TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 21, 2021

2020004742 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/516,726 04/04/2017 Nicolas Seyvet 4015-9913 / P44001-US1 7185
24112 7590 10/21/2021
COATS & BENNETT, PLLC
1400 Crescent Green, Suite 300
Cary, NC 27518
EXAMINER
IBRAHIM, MOHAMED
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2444
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/21/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________

Ex parte NICOLAS SEYVET, JAWWAD AHMED, RICKARD CÖSTER,
ANDREAS JOHNSSON, TONY LARSSON, and
IGNACIO MANUEL MULAS VIELA
_______________

Appeal 2020-004742
Application 15/516,726
Technology Center 2400
_______________

Before TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, HUNG H. BUI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final rejection of claims 27–51, all the pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2

1 Appellant refers to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed December 23, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed June 9, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer mailed April 9, 2020 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed August 5,
2019 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed April 4, 2017 (“Spec.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, “[d]ue to high requirements in the
telecommunications cloud environment it is important to develop techniques
for service assurance to fulfill SLA [service level agreement] requirements,
but also to fulfill other requirements” including, for example, “monitoring []
relevant key performance indicators relating to one or more specific SLAs
for the service, analyzing resource-related data for finding abnormal trends
and anomalies, and triggering suitable cloud actions in case of SLA
violations.” Spec. 3:8–12. As such, Appellant’s claimed invention seeks to
provide “a network node [in telecommunications cloud] and a method
therein for execution of an analytics task based on a policy [for entitling
resources based on a service level agreement (SLA)].” Spec. 1:4–6, 5:3–13.
Claims 27, 39, and 51 are independent. Representative claim 27 is
reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:
27. A method for execution of an analytics task, the method
comprising:
obtaining, by a node policy agent of a first network node of a
telecommunications network, a policy for entitling resources
to an analytics application,
wherein the first network node is supported by a distributed
cloud infrastructure,
wherein the first network node executes at least one service
application executing a first service,
wherein the first network node executes at least one analytics
application, which executes at least part of a distributed
analytics service, and
wherein the policy is based on an analytics task and on a
service-level agreement (SLA) for the first service;
transmitting, by the node policy agent, the policy to a node
manager of the first network node;
receiving, by the node manager, the analytics task from a second
network node of the telecommunication network; and
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executing, by the node manager, the analytics task within the
analytics application, based on the policy.

Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.).

REJECTION AND REFERENCES
Claims 27–51 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
the combined teachings of Pasala et al. (US 2013/0132561 A1; published
May 23, 2013; “Pasala”) and Schang et al. (US 2010/0083145 A1; published
Apr. 1, 2010; “Schang”). Final Act. 4–8.

ANALYSIS
In support of the obviousness rejection, the Examiner finds the
combination of Pasala and Schang teaches or suggests all limitations of
Appellant’s claims 27, 39, and 51. Final Act. 4–8. In particular, the
Examiner finds Pasala teaches most limitations of Appellant’s claimed
“method for execution of an analytics task,” including (1) “obtaining . . . a
policy for entitling resources to an analytics application,” (2) “transmitting
. . . the policy to a node manager of [a] first network node,” and (3)
“executing, by the node manager, the analytics tasks within the analytics
application, based on the policy.” Id. at 4 (citing Pasala ¶¶ 7, 12, 29–32, 40).
Pasala teaches “systems and methods for monitoring and controlling a
service level agreement [SLA] for an application in a cloud platform [shown
in Figure 1].” Pasala ¶ 22. Service level agreement (SLA) is an agreement
between a service provider (i.e., a first network node) and a customer (i.e., a
second network node) that governs the terms and usages of services offered
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by the cloud platform provider. Pasala ¶ 3. Pasala’s Figure 1, depicting an
application service provider (ASP) hosting enterprise applications on a cloud
platform 104 to support a plurality of enterprises 106, 108 and user 102
associated with SLAs, as reproduced below:

