Tennsco Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 18, 1973

206 N.L.R.B. 48 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Tennsco Corp. andLocal 234 of the Stove, Furnace and
Allied Appliance Workers' International Union of
NorthAmerica,' AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-4455
, September 18, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On May 11, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
,Thomas A. Ricci issued 'the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings," and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Tennsco Corp., Dickson,
Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommend-
ed Order.
i The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made
by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibili-
ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined
the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
We note that the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently referred to
"Article XXVII" rather than "Article XXV" of the collective-bargaining
agreement in his discussion of the Respondent's alleged refusal to permit
Sullivan to visit the plant. The Administrative Law Judge's Decision is here-
by corrected.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held on March 21,and 22, 1973, at
Nashville, Tennessee, on complaint of the General Counsel
against Tennsco Corp., herein called the Respondent or the
Company. The complaint issued on January 16, 1973, on a
charge filed on August 15, 1972, by Local 234 of the Stove,
Furnace and Allied Appliance Workers' International
Union of North America , AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union. The principal issue of the case is whether the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it refused
to furnish the Union, on request , the work production stan-
dards and rates which directly affected the employees' con-
dition of employment. Briefs were filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a corporation, has an office and plant
in Dickson, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the manufac-
ture of multipurpose metal storage equipment. During the
past 12 months, a representative period, the Respondent
purchased and received at this location directly from points
located outside the State of Tennessee goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000, and during the same period it
manufactured, sold, and shipped to points located outside
the State of Tennessee finished products valued in excess of
$50,000. I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise
jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Local 234 of the Stove, Furnace and Allied
Appliance Workers' International Union of North Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section'2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This is a very simple case, in which the Company's refusal
to furnish to the Union its timestudy production standards
is conceded, the direct relationship between these standards
and the employees' conditions of employment unquestiona-
ble, and applicable law established and unambiguous. The
refusal to show all the standards to the representative of the
employees' collective-bargaining agent was a continuing re-
fusal to bargain with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the statute.' See The Timkin Roller Bearing Com-
pany, 138 NLRB 15. The complaint also contains four spe-
cific allegations of coercive conduct-each said to
i There is no issue concerning the Union's majority representative status
throughout the period of the pertinent events-spring and summer of 1972-
or as to the appropriate bargaining unit. Accordingly, I find, as alleged in the
complaint and admitted in the answer, that throughout the year 1972 the
Union was the exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in the appro-
priate bargaining unit within the meaning of the statute . I also find that all
production and maintenance employees, shipping and receiving employees,
at the Respondent's Dickson, Tennessee, plant, excluding all other employ-
ees, office clerical employees, technical and professional employees , guards,
the Act, constitute an appropriate bargainingand supervisors as defined in
unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
206 NLRB No. 14
TENNSCO CORP:
constitute separate violations of Section -8(a)(1): (1 ) a threat
by the company president to "get rid of the union"; (2)
written reprimands given a grievance committee member in
retaliation for union activity; (3) inducement of employees
to abandon the Union ; and (4) refusal to permit a union
agent to visit the plant . These last subordinate allegations
are not supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Data Re Production Standards
The Union was first recognized as bargaining agent in
this plant of about 50 employees in 1967, when the parties
signed a first 3-year contract; payment from 1967 to 1970
was based on a work production incentive system, each
operation being timestudied and bearing a numerical stan-
dard. Faster workers could earn a 17-percent premium in
pay if they made 117 percent of the base-rate standard. The
average production of the entire employee complement was
about 125 percent, measured against the established 400
standards in effect. The Company was happy.
' In 1970, the Union persuaded the Company to change the
system and to pay all employees at an hourly rate for the
next 3 years; a 1970-to-1973 contract, in effect throughout
1972, so provided. To convince management that the em-
ployees would work as diligently and productively as in the
past, albeit hourly paid, the Union agreed the Company
could use a reprimand system. The new contract therefore
empowered the Company to give reprimand notices to em-
ployees who did not do enough work, successive notices
building up to 2- or 3-day penalty layoffs and eventual
discharge of any employee who did not do enough work. As
to exactly how enough work was to be measured, the con-
tract was by no means clear; indeed disagreement on this
score led to a grievance and arbitration in 1972. At any rate,
a fair statement, based upon the totality of the recordmade
in this proceeding, is that the question whether any employ-
ee produced "enough" had to be answered by some refer-
ence to the production standards.
