TeraDact Solutions, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 23, 20202020004407 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/011,826 08/28/2013 Christopher K. Schrichte 062A.0007.U2(US) 2633 29683 7590 12/23/2020 Harrington & Smith, Attorneys At Law, LLC 4 RESEARCH DRIVE, Suite 202 SHELTON, CT 06484-6212 EXAMINER FRENEL, VANEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3687 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/23/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@HSPATENT.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHRISTOPHER K. SCHRICHTE Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 Technology Center 3600 Before ADAM J. PYONIN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 7–23 and 27–29, all the claims pending in this application.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Teradact Solutions, Inc. Appeal Brief 1. 2 Claims 1–6 and 24–26 are canceled. Appeal Brief 2. Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Invention Appellant’s invention relates generally to “automatically removing sensitive information from documents.” Spec. ¶ 3.3 More specifically, a “redaction engine 30 is adapted to take an electronic version of the document 12, and remove or redact information in the document using rules accessed from [a] rule set 32 to produce [a] modified document 14.” Id. ¶ 76, Figs. 1, 4. The redaction engine selects a redaction rule set from different redaction rule sets based upon identification of the requester. Id. ¶ 76. “For example, an employment application document or a document from a personal department might automatically have a first rules set versus a document from an intelligence department or an intelligence document which could automatically have a second rules set.” Id. Illustrative Claim Claims 7, 13, 15, and 22 are independent. Independent claim 7, reproduced below with certain limitations at issue italicized, is illustrative of the claims on appeal: 7. An apparatus comprising: a scanner configured to generate an electronic first document from a scanned document; a redaction generator configured to receive the first document from the scanner, where the redaction generator is configured to generate an electronic redacted second document from the first document received from the scanner, wherein the 3 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed August 28, 2013 (“Spec.”); (2) the Non-Final Office Action mailed September 18, 2019 (“Non-Final Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed November 21, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); and (4) the Examiner’s Answer mailed March 20, 2020 (“Ans.”). Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 3 redaction generator comprises a computer including a redaction engine coupled to a source of redaction rules, wherein the source of redaction rules comprises at least one rule, where the redaction engine is configured to automatically exclude information in the first document from the second document based upon the at least one rule to thereby create the second document as a redacted version of the first document; and a document releaser configured to transmit the second document from the apparatus based upon a request from a different apparatus for the first document, where the document releaser is configured to determine an identity of a requester of the request, and where the redaction generator is configured to select a redaction rule set comprising the at least one rule from a plurality of different redaction rule sets for different requesters based upon the identification of the requester by the document releaser. Appeal Br. 98–99 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects claims 7–23 and 27–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. Non-Final Act. 2–11. The Examiner rejects claims 7–23 and 27–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the teachings of McFarland et al. (US 2006/0184522 A1, published Aug. 17, 2006) (“McFarland”) and Rackman (US 5,903,646, issued May 11, 1999). Non-Final Act. 11–23. OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence. Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 4 Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). I. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Appellant appeals the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7–23 and 27–29 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. Appeal Br. 6–79. We select independent claim 7 as illustrative of all claims rejected under § 101 in this appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has held that § 101 includes implicit exceptions—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—which are not patent-eligible. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In January 2019, the Office issued the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), which addresses the manner in which § 101 case law is to be applied by the Office. In October 2019, the Office issued an update to explain further the manner in which the Guidance should be implemented. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites /default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“Guidance Update”). The Board is required to adhere to these guidance documents as a matter of Office policy. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The Guidance sets forth a four-part analysis for determining whether a claim is eligible subject matter under § 101; the four parts are labeled here as Step 1, Step 2A Prong 1, Step 2A Prong 2, and Step 2B. Id. at 53–56. Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 5 Guidance Step 1 First, under “Step 1,” we consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely “[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant’s independent claim 7 recites an apparatus (i.e., a “machine”), and as such is directed to a statutory class of invention within § 101 and we proceed to the next step. Guidance Step 2A Prong 1 (Judicial Exceptions) Second, under “Step 2A Prong 1,” we evaluate “whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17. The Examiner determines that: Exemplary independent claim 7 is directed to the abstract idea of a redaction engine coupled to a source of redaction rules. This is considered to be abstract because it is a concept related to “data gathering” which the courts have found to be examples of abstract ideas because the claims fall under the category of “certain methods of organizing human activity” which are patent ineligible. Final Act. 2. Appellant argues that “‘a redaction engine coupled to a source of redaction rules’ is not ‘merely data gathering’.” Appeal Br. 11, 23. We agree with Appellant. The Examiner has not demonstrated that the claimed redaction engine is limited only to data gathering. Moreover, the Examiner does not provide support under the Guidance or case law for the assertion that a claim “fall[s] under the category of ‘certain methods of Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 6 organizing human activity’” because the claim recites “a concept related to ‘data gathering.’” Final Act. 2. The Examiner further determines that claim 7 includes elements that: comprise commercial interactions including marketing, sales activities, or behaviors, and business relations; managing personal behavior or interactions between people including social activities and following rules or instructions. And are thus, directed towards the abstract grouping of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity in prong one of step 2A of the Alice/Mayo test (see 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, at 52). Ans. 28. Appellant argues that “‘a redaction engine coupled to a source of redaction rules’ is not fundamental economic principles . . . commercial or legal interactions . . . marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations” and therefore “is not ‘Certain methods of organizing human activity’ in accordance with 2019 PEG and October 2019 Update.” Appeal Br. 10 (citing Guidance and Guidance Update). We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not demonstrated that claim 7 recites “commercial or legal interactions (including . . . marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); [or] managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We, therefore, find error in the Examiner’s determination that claim 7 recites a certain method of organizing human activity. Nor does the Examiner address any other category of abstract idea under the Guidance. For that reason, we have also not independently considered any of the other categories of abstract ideas under the Guidance. Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 7 Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7– 23 and 27–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. II. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Independent claim 7 recites, in part: a document releaser configured to transmit the second document from the apparatus based upon a request from a different apparatus for the first document, where the document releaser is configured to determine an identity of a requester of the request, and where the redaction generator is configured to select a redaction rule set comprising the at least one rule from a plurality of different redaction rule sets for different requesters based upon the identification of the requester by the document releaser. Appeal Br. 98–99. The Examiner notes that McFarland does not teach or suggest the limitations at issue. Non-Final Act. 12. But, the Examiner finds Rackman teaches or suggests these limitations. Id. at 12–14 (citing Rackman 7:5–52, 8:46–67, 7:40–67, and 12:1–67). The Examiner determines that sufficient motivation existed to combine the teachings of the references. Id. at 13–14. Rackman relates to providing access control of litigation documents by “creating [a] master optical disk and master database for use by the producing party.” Rackman 8:16–17. In Rackman, the master optical disk provided by the producing party to the opposing party includes non- encrypted redacted versions of documents and encrypted versions of the same documents in non-redacted form. Id. at Fig. 5. Each encrypted Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 8 document includes a unique key and separate keys may be provided to individually decrypt each of the encrypted documents. Id. at 2:59–3:2. Appellant separately argues each of the limitations. Appeal Br. 79– 84. Appellant argues Rackman does not teach or suggest a document releaser configured to transmit the second document because “Rackman only discloses recording redacted information on an optical disk drive 22; not any type of document releaser configured to transmit the second document from the apparatus based upon a request from a different apparatus for the first document.” Id. at 81. Appellant continues: Rackman does not disclose a document releaser configured to determine an identity of a requester of the request; merely a key is required regardless of the identity of the person who has the key. Also, contrary to what the examiner has stated, Rackman does not disclose a redaction generator configured to select a redaction rule set from a plurality of different redaction rule sets for different requesters based upon the identification of the requester by the document releaser. Id. at 83. Appellant’s arguments are persuasive. The Examiner cites generally to three columns of text from Rackman, without further explanation or more specific findings. Non-Final Act. 12–13. For this reason, the Examiner has not shown, nor are we are able to confirm, that the cited columns of Rackman teach or suggest the limitations at issue. Also, the Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments with a boilerplate paragraph citing various case law for the proposition that “obviousness is determined on the basis of the evidence,” rather than providing a specific rebuttal to Appellant’s arguments. Ans. 32. Given the record before us, it is unclear how Rackman teaches or suggests each of the disputed limitations. Appeal 2020-004407 Application 14/011,826 9 Accordingly, we find persuasive Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has not demonstrated sufficiently that the combination of McFarland and Rackman teaches or suggests the disputed limitations, as recited in independent claim 7. Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments. Consequently, based on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 7. We also do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 13, 15, and 22, which recite commensurate limitations, and of dependent claims 8–12, 14, 16–21, 23, and 27–29, for similar reasons. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 7–23, 27–29 101 Patent eligibility 7–23, 27– 29 7–23, 27–29 103(a) McFarland, Rackman 7–23, 27– 29 Overall Outcome 7–23, 27– 29 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation