that are located
in the same premises. Busak, instead, merely describes that “system 14
could be remote from security system 16. . .” and that control points 84 are
on the premises and may be connected to security system 16 via hardwire 88
or RF connections 86. Ex. 1005, 3:35–39, Fig. 2. Thus, we are not
persuaded that Busak discloses that control system 16 “is located remote
from the premises.”
Based on the foregoing, we determine that as to claims 31, 143, and
206, Petitioner has not met the threshold of 35 U.S.C § 314(a). Petitioner
has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Busak discloses that the
claimed “second control device is located remote from the premises.” For
similar reasons, we also determine that Petitioner has not met the threshold
of 35 U.S.C § 314(a) for dependent claims 48, 177, 183, 185, 188, 216, and
217.
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B. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Obviousness over Busak and French
Petitioner asserts that claim 40 of the ’076 patent is unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Busak and French. Pet. 46–52.
Petitioner relies on claim charts showing how this reference allegedly
discloses the claimed subject matter. Id. Petitioner further relies on a
declaration from Richard Bennett. Ex. 1002. Claim 40 depends from claim
31. Petitioner does not assert that French cures the above-noted deficiency
found in claim 31. Nor does Petitioner provide additional argument that the
limitations of claim 31 would have been obvious over the disclosures of
Busak. Thus, for reasons described above we are not persuaded that
Petitioner has met the threshold of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and we deny
institution of review of claim 40 over Busak and French.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has not
demonstrated there is a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in establishing
the unpatentability of claims 31, 40, 48, 143, 177, 183, 185, 188, 206, 216,
and 217 of the ʼ076 patent.
V. ORDER
For the reasons given, it is
ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims and
no trial is instituted.

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PETITIONER:

Frank C. Cimino, Jr.
FCCimino@Venable.com
Megan S. Woodworth
MSWoodworth@Venable.com
VENABLE LLP

Vaibhav P. Kadaba
Wkadaba@kilpatricktownsend.com
D. Clay Holloway
Cholloway@kilpatricktownsend.com
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

Jackson Ho
jackson.ho@klgates.com
David A. Simons
david.simons@klgates.com
K&L GATES LLP

PATENT OWNER:

Raymond A. Joao
rayjoao@optonline.net

René A. Vazquez
rvazquez@hgdlawfirm.com
HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC 1