Pasala’s Figure 1 shows an application service provider (ASP) hosting
enterprise applications including applications associated with SLAs from
enterprises 106, 108 on a cloud platform 104 (i.e., “first network node” in a
network, shown in Figure 2). The cloud platform 104 monitors metrics and
terms of the SLA, sets up operation rules (policies), and execute one or more
actions (i.e., analytics tasks) based on those rules (policies) on behalf of
enterprises 106, 108, or user 102 (i.e., “second network node” in the same
network). Pasala ¶¶ 12, 29–32, Figures 2–4.
To the extent necessary, the Examiner relies upon Schang for
expressly teaching that (1) “the policy is based on an analytics task and on a
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service-level agreement (SLA) for the first service” and (2) the analytics task
is received from a second network node in order to support the conclusion of
obviousness, i.e., “to efficiently gather analytics data needed to process and
fulfill the SLA.” Id. at 4–5 (citing Schang ¶¶ 40–41).
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s rationale to combine the
teachings of Pasala and Schang. Instead, Appellant dispute the Examiner’s
factual findings regarding several terms defined. For example, Appellant
argues neither Pasala nor Schang, alone or in combination, teaches or
suggests the claimed “service application” or the claimed “analytics
application” recited in claims 27, 39, and 51. Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 2.
According Appellant, Pasala only teaches a “hosted application” shared
between machines. Appeal Br. 6 (citing Pasala ¶¶ 7, 12).
Appellant also argues neither Pasala nor Schang, alone or in
combination, teaches or suggests the claimed “distributed analytics service”
recited in claims 27, 39, and 51. Appeal Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 3. According to
Appellant, “if the analytics application is not disclosed, it cannot execute a
distributed analytics service.” Reply Br. 3.
Lastly, Appellant argues neither Pasala nor Schang, alone or in
combination, teaches or suggests the claimed “first network node of a
telecommunication network” and the claimed “second network node of the
telecommunication network” recited in claims 27, 39, and 51. Appeal Br. 7–
8; Reply Br. 3–4.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of Examiner error.3
Instead, we find the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to

3 We determine the Examiner established a prima facie case of obviousness
for claims 27, 39, and 51, including addressing all limitations and
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Appellant’s arguments, supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 3–
11. Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and explanations provided
therein. Id. For additional emphasis, we note that claim terms, during
examination, are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the rule of broadest reasonable interpretation,
claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007). In some cases, as here, the ordinary meaning of claim language as
understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay
judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
This means that the words of the claims are given their plain meaning unless
that meaning is inconsistent with the specification. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d
319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Here, the terms “service application,” “analytics application,” or
“distributed analytics service” are not expressly defined in Appellant’s
Specification. However, Appellant’s Specification describes “analytics
application” in the context of “an analytics task” designed to analyze

articulating a reason for the combination. See Final Act. 4–8. Thus, the
burden was properly shifted to Appellant to rebut the Examiner’s findings.
See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We will not reach the
merits of any issues not contested by Appellant and treat such arguments as
waived. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential).
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resources available under the terms of a service-legal agreement (SLA),
including, for example: (1) number of CPU cycles per time unit, (2) memory
constraints, (3) network capacity consumption, (4) hard drive utilization, and
(5) restrictions on data for analytics. Spec. 4:1–4, 8:31–33, 11:6–22. When
such an “analytics application” is distributed from a cloud service provider
to end users (i.e., enterprises 106, 108 or user 102, shown in Pasala’s Figure
1), the execution of such an “analytics application” at different end users is
commonly understood as a “distributed analytics service.”
As its name suggests, the term “service application” is commonly
understood by those skilled in the art as nothing more than an application
designed for any telecommunications services, including, for example, a
user’s request for resources (Spec. 1: 15–17), web services, multimedia and
gaming services (Spec. 1:34–35), and other types of services such as
industry and factory applications (Spec. 2:32–34).
As correctly recognized by the Examiner, the term “service
application” can be broadly, but reasonably interpreted to encompass
Pasala’s “cloud platform that hosts at least one application associated with
one service.” Ans. 4 (citing Pasala ¶ 12). Similarly, the term “analytics
application” can be broadly, but reasonably interpreted to encompass
Pasala’s “service provider [] [that] analyze the application’s behavior with
respect to scalability, performance and optimization based on the analysis.”
Id. (citing Pasala ¶¶ 27, 43).
Likewise, the term “distributed analytics service” can be broadly, but
reasonably interpreted to encompass Pasala’s distribution of applications
from the cloud service provider (i.e., the claimed “first telecommunication
node”) to a plurality of services and virtual machines (i.e., the claimed
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“second telecommunication node”) for analysis for scalability, performance
and optimization. Id. at 5 (citing Pasala ¶¶ 27, 31, 42, 43).
On this record, Appellant does not persuaded us of Examiner error.
“[T]he fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that conform to
their interpretation does not make the PTO’s definition unreasonable when
the PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claims 27, 39, and 51, and
their respective dependent claims 28–38 and 40–50 which fall therewith.

CONCLUSION
As such, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 27–51 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Pasala and Schang.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Bas
is
Affirmed Reversed
27–51 103 Pasala, Schang 27–51
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2019).
AFFIRMED