01974136
01-27-2000
Teresa A. Williams, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Teresa A. Williams v. United States Postal Service
01974136
January 27, 2000
Teresa A. Williams, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01974136
) Agency No. 1-J-604-1079-94
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
On April 23, 1997, the complainant initiated an appeal from a final
decision of the agency dated March 25, 1997 concerning her complaint
of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of the Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and
�501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et
seq.<1> The appeal is timely (see 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)), and is accepted under
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. �
1614.401(a)).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the complainant was discriminated against on the bases of her race
(black), disabilities (carpel tunnel syndrome and stress) and reprisal
(EEO activity) when: (1) she was issued a notice of removal in April 1994,
and (2) her mailed letter was confiscated and opened.
BACKGROUND
The complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging the above issues.
Following an investigation of issue 1, the complainant requested a hearing
before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge
(AJ). After the complainant informed the AJ that the agency failed to
process issue 2, the AJ remanded the complaint to the agency for further
processing. On remand, the agency conducted a supplemental investigation
on issue 2, and sent the complainant a copy thereof with another notice of
her right to request a hearing. According to the agency, this package was
returned unclaimed, and the complainant does not dispute this. The agency
then issued a final decision finding no discrimination. On appeal, the
complainant makes no comment and does not address the hearing matter.
Accordingly, we find the complainant has waived her right to a hearing.
The complainant was issued a notice of removal in April 1994 for
improperly using postal equipment and her position for personal
gain. It was issued by the Manager of Distribution Operations (Manager
1-- white) with the concurrence of the Manager of In-Plant Support
(Manager 2--white). The notice charged the complainant with stamping
as postage O.K. a personal certified letter without proper postage.
The letter was directed to the Department of Labor, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs (OWCP). The complainant acknowledged the
above action. She averred that because the finance office was closed,
she placed $1.25 in an envelope for finance to pay for the mailing.
The notice charged that the finance office did not receive the money,
and $1.25 would not cover the postage. The removal charges were supported
by the record. The complainant grieved the removal, and in May 1994
it was reduced to a two week suspension.
With regard to issue 2, the record reflects that the complainant's
letter was confiscated on March 17, 1994 and given to the Manager 1.
The complainant stated she belatedly got the letter back on April 24,
1994 when she was issued the removal notice. She stated that the letter
had been opened. The complainant averred this violated the sanctity of
the mail, and that it had been opened by Manager 2. A union official
who is a distribution clerk affirmed that she was informed by Manager
1 that Manager 2 opened the letter. The distribution clerk stated this
violated the security of the mail, and that agency rules and guidelines
provide that a letter should not be opened unless there are suspicions of
a criminal nature to confiscate and disclose the contents of a letter.
Managers 1 and 2 stated that the letter was confiscated because it was
illegally placed in the mail stream. They did not recall whether the
letter was opened, but recalled not reading its contents. They stated
that after the complainant was interviewed by a postal inspector (March
25, 1994), they believed the letter was returned to management and they
were told to tell the complainant to put postage on it before mailing.
They stated management released all documents to the union.
The complainant alleges reprisal discrimination. She does not identify
EEO activity, and the record does not reflect whether Managers 1 and 2
were aware of such. But with regard to the facts that gave rise to the
instant complaint, the complainant initially contacted an EEO counselor
on April 8, 1994, prior to being issued a notice of removal, and prior
to the return of the letter.
With regard to the complainant's disability claim, an OWCP letter
of October 1991 indicates the complainant was previously diagnosed
with left carpel tunnel syndrome and left distal ulnar neuropathy.
A letter by the Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services detailing
a job analysis in November 1991 reflects the complainant served in a
distribution clerk job with modified duties. Her job function included
sorting and sweeping one ounce first class mail. Trays of letters were
brought to the complainant and work above shoulder level was avoided.
A form signed by a physician in July 1993 indicated that the complainant
was restricted from lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds, and from
reaching above her shoulder and twisting both forearms.
The complainant avers that the action agency's action of accusing her
of wrongdoing placed great stress upon her. According to the Manager 1,
the complainant did not return for some four months after the expiration
of her two week suspension. The complainant attributed this to stress.
There is no further information in the record on the complainant's
alleged stress disability.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973) provides
the analytical framework for proving employment discrimination in
cases in which disparate treatment is alleged and no direct evidence
of discrimination has been presented. Although McDonnell Douglas is a
Title VII case, its analysis is also applicable to disparate treatment
cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See Prewitt v. U.S. Postal
Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1981). McDonnell Douglas
requires the complainant to first establish a prima facie case. If the
complainant succeeds, the agency's burden then is to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action in order to rebut
the prima facie case of discrimination. Finally, the complainant has
the opportunity to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
agency's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. The ultimate
burden of proof that discrimination took place is on the complainant.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981).
As a threshold matter, one bringing a claim of discrimination on the
basis of disability must show that she is a qualified individual with
a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Under 29
C.F.R. � 1630.2(g), the definition of an individual with a disability
is one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such
an impairment or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. Major
life activities include caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29
C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)(i).<2>
The complainant has a record of an impairment which substantially limits
a major life activity. Specifically, she has diagnosed with left carpel
tunnel syndrome and left distal ulnar neuropathy, and has been restricted
from lifting or carrying more than 10 pounds, from reaching above her
shoulder, and from and twisting both forearms. The record shows that
the complainant had the reaching and weight restriction for at least
two years prior to the actions at issue here.
The complainant did not describe the manifestations of her alleged mental
stress condition in any detail, nor submit medical evidence to support she
had a mental condition which substantially limited a major life activity.
Further, the record does not show that the complainant had a record
of such a disability or was regarded as having such by the agency.
Accordingly, the complainant failed to establish that her mental stress
condition constituted a disability. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 119 S.Ct 2139 (1999).
Since the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for issuing the complainant a notice of removal, as set forth below,
we may proceed directly to whether she demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the agency's reason was merely a pretext to hide
discrimination based on her race, physical disability, and reprisal.
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
713-714 (1983).
The agency explained that it issued the notice of removal for the reasons
charged. The complainant contended that this explanation was pretextual
because she did no wrong and suggested she was treated differently.
The complainant's contentions are not supported by the record, and she
has failed to establish pretext or discrimination with regard to the
notice of removal.
The agency explained that it confiscated the complainant's letter
because she placed it illegally in the mail stream without proper
postage. The complainant did not show this explanation was pretext to
mask discrimination or otherwise prove discrimination. The complainant
also stated that Manager 2 belatedly returned the confiscated letter to
her and had opened it. The record on this is not clear. According to
Managers 1 and 2, all documents were released to the union. Hence,
the agency may not have been behind the delay. Further, Managers 1 and
2 stated that they did not recall whether the letter was opened, and
recalled not reading its contents. Given this, and the circumstances
under which the letter was confiscated, we find the complainant has not
proved discrimination with regard to allegation 2.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons, it
is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the final decision of the
agency which found that the appellant was not discriminated with regard
to issues 1 and 2.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in
which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
January 27, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden,
Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to
all Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the
administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the
revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where
applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as
amended, may also be found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,
the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints
of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's
website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.