With establishment of the new pay system in 1970, the
amount of work performed by the group as a whole de-
clined. The Respondent's witnesses at the hearing said it
dropped 25 percent; even union employee witnesses admit-
ted some workers did less than before. Not everyone slowed
up; in fact the Company admitted most of the employees
continued to do well; it was only the "bad apples," or the
"bad guys," who slackened' their pace. And the Company
began to give reprimand notices to this one or that one.
Some employees were laid off for a few days in discipline
under rule 7-set out in the then current contract-reading:
"Willfully holding back, hindering, or limiting production."
The Company took other steps to raise "productivity," as
President Speyer explained at the hearing. It brought in
more expert timestudy engineers who reevaluated the pro-
duction standards. In consequence, about 80 of the 400
rates were changed, some upward and some downwards.
But without question the purpose of the reevaluation of the
production standards was to increase the amount of work
the employees would have to do for their hourly pay.2 And,
2 From the testimony of Mr. Speyer:
Q. Now, is it not true that if an employee does not produce the
49
understandably, the Union came to look upon the speedup
as a "sweat shop." Ray Sullivan, the Union's international
representative, testified that employees began to complain
to him that they were being required to work at too fast a
pace.
Finally, on March 29, 1972, the Union filed a grievance
on this subject. It read: "The Union request that no rates
be raised in order that the normal work pace will be consis-
tent with the former normal incentive earning of 117 per-
cent." The grievance went to arbitration and on November,
20, 1972, the arbitrator wrote that he "sustained" the griev-
ance. Like the contract, which does not make clear precisely
what adequate productivity by employees is, the arbitrator's
decision, together with other papers received in evidence
relating to the arbitration proceeding, are ambiguous and
confusing as to just what it was that the arbitrator was asked
to decide. In partial defense against the complaint here, the
Respondent contends that the grievance had nothing to do
with "raising" the production standards, with trying to get
more work out of the employees, with speeding up produc-
tion. It insists that the Union wanted to stop the Company
from making any changes in any production standards. This
is simply not true. (1) If change in production standards and
requirements have no effect upon the employees' conditions
of employment, the Union could not care less how the Com-
pany changed them, upwards or downwards. (2) The griev-
ance literally complains of the "raising" of the rates, and its
effect upon the "work pace." (3) One clear thing in the
contract was that the Company did have the right to change
the standards. And, (4) no suggestion was made by anyone
at the hearing that the Company could not establish differ-
ent standards from time to time. However ambiguously it
may have been articulated, the real dispute underlying the
grievance was that the Company was so altering the rates
that the employees were in danger of layoff and discharge.
Any doubt on this score is completely dispelled by Speyer's
own testimony. He said that when he fully comprehended
what the grievance was about he "rose in righteous indigna-
tion" and gave a speech on June 6, 1972, to all the employ-
ees assembled.
Well, I told them that the two companies had gone
broke here before us with problems, and that we had
some awfully good people who deserved to be protect-
ed, and that it was up to me as president of the compa-
ny to make sure they were protected. There were some
people here that were going to hurt us, sink us, and we
had to get rid of these. We had to stop some of these
practices. I said that a grievance had been filed in
which we were not allowed-the union was contending
that we could not change our rates. I was just appalled
by the concept of this because a lot of our cost, steel
had just gone up 6 percent, the government said under
required rate, then this is in violation of one of the company's rules?
A. It could be in violation, right.
Q. If an employee does not meet his production rate, in other words,
if he is in violation of this rule , what can happen to him?
A. What can happen He can receive a reprimand.
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Phase II, I think it is, that we couldn't raise our prices
more than two and one-half percent. Our wages had
been rising at the rate of about seven or eight percent
per year to that point. If we can't get... .
Each year they went up seven or eight percent, I think,
and that if we were not allowed to become more pro-
ductive, the next time a contract came up there was no
way in which we could raise wages because you can't
get something out of nothing. And I was just amazed
that the union would contend this. I stated that there
were some people around that were hurting us, and that
they would be gotten rid of. It might take a week or two
weeks or six months, but we would eventually find
them and eventually find a way to get them out of the
plant to help the other people. If not, we'll all be work-
ing for Japan. If we can't get our productivity up in this
country... .
In mid-June and again in August, Sullivan called Joseph
Youree, vice president and office manager, and asked for
copies of all the existing production standards, old and new;
he said he wanted them for the grievance then pending and
for "union meeting, and if other grievances may arise." The
Respondent admits it refused to give him the data.
Just as the bargaining agent has a right to know how
much its people are being paid for the work they are re-
quired to do, it also has a right to know how much work they
are required to do for the remuneration received. Where the
paycheck changes each week, depending upon the work
content of scientifically determined work standards, estab-
lished by company representatives, there can be no ques-
tions that the standards directly affect conditions of
employment and must be shown to the union on demand.
Indeed, the union in such cases has a right to come right into
the plant to conduct its own time and work studies to ascer-
tain that the standards furnished by the company are cor-
rectly set. Without this information, always comprehensive
and current, the union cannot represent the employees, can-
not intelligently bargain on their behalf. And this is why
refusal to furnish production standards is a form of refusal
to bargain, a refusal to accord to the union the representa-
tive status dictated by the statute, and in the end a violation
of Section 8(a)(5). All this is no less true when the work
standards can bring about layoffs, and discharge, regardless
of whether the action be called discipline, or anything else.
In either case-direct payment depending upon the work
standards or possible discharge depending upon work stan-
dards-the union cannot be kept in the dark concerning a
very important condition of employment.3
And there does not have to be any grievance pending
before the employer's duty to reveal the data comes into
being. Absent the exact information, the union or its repre-
3 In industrial establishments subject to the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Act, the nostalgic old days of the cowboy are gone forever.
In the words of the song:
I asked my foreman to figure my roll
He figured me out ten dollars in the hole
Singin ' Hi Hi, Yippee Yippee Yeah!
sentatives cannot know whether or not a grievance should
be filed. More important, with everything aboveboard, the
chances are likely there will be no grievance, for union
agents as well as management representatives pretty gener-
ally agree that a fair day's work for a fair day's pay is the
way things ought to be.
The Respondent advanced a number of defenses for its
refusal to produce the standards, none of them persuasive
or sufficient. (1) One is that the data had nothing to do with
the March 29 grievance; this is inaccurate because the
Union was protesting the fact work requirements were
being raised. Anyhow, this data must be produced without
regard to pending grievances. (2) At one point the office
manager said the Union already had the information. This
too is not true. Copies of newly established standards are
kept under a piece of glass on the foreman's desk. It is
probably true an employee could go there and look at one
or another of them. But it is the Union which is entitled to
have the information. Most of the old standards, still in
effect, were posted nowhere in the plant; there were employ-
ees who did not remember them as of old, and there were
new employees who had never seen them. Workmen are
subject to layoff and discharge also for not achieving the
production requirements of the old standards, more than
300 still in effect. Reports from employees to union agents
therefore of necessity would be haphazard, as Sullivan re-
peated more than once. (3) At another point in his testimo-
ny, Youree, who directly refused Sullivan's requests, said
that some of the new standards called for less productivity,
and that, if the employees who worked on these operations
knew of the fact, they would slow down in their work pace,
and that therefore he was not going to show the Union any
standards. It was here that Youree, inadvertently perhaps,
exposed the Respondent's true position. It is: if the employ-
ees could be kept in the dark about a rate favorable to them,
they could also be hoodwinked with a production standard
that required excess work for the same pay. And this is what
the Respondent felt it was justified in doing. Actually
Youree's testimony is not necessary to prove the validity of
the complaint, for President Speyer made the Company's
position clear enough in his total testimony.
Asked why he thought it was unfair of the Union to have
filed its grievance in the spring, why the union was "un-
fair"-as he told the employees in his June 6 speech, Speyer
answered: "Productivity. The fact that people want not to
work and get paid a lot of money. I think that as a country
we are going down the drain because of this. And this is an
exact example of what we are really suffering from as an
entire country . . . I think it's inherently wrong and evil .. .
to expect to get more for less, more pay for less work."
I pass no judgment upon Mr. Speyer thinking his employ-
ees should do more work for their pay, or upon Sullivan for
calling this a "sweat shop"-another way of asking for more
pay for less work. Neither the legality nor the morality of
these classic and conflicting positions are matters of con-
cern here. Speyer misconceives the charge in this case. No
one is saying he may not insist upon more work; all he is
being told is that he must open up his records and show the
chosen spokesman of his employees how he goes about
figuring their earnings, deciding whether to keep them or
fire them.
TENNSCO CORP. 51
The parties stipulated that, between November 1971 and
September 1972, 12 reprimand notices were given employ-
ees for "Loss of work for rule 7 violations," four of them
imposing layoffs of several days . In the face of Speyer's
direct testimony, that he has a right to demand more work
of his employees, that they must work "hard"-as he ex-
plained, and of his admitted threat to all that he was going
to "get rid" of the bad apples, the Respondent asserts these
reprimands did not relate to "productivity," had nothing to
do with whether or not the employees were working at the
proper pace. Underlying this theory is the mere statement
that, whenever a man does not produce according to work
standards scientifically established, the reason of necessity
is that he has walked away from his machine, that he is
talking instead of working, in short, that he has refused to
stay at work. It is a play on words. For delinquency of the
loitering or neglect of a duty type, there is another, rule 9,
reading, "Wasting time or loitering in toilets or on other
company property," and there is direct evidence on this
record that reprimand notices were given for such neglect
of duty also. The Respondent would merge both kinds of
reprimands and notices into one, in order to avoid the clear
fact that people were suspended, and may be discharged, for
not working hard enough to meet the various standards of
productivity. One man, Ladd, started talking with a fellow
workman in the aisle, about something totally unrelated to
his job . He was given two reprimand notices that day, one
under the "loitering" rule, and one for not "producing"
enough. The second notice reads:
During the last three weeks you have produced at the
required rate of efficiency only one (1) time . This is a
violation of Plant Rules and Regulations number 7.
Since this is your second violation , you are being
awarded two (2) days' loss of work.
If reprimands have nothing to do with not meeting the work
standard requirements , there was no reason to give the man
two notices instead of one.
It was an unfair labor practice for the Respondent to have
refused the Union's request for all the work standards in
effect in June and again in August 1972, and it must there-
fore be ordered hereafter to furnish such data at the Union's
request.
Complaint Allegations Not
Proved of Record
1. Ladd, a witness for the General Counsel, testified that
on June 6, when Speyer gave his speech about the necessity
for more production from all, but especially from the few
who were believed to be very slow, the president included
in his remarks the phrase "he would get rid of the union."
Ladd equivocated and several times said he "understood"
Speyer to be saying this when speaking of the "bad guys"
who were endangering the whole operation and everybody's
job. Two other witnesses for the prosecution-Chasteen and
Booker, both employees-also testified about the speech,
but recalled nothing about Speyer threatening to retaliate
illegally against the Union. Speyer clearly denied making
the statement as attributed to him by Ladd, and he was fully
corroborated by Youree and Manley, the plant manager. I
credit Speyer and find he, did not in so many words say he
would move against the Union as such.
In his brief, the General Counsel argues that, even if
Speyer did not directly say he intended to put an, end to
collective bargaining in this plant, it must be inferred from
the totality of his remarks that day that he intended to
convey such a message and that the employees so under-
stood him. Were there no other objective explanation and
justification on this record for what he did say, there might
be a certain persuasion in the theory of complaint as to this
allegation. What Speyer did say was that he would get rid
of those employees who were not producing in keeping with
the production standards, and it is a fact that this is a
running dispute he was then having with them and with
their Union. More important, the contract gave him a right
to do just that, and the employees knew this also; they were
therefore not likely to misunderstand him. Indeed, it is in-
consistent of the General Counsel to assert that at this point
Speyer was thinking, and talking, antiunion and not anti-
slow workers , for he is simultaneaouly insisting that
Speyer's right, and threat, to discharge people for failing to
meet timestudy standards was precisely the predicate for his
statutory obligation to produce these standards at the
Union's request. It is not union animus that brings into
being the duty to reveal production standards, but the rela-
tionship between those standards and conditions of employ-
ment, be it direct pay or pure employee status. This record
does not warrant the adverse inference suggested by the
prosecution, which would attribute a meaning to Speyer's
words at variance with what he in fact uttered.
2. On August 2, 1972, Tidwell, another employee, left his
place of work during hours and went to Ladd 's machine to
continue a discussion the two men had started earlier in the
day about the selling price of one of the company products
Ladd wished to buy. They talked in the aisle for what Ladd
said was 3 minutes, but what other witnesses said was as
much as 5 minutes or more . Speyer was in the plant and saw
them. That same afternoon each man was given two repri-
mand notices, one for loitering-under rule 9-and a sepa-
rate one for not doing enough work-under rule 7. Ladd
had received a first low-production reprimand as a warning
the past November, and, as provided for in the contract, this
second one carried a 2-day layoff penalty. Because Ladd
was a member of the Union's grievance committee, and
because he was one of the four men who had signed the
Union's grievance in March, the complaint alleges the two
reprimands given him were a form of coercion violative of
Section 8(a)(1), and the 2-day suspension discrimination in
employment illegal under Section 8(a)(3).
Ladd said at the hearing that he did not stop working
during the incident, but that "I might have answered him
[Tidwell], but I don't remember the exact words I used."
Employee Chasteen testified he saw the two in conversation
for about 5 minutes and that Ladd did not leave his ma-
chine. Tidwell, called by the Respondent, said instead that
while the two operators were, arguing the price of the prod-
uct Ladd did stop working. And Speyer testified he watched
them talking for about 10 minutes, with neither man work-
ing
-Whether or not Ladd had been producing at the required
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rate of efficiency , of course , this record does not show; it
could not, for that question goes to the heart of the running
dispute between the parties . The Respondent said he was
one of the low producers , one of the "bad apples," and,
while the General Counsel was hardly in a position to prove
affirmatively Ladd was not among the production delin-
quents, it remains a fact some of the men were, and Ladd
may well have been among them . He had been reprimanded
once before . There is ambivalent testimony by management
witnesses about disciplining only those slowpokes who were
seen drifting away from their machines , but this was a
tongue-in-cheek argument . And yet, if an employer looks
more critically, even when thinking of work output, upon a
man who is seen to neglect his operation , it is not an unrea-
sonable attitude to expect . That Ladd was talking with a
man who had left his machine and was neglecting his own
work is clear enough on his testimony . How long this went
on may be a question , but if Speyer , who personally directed
Ladd be given the rule 9 reprimand , formed the impression
the man was neglecting his work , he could not really be
faulted.
More important, however, in appraising this allegation of
the complaint , is the fact there is no evidence worthy of note
indicating in the least that the Respondent was in any way
ill-motivated against this particular man because of his
union activity . The General Counsel doubles the quantum
of evidence said to support an inference of illegal intent by
saying Ladd was both a grievance committee member and
a man who signed a union grievance . For all that appears,
he signed the grievance-more than 4 months earlier-be-
cause he was a member of the grievance committee . It is true
Speyer, during this general period , felt the Union was letting
him down in quarrelling with his concept of correct produc-
tion pace , and even that he would no longer recommend this
Union to other employers . It does not follow he would
therefore retaliate against individual employees ; at least it
cannot be found he did so on what amounts to no more than
suspicious circumstances . Maybe he was a little touchy at
the moment with people talking when they should be think-
ing of their work . An unfair labor practice must be proved
by a preponderance of the substantial evidence on the re-
cord as a whole . Glen Raven Silk Mills, Inc., 101 NLRB 239.
I find that burden has not been satisfied in this instance.
3. A third precise allegation of wrongdoing by the Re-
spondent is that it refused to permit Sullivan, the union
agent, to visit the plant and look things over while the peo-
ple were working . I do not think there is evidence enough
to prove commission of an unfair labor practice in this
respect either . One day Sullivan called Manley on the tele-
phone to say "we had been having a lot of problems over
there lately , and I 'd like to go through the plant. " According
to Sullivan , Manley answered, "I guess it will be all right,"
but called back later that day to say he had talked to Speyer
in Chicago (the Respondent's central office ), and that Spey-
er did not want Sullivan in the plant . Continuing in his
testimony , Sullivan added he then argued with Manley, in-
sisting it was solely the manager 's prerogative to decide this
question, and not the Company president 's. Before he was
through , Sullivan admitted Manley asked him to telephone
Speyer that day and that he refused to do that . In explana-
tion of this , he argued at the hearing he was sticking to the
letter of the contract , which spoke only of the "plant manag-
er":
ARTICLE XXVII-RIGHTS OF UNION REPRE-
SENTATIVES
The Union Representative shall have the right to come
in the plant , but, for security reasons and for safety
reasons , must first secure permission from the Plant
Manager, or any other authorized official in his ab-
sence.
According to Manley , his first response to Sullivan was
that, while he (Manley) was agreeable , he must first check
with Speyer , and that when he had done so by telephone to
Chicago he got back to the union agent and advised him to
call Speyer, adding that the president preferred to be at the
plant when Sullivan visited it. Speyer testified he comes to
this plant just about every week . Not only did Sullivan not
pursue his request with Speyer then, but he never again
asked anyone for permission to visit the plant.
I do not reach the question whether, had Sullivan that day
clearly pursued his request by asking Speyer about it, it
would have been illegal for the Respondent to have refused
his request . At the hearing, the union agent explained why
he wanted to inspect the work area ; he said he had to
investigate employee complaints about the speedup system
and check the work pace , because the employees said they
could not understand the production standards . And this
was probably true. But all he told Manley on the telephone
was that he had "problems" and wanted to "go through" the
plant.
In any event , the truth of the matter is Sullivan was not
refused permission . With his admission that Manley told
him to call Speyer on the telephone , it follows that he very
well knew the matter was still open . I do not believe the local
manager gave him a flat "no." Sullivan's real quarrel with
the Respondent was over who was authorized , under the
contract , to speak for the Company on this small matter. It
is not a good way to exercise either a statutory or contractu-
al right . And, in the end, if Sullivan reads the contract one
way and the Company another , this proceeding is not the
correct avenue for enforcing contract rights , for contract
violations are not unfair labor practices.
4. The final allegation of wrongdoing charged to the Re-
spondent is that it violated the Act when it gave timely
reminders to employees of the "escape" period provided in
their union dues -checkoff authorizations . The written no-
tices were given in hand to five employees on July 20, 1972,
two employees on August 17, and 11 others on October 11.
All read as follows:
Should you desire to drop your union membership,
you may do so by telling the company in writing be-
tween and . The application you signed
to join the union allows only this 10 day period annual-
ly to request that your membership be dropped.
I request that my name be removed from the list of
TENNSCO CORP. 53
union members and no further dues be deducted.
Both Youree and Manley, testifying in defense , said some
employees had inquired how they could withdraw from the
Union. The letters were handed to the employees with their
paychecks and it appears that none was told a single word
about them by company representatives. Youree also said
none of the employees who received them left the Union.
The Board has held comparable information given to
employees by their employer, whether oral or via posted
written notices, not to be proscribed by the Act when not
accompanied by either direct instruction or threats of any
kind. Perkins Machine Company, 141 NLRB 697. The deci-
sion precedents cited in the General Counsel's brief for a
contrary finding are inapposite. The sole unfair labor prac-
tice proved on this record to have been committed by this
Respondent is its refusal to produce timestudy standards.
This is a violation of Section 8(a)(5), and, while by logical
extension that every violation found under Section 8(a) is
also a violation of Section 8(a)(1), it does not mean every
technical disregard of the statutory duty to bargain implies
union animus. Cf. May Department Stores Company d/b/a
Famour-Barr Company v. N.L.RB., 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
IT. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The conduct of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re-
spondent described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be required
to cease and desist therefrom and to take appropriate
remedial measures. The Respondent must be ordered to
produce, on request of the Union, copies of all the produc-
tion standards in effect at any time.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All production and maintenance employees, and re-
ceiving and shipping employees, at the Respondent's Dick-
son, Tennessee, plant, excluding all other employees, office
clerical employees, technical and professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitutes a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. At all times since June 1972, the Union has been and
now is the exclusive representative of the employees in said
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing, in June and August 1972, and thereafter,
to produce at the Union's request all of its production stan-
dards, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I issue the following recommended:
ORDER4
The Respondent, Tennsco Corp., Dickson, Tennessee, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing, on request of the Union, to produce all its
production standards.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form organization, to join or
assist Local 234 of the Stove, Furnace and Allied Appliance
Workers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request of the Union produce all its production
standards.
(b) Post at its plant in Dickson, Tennessee, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
4In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
5 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found , after a
trial, that we violated the Federal law by refusing to furnish
to the Union upon its request the production standards in
effect in our plant,
WE WILL, upon request of Local 234 of the Stove,
Furnace and Allied Appliance Workers' International
Union of North America , AFL-CIO, supply to its rep-
resentatives copies of all production standards in effect
throughout the plant.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
Dated By
TENNSCO CORP.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
,This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal Building,
Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee
38